Go to the Moussaoui trial web site,
http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/notablecases/moussaoui/exhibits/, see Defense Exhibits and look at the following documents:
DE # 939, in this documents Tom Wilshire, aka John, says in email back to his CIA CTC managers, Richard Blee, Cofer Back, and George Tenet, that when the next big al Qaeda terrorist attack is carried out [the CIA] must consider that Mihdhar, "should be of high interest". Right after that statement in DE #939, less than one month later the CIA and FBI HQ, Deputy Chief of the ITOS unit at the FBI, Tom Wilshire, and FBI HQ Agent Dina Corsi, are told by Mary (aka Margret Gillespie, a FBI agent at the CIA Bin Laden unit) that Mihdhar and Hazmi are inside of the US.
DE #448, this is the actual release from the NSA approved on August 27, 2001, that allows FBI Agent Dina Corsi to give the NSA Kuala Lumpur information to the FBI criminal investigators on the Cole bombing. But on August 28, 2001, she tells FBI Agent Steve Bongardt, when he accidentally gets Corsi’s EC from John Liguori, that he and his team are forbidden to have the NSA material in her EC, and therefor they must destroy her EC with this information and are forbidden (because they cannot have any contact with this NSA material) to take part in any investigation of these al Qaeda terrorists. Bongardt also knows that these terrorists are inside of the US in order to take part in a horrific al Qaeda attack when he tells Corsi”
“Why do you think they are here. Do you think they are going to ******* Disneyland”
DE #469, FBI HQ Agent Dina Corsi’s EC to start an intelligence investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi, in order to keep this investigation away from FBI criminal investigators, a team of experienced investigators that desperate wanted to find Mihdhar and Hazmi before they had time to carry out another al Qaeda attack. This EC also connects Mihdhar and Hazmi to information on the Cole bombing.
DE #681 Email from Dina Corsi to John Liguori, stating that her EC could not be passed to the FBI criminal investigators, when the NSA release to do this had already been approved 2 days earlier
DE #682, Email from FBI Agent Dina Corsi to FBI Agent Steve Bongardt (lead FBI agent in the New York FBI field office on the FBI USS Cole investigation) stating that at such time as information is developed that indicates the “existence of a substantial Federal crime the information, [on Mihdhar and Hazmi] will be passed over "the wall"”.
But Corsi knew as she admitted to the DOJ IG investigators that she had read the NSA cable before the June 11, 2001 meeting between the FBI Cole bombing investigators, the CIA and herself that stated that Mihdhar and Hazmi were al Qaeda terrorists connected to other al Qaeda terrorists that had taken part in the east Africa bombings, a crime, and were traveling to an important al Qaeda planning g meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Almost beyond belief this NSA information had been given to FBI Director Louis Freeh by the CIA in December 2000. But Freeh told FBI Agent Ali Soufan in November 2000, when asked by Soufan to make an official request to the CIA from any information the CIA had on any al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur and on Walid Bin Attash that the CIA had none of this information. Freeh had not only been given this information, but it ended up in his January 4, 2000 briefing papers, including later the full name Khalid al-Mihdhar. (see p 181 9/11 Commission report, p 238-239 DOJ IG report).
On August 22, 2001, Corsi admits to the DOJ IG investigators, see p 302 of the DIOJ IG report, that she knows the CIA, and even FBI HQ had the photo of Khallad (Walid Bin Attash ) taken at Kuala Lumpur al Qaeda planning meeting, knows that both the CIA and FBI HQ had been keeping this photo secret from the FBI Cole bombing investigators in spite of the fact that she knows this directly connects both Mihdhar and Hazmi to the planning of the Cole bombing at this meeting, yet another crime. It is clear that even though the existence of this photo was known by many people( 50-60 people) at the CIA including almost all of their highest level managers and by several managers at the FBI, that they all had been keeping this secret so Bongardt and his team would never have the information he and his team had been looking for to start an investigation and search for Mihdhar and Hazmi.
In this email, Corsi also admits that she and her boss Rod Middleton had just talked to a NSLU attorney, on August 28, 2001, to satisfy Bongardt’s request to get a legal opinion to see if he could search for Mihdhar and Hazmi, since he felt that the NSA information had nothing to do with any FISA warrant. Unfortunately while Corsi told Bongardt on August 29, 2001 the NSLU attorney had ruled that he could not take part in any investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi, page 538, footnote 81 in the 9/11 Commission report says that Sherry Sabol, the attorney Corsi contacted, tells DOJ IG investigators on November 7, 2002 that she had told Corsi that Bongardt could take part in any investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi since the NSA information had no connection to any FISA warrant, and if Corsi was still confused she could request a release a from the NSA herself, unaware she had already been approved for this very release 2 days earlier.
Unfortunately almost 3000 people paid with their lives for this criminal deception carried out by the CIA and FBI HQ.