Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Meed]

Cornsail,

I don't know if this will help this time, but I think it is worth trying again just to reach understanding (I am not interested in people changing their minds on this, only that the arguments make sense).

We use actions to perform other actions all the time; and that is the nature of the simulation.

So, when I think of the number 5, there is no physical 5 out there that I can touch. The concept of 5 exists in the function (action) of my brain. I can then use that action (concept of 5) and add (perform another type of action) it to another concept of 5 (action) to produce a new type of output -- the point being that with an underlying mental substrate I can perform actions on actions to produce an output (which is, itself, another concept or action).

The simulation is the same -- it consists in the action of the computer. It begins with a description of atoms and the substrate (computer) performs new actions on the action that is the description of atoms, applying rules that amount to the laws of physics.

What results is an action, a concept. The concept is created in the function of the computer, though, so we could theoretically interact with it by trying to understand the pattern of electron movement.

No one has to observe the action from the outside for it to have meaning (except to us as observers), because the meaning is encoded in the constraints of the way the system operates. There has to be an original observer to create meaning within the system (top-down), but for the system to continue producing the simulation no one theoretically has to interpret it.

Now, I can see a real problem with what you mentioned in an earlier post, which amounts to how we could interact with such a simulation. We would have to map the output of the electron movements in the computer to match what occurs in the simulation representing consciousness; and the way that is carried out depends on someone being able to interpret those electron movements as something intelligible. I would be concerned that we fooled ourselves in the implementation of that mapping into thinking that consciousness occurs in the simulation; how could we really tell?

If we could do it, then once the mapping rules are set up, then we should be able to interact with the simulation in future and see new outputs that convince us that the simulated people carry out conscious activity. But the engineering issues would be an absolute bear, and I agree that in their implementation they introduce a level of uncertainty that I don't think we can really overcome. I don't see how we could tell for sure that we have mapped 'conscious action' in the simulation properly, because I don't know how we could tell what electron movements meant what.

We would truly have to be gods to do such a thing.

That is a clearer way of putting it. The problem I have is when you say things like "the water is real in the simulation" or "the person is real in the simulation". Why? I don't consider water to be an action and I don't consider a person to be an action. Maybe this is where we'd disagree. I would say that a simulation of water is a pattern of action by the computer that is isomorphic to the patterns of action exhibited by water. It makes no sense to me to say that "the water is real in the simulation" unless you