Lockerbie: London Origin Theory

[Caustic Logic]

Personally, gut-level, I'm going for the complex scenario ATM, where Bedford's story isn't even directly true. He's been compelled take the bags in word, and put them square on "Camjob." And it was actually Peter Walker who saw the, just after leaving the container unwatched for 45 minutes, and just before an "oh s***" moment.

But I don't think it's a coincidence that the idea of a case or two like that wound up popping out somewhere in the mix of baggage worker statements.

And as for what other statements the police were taking at the same time, January 1989, Ray Manly's is still not among them. He swears they talked to him, that he told them about the break-in he discovered, and that when he asked years later, they said there was no such report. Don't know why I waited so long to look at that in more detail, but I've finally got a worthy blog post up about it, if anyone's interested. (Rolfe is on a long-ish holiday, so anyone else)

"They told me no one knew..."

 

[Caustic Logic]

Alright, I'll make a provocatively bold proposal:

The reports of John Bedford and Ray Manly support each other in illustrating a Heathrow infiltration of the bomb. They don't exactly prove it, but make it the single most well-supported method. No Malta origin, or Frankfurt origin, version has the kind of relevant detail available in actual clues rather than inference.

We have two points that both stand out as a bit odd, coming in the 18 hours prior to the Lockerbie bombing.
1) The break-in, reported around 12:30 AM, leaving airside access to whoever cut that lock - the worst security Breach Manly saw in 17 years there.
2) Two suitcases, both it seems matching the primary case style, seen in the lower outboard corner of AVE4041, just inches from the explosion position, that could not possibly have come in from Malta on that German feeder. They appeared under mysterious circumstances, were unusually noticed and recalled, but surrounded by contention and confusion. And dismissed as coincidence by investigators and judges.

The obvious question is if the security breach was connected to the cases, or if they came from some other non-Libyan origin. The prosecution, at appeal in 2002, harped on the time spread to force the issues apart, and the judges concurred. Manly's report at 12:30 and Bedford's sighting around 4:40 PM were 16 hours apart. What could account for that time gap?

My spelled out theory, of a rather simple two-phase operation. Maybe it was supposed to take the better part of 24 hours.

If anyone would like to poke any holes in that, I'll just drop some starter de-bunks from the appeal judgment [PDF], point [244]. Consider what five Scottish lords used to de-bunk this connection, and then see how their arguments fare against my theory.

- Moreover, although readily discoverable evidence of the break-in had been left behind in the form of the damaged padlock, the hypothesis involved that the case was not introduced into the interline shed until some fifteen hours later.

- Unless the risk of opening the case airside to set the timer was to be undertaken, the timer would have had to be set before the break-in.

- No method of arranging for the bag to pass through the system to the interline shed had been identified.

- The intruder would have required either to wait for fifteen hours himself, or to have the assistance of an accomplice.

- No place of concealment for the intruder or the suitcase had been identified.

- There was nothing in the evidence to explain why a suitcase, brought through T3-2A between 2205 and 0030 hours, would not be placed in the interline shed in time for either of the two earlier PanAm flights. On the hypothesis under examination, the suitcase had been tagged for flight PA103, although there were two earlier flights that would have involved a shorter period of concealment of a suitcase containing an armed explosive device.

- Yet there was no evidence that there was anything about flight PA103 or its passengers that singled it out as the target.

- Moreover, if an accomplice with airport identification, genuine or false, was involved, there was no need to break in to airside. All that was required was to smuggle the components of the explosive device through an access point, such as T3-2A, where persons with appropriate identification were not searched.

- The effect of all these points, the Advocate depute submitted, was to show that the hypothesis that the break-in at T3-2A was the means of infiltrating one of the Bedford suitcases was so weak and flawed that the additional evidence could not pass the Cameron test.

 

[Buncrana]

As AVE4041's last point of 'secure' handling at Heathrow, before being taken out to meet 103A arriving from Frankfurt, and then loaded onto 103 to New York, was outside the Build-up shed which was ultimately Walkers responsibility, I find it not that unsurprising that Walker's testimony and statements are contradictory and confusing. If it was Heathrow that the bomb suitcase had been inserted, then it was specifically he who didn't properly secure the container whilst awaiting the arrival of the Frankfurt flight after Bedford had finished his shift.

I've always thought the time lapse between the airside breach of Heathrow at Terminal 3 and the destruction of 103 was indeed very odd, but was still of the opinion the two events were connected. Or three events, perhaps even four?

Such a rare occurrence was this particular failure of security at Heathrow, as stated by Manley himself (whom I believe died only a year or so after his appearance at the first appeal), together with the evidence given by Bedford, and the disasterous event occurring at 7.03pm over Lockerbie, I find difficult to simply pigeonhole as coincidence. However, as it is, this is nothing more than a gut feeling.

However, are there four coincidences?

1] The break-in at Terminal 3 indicating a highly unusual breach to airside.
2] Bedford spotting two extraneous suitcases in AVE4041 which he is adamant were not loaded into the container by him.
3] Pan Am 103, departing from Termainal 3, explodes over Lockerbie that same evening.
4] Earlier that day, Mustafa Al Mougrabi, close associate of Abu Talb, and known to have visited Abassi in Frankfurt just prior to the Autumn Leaves arrests, boards flight from Cyprus to Heathrow.


