Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Belz...]

The wording there is a bit weird, but yes. Neurons aren't special, it's the computation behaviour that matters.

Perhaps it's simpler to understand if we word it like this.

 

[PixyMisa]

Well, I have to disagree with you, there, then. It's the "fully" that doesn't ring right. I'm pretty sure we have a good grasp of how consciousness operates but it's a bit premature to claim that we know all there is to know about it.

Consciousness in and of itself is something that can be built with a handful of 74LS chips and a wirewrap board.

Human consciousness is complicated not because consciousness is complicated but because there's all these other things we lump in with it.

It's the difference between having a complete theoretical model of the hydrogen atom and knowing everything about every possible hydrogen compound.

 

[Piggy]

Yes, what I am saying - and I'm far from alone here - is that consciousness in and of itself is actually dead simple and fully understood. What is complex and hard to understand is all the other stuff that brains do - sensory processing and language and memory association and so on

Then please back up this claim with evidence, since you seem to be in disagreement with all the brain scientists I've ever read.

 

[Piggy]

It is of course possible to create an intelligent machine that doesn't resemble the biological structures of the brain at all, but if you're studying how human brains do what they do, then you might as well do it right.

It might indeed be possible for us to build a conscious machine without mimicking the precise structure of the human brain... if we knew what exactly consciousness is and how it's produced.

But since we don't, then we really have no way of manufacturing that behavior by any other means.

 

[Piggy]

Consciousness is quite simple really.
I remember watching an ant carrying a dead lacewing across a patio for a while.
The ant was clearly conscious as it was dealing with the breeze blowing it back a few feet each time it made progress. After numerous attempts it realised that by hooking its feet along the edge of the tile it would be less likely to be blown back.
It had already realised it was more fruitful to drag it rather than carry it over its head.
On reaching a wall it realised after continually falling off, to follow the bottom of the wall, leaving the ant trail and go round and rejoin the ant trail further on. At one point it even left the fly where it had become stuck in a crevice, returned to the ant trail and brought back another ant and together they released the fly and successfully returned to the ant trail. To be helped by more ants, it wasn't long before it was taken underground into the nest.
Sounds like an intelligent conscience being to me.

I doubt it was fully self conscious, or that there was a complicated computation going on in its head.

What makes you think that consciousness was necessary for that behavior?

Keep in mind that we've discovered that consciousness is not even necessary to recognize the emotions in a human face, and what you are describing is much, much simpler than that.

 

[Piggy]

That's an excellent example, until a few hundred years ago we didn't know that light travelled faster than sound because we couldn't measure it.

However we can certainly measure all the relevant things about a neuron, what it's made of and how it works, etc. And as Pixy has pointed out, the quantum stuff we can't measure isn't robust enough to be involved in conscioussness.

So what do you postulate the missing bit is? If consciousness isn't just an emergent property of a bunch of neurons squished into a skull, what is the missing thing that provides the explanation?
And if there isn't a missing bit, what wouldn't we understand if we knew what the neural correlate of every conscious state was?

Well, first of all, we don't understand everything we need to understand about how neurons work, and we certainly don't understand as much as we need to about how they work in groups.

But in any case, the "missing bit" is what Rumsfeld would have called an "unknown unknown" ... we don't know what we don't know, we don't know what it is that's missing.

Let's go back to the example....

Suppose we discovered that experiencing the smell of cinnamon was always correlated with a particular neural state in the brain. Whenever we're conscious of smelling cinnamon, the neural state is present, when we're exposed to cinnamon but not conscious of the smell the neural state is not present, and when we artifically create that neural state in the brain we have the experience of smelling cinnamon even though there's nothing around us that smells like it.

At the moment, we have no way of even imagining a good answer to the question "Why does that neural state correspond with the experience of smelling cinnamon, and not with some other experience (say, seeing a red sphere, or feeling pain in our toes) or with no experience at all?"

It's not just that we don't have an answer. We don't even have a conceptual framework into which an answer might fit.

 

[Piggy]

The wording there is a bit weird, but yes. Neurons aren't special, it's the computation that matters.

Tease that out for me, please.

When you say "computation" here, what exactly do you mean by it?

 

[Piggy]

Consciousness is a process, not a substance; the idea that it's a substance doesn't even make any sense given our understanding of both neuroscience and physics.

No one is arguing that it's a substance. Not here, or anywhere else that I've seen.

Consciousness is, however, a behavior of the brain, an organ that's built to perform that behavior.

