Is there a skeptical/scientific argument against predeterminism?

[SpuriusMaximus]

Ockham's knife is double-edged and you have to know how to hold it. It applies when there are two answers to a problem with the same level of evidence. Both the mechanistic and indeterministic explanations present no evidence.

That is actually just as false when you do it, as when the religious apologists do it. The fact is, we can show that the brain is at least partially responsible for decision taking. As I was saying, in the meantime we can even watch it on MRI in real time. Just because you don't know, doesn't mean you can just postulate that that there actually is no evidence for either and we can go with the fairytale that is the most convenient. (E.g., the one that lets one person claim that they're more moral than the rest of the species combined.)

The simplest explanation therefore is that it causes ALL of it. Any extra mechanisms being involved in creating some extra "free will" would be just that: extra entities. There is no way, except maybe going full-tilt dualist and excluding the neurons entirely from the decision making, for it to be anything else than extra entities on top of the ones that the simpler explanation involves.

Therefore the mechanistic explanation is in fact the one that passes Occam's Razor.

And before we knew about the randomness involved, the same applied to determinism. We knew that reasons (e.g., previous experiences) are involved at least partially in the decisions taken. So any working explanation would have to involve them. Any extra mechanisms involved would be just that: some extra entities.

Therefore the deterministic explanation was the one that passed Occam's Razor. Period.

In the meantime not that much has changed, actually. The decisions are still based on reasons to do it vs reasons not to do it, just every reason on both lists now has a probability to actually be counted. Instead of being just a sum of the number of reasons for vs against, now it's a probability between 0 and 1.

That does rule out pre-determinism, but it still doesn't change the issue of "free will" at all. Now the reasons are dice rolls, but that's still reasons. If I call in sick at work because I rolled my D&D 20-sided die and it rolled a 1, the number that randomly came up is still a reason, not an act of "free will". The plastic polyhedron has no free will. And more importantly, it being random still doesn't mean anything when it comes to assigning moral blame.

And that's about it. That's all that that randomness really means.

And again extra "free will" mechanism than that would have to be just that: something extra. And the version with extra stuff, in the absence of any evidence that would need it, FAILS Occam's Razor.

So the simplest thing is rational skepticism. The simplest thing is to adopt a metaphysical determinism. Which is what you do.

You certainly said nothing about my interpretation of the principle of causality that excludes metaphysical solutions from determinism and free will. If you haven't understood it I can explain it a little more.

Honestly, I don't give a flip. What I'm talking about isn't metaphysics as in some guy pulling stuff out of the ass while gazing at his own navel, nor about philosophical assumptions. I'm talking about stuff that was actually measured in labs and observed on an MRI machine. That is by now quite overtly in the domain of science. There is in fact a reason why we have a domain of science called "NEUROscience."

And frankly excluding science just because it overlaps with what someone arbitrarily decided to call "metaphysics", is just silly. If the guys without evidence want to exclude something for ZERO reasons other than that they filed it under a funny name -- be it "metaphysics" or "soul" or "mind" or whatever -- well, nobody else cares. Names aren't magical. Giving something a funny name doesn't actually make it special and deserving its very own special rules.

If you want to play, you have to show your own evidence for whatever extra entities you want introduced in the model. It's really that simple.

 

[David Mo]

But, again, what you're saying is that you need to have explained to you again even what moral philosophy means by elementary terms like "good", "bad" or "moral evil", or how they relate to "desirable" and "undesirable". Never mind that it's been quite clear ever since Plato. And you are apparently too unable to even check what Wikipedia says about "good".

I'm not talking about Plato or Wikipedia. I'm saying that you don't know what you're writing. I ask you direct questions and you get entangled in empty answers.

I will give you two examples:

Answer how it is possible that "what is desirable" is the conclusion of an argument that has other premises. The conclusion of an argument cannot be an isolated concept. It will be a proposition that includes the desirable as part of it. What is it? What are the premises?

Another example taken at random that your theory of what is good (what the majority voted for) does not mean anything or serve any purpose:
Moral problems arise mainly in the private sphere. A family must vote to know if a violent parent is bad? It is obvious that your criterion of the vote is useless to resolve what is good in private context. That is to say, 90% of moral problems in ordinary life.