So, yes, I can quite easily envisage to two-phase mission. One where the device is introduced into the 'highly secure' airside at Heathrow, and the suitcase or some other component of the primary suitcase arrives seperately and later than the breach at Terminal 3. The breach was surely most likely to occur at a time when that area of the airport was at it's most unsecured and with less workers or personel around to foil any security the gap to exploit any access was at the dead of night?

Some just quick thoughts..

 

[Caustic Logic]

Eddie! Thanks for the comment. It's really slow here these days.

As AVE4041's last point of 'secure' handling at Heathrow, before being taken out to meet 103A arriving from Frankfurt, and then loaded onto 103 to New York, was outside the Build-up shed which was ultimately Walkers responsibility, I find it not that unsurprising that Walker's testimony and statements are contradictory and confusing. If it was Heathrow that the bomb suitcase had been inserted, then it was specifically he who didn't properly secure the container whilst awaiting the arrival of the Frankfurt flight after Bedford had finished his shift.

To be fair, if bags were already placed before he took over, it wouldn't be his fault. But I'm just not sure that's what happened. And of course you were the one who first tipped me off about Walker's inconsistency. Now it seems a major clue.

Although, of what? It's an initial difference between Walker's and Bedford's statements, when what I suspect is coordination between them.

So, was that a stupid knee-jerk denial of the whole container because he didn't want to have seen it? Or a fake controversy, to make it look like him and John weren't collaborating? It sure sticks out as unusual, at any rate.

I've always thought the time lapse between the airside breach of Heathrow at Terminal 3 and the destruction of 103 was indeed very odd, but was still of the opinion the two events were connected. Or three events, perhaps even four?

Same day. As the judges noted, that might be said to be a temporal connection, huh?

Such a rare occurrence was this particular failure of security at Heathrow, as stated by Manley himself (whom I believe died only a year or so after his appearance at the first appeal), together with the evidence given by Bedford, and the disasterous event occurring at 7.03pm over Lockerbie, I find difficult to simply pigeonhole as coincidence. However, as it is, this is nothing more than a gut feeling.

However, are there four coincidences?

1] The break-in at Terminal 3 indicating a highly unusual breach to airside.
2] Bedford spotting two extraneous suitcases in AVE4041 which he is adamant were not loaded into the container by him.
3] Pan Am 103, departing from Termainal 3, explodes over Lockerbie that same evening.
4] Earlier that day, Mustafa Al Mougrabi, close associate of Abu Talb, and known to have visited Abassi in Frankfurt just prior to the Autumn Leaves arrests, boards flight from Cyprus to Heathrow.

I thought it was Abu Talb's wife that made such a journey. Did both Mougrabis journey to London that day? Family reunion?

So, yes, I can quite easily envisage to two-phase mission. One where the device is introduced into the 'highly secure' airside at Heathrow, and the suitcase or some other component of the primary suitcase arrives seperately and later than the breach at Terminal 3.

Other than Mougrabis coming in that day, and the possibilities that opens, I don't see any reason to slip the bomb or anything of it in through a second breach. Having your whole suitcase set hidden behind the perimeter and needing nothing more would be smartest.

The breach was surely most likely to occur at a time when that area of the airport was at it's most unsecured and with less workers or personel around to foil any security the gap to exploit any access was at the dead of night?

Some just quick thoughts..

Indeed, midnight has that one characteristic that makes it an obvious choice. Not being seen in the act is all that mattered I suspect. He was surely seen, just not in his multiple small acts that led to the bombing.

 

[Buncrana]

Eddie! Thanks for the comment. It's really slow here these days.

To be fair, if bags were already placed before he took over, it wouldn't be his fault. But I'm just not sure that's what happened. And of course you were the one who first tipped me off about Walker's inconsistency. Now it seems a major clue.

Although, of what? It's an initial difference between Walker's and Bedford's statements, when what I suspect is coordination between them.

So, was that a stupid knee-jerk denial of the whole container because he didn't want to have seen it? Or a fake controversy, to make it look like him and John weren't collaborating? It sure sticks out as unusual, at any rate.

Cheers A, indeed things are always slow on all things 'Lockerbie'. Threads, investigation, trial, appeals, release of documents, estimated death, and now the slow connection at Heathrow between the break-in and the bombing. Nevertheless, instinct says these delayed connections are all relevant

I'll need to double check the transcripts and fatal accident inquiry documents, but I'd suspect that Walkers story changed in parallel as the blame shifted between Heathrow, Frankfurt in the early years, and finally by Zeist, to Luqa.

Before Luqa was ever mentioned, as we know, Heathrow and Frankfurt were slinging mud either way hoping something would stick. Heathrow knew of the break-in (although deciding to keep this significant failure 'missing' in a dusty drawer for 12 years), and Bedfords suitcases, thus pointing squarely at the Brits lax security being, from very early in the investigation, a likely candidate for the access point for the bomb. All the while trying to cast dark and mischievous allegations to the BKA and Frankfurt.

