Hmmm...
Nouns, culture, pain, past/present/future, childcare, conjectural reasoning, music, myths, nonbodily decorative art, numerals (counting), recognition of individuals by face, facial expression of disgust, rape, etc. Yes, the list is long.
I have no objection to this being a list of
common human traits that, according to current observations, are independent of the culture. The term
universal means "applicable to all cases". "Human universals" sounds more catchy, but it's certainly less accurate than how I just described this list. "Belief in supernatural/religion" is, according to this list, a human universal, so we have to be careful with the meaning Donald Brown attributes to this expression. It's even funny in the context of this forum and it definitely isn't meant to apply to every individual.
So we have a list of common human traits that are independent of the culture, and very few of them seem to be related with morality.
My question is: what is this list evidence of? What's the rational path from a list of common human traits to a scientific theory of moral rights and wrongs? Is childcare good? Is rape good? Where in the moral landscape does it belong? Under what circumstances? In what specific form?
On what basis?
Some of our ideas about right and wrong come about because we are rewarded or punished for certain behaviors. We feel good when we perform an act of altruism or when we confirm a belief. We experience distress when we perceive pain in another conscious being or when we are deliberately attempting to deceive. So it becomes relevant to understand the common neurobiological basis for these reactions and the conditions under which they occur. And also to understand when they do not. The experience of pain has a stronger relation to morality than the experience of boredom, for example.
We are generally "wired" in a certain way, and that predisposes us to behave in certain common ways. I don't dispute that.
However, I'm not sure I would've perceived pain when Franco was dying, had I been aware of it at the moment. But even if, with a broad brush, I accept that we commonly experience distress under certain circumstances, what is it evidence for? A person can feel distress and at the same time think that what produces this distress is the morally preferred choice. What's the scientific argument that tells us that it shouldn't, rationally (or whatever your argument is)?
Are you saying that your statements about the inconsistency of human values were a red-herring, then? That even though you brought it up as though it were relevant to the question of whether science can answer moral questions, it really makes no difference one way or the other?
Eh, no. If I misunderstood you, my apologies. I argued against the consistency of universal human values, because to me it's obvious that such thing doesn't exist. You and Donald Brown use a very similar expression to refer to a different thing whose existence I don't deny: common human traits independent of the culture.
A scientific theory about rights and wrongs looks at what it is that makes an action right or wrong. The domain Harris maps out with regards to morals is that of the experience of conscious creatures, as individuals or as a group. It is those things which add to or subtract from what we perceive as a good life, what it takes to flourish or languish - suffering, satisfaction, physical health, autonomy, fear, poverty, etc. Similarly, a scientific theory about health maps out a domain with regard to death, disability, disease, discomfort and dissatisfaction.
If you are looking for a plausible scenario, then, fortunately for you, Harris has conveniently bundled this evidence in the form of a book.
Although we generally share some common traits, what we perceive as a good life differs. "The experience of conscious creatures, as individuals or as a group" is extremely vague.
What these common traits show is just a common predisposition towards certain behaviors. A common predisposition towards certain behaviors implies a common biological wiring. Culture emerges from this biological wiring. Therefore, all cultures emerge from our biological wiring and are equally valid from this point of view. So the whole biological argument is pointless.
Since our common biological traits don't tell us anything about our differences, on what basis do we judge what's morally better and worse, from a scientific point of view?
Regarding Harris: he hasn't developed a scientific theory. He has just written a book, like many people do. If you want to bring his arguments here, you're welcome. Like with the Bible, the fact that it's written doesn't mean that it's true.