Try to answer these questions simply. Go on!

NOTE: About what determinism is, I will explain it to you on another occasion, because you don't know what you are talking about.

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

I'm not talking about Plato or Wikipedia. I'm saying that you don't know what you're writing. I ask you direct questions and you get entangled in empty answers.

Nope. It's still just you getting tangled when it comes to understanding basic English.

Again, if your argument is that you need even the meaning of the most elementary terms explained to you, then all you're saying is that you're unqualified to be having this argument.

But while ignorance could be remedied, insisting page after page that an argument must be wrong because YOU don't understand even the basic words, is what moves it into the domain of the outright stupid.

I will give you two examples:

Answer how it is possible that "what is desirable" is the conclusion of an argument that has other premises.

Every calculation or logical inference has a conclusion that is different from the premises, silly. In fact, if they were not different, you'd have an "if X then X" argument, a.k.a., the begging the question fallacy.

And it's having to explain to you this kind of absolutely elementary stuff, that just makes the case that you're unqualified to even be having this talk. In fact, any talk involving logic.

The conclusion of an argument cannot be an isolated concept.

Nobody said that it is isolated from the premises. If that's what you've understood when I told you that the value of X is the conclusion, not one of the premises, frankly you ARE claiming to be too unqualified to be having this discussion. In fact, you're too unqualified for ANY discussion involving logic.

It will be a proposition that includes the desirable as part of it.

No it won't, silly. Or not directly and/or not at the same level. Because that would be begging the question. Just because you still don't seem to understand fallacies, doesn't mean that doing them is mandatory

Another example taken at random that your theory of what is good (what the majority voted for) does not mean anything or serve any purpose:
Moral problems arise mainly in the private sphere. A family must vote to know if a violent parent is bad? It is obvious that your criterion of the vote is useless to resolve what is good in private context. That is to say, 90% of moral problems in ordinary life.

It was an example, in response to a very specific question from you, that did not involve an ordinary life situation. Now you're just moving the goalposts, and quite blatantly at that. What you're saying now is that no no no, answering the setup in YOUR question doesn't count, I should have answered some completely different setup that you made up post-facto. Cute, but ultimately still just another fallacy to add to the list of ways you've failed logic.

But I'll answer anyway, because it's actually a very basic and well understood issue: no, the same principle of figuring out what the majority of people want -- which again, is what ACTUAL intersubjectivism is about -- can be applied to just about any other situation. It also doesn't involve narrowing it down to just the family voting. E.g., would most people WANT to be hit by a family member? Well, no.

You can take an actual vote, or do a survey on the street, or whatever, but the basic principle is the same.

And it doesn't matter if it's about passing terrorism laws, or about whether it's ok to hit a spouse, or whether it's ok to flush the toilet at 3 AM, or whatever really. The basic premise of intersubjectivism -- you know, the very one you CLAIMED to represent -- is to start from figuring out what most people want or don't want.

Or if you go utilitarian, what makes most people happy or unhappy, and by how much. And a few other similar versions, depending on which exact school of moral philosophy you subscribe to. Intersubjectivism just cuts directly to asking what do they want, but ultimately it's the same principle.

Try to answer these questions simply. Go on!

Not sure what you feel a need to be smug and taunting about, since all you did was ask elementary stuff, rather than anything confounding anyone. In fact, all you shown is exactly what I was saying: that you don't understand enough to be even having this conversation. Because if you had even the most elementary knowledge about subjectivism -- you know, since you claimed to actually be a proponent of intersubjectivism -- or generally moral philosophy, you wouldn't need to ask this stuff in the first place. That you think it's something that surely confounded me (or anyone else for that matter) just illustrates the depth of your own incompetence on that domain, nothing more.

NOTE: About what determinism is, I will explain it to you on another occasion, because you don't know what you are talking about.

So basically instead of answering the objection, you dodge and ego-wank. Cute, but stupid and predictable. As usually when it comes to your messages

 

[David Mo]

Answer how it is possible that "what is desirable" is the conclusion of an argument that has other premises. The conclusion of an argument cannot be an isolated concept. It will be a proposition that includes the desirable as part of it. What is it? What are the premises?