Meanwhile Frankfurt were busy 'losing' all the records, proving a problem to any proper investigation. Such incompetence is just (another) coincidence.

I thought it was Abu Talb's wife that made such a journey. Did both Mougrabis journey to London that day? Family reunion?

Other than Mougrabis coming in that day, and the possibilities that opens, I don't see any reason to slip the bomb or anything of it in through a second breach. Having your whole suitcase set hidden behind the perimeter and needing nothing more would be smartest.

Indeed, midnight has that one characteristic that makes it an obvious choice. Not being seen in the act is all that mattered I suspect. He was surely seen, just not in his multiple small acts that led to the bombing.

I was thinking of Mougrabi arriving with the suitcase to be used. On arrival at Heathrow it's sent to the baggage carousel, where its the only bag not collected by Mougrabi and co., who leave the airport. The bag is then at some point collected by baggage staff at Heathrow, either from the carousel or somewhere at the baggage hall, or wherever a bag like that would be taken to and expecting the owner to turn up later to collect it.

The insider, presumably the same accomplice, or perhaps another, who earlier received the Toshiba radio introduced via the break-in, and most likely someone working at Heathrow and aware of this pattern and holding zone for such baggage not collected by it's passenger and containing innocent items, collects it, and now this two-part mission, is ready to action.


Details on the Mougrabi's who travelled to Heathrow from Cyprus on 21 Dec 1988:

Q Could we have Production 229 on the screen, please.
Now, just dealing with the question of the Mougrabi family, we've seen that a number of the members of the Mougrabi family, both male and female, [8305] were involved in the Palestinian struggle, put generally; is that right?

A Yes, it's a duty every Palestinian should undertake.

Q I understand. Let's see the label, please, of Production 229.
Now, Mr. Talb, this probably won't mean very much to you initially. So if you bear with me, please. Production 229 bears to be a flight manifest of flight CY 1364 on the 21st of December of 1988, and crew. And we can see from the lower label that it was also described as an exhibit, flight manifest of flight CY 1364 on 21st December 1988, and crew.

If we could now move to CRT1, please.

Again, Mr. Talb, this will not mean much to you, but it's important for us. This is a certificate of authentication by one Miltiades, Michael, who works for Cyprus Airways at Larnaca, and he hands over a document and authenticates that as -- those documents, rather, as true
copies of the originals which were in the possession and control of Cyprus Airways.

And it's dated the 1st of November of 1999. And if we could look also at CRT2, please. There we can see Miltiades, Michael, the same man, certifies that these are business documents and included in the business [8306] documents is the manifest that I've referred to. And that is
also dated the 1st of November of 1999.

Now, just so that you know, Mr. Talb, that little exercise is simply to demonstrate that these are documents that speak for themselves, without the need of witnesses.

Now, can we now go to CY 1364, please. Let's go to image 2, please.
We can see in the top left-hand corner, this is CY 1354, is it, or 64. And if we scroll down, we can see that this is a flight from Cyprus to London Heathrow.

And I want to find passengers 211 to 214, which I think we'll find on image 5.
We see that 211 through to 214 were passengers called Mougrabi. Do you see that?

A Yes, I can see that.

Q And they flew from Cyprus to London Heathrow on the 21st of December of 1988. Can we also look at passenger number 208. You can see it's conveniently underlined. He is described as Mr. D. O'Connor, also flying to London Heathrow. Do you see that?

A Yes.

Q And Your Lordships know that he died on board Pan Am 103. [8307]
You can close that image.

ETA: Just to be clear, the four passengers referred above are Jamilla Mougrabi, Abu Talb's wife, and her three brothers.

 

[Caustic Logic]

Well, I have to say this is an issue I have a hard time with. I've got ambiguous feelings about the Abu Talb connection, and admittedly haven't got a full grasp on the details. I could list some pros and cons, from what I do now know:

Pro:
- Member of PPSF, Palestinian group with some (?) links to the PFLP-GC, who had those bombs
- Sweden residency, in common with "Abu Elias" of the PFLP-GC, who may have fled Germany with the very bomb that would kill 103
- A terrorist past, unlike Megrahi, and a prior conviction (though on flimsy evidence I hear, and I'm not convinced he did that bombing either)
- Travels by his wife and her brothers to London on the day of the bombing, which I feel happened in London.

Con:
- Was an official suspect at one point, when the investigation, in my mind, was always about pulling attention away from the real perps
- Was used (intended or not) to drag investigators to Malta, via his maybe-PFLP-GC pedigree and his own Maltese clothes link
- Was targeted in the media, and from this, identified by Tony Gauci, despite being almost as different from the buyer than Megrahi, and only possibly being on Malta the purchase date, and having plenty of Maltese clothes already. He wasn't the buyer anyway.
- Has a good reason for the circled calendar date, and his wife's call to a friend to "get rid of the clothes," while keeping her husband's right there for police to find.
- In general, he's had a lot of crap and insinuation spread, and that to me doesn't feel like someone actually involved. Someone hushed up and plopped quietly into a new life in Virginia sounds more like it. This guy was in prison right through 'til recently, when he was released and disappeared.