We don't yet know how to construct a machine that can also perform that behavior, but the notion that programming alone can accomplish it is nonsensical, for the reasons that have been laid out repeatedly on this thread.

 

[Piggy]

Consciousness in and of itself is something that can be built with a handful of 74LS chips and a wirewrap board.

This notion is not in line with the understanding of scientists who study the only thing we know of which produces consciousness.

Perhaps this arises from your mistaken and utterly unfounded notion that "self-referential information processing" = consciousness?

 

[Piggy]

The "computational model" is merely the idea that consciousness comes from the behavior of our neurons, and the behavior alone.

Btw, rocketdodger, I have to ask.... If the computational model indeed is nothing but the notion that the behavior of neurons is responsible for conscious experience, then why not call it the neural model?

I mean, under those circumstances, why call it "computational"?

And what does the notion of computation add to our understanding over and above biology, neurology, physics?

 

[Piggy]

So what do you postulate the missing bit is?

Btw, I just saw an example that might make more sense than the one I used earlier.

How do geckos crawl up glass? They don't have suction cups on their feet, or anything sticky. So how do they do it?

Turns out, they have extremely fine hairs on their feet which increase the contact surface tremendously, compared to our own hands and feet, for example.

If we build robots which have a similar percentage of contact area, they can also climb up slick surfaces.

Problem solved?

Well, actually, no. As you're no doubt thinking right now, that's not an explanation.

We've merely noted that both geckos and robots that have a large percentage of surface area in direct contact with another surface can scale smooth vertical planes.

We have a correlation. But we haven't explained why the correlation exists.

To understand why, we have to be able to see at a much greater level of magnification.

Atomic theory provides the answer. It's the cumulative Van der Waals forces that keep the gecko, and the robot, stuck to the glass. And it's the mechanical action of the feet that allow them to stick and unstick at will.

Without the framework of atomic theory, we cannot explain the correlation, even when we know it exists.

Similarly, given our current state of knowledge, we would not be able to explain NCCs even if we were to somehow figure them out tomorrow.

To do that, we need something similar to atomic theory, or wave theory -- some deeper understanding which would allow us to make the connection and move from correlation to causation.

As it is, we have 2 sets of observations: what our neurons are doing, and what we're consciously experiencing.

But we have no basis for understanding why a correlation exists between these sets of observations.

 

[Malerin]

Btw, I just saw an example that might make more sense than the one I used earlier.

How do geckos crawl up glass? They don't have suction cups on their feet, or anything sticky. So how do they do it?

Turns out, they have extremely fine hairs on their feet which increase the contact surface tremendously, compared to our own hands and feet, for example.

If we build robots which have a similar percentage of contact area, they can also climb up slick surfaces.

Problem solved?

Well, actually, no. As you're no doubt thinking right now, that's not an explanation.

We've merely noted that both geckos and robots that have a large percentage of surface area in direct contact with another surface can scale smooth vertical planes.

We have a correlation. But we haven't explained why the correlation exists.

To understand why, we have to be able to see at a much greater level of magnification.

Atomic theory provides the answer. It's the cumulative Van der Waals forces that keep the gecko, and the robot, stuck to the glass. And it's the mechanical action of the feet that allow them to stick and unstick at will.

Without the framework of atomic theory, we cannot explain the correlation, even when we know it exists.

Similarly, given our current state of knowledge, we would not be able to explain NCCs even if we were to somehow figure them out tomorrow.

To do that, we need something similar to atomic theory, or wave theory -- some deeper understanding which would allow us to make the connection and move from correlation to causation.

As it is, we have 2 sets of observations: what our neurons are doing, and what we're consciously experiencing.

But we have no basis for understanding why a correlation exists between these sets of observations.

Nicely put.

 

[Malerin]

OK, Pixy, since you're unable to support your claim that SRIP is not a necessary and sufficient condition for consciousness, we have to conclude you're wrong and your claim "SRIP IS consciousness" is equivalent to "SRIP is a necessary and sufficient condition for consciousness".

So let's see what that entails:

The first objection is the easiest: there are unconscious processes at work in our brains all the time (e.g., regulation of digestion). These processes involve information processing and are self-referential. Therefore, these processes are SRIP.

It follows from the claim that SRIP is a necessary and sufficient condition for consciousness, that these processes are conscious processes. However, we are not conscious of them. There's a contradcition. Therefore, SRIP is not a necessary and sufficient for consciousness.

Over to you.

Seems you haven't left this thread for dead like you claimed, Pixy.

Reposting.

