Has consciousness been fully explained?

[westprog]

Obviously it wouldn't be identical, but we're only looking at the externally observable behavior.

We could take a person, remove their brain, and insert the computer running a simulation, carefully attaching it to all the nerve endings, through suitable converters.

In theory, we should be able to create the impression of a perfectly normal human being, capable of conversation, and enjoying a walk on the beach.

Agreed ?

And so we go around again.

No, it's not possible to take a simulation of a power plant and use it to control a power plant. Simulation software is not the same as control software. See several hundred recent posts on this subject.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Obviously, and that's why we need to study the structure of the brain, until we see how it works.

Hmmm...I'd say that right now [with regard to the brain and consciousness] we're trying do the equivalent of building working radios without even a rudimentary understanding of electromagnetism. Its all well and good to be able to study the shape and craftsmanship of existing radios (i.e. brains) but we need a scientific understanding of the physics of electromagnetism (i.e. consciousness) which underlie the root of its form and function.

 

[blobru]

Unfortunately, unconsciousness (sleep and coma) is also produced by the workings of neurons in a human brain.

That really only provides a location. SRIP provides one type of action that is probably necessary for human consciousness; and it is the particular types of actions, the architecture that we need to pin down. I think most of us agree on the location of it.

Wasp, sequel to your detailed reply to Clive on pain complexity (post #3977), just focussing on "pain", do you think it's possible to state necessary and/or sufficient conditions for consciousness of pain, in terms of neurons? Is there a minimum level of electrochemical activity before a pattern of neurons firing is conscious for the subject? Does it ever make sense to speak of unconscious "pain" (neurons firing along dedicated pain pathways which the subject isn't conscious of; or perhaps anesthetized pain, where the enzymes that cause the pain neurons to fire are inhibited by drugs)? Beyond just pain, are there certain subsystems of the nervous system which must be involved for the subject to be conscious of the neurons firing (i.e., is activity in certain regions always unconscious; always conscious)?

Maybe a pointless sidetrack, but I'm curious how much "consciousness" can be pinned down to certain regions of the brain / nervous system; certain threshholds of nervous activity; perhaps even certain patterns of enzyme catalysis or neurons firing? It's well known of course that certain frequencies of neurons firing as measured by EEGs are indicative of certain types of consciousness -- (Beta [12-30 Hz] and active concentration, for example) -- and certain regions more active than others in these states: can we be any more specific (layman deferring to your expertise; you'd hinted at an answer in your earlier reply re the five pain pathways)?

I was fascinated by your discussion of pain asymbolia, where patients can feel pain yet not suffer, not be repelled or motivated by feeling it. Naively, I would have expected the pain 'quale' was the motivation for acting to alleviate the pain. Yet it appears the consciousness of the pain, the 'quale', can be separated from the motivation to act on it. Any complementary cases you know of, where patients react to 'painful' stimuli that they don't 'feel' ("painful" here would translate to what would cause pain absent the condition: not sure what to call it... "pain pzombia"?)?

Whew, that's a lot of questions... sorry. (& a slightly premature happy new year!) ETA: whoops... looks like you've answered most of my last question in a subsequent reply to Orbini (post #3978). *sigh* just ignore me...

 

[Orbini]

The end result would be a system that rigidly produces a particular range of outputs according to what was recorded in the particular brain being modeled. This would be the equivalent of recoding an archive of canned responses that is linked to an algorithm the plays the responses when certain cues are given.

Not at all. We don't "play back" the recorded data, but instead we learn how the model differs, and that way we can produce a better model.

We use the same method in other computer models, for instance in modeling the strength of a new bridge, the computer has no specific knowledge about bridges. The only thing we put in are Newton's laws of physics, combined with all the properties of the materials used in the bridge.

After the model is done, we can compare the results to a real bridge. If there's a difference, we can trace it back to one of the properties we originally put in. We fix that error, and the next time we use that model on a totally different bridge, it will be more accurate.

So, in a computer model of a brain, we only need to worry about a highly accurate model of a single neuron, and an accurate copy of all the connections. A single neuron does not have consciousness, so we don't need to worry about that. Once we get those details right, we can combine millions and billions of them, and the results should still be the same. If not, we can trace our error back to the model of the neuron, and fix that.

 

[Orbini]

Hmmm...I'd say that right now [with regard to the brain and consciousness] we're trying do the equivalent of building working radios without even a rudimentary understanding of electromagnetism. Its all well and good to be able to study the shape and craftsmanship of existing radios (i.e. brains) but we need a scientific understanding of the physics of electromagnetism (i.e. consciousness) which underlie the root of its form and function.

Unless our brain uses new and unknown laws of physics, we already have all the relevant understanding of the underlying stuff. There's no consciousness in a single neuron, or in a single connection, so why worry about that ?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

A computational simulation of a generator will not produce electricity, ...

But it will produce simulated electricity.

Can you explain to us how real consciousness differs from simulated consciousness? Similar to the way you might explain the difference between real computation and simulated computation, perhaps.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Suppose you have a chronic pain condition, and none of the standard pain killers can provide good relief. You're talking to your doctor, and he suggests using a new, experimental drug, that doesn't take away any functional part of the pain, but it just removes the subjective feeling that it hurts. The rest of your consciousness remains unaffected, so you can still function exactly the same, and nobody will be able to tell any difference.

The assumption here is that the feeling of pain is entirely epiphenomenal. For this to be possible, we have to imagine a world in which every statement we utter about consciousness has no part of its cause rooted in the experience of consciousness, since that experience has no affect on our brains or mouths. It appears the possibilities are:

• Our statements about consciousness, in fact, have no relation to our conscious experiences.
• Our statements about consciousness are accidently correlated with our conscious experiences.
• Our statements about consciousness are a result of nonconscious activity in our brain that also gives rise to matching epiphenomenal experience.