On this last pro point you've brought up again, I have to say the coincidence of such a trip to that place at that time is a bit much for coincidence. That is, it's likely a clue, but of just what Kind I don't know.

Parviz Taheri comes to mind. I think we mentioned him here, but you know, the Iranian guy who flew from Frankfurt to London on PA103A, to meet his future wife, he says. But when questioned on his return, on Christmas, was found to have on him the very address where the PFLP-GC had been based while making the altimeter bombs. Possible coincidence, but I'm not betting on it. But he could have no connection I can see with anything on the ground, ne reason to carry that address around if involved, and no checked luggage at all to carry any bomb. If he had a purpose, I suspect it was a distraction, perhaps in tandem with the "Helsinki warning," both of which drew investigators' attention to Frankfurt, while the bomb was put on in London. (Taheri even visited Helsinki, and once told police they could find out about the bombing by talking to the Iranian embassy there.)

What do you think of some kind of plan like that regarding the Mougrabis? I'm not sure how that would play out, and too tired and headachey to try and think it out now. But it's a thought.

 

[Buncrana]

What do you think of some kind of plan like that regarding the Mougrabis? I'm not sure how that would play out, and too tired and headachey to try and think it out now.

Hmmmm…I'm not really sure (obviously), but I just find that Teheri, travelling from Frankfurt to Heathrow, and 4 Mougrabi's travelling from Cyprus to London, all on the 21Dec, simply stretching coincidence too far. I know certainly the Mougrabi's were hopping around Europe a fair bit, but nonetheless, given all those named have a direct, or indirect, connection to the flat where the Palestinian group and Khreesat were building barometric bombs into Toshiba radio's is disturbing at the very least. It's also far more compelling than any suitcase and bomb travelling from bloody Malta.

Mahmoud and Mustafa Mograbi, with the help of their brother-in-law Abu Talb and a friend named Imad Chaaban, aka Marten Imandi, were using Uppsala as a base for their terrorism operations. In 1985 and 1986, they bombed the offices of Northwest Airlines in Copenhagen and Stockholm, an Amsterdam office of Israel's airline, El Al, and a synagogue in Copenhagen.

On Dec. 24, 1989, an Uppsala court found Talb, Chaaban, and Mahmoud and Mustafa Mograbi guilty of staging the Northwest and El Al bombings. Talb was sentenced to life in prison.

Apart from Talb, it seems they were all visitors to Abassi's flat where Dalkamoni's team and Khreesat was working on the Toshiba's. And just to reiterate, I don't believe that Talb is the buyer of the clothes from Marys House. However, I'm growing in certainty that he was behind the purchase, although most likely got someone else to buy them from Gauci. Perhaps they were even bought for him while he is unaware as to where they're exactly from.

Another interesting article from the irrepressible Marcello Mega.

Now we have obtained documents which outline evidence that the leading player responsible for taking 270 lives in Lockerbie on December 21, 1988, was not Megrahi but Talb. The report carries weight because of the calibre of those who amassed the evidence - Jessica de Grazia, a former senior New York prosecutor who led an investigation for the UK Attorney General's office into the Serious Fraud Office, and Philip Corbett, a former deputy head of Scotland Yard's Anti-Terrorist Branch.

[..] Talb and his colleagues decided Heathrow's security would be easier to crack. It emerged after the bombing there had been a security breach at Heathrow when a lock was forced near Pan Am's airside berths. Corbett describes the probe into the breach as 'inadequate'. Their inquiries uncovered evidence that on an earlier visit to London, Talb bribed an employee to get an unchecked case airside.

[..] on December 19 he sailed from Sweden to Britain, arriving in London on December 21, the day of the bombing. There he met other terrorists, including bomber Abu Elias and Martin Imandi, who are thought to have been in possession of the device left on Flight 103.

[..] The evidence gathered by De Grazia and Corbett would have been the cornerstone of Megrahi's appeal..

That is a quite astonishing claim really. Not from Mega, but by the De Grazia/Corbett report if true. Evidence that Talb was known to have prior to Dec21st, already managed to circumvent security at Heathrow and with, obviously still at the time, an accomplice and contact already placed inside Heathrow!

If that's true, then that would certainly shed even more light on the reasons why Heathrow would want the break-in kept quiet. Had the "bribed employee" been caught with this earlier breach to airside baggage? Or was the bag simply discovered and noted it had not been checked through the normal security? Was it a pre-run of Dec21st?

I suppose more of this was dealt with in the 800+ pages that we have yet to see from the SCCRC report…

Nonetheless, I'm still speculating and visualizing that somehow the break-in introduced an element of the bomb used on 103, with another element arriving at some point during the approx 18 that separates the two events.



[1] http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=383658&rel_no=1

[2] http://www.russfound.org/The_Spokesman/Mega106.html

 

[Caustic Logic]

Well, that certainly makes it a worthy point to be looking at.

There is one outside thought, which is the veracity of all that's being said here. I had never heard of this investigation at all, and I have many questions. I'll have to take a closer look. But is it possible there are intelligence operations still around in recent years, promoting fruitless side-theories, tying in emerging genuine clues with old dead ends, to frustrate efforts at finding the truth? Yeah, it's possible, is all I'm saying.