Another example taken at random that your theory of what is good (what the majority voted for) does not mean anything or serve any purpose:
Moral problems arise mainly in the private sphere. A family must vote to know if a violent parent is bad? It is obvious that your criterion of the vote is useless to resolve what is good in private context. That is to say, 90% of moral problems in ordinary life.
NOTE: About what determinism is, I will explain it to you on another occasion, because you don't know what you are talking about.

No it won't, silly. Or not directly and/or not at the same level. Because that would be begging the question. Just because you still don't seem to understand fallacies, doesn't mean that doing them is mandatory

But I'll answer anyway, because it's actually a very basic and well understood issue: no, the same principle of figuring out what the majority of people want -- which again, is what ACTUAL intersubjectivism is about -- can be applied to just about any other situation. It also doesn't involve narrowing it down to just the family voting. E.g., would most people WANT to be hit by a family member? Well, no.
You can take an actual vote, or do a survey on the street, or whatever, but the basic principle is the same.

It's very clear. You don't answer the first question I asked you because you don't know what you said.
This is obvious. Not only because you can't answer my simple question, but also because you continually contradict yourself.
First of all, you have said that the criterion for knowing what is good is the desirable. After that, you say that the desirable was not the criterion, but the conclusion of some unknown (?) premises. Finally you say again that good is what "people want," that is, what is desirable.
And when it seems that the dance had stopped, suddenly utilitarianism appears. "Or if you go utilitarian, what makes most people happy or unhappy, and by how much". In Spain we say: Éramos pocos y parió la abuela. (We were few and grandmother gave birth). Is utilitarianism now the unquestionable solution to our moral problems, to happiness o whatever else?
(In the meantime, voting has been relegated to limbo).

My friend, you're so dizzy that you're stumbling around.

What seems like a joke is that, according you, anything goes in order to know what people want, including polls. This is absurd because the survey method is useless for complex issues such as morals, because surveys depend on circumstantial variables and because surveys reflect the existence of diverse opinions about practically everything. Including people who think that a certain amount of parental violence is necessary to maintain family order. If so, which criterion guarantees that one answer is morally more correct than the other? Majority again? And Socrates?

We don't seem to have the same concept of intersubjective. That is, you do not use the word as it is used among experts. See here, please:
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/knowledge/inter-subjectivism.html
In any case, intersubjectivity has nothing to do with majorities neither vote.

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

It's very clear. You don't answer the first question I asked you because you don't know what you said.
This is obvious. Not only because you can't answer my simple question, but also because you continually contradict yourself.
First of all, you have said that the criterion for knowing what is good is the desirable. After that, you say that the desirable was not the criterion, but the conclusion of some unknown (?) premises. Finally you say again that good is what "people want," that is, what is desirable.

None of that is actually anything more than your continued misunderstanding even simple terms. I assume that that has to be some intentional derailing, because frankly nobody can actually be that stupid. I've actually worked with someone who had Down Syndrome, and even he wouldn't have been confused by my using words like "good" and "desirable".

And when it seems that the dance had stopped, suddenly utilitarianism appears. "Or if you go utilitarian, what makes most people happy or unhappy, and by how much". In Spain we say: Éramos pocos y parió la abuela. (We were few and grandmother gave birth). Is utilitarianism now the unquestionable solution to our moral problems, to happiness o whatever else?

Utilitarianism was just an example of one of the many schools of moral philosophy, which uses its own criterion. Nobody said it was now the unquestionable solution or anything.

In short, all you do there is more of your schizophrenic reading between the lines and ignoring the actual lines

(In the meantime, voting has been relegated to limbo).

No, voting was just one example of how you can go about it, and the message where that appeared explicitly said so. If you get that confused by reading simple English, it's still just your own comprehension problems.

My friend, you're so dizzy that you're stumbling around.

Nope, it's still just you playing too confused to read simple English. Presumably in order to avoid actually having a coherent argument.

What seems like a joke is that, according you, anything goes in order to know what people want, including polls.

Not literally anything, but it is one of the methods for figuring that out.

This is absurd because the survey method is useless for complex issues such as morals, because surveys depend on circumstantial variables and because surveys reflect the existence of diverse opinions about practically everything.