I'm thinking there's a problem here, related to evolution.

~~ Paul

 

[Orbini]

Similar to the way you might explain the difference between real computation and simulated computation, perhaps.

Or perhaps the difference in experience a pilot has when flying a state of the art simulator, vs a real airplane.

 

[Frank Newgent]

Reminds me of this

 

[westprog]

But it will produce simulated electricity.

Can you explain to us how real consciousness differs from simulated consciousness? Similar to the way you might explain the difference between real computation and simulated computation, perhaps.

~~ Paul

It differs in the same way that simulated bridges differ from real bridges.

If we assume that consciousness is computation, then of course consciousness will be computation. Assumptions make life easier.

 

[westprog]

Or perhaps the difference in experience a pilot has when flying a state of the art simulator, vs a real airplane.

Yes, perhaps, you might, maybe, could be.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Unless our brain uses new and unknown laws of physics, we already have all the relevant understanding of the underlying stuff. There's no consciousness in a single neuron, or in a single connection, so why worry about that ?

Because we do not understand the physics of subjective experience in-and-of-itself. This is a gaping hole in our scientific understanding of the world. Its really that simple.

 

[AkuManiMani]

But it will produce simulated electricity.

Can you explain to us how real consciousness differs from simulated consciousness? Similar to the way you might explain the difference between real computation and simulated computation, perhaps.

~~ Paul

Simulated electricity is just a dynamic representation of the real thing -- it does not have the same physical consequences. But atleast in the case of electricity we have a sufficient understanding of the underlying physics involved to make useful simulations of it. As of now, we do not understand the physics of consciousness so we cannot even go about building a simulation of it. Even assuming we did have such a simulation it would also just be a representation.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Not at all. We don't "play back" the recorded data, but instead we learn how the model differs, and that way we can produce a better model.

We use the same method in other computer models, for instance in modeling the strength of a new bridge, the computer has no specific knowledge about bridges. The only thing we put in are Newton's laws of physics, combined with all the properties of the materials used in the bridge.

After the model is done, we can compare the results to a real bridge. If there's a difference, we can trace it back to one of the properties we originally put in. We fix that error, and the next time we use that model on a totally different bridge, it will be more accurate.

So, in a computer model of a brain, we only need to worry about a highly accurate model of a single neuron, and an accurate copy of all the connections. A single neuron does not have consciousness, so we don't need to worry about that. Once we get those details right, we can combine millions and billions of them, and the results should still be the same. If not, we can trace our error back to the model of the neuron, and fix that.

Sticking with the radio example: If we have an accurate computer model of a radio -- sans the necessary physical materials assembled in proper fashion -- do you think that it will pick up radio stations?

 

[Orbini]

Sticking with the radio example: If we have an accurate computer model of a radio -- sans the necessary physical materials assembled in proper fashion -- do you think that it will pick up radio stations?

No, but I never suggested anything like that. What's the obsession around here with bad analogies ?

I'm talking about a model, running on physical hardware, connected to the outside world through suitable I/O converters. I never suggested leaving out the physical materials, or the I/O converters, so please don't insist on doing so.

To stick with a better analogy: if we have an accurate model of a piano, down to every detail, and the model can calculate exactly how the string would vibrate, and how that vibration would be transferred to the surrounding air, and we run that model on a physical computer, and attach a speaker to our sound card, would it sound like a piano ?

 

[Orbini]

Because we do not understand the physics of subjective experience in-and-of-itself. This is a gaping hole in our scientific understanding of the world. Its really that simple.

Are you claiming a single neuron as a subjective experience, or that it operates using yet unknown laws of physics ?

 

[PixyMisa]

Sticking with the radio example: If we have an accurate computer model of a radio -- sans the necessary physical materials assembled in proper fashion -- do you think that it will pick up radio stations?

It amazes how people never tire of asking blatantly nonsensical questions.

Yes, of course it will pick up radio stations if they are included in the computer model.

And if, in the computer model, those radio stations are broadcasting music, and you tune your computer model of a radio to pick it up, then your computer can play back that music in the real world, because information is substrate-independent.

 

[PixyMisa]

Because we do not understand the physics of subjective experience in-and-of-itself.

Yes we do.

You might not, but we do.

All this is, is a combination of the argument from personal incredulity and the argument from ignorance. You don't personally believe that we know something, therefore it's magic. Sorry, but logical fallacies don't cancel each other out that way.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

If we assume that consciousness is computation, then of course consciousness will be computation. Assumptions make life easier.

I didn't say you should assume it. I asked people to explain the difference between real and simulated consciousness. My second sentence ("Similar to the way you might explain the difference between real computation and simulated computation, perhaps.") was just a sarcasm.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Simulated electricity is just a dynamic representation of the real thing -- it does not have the same physical consequences. But atleast in the case of electricity we have a sufficient understanding of the underlying physics involved to make useful simulations of it. As of now, we do not understand the physics of consciousness so we cannot even go about building a simulation of it. Even assuming we did have such a simulation it would also just be a representation.

See Pixy's comments above. But then your statement:

"A computational simulation of a generator will not produce electricity, and a structural replica of a radio will not pick up stations."

has nothing to do with whether we can, in fact, simulate a working brain. You went on to say:

"We need to grasp the physics of what living brains are doing with regard to consciousness in order to know how to create artificial systems that have the same capabilities."

which is certainly true. But it may turn out there is no special physics and a conventional computer simulation will do the trick just fine.

~~ Paul