Otherwise, if true, it sounds damn compelling.

The one point I intend to hang onto until I see enough reason not too, is Abu Talb's onetime official suspect status. That will keep me holding back rather than diving into calling him a key suspect.

In general, I've never gotten the PPSF to PFLP-GC link that makes Mr. Abu Talb enough a part of the network to be suspect. I hear there is one, but ... anyway, here you cite, if I read right, a one-person removed connection - or cluster of them. Imamdi et al. visiting the Frankfurt cell does ring a bell, but I'm hazy at best. That would I think be beyond coincidence.

As for buying the clothes, whoever made that conspicuous purchase of brand-new clothes past closing time was not apparently trying very well to make himself anonymous. I'm having a hard time seeing any Libyan, or Abu Talb, or anyone sane, planning out such a way to fill the bomb bag. In a way, our Swede is less likely, in a sense, due to his existing possession of similar clothing - including, we hear, an exact replica of the blue babygro bought.

I know that leaves us with few options - it makes the most sense to do it that way only to frame someone else. But why Tony Gauci? (Etc. ...)

Now, on the London angle, again we have someone being informed that there is evidence of a bribe of an airport worker in London. That means insider, and ties in with the break-in, so Talb needn't even be there, though his wife did pass through, along with Mr. Taheric, etc. ...

I'd like to see the evidence they uncovered for this insider in some more detail, but I fear these are professional defense witness expert types like John Wyatt, Owen Lewis, and for that matter Juval Aviv. They don't always share their sources, and while some may do some good work, some are crackpots, at least part-time. It almost seems that defense teams don't want actually true material, which could piss off the wrong people just a little too much, but some approximation - truthy enough to raise doubts in court and maybe get the case tossed, but not solid enough to force a military shut-down of the trial and ensuing crisis...

So just from the outside, those are my unfounded rantings. I'll actually start reading the stuff next.

ETA: Caustic Logic can reveal that he's still skeptical. They found evidence that he sailed to London on Dec 19-21, and there met with Imamdi and, precisely, Abu Elias, whom I had long suspected of being in London that day (tho some sources have him handing the bomb off to Iranians, and there's the potential Iran Air link, etc...). I've heard of meetings like this alleged in Frankfurt in the days before the bombing, and those I think were untrue. In the years after Manly and the break-in evidence surfaced, they're being alleged in London. How did they get all the intelligence to know each of those people was there? In what building? On whose word or evidence? Etc ...

Sorry I'm being such an ass about this. But anyway, those are my thoughts. Maybe overly-skeptical, but someone else would have to show that.

 

[Rolfe]

I'm having similar thoughts to Adam as regards the Mega article, but coming from a slightly different angle.

Like Buncrana, I don't believe Abu Talb was the clothes purchaser. I think it would have been possible for the investigators to get Tony to identify Talb in the same way they subsequently got him to identify Megrahi, and I think they were working on that before they changed tack and changed suspects. But he's too young and doesn't match the description in other ways either.

We know Talb had clothes from the same Maltese manufacturers as supplied Mary's House, but we don't know these came from Mary's House. And if they did, it means Talb would have made more than one visit there, because all the items Tony described as being bought on the occassion he remembered were found at Lockerbie.

I can't see any sensible reason for alleging the Lockerbie bomb was taken to Malta at any time, or indeed for alleging the original plan was to load the bomb there. This makes no sense in the context of a barometric trigger. The thing would have had to be put directly on to the transatlantic leg of the US carrier. Frankfurt did have such flights I believe, but not Malta.

I also see a repetition of the theory that we've debunked to death, regarding the onset of the Gulf War being the reason for the change of suspects. We know that the Horton manual page was in the chain of evidence by May 1989 and the timer fragment by September 1989. The overt change of tack didn't occur until September 1990 and the Gulf War was only beginning to grumble then. No doubt the unfolding political situation made the change to Libya as the official suspects highly convenient and desirable, but it didn't cause it.

All these comings and goings of the Palestinian factions make fascinating reading though, and a lot of it seems beyond coincidence. I think what we have to remember is that the PFLP-GC wasn't a one-man-band. There were 14 men arrested in the Autumn Leaves raid, is that right? Different people would do different things, and there probably isn't one person who could be described as "the Lockerbie bomber". This of course makes it harder to figure out the chain of events. (The idea that Megrahi both made that spectacularly conspicuous and traceable clothes purchase in Sliema, and was present at Luqa three miles away when the bomb was invisibly smuggled on KM180, was always ridiculous.)

It's possible these low-lifes didn't even agree among themselves. I've often had a suspicion that the clothes purchase was intended as a red herring, to induce the investigators to waste time looking on Malta rather than pursuing the Heathrow angle. I also wonder if someone had an idea they might frame Abu Talb while they were at it.

Do we have a thread on the PFLP-GC, their movements and the evidence they were involved with a Heathrow introduction? It's something I know I'll have to think about some time, but I haven't really got to grips with it yet. Buncrana seems to know a lot, maybe he could set out a summary of the evidence?