That you can't maximize every single variable, in this case how much everyone gets of what they wanted, is pretty much the nature of the beast in multivariable optimizations. (You could have googled that when I told you the term repeatedly. Except you were still too busy playing the "I don't understand what 'good' means" spiel.) And for that matter in any school of moral philosophy. None say that you can have a solution that is perfect for everyone. So I'm not sure how you managed to miss that all these years

Including people who think that a certain amount of parental violence is necessary to maintain family order. If so, which criterion guarantees that one answer is morally more correct than the other? Majority again?

The one that is best for the most people, in a nutsa... err... nutshell. Is there even ANY school of philosophy which doesn't aim for the 'what's best for most people' point? They may disagree on how you get the data for that, or what criterion to use when judgting what's 'best', but I'm not aware of ANY that just give up because someone might want the opposite.

And Socrates?

Got the crap end of the stick. It's pretty clear that the subjective morals of the times had a "thou shalt not question my gods" as what the vast majority of people wanted. (The main charge levelled against him was impiety.) You can try to convince them that it shouldn't be so, which ultimately he and Plato did, but the notion that just one person can decide what is really moral and overrule everyone else, is no more valid to claim about Socrates than about Critias. Not the least because it requires the leap of faith that, when it conflicts with your values, the guy you're following anyway is more of a Socrates than a Critias.

I'm not sure what you find so confusing about him?

I would add though that if you actually read all about it, including the Apologia, it's pretty clear he was actually trying to annoy as many people as possible and make himself a martyr.

We don't seem to have the same concept of intersubjective. That is, you do not use the word as it is used among experts. See here, please:
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/knowledge/inter-subjectivism.html
In any case, intersubjectivity has nothing to do with majorities neither vote.

Not entirely wrong, but it seems like you went with the first link that came up in Google and it wasn't even from the right domain. You can find a more relevant description of what intersubjective/intersubjectivity means for ethics for example here: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/36fe/55185eaf5223425e7b3a8e80171c23c13a75.pdf

In a nutshell, it means that it's about shared valued and norms, and about social contracts. Rather than proclaiming that some criterion is absolute and set in stone, whether anyone else agrees or not, ethical intersubjectivism applies, surprisingly enough, the intersubjectivity idea to it. It's about reaching a common understanding of what our collective values are and how we agree to go about it.

And yes, if you want to talk about Socrates, he was obviously into none of that. If he thought what he wanted to do was the right thing, screw what the others thought. Well, turns out they agreed to screw him in return It essentially took Plato to actually do the intersubjective thing and put out enough information and arguments to change the opinion of society about it.

 

[David Mo]

Utilitarianism was just an example of one of the many schools of moral philosophy, which uses its own criterion. Nobody said it was now the unquestionable solution or anything.
(...)

That you can't maximize every single variable, in this case how much everyone gets of what they wanted, is pretty much the nature of the beast in multivariable optimizations. (...) None say that you can have a solution that is perfect for everyone. So I'm not sure how you managed to miss that all these years

The one that is best for the most people, in a nutsa... err... nutshell. Is there even ANY school of philosophy which doesn't aim for the 'what's best for most people' point? They may disagree on how you get the data for that, or what criterion to use when judgting what's 'best', but I'm not aware of ANY that just give up because someone might want the opposite.

Got the crap end of the stick. It's pretty clear that the subjective morals of the times had a "thou shalt not question my gods" as what the vast majority of people wanted. (The main charge levelled against him was impiety.) You can try to convince them that it shouldn't be so, which ultimately he and Plato did, but the notion that just one person can decide what is really moral and overrule everyone else, is no more valid to claim about Socrates than about Critias. Not the least because it requires the leap of faith that, when it conflicts with your values, the guy you're following anyway is more of a Socrates than a Critias.
(..)

Not entirely wrong, but it seems like you went with the first link that came up in Google and it wasn't even from the right domain. You can find a more relevant description of what intersubjective/intersubjectivity means for ethics for example here: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/36fe/55185eaf5223425e7b3a8e80171c23c13a75.pdf

In a nutshell, it means that it's about shared valued and norms, and about social contracts. Rather than proclaiming that some criterion is absolute and set in stone, whether anyone else agrees or not, ethical intersubjectivism applies, surprisingly enough, the intersubjectivity idea to it. It's about reaching a common understanding of what our collective values are and how we agree to go about it.

