Has consciousness been fully explained?

[PixyMisa]

This seems to me to be what you are doing with consciousness, whatever level of explanation we have isn't enough, you want one more, whereas with Geckos you seem happy with electrostatic forces. I can't really see a difference between the actions of neurons causing consciousness and opposite charges attracting.

Indeed, it's a form of special pleading - applying a double standard to the rules of evidence.

 

[Philosaur]

`

You're right that's a better example, and it summarises my difficulty with your position nicely.

You seem to think that the Van der Waal's forces is an explanation for Geckos feet, it's not, it's just another correlation, you can keep asking why as long as you want.

Why do opposite charges attract? We don't know (If anybody claims we do I can ask why to their explanation)


This seems to me to be what you are doing with consciousness, whatever level of explanation we have isn't enough, you want one more, whereas with Geckos you seem happy with electrostatic forces. I can't really see a difference between the actions of neurons causing consciousness and opposite charges attracting.

This is exactly the sort of response I was ready to make, but you've done an admirable job with yours. The physicist Richard Feynman had something similar to say on the subject of explanation.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wMFPe-DwULM

That's where Piggy and I differ anyway: I say there *just is* that correlation of mental states to neural states. I'm fine with this. Piggy's not. In my opinion, there's not much point in getting hung up building an explanatory bridge between well-understood neural activity on one side and inaccessible subjective mental states on the other.

 

[rocketdodger]

Btw, rocketdodger, I have to ask.... If the computational model indeed is nothing but the notion that the behavior of neurons is responsible for conscious experience, then why not call it the neural model?

I mean, under those circumstances, why call it "computational"?

Because the relevant behavior -- or at least what most people think is the relevant behavior -- of/in the neurons reduces to computation, one way or another.

I agree that "neural" model is a better term for human consciousness, but that would just be a subset of the overall "computational" model for general consciousness. That is to say, we think all consciousness comes from computation, and we specifically think human consciousness comes from computation taking place in and/or supporting a suitable neural network.

And what does the notion of computation add to our understanding over and above biology, neurology, physics?

Simple: It is often easier to make sense of things when you look at aggregate behavior.

I could ask you in turn "what does the notion of biology add to our understanding over and above physics?"

 

[rocketdodger]

The computational model is not the same as the physicalist model. The essence of the computational model is that there is no physical behaviour associated with the neurons that is required for consciousness to exist, and that any physical process which follows the same computational model with produce consciousness in exactly the same way.

So it doesn't matter whether the "program" of the brain is carried out by neurons, transistors, cards or rocks laid out on a beach, the result will be exactly the same in terms of producing consciousness.

It's implicit in the computational view that consciousness is not something physical, like electromagnetism - because clearly it's not possible to substitute, say, neutrons for electrons and get the same physical effect. It's something else - like addition, for example.

It's quite important to distinguish between the physicalist and computational viewpoints. It's often claimed that proponents of physicalism - the idea that something physical that happens in the neurons creates consciousness - are denying that artificial consciousness is possible. In fact, the possibility of artificial consciousness is implicit in physicalism.

This is the essence of the disagreement which has been going on for some time now.

Yeah, except for the obvious fact that all computation is a physical behavior.

Well, obvious unless one is a dualist -- like yourself.

The essence of the disagreement, westprog, is that people like you and Malerin think -- for some bizarre reason -- that "computation" somehow exists outside of physical reality. It doesn't, as far as anyone can tell. If you can find it, please show it to me.

 

[rocketdodger]

The notion that consciousness comes from the behavior of neurons is the physicalist or biological model. If that's the same as a computational model, then fine.

However, as it's been elaborated on this forum, with all the baggage... that is something that I do not find in the literature on the brain.

To be specific, the computational model is a subset of what you are calling the physicalist or biological model. The computational model is concerned with only a few of the behaviors of neurons, in particular the signal integration / propagation behaviors.

 

[rocketdodger]

Tease that out for me, please.

When you say "computation" here, what exactly do you mean by it?

Their ability to switch, in layperson's terms. Same goes for transistors (although neurons exhibit vastly more complex switching behavior than a single transistor ).

 

[westprog]

Then please back up this claim with evidence, since you seem to be in disagreement with all the brain scientists I've ever read.

It's not that Pixy is totally unwilling to provide evidence - it's that usually it either has nothing to do with his claims, or it actually contradicts them, as with Church-Turing.

 

[westprog]

what exactly do you mean?

Good luck with that one.

 

[westprog]

This notion is not in line with the understanding of scientists who study the only thing we know of which produces consciousness.

Perhaps this arises from your mistaken and utterly unfounded notion that "self-referential information processing" = consciousness?