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

By the way, I've noticed something else about that article. The date of the original publication is 16th August 2009, four days before Megrahi was released. Mega states twice that it is public knowledge that Megrahi has had to agree to drop his appeal as a quid pro quo of being granted compassionate release.

The report would have formed the basis of Megrahi's appeal against his conviction, a case which will never be heard after he dropped his legal challenge in return for his early release. [....]

However, on Tuesday, as part of the private understanding between the dying Megrahi and the Scottish Executive, his lawyers will drop his appeal.

That is exactly as I remember it. We were told that Megrahi would drop his appeal, and thereafter he would be granted compassionate release.

It's the threads on the release that should be in the CT forum, not the threads on the evidence at Zeist.

Rolfe.

 

[Caustic Logic]

Alright, I should add some more in a sweeter tone now. Eddie, thanks for some interesting new claims to consider. New info is always awesome .

It's possible these low-lifes didn't even agree among themselves. I've often had a suspicion that the clothes purchase was intended as a red herring, to induce the investigators to waste time looking on Malta rather than pursuing the Heathrow angle. I also wonder if someone had an idea they might frame Abu Talb while they were at it.

Now that has a ring to it. It's just not a sneaky terrorist way to fill a bomb bag. If that purchase as described is in fact not fiction, something like this could explain it. Knowing Malta points to Libya, maybe they were tossing the CIA a bone, a suggestion for dealing with the upcoming "thing they don't want to see."

We don't need a new thread for Abu Talb unless there's evidence linking him to the most plausible mode of attack - London. And that should be covered here.

IIRC, Talb was also frequently connected to the plotters in Germany, passing off a suitcase full of clothes to Jaafar, etc. So when I see him again, now "known" to have done the same right-there, right-then link in London - after the London theory's gotten some vogue, not before - I'm naturally skeptical.

But I admit I've got holes in my understanding of the various links alleged, and might be missing parts that would lend weight to even circumstantial evidence.

And Buncrana has brought up some important clues, alleged ones anyway. If in fact ... sailed Dec 19 rather than watching the kids, on that red-circled date, and it was verified with a ticket stub or something, that would obviously be of great interest.

I gather the travel that day of his wife to the same place via airplane is more well-established. Curious if both of these are true.

The London insider claim, likewise, would be of some interest even if none of the other two were true. So long as there are enough (reliable?) association clues, etc.

But now we have all of these alleged. Abu Talb bought extra clothes at Mary's House, a month after securing a ton of Maltese clothes elsewhere. (I know none of us buys this part, but it's in this mix anyway). And he apparently took them to London on a date circled in the calendar, as his a terrorist related to his wife flew in from elsewhere, to meet airline security expert Abu Elias, and maybe the bribed airport insider, and Abu Talbs's flatmate, to make sure everyone was in one place with their contributions, no matter how small. And this for an operation that I just explained could be done by one man, if he could only do two things done in advance - have the bomb built, and pack a friggin' suitcase.

One thing, among what I might be missing, is how valuable the "convicted terrorist" part of Abu Talb's frequent description really is. After all, al-Megrahi is a convicted terrorist, but that doesn't mean he had anything to do with the bombing of Pan Am 103. Eddie, or Rolfe, or anyone, how good was the case against him over those bombings around Denmark? I scanned over some links once, and it didn't seem very amazing either.

 

[Rolfe]

He gave evidence at Zeist, so you can read his own words. He does deny stuff, but not very convincingly. I don't have any trouble believing he was into it up to his neck to be honest.

Keep all this here if you like, I was just wondering about the sense of having it mixed up with Bedford's evidence and so on. The PFLP-GC and its known movements and hangers-on seems to be quite a meaty subject on its own.

I've been obsessing a bit over the baggage handling at Heathrow, and I want to put that here, so it's going to get mixed up a bit.

Rolfe.

 

[Caustic Logic]

Oh, yes, the whole PFLP-GC nexus bears its own thread. There was that one you started, what was going on at Frankfurt, or whatever, if that's adequate.

Saying that it's in the transcripts doesn't help much, though. I'm quite in a no-new-research mode, and the reasons to suspect Abu Talb is one sector I didn't already research very well. So that's one thing against whatever I say here. I don't know what I'm saying to some degree.

 

[Rolfe]

I wasn't thinking so much of "what was going on at Frankfurt", because that was really about the vanishing luggage records and Bogomira's souvenir and so on. I was thinking of the stuff Buncrana is coming out with about the travels and machinations of the PFLP-GC adherents and hangers-on. There's quite a lot there and it's getting mixed up with other stuf.

Rolfe.

 

[Caustic Logic]

Yeah, sounds good. Autumn Leaves gang, PPSF, Khreeat, Talb, etc. I probably won't add much, but will have some thoughts.

 

[Rolfe]

Well, the Heathrow baggage transfer. I finally read the appropriate parts of the transcript.

