I doubt it - what is there to measure, test, quantify?
The study of quantum mechanics suggests that some events are, in fact, random. Whether an electron jumps from one orbit to another, emitting a photon is, to the best of our knowledge, a random event.
I might be wrong, but I don't think quantum mechanics remotely indicates that what happens on the quantum level is really "random". Just because we have yet to identify a cause/causes doesn't mean it's really random. I just means we don't understand it (yet?).
No, it goes further than that. There are no successful local "hidden variable" theories of quantum mechanics. Either quantum events are truly random, or they violate causality.I might be wrong, but I don't think quantum mechanics remotely indicates that what happens on the quantum level is really "random". Just because we have yet to identify a cause/causes doesn't mean it's really random. I just means we don't understand it (yet?).
I might be wrong, but I don't think quantum mechanics remotely indicates that what happens on the quantum level is really "random". Just because we have yet to identify a cause/causes doesn't mean it's really random. I just means we don't understand it (yet?).
Random != Free, however. In fact, if the wavefunction collapse is truly and universally random then that points very strongly to the absence of free will. If there’s nothing we’ve found so far in the universe that can influence the direction of collapse, Occams Razor and/or the Copernican Principle (which, I know, are not physical laws as such) suggests that it’s highly unlikely my brain just happens to be the one physical structure that can.
I do think free will might be logically falsifiable. It’s possible that the biological basis of consciousness will turn out to be completely unconnected to anything but perception – that our sensation of ‘making decisions’ can be proved to be nothing but instant post-hoc rationalisations of what we appear to ourselves to be doing.
Which will be an interesting day for ethicists…
Just wondering...
"The nonvoluntary origin of desires and infinite regression demonstrate the nonexistence of choice. There exists no capacity to do otherwise and no capacity to have done otherwise. Predestination does not exist since uncaused events equate with fundamental unpredictability. No one merits or deserves anything. Nothing is anyone’s fault or to anyone’s credit. ..."
No, it goes further than that. There are no successful local "hidden variable" theories of quantum mechanics. Either quantum events are truly random, or they violate causality.
There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will. Suppose the world is super-deterministic, with not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our behavior, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including the "decision" by the experimenter to carry out one set of measurements rather than another, the difficulty disappears. There is no need for a faster than light signal to tell particle A what measurement has been carried out on particle B, because the universe, including particle A, already "knows" what that measurement, and its outcome, will be.
The only alternative to quantum probabilities, superpositions of states, collapse of the wave function, and spooky action at a distance, is that everything is superdetermined. For me it is a dilemma. I think it is a deep dilemma, and the resolution of it will not be trivial; it will require a substantial change in the way we look at things
Disproven, as far as I can tell (I'm not a physicist). If everything is strictly deterministic and causality is preserved, then we have a local hidden variable theory of QM. Local hidden variable theories of QM are contradicted by experimental data.Is this woo, or disproven?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superdeterminism
BBC Radio interview with Paul Davies, 1985