 

[PixyMisa]

As it is, we have 2 sets of observations: what our neurons are doing, and what we're consciously experiencing.

But we have no basis for understanding why a correlation exists between these sets of observations.

That's ridiculous. The reason why a correlation exists is that conscious experiences are neural activity.

Oh and by the way, there isn't one "atomic theory" for gecko feet and another for neural correlates of consciousness. It's the same theory everywhere, and we know what it is.

 

[PixyMisa]

OK, Pixy, since you're unable to support your claim that SRIP is not a necessary and sufficient condition for consciousness

I never said that, of course.

I said that this was not my position, and not a meaningful position, and proved that your statement was not equivalent to mine.

You were wrong from the beginning, and you ignored the fact that the very page you quoted said that you were wrong.

You're still wrong. I suggest you get used to it.

 

[PixyMisa]

Seems you haven't left this thread for dead like you claimed, Pixy.

The thread is still dead, as witness the fact that you still haven't managed to understand what that Wikipedia page says.

 

[laca]

No one is arguing that it's a substance. Not here, or anywhere else that I've seen.

Consciousness is, however, a behavior of the brain, an organ that's built to perform that behavior.

Interesting choice of words. I would have went with "capable of" myself...

We don't yet know how to construct a machine that can also perform that behavior, but the notion that programming alone can accomplish it is nonsensical, for the reasons that have been laid out repeatedly on this thread.

Why is it nonsensical? Here's my line of thought:

1. We can program all neuronal functions.
2. The brain is made up of neurons.
3. From 1. and 2. it follows that all brain functions can be performed by programming.
4. Consciousness is entirely the "byproduct" of the brain.
5. From 3. and 4. it follows that consciousness can be performed by programming.

Where is the error?

 

[PixyMisa]

Interesting choice of words. I would have went with "capable of" myself...



Why is it nonsensical? Here's my line of thought:

1. We can program all neuronal functions.
2. The brain is made up of neurons.
3. From 1. and 2. it follows that all brain functions can be performed by programming.
4. Consciousness is entirely the "byproduct" of the brain.
5. From 3. and 4. it follows that consciousness can be performed by programming.

Where is the error?

That is indeed the question.

Answer came there none. Lots of responses, but no answers.

 

[Guybrush Threepwood]

Btw, I just saw an example that might make more sense than the one I used earlier.

How do geckos crawl up glass? They don't have suction cups on their feet, or anything sticky. So how do they do it?

Turns out, they have extremely fine hairs on their feet which increase the contact surface tremendously, compared to our own hands and feet, for example.

If we build robots which have a similar percentage of contact area, they can also climb up slick surfaces.

Problem solved?

Well, actually, no. As you're no doubt thinking right now, that's not an explanation.

We've merely noted that both geckos and robots that have a large percentage of surface area in direct contact with another surface can scale smooth vertical planes.

We have a correlation. But we haven't explained why the correlation exists.

To understand why, we have to be able to see at a much greater level of magnification.

Atomic theory provides the answer. It's the cumulative Van der Waals forces that keep the gecko, and the robot, stuck to the glass. And it's the mechanical action of the feet that allow them to stick and unstick at will.

Without the framework of atomic theory, we cannot explain the correlation, even when we know it exists.

Similarly, given our current state of knowledge, we would not be able to explain NCCs even if we were to somehow figure them out tomorrow.

To do that, we need something similar to atomic theory, or wave theory -- some deeper understanding which would allow us to make the connection and move from correlation to causation.

As it is, we have 2 sets of observations: what our neurons are doing, and what we're consciously experiencing.

But we have no basis for understanding why a correlation exists between these sets of observations.

`

You're right that's a better example, and it summarises my difficulty with your position nicely.

You seem to think that the Van der Waal's forces is an explanation for Geckos feet, it's not, it's just another correlation, you can keep asking why as long as you want.

Why do opposite charges attract? We don't know (If anybody claims we do I can ask why to their explanation)


This seems to me to be what you are doing with consciousness, whatever level of explanation we have isn't enough, you want one more, whereas with Geckos you seem happy with electrostatic forces. I can't really see a difference between the actions of neurons causing consciousness and opposite charges attracting.

 

[Malerin]

I never said that, of course.

I said that this was not my position, and not a meaningful position, and proved that your statement was not equivalent to mine.

You were wrong from the beginning, and you ignored the fact that the very page you quoted said that you were wrong.

You're still wrong. I suggest you get used to it.

OK, you'd rather be dishonest. Good luck with that.