The supervisor responsible for unloading PA103A was Darshan Sandhu. He gave evidence at Zeist. He said that as the plane didn't land until 17.36, the transfer had to be done in less than 15 minutes. AVE4041 was brought out across the tarmac by a loader called Sidhu, who loaded it with the bags from PA103A. Sidhu was not called as a witness. However, Sandhu spent most of the time during this period helping Sidhu with the job. He also moved around the aircraft keeping an eye on the rest of the unloading. I'm surprised they only had one person filling AVE4041, but then the plane wasn't usually so late and Sandhu did help out a lot.

Sandhu says only a few things. He recalls Sidhu dropping a case, a metal affair like the things photographers carry their fancy lenses in. He found a bag labelled for Heathrow among the group said to be for New York, and set it aside to go to baggage reclaim. He does not believe there were any other such bags in that hold. There were some bags left over when the container had been filled and they were sent over loose. He saw them being loose-loaded into Maid of the Seas, which was at the adjacent stand. When AVE4041 was filled, the container was closed up.

Nobody asked Sandhu about the disposition of the luggage which was already in the container when it was wheeled onto the tarmac. Or even if there was any. Nobody asked him if he remembered Sidhu or himself removing one or two cases lying flat in the floor of the container to put Frankfurt luggage below them. Nobody asked him if it was at all likely either of them would have been so picky about the loading, when they were working against the clock. Nobody asked Sidhu anything, he wasn't there.

Sandhu says nothing at all about sorting the luggage, either first class or Detroit. There's no mention at all of Detroit luggage. Apparently Roland O'Neil at Frankfurt said the first class luggage was supposed to go into a different container to be unloaded first, but from what Sandhu said that didn't happen. (More blows to Charles in that AVE4041 wasn't supposed to be the first class container, so McKee's suitcase in it was pure chance.)

The other loader who gave evidence was Crabtree, who was supervising the loading of Maid of the Seas. He merely gave evidence that the container came over already filled and was put where it should have been put. It was not the last on. He also said it wasn't impossible a couple of the extra cases from PA103A went into another container, but we know Sandhu said that didn't happen.

It was Crabtree who was asked about the possibility of the bags being rearranged on the tarmac!

Q Because the object of the exercise, within reason, would be to accommodate as many bags as one reasonably could within such a container?
A Yes.
Q And to achieve that, it would sometimes be necessary for a loader to initially, perhaps, move bags around in the area of the base of the container so that they would better fit in?
A During the loading of a container, that is the case, yes.
Q And you’ve seen that going on?
A In this case?
Q I am talking generally.
A Generally speaking, yes, sir.
Q I don’t think you saw the loading of the container in this particular --
A No, sir.
Q And so, clearly, a loader would improvise, depending on the size of the bags he had to deal with and the number of bags, as to how he positioned them?
A That is correct.
Q And he might, on occasion, put some in upright and then decide that it was more effective to stack them in another position? [6306]
A Yes, sir.
Q And there would be a bit of rejigging of the bags went on to suit the demands; is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Thank you.

That's ridiculous. He didn't see whether Sidhu did that or not. He's only been asked for a general rule (very like the annoying cross-examination of the Frankfurt baggage handlers). He hasn't been asked whether it was likely for a piece of luggage originally on the floor to end up "in a far corner of the container". He hasn't been asked whether it's likely that a handler in a desperate rush will be so picky as to remove a 26-inch case so he can put a 29-inch case in its place.

Bloody lawyers!

Rolfe.

 

[Caustic Logic]

Indeed highly relevant to this discussion.

So to summarize, it's been specullated the Bedford suitcases were simply moved. This would be by one of only about four airport employees after Bedford, three of whom testified.

Walker didn't even remember the container, so there's no reason to suspect anything unusual happened with it that he noticed. But it would be the prime time for a terrorist to re-arrange the cases, to the near corner, not a remote one. But by the judgment, there was no intruder and only airport workers, after Walker, would have done it.

Sidhu brought the container out to meet the flight, might have seen these cases, most likely one to have moved them if anyone did. He was not called to testify.

Sandhu oversaw Sidhu's work, might have seen what was in there and its arrangment, seen it re-arranged, or done it himself. Testified but was asked about none of this.

Crabtree was in no position to see anything of what happened to said luggage, and was asked, in general principle, if people might move bags around sometimes. Yes, he said, taken as the evidence that might well (must?) have happened. Such a certainty that it's not even worth asking for precise details as to whether it did.

So therefore the suitcase might have been moved to some remote corner of the container." Meaning, that's why we can be so certain of the 1:1,000,000 chance yet another and different brown hard-shell case wound up in the same spot right after that.

Not a real good omen, folks.

 

[Buncrana]

Can I just recap on the Heathrow luggage aspect a second....

1. Manly reports break-in at Terminal 3.
   
   
2. Bedford begins loading 4041 at Interline shed with 4-8 suitcases belonging to interline passengers already at Heathrow and, after a short 15 min break, returns and now notes 2 additional unknown suitcases in 4041 in the position later determined explosion occurred. At least 1, possibly both, suitcase(s) observed by Bedford were said to be a bronze/brown samonsite.
   
   
3. Bedford finishes shift around 1710 and leaves AVE4041 outside unguarded Build Up shed and informs Walker. Walker denies and then later admits to such.
   
