A Laughing Baby
A baby. Goo goo ga ga
- Joined
- Nov 11, 2010
- Messages
- 2,987
Of course he does. Any rational person would because the clause grants power to make laws to carry into effect the powers enumerated before it. It must be subjugated to an enumerated power because it says it must.
Not quite, at least according to Orin Kerr.
Here is what he had to say on the Hudson ruling, which used a lot of the same reasoning but subjugated the Necessary and Proper Clause to a greater extent than Vinson's.
The point of the Necessary and Proper clause is that it grants Congress the power to use means outside the enumerated list of of Article I powers to achieve the ends listed in Article I. If you say, as a matter of “logic” or otherwise, that the Necessary and Proper Clause only permits Congress to regulate using means that are themselves covered by the Commerce Clause, then the Necessary and Proper Clause is rendered a nullity. But that’s not how the Supreme Court has interpreted the Clause, from Chief Justice Marshall onwards. Indeed, as far as I know, not even the most vociferous critics of the mandate have suggested that the Necessary and Proper Clause can be read this way.
And here's a quote from his thoughts on the Vinson ruling (I can't link the url since connecting to that url crashes my browser for some reason, it's on the same site, easy to find):
This might work as a Supreme Court opinion that can disagree with precedent. But Judge Vinson is just a District Court judge. And if you pair Justice Thomas's dissent in Raich with Judge Vinson's opinion today, you realize the problem: Judge Vinson is reasoning that existing law must be a particular way because he thinks it should be that way as a matter of first principles, not because the relevant Supreme Court doctrine actually points that way. Remember that in Raich, the fact that the majority opinion gave hte federal government the power to "regulate virtually anything" was a reason for Justice Thomas to dissent. In Judge Vinson's opinion, however, the fact that hte government's theory gave the federal government the power to "regulate virtually anything" was a reason it had to be inconsistent with precedent.