It's an explanation by redefinition. It's a simple closed circle. If we want to redefine consciousness as "a stack of pancakes" then we can change the ingredients to flour, milk and butter.

 

[westprog]

1. We can program all neuronal functions.

Where is the error?

Clearly we can't program all neuronal functions.

 

[dlorde]

What makes you think that consciousness was necessary for that behavior?

Keep in mind that we've discovered that consciousness is not even necessary to recognize the emotions in a human face, and what you are describing is much, much simpler than that.

Yes. There is a very strong tendency to anthropomorphise animal behaviour, which takes considerable effort and experience to avoid.

 

[laca]

Clearly we can't program all neuronal functions.

Maybe I was not clear enough. What is it about a single neuron's behavior that cannot be programmed?

 

[rocketdodger]

Maybe I was not clear enough. What is it about a single neuron's behavior that cannot be programmed?

Isn't it obvious?

The "magical ingredient that only God can provide, because my soul was created by God and I must oppose any notion to the contrary" behavior.

 

[dlorde]

Clearly we can't program all neuronal functions.

The idea is that we can program the neuronal functions that allow us emulate the significant behaviour of a neural network.

 

[Belz...]

Indeed, it's a form of special pleading - applying a double standard to the rules of evidence.

Agreed.

 

[Piggy]

That's ridiculous. The reason why a correlation exists is that conscious experiences are neural activity.

Oh and by the way, there isn't one "atomic theory" for gecko feet and another for neural correlates of consciousness. It's the same theory everywhere, and we know what it is.

When I say we need "an atomic theory" here, I don't mean we need atomic theory. I mean that we need something equivalent to the way that atomic theory links the physical structure of gecko feet to their ability to scale walls.

As for your first statement, I'm afraid it's extremely sloppy thinking.

Yes, neural activity generates conscious experience. But if you're really interested in understanding the phenomenon, you're not going to be satisfied with this explanation.

There is all kinds of neural activity that is not involved in consciousness, so it's more accurate to say that neural activity sometimes produces conscious experience and sometimes does not.

This leads to the question: Under what circumstances does neural activity generate conscious experience.

And at a greater degree of granularity, why does a given neural state correlate with a particular conscious experience and not some other conscious experience or no conscious experience.

 

[Piggy]

Why is it nonsensical? Here's my line of thought:

1. We can program all neuronal functions.
2. The brain is made up of neurons.
3. From 1. and 2. it follows that all brain functions can be performed by programming.
4. Consciousness is entirely the "byproduct" of the brain.
5. From 3. and 4. it follows that consciousness can be performed by programming.

Where is the error?

The first error is at step 1. We cannot program all neuronal functions.

 

[Piggy]

`

You're right that's a better example, and it summarises my difficulty with your position nicely.

You seem to think that the Van der Waal's forces is an explanation for Geckos feet, it's not, it's just another correlation, you can keep asking why as long as you want.

Why do opposite charges attract? We don't know (If anybody claims we do I can ask why to their explanation)


This seems to me to be what you are doing with consciousness, whatever level of explanation we have isn't enough, you want one more, whereas with Geckos you seem happy with electrostatic forces. I can't really see a difference between the actions of neurons causing consciousness and opposite charges attracting.

Actually, when you drill down like that, you're asking a different question.

Atomic theory does provide an answer for the correlation between surface area contact and scaling smooth vertical surfaces.

If you have a question about the Van der Waals effect, that's a different question about different things.

And in any case, this does not change the fact that currently we have no such framework that would allow us to understand NCCs, even if we were able to describe all of them right now.

 

[Piggy]

That's where Piggy and I differ anyway: I say there *just is* that correlation of mental states to neural states. I'm fine with this. Piggy's not.

It's not just that I am not. Science is not. Nor should it be.

Stopping at correlation is stopping short. We know there is a deeper understanding to be had. We just do not yet know what it might be.

Being uninterested in an explanation is merely opting out. It is not the same as providing an explanation. One cannot claim that we have an answer when we do not have an answer simply because one doesn't care what the answer might be.

 

[tsig]

When I say we need "an atomic theory" here, I don't mean we need atomic theory. I mean that we need something equivalent to the way that atomic theory links the physical structure of gecko feet to their ability to scale walls.

As for your first statement, I'm afraid it's extremely sloppy thinking.

Yes, neural activity generates conscious experience. But if you're really interested in understanding the phenomenon, you're not going to be satisfied with this explanation.

There is all kinds of neural activity that is not involved in consciousness, so it's more accurate to say that neural activity sometimes produces conscious experience and sometimes does not.

This leads to the question: Under what circumstances does neural activity generate conscious experience.
And at a greater degree of granularity, why does a given neural state correlate with a particular conscious experience and not some other conscious experience or no conscious experience.

About the age of two in humans.