   
4. At build up shed Walker gives confusion recollection of seeing Bedfords 2 bags.
   
   
5. AVE4041 is taken out to meet 103A at 1736 and then loaded onto PA103, and, although it is occassionally done by baggage loaders, no evidence is given by any of the loaders that a rearrangement if 4041 took place.
   
   
6. FAI in 1991 concludes that as the explosion occurred 10/12" above floor of 4041, and as Frankfurt luggage went above Bedford's bags, which were not moved and still on floor, the bag had arrived on 103A. The FAI offers no explanation as the whereabouts any remnants of Beford's Samsonite despite being directly underneath the explosion.
   
   
7. The FAI does note however, that no Heathrow interline passenger was travelling with a Samonsite, and thus any of the bags that should have been in the container 4041 loaded by Bedford. There is no reference to Karen Noonan's suitcase.
   
   
8. Zeist in 2000 concludes that Bedfords suitcases had now been rearranged to another area of 4041, because Karen Noonan's bag, arriving via 103A, was on the floor and took the initial blast and somewhat protected the floor from the full force (thus replacing the original spot noted by Bedford and the 2 suitcases). The Lordships offer no explanation as to the wherabouts of any remnants of the 1 or 2 samonsites noted by Bedford, nor are any remarks made that the bags that were first loaded by Bedford would have consisted of no Samonsite cases.

Is that a fair summary?

 

[Rolfe]

Close. Bedford's break was more like half an hour, could have been more. He knocked off work at 17.02. He actually left the container outside the build-up shed about ten or fifteen minutes to five. PA103A touched down at 17.36, but would have taken a few minutes to make its way to the stand and get the doors open and so on. The container would have been sitting outside the build-up shed for at least 45 minutes, possibly close on an hour.

The conclusions of the FAI weren't quite as you report.

I am therefore satisfied that the suitcase in which the explosive device was contained was among those transferred from Flight 103A to Flight 103. I am also satisfied on a balance of probabilities that it was not associated with any of the passengers who boarded Flight 103 at Heathrow. This decision is based upon the evidence of Detective Constable Henderson who analysed the baggage which was recovered and those pieces which were not recovered and where possible linked each piece with the person accompanying it. He gave evidence to the effect that none of the descriptions given by relatives of the baggage which they expected the victims to have been carrying fitted this suitcase.

What Mowatt seems to be saying is that none of the passengers was thought to have been carrying a suitcase matching the description of the bomb bag. I don't believe he ever said that none of them were carrying a Samsonite. Indeed, I believe some were. I believe Charles McKee's suitcase (which was interfered with) was a grey Samsonite.

This makes Bedford's left-hand bag very mysterious indeed. The description he gives is uncannily similar to the description of the case eventually determined to have been the bomb bag. During his forensic investigation, Hayes actually described the bomb bag variously as brown, maroon and burgundy, as well as bronze. (Its official colour was "antique copper" I believe.) So if there was no legitimate suitcase answering the description of the bomb bag, what the hell was it that Bedford saw if it wasn't the bomb bag? Of course this evidence was not led at Zeist.

It doesn't provide quite the same problem as regards the right-hand case. Bedford seems less sure about the description of that case, and while it might well have been another brown Samsonite, it might just have been "similar". I wonder if a grey Samsonite might class as "similar".

Nobody asks the Heathrow loaders if they removed any of the cases in the container when it came out on to the tarmac, and the information was not volunteered. It's very difficult to see why the point wasn't addressed, as it's clear Sandhu had a reasonable recollection of the loading. He remembered Sidhu dropping a case, and he remembered there being extra bags and seeing them loose-loaded. What is clear, however, was that the loading was very hurried due to the lateness of PA103A.

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

Crabtree was in no position to see anything of what happened to said luggage, and was asked, in general principle, if people might move bags around sometimes. Yes, he said, taken as the evidence that might well (must?) have happened. Such a certainty that it's not even worth asking for precise details as to whether it did.

Uncannily similar to the cross-examination of the Frankfurt baggage handlers. Koca, who did the coding and whose handwriting was questioned, wasn't called to give evidence. Candar, who heaved the suitcases, wasn't asked whether he had or might have handled any bags that weren't from KM180 during the period in question. Someone else (Schreiner?) was asked in principle whether it was possible a baggage handler might not always follow proper procedure,

I see a pattern here. But this one is worse. There was no reason at all for Candar or Koca to have remembered coding that particular plane that particular day. The crash happened hours later, and there was no reason to imagine KM180 had anything to do with it anyway. They weren't asked about the incident for months.

In contrast Sandhu and Sidhu must have realised not more than about three hours later that they had loaded the plane that had crashed. It's perfectly possible one or both of them remembered more detail than they were asked about.

The cavalier treatment of crucial points like this is inexplicable in the light of the excruciating detail in which many witnesses were taken through entirely routine evidence in the early weeks at Zeist. Every ATC who handled the plane on the way to the Scottish sector was cross-examined on his evidence, every policeman who found a bit of AVE4041 and so on. But nobody could be bothered asking Sandhu if he remembered whether any cases were unloaded from the container as the Frankfurt cases began to come off the conveyor.

Rolfe.