And yes, if you want to talk about Socrates, he was obviously into none of that. If he thought what he wanted to do was the right thing, screw what the others thought. Well, turns out they agreed to screw him in return. It essentially took Plato to actually do the intersubjective thing and put out enough information and arguments to change the opinion of society about it.

You said that the problem of good was "easy to solve" in a "trivial" way. It is wise to rectify.
It seems that we have finally reached an agreement (this is intersubjectivism!): the problem of knowing what the good is does not have an automatic solution. It must be solved by a variety of scientific, sociological, philosophical, etc. reasons.
Then, the problem of good cannot be solved with the mere analysis of causes and effects. It involves making decisions that involve the freedom to choose between different options. Whether or not that decision is determined for internal reasons is something that cannot be known. Nor is it foreseeable that it will be known, given the tremendous complexity of human affairs.

Anyway, as I said in a couple of previous comments. Freedom is not contradictory to the principle of causality and methodical determinism. Because the principle of causality is not a description of facts, but a methodological principle. I am surprised that this proposal has not been discussed here.

I brought here the problem of Socrates because it contradicts your naïve confidence in the simplicity of the problem of good and the law of the majorities. Neither the Athenian majority, nor that supposed current pro-Socrates majority solves the problem of good. Both can be wrong. Socrates is an enigma of history and Plato's defence has nothing to do with the myth of Socrates, which is commonly used in textbooks. It is a furious criticism against democracy. Absolutely counter your "democratic good". A more expert reading discovers that the little we know about Socrates is full of lights and shadows. There is no consensus, then, on Socrates. And be careful with Plato.

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

You said that the problem of good was "easy to solve" in a "trivial" way. It is wise to rectify.

For a particular example you asked about.

It seems that we have finally reached an agreement (this is intersubjectivism!): the problem of knowing what the good is does not have an automatic solution. It must be solved by a variety of scientific, sociological, philosophical, etc. reasons.

Well, I didn't say it was downright automatic. But sure, I'll agree that one must apply some reason to it.

Then, the problem of good cannot be solved with the mere analysis of causes and effects. It involves making decisions that involve the freedom to choose between different options. Whether or not that decision is determined for internal reasons is something that cannot be known. Nor is it foreseeable that it will be known, given the tremendous complexity of human affairs.

Sure, we probably won't have 100% certainty any time soon.

Anyway, as I said in a couple of previous comments. Freedom is not contradictory to the principle of causality and methodical determinism. Because the principle of causality is not a description of facts, but a methodological principle. I am surprised that this proposal has not been discussed here.

Actually I think I've addressed it before. In short, it is both. It can be both a methodological assumption (e.g., there must be a cause why all my arrows went to the left) and a statement of fact (e.g., the cause IS the wind.) I will grant though that at this point, sure, we can't follow every single neural pattern and say with absolute certainty what the cause was why some person decided to turn left instead of right in the supermarket.

I brought here the problem of Socrates because it contradicts your naïve confidence in the simplicity of the problem of good and the law of the majorities. Neither the Athenian majority, nor that supposed current pro-Socrates majority solves the problem of good. Both can be wrong.

Or both can be right, given the different circumstances. That is actually quite possible and normal under moral subjectivism and/or relativism. But yes, both can also be wrong.

Socrates is an enigma of history and Plato's defence has nothing to do with the myth of Socrates, which is commonly used in textbooks. It is a furious criticism against democracy. Absolutely counter your "democratic good". A more expert reading discovers that the little we know about Socrates is full of lights and shadows. There is no consensus, then, on Socrates. And be careful with Plato.

I will even agree to that, especially given Plato's anti-democracy slant in The Republic. And, yes, the fact that he has no problem putting his own words in the mouth of Socrates, Solon, and other figures who couldn't have had those dialogues by virtue of not even being alive at the same time.

Still, for the purpose of discussing how a given trial fits a certain moral or legal system, it seems to me like we can discuss the possibly fictional trial of Socrates just as well, if that's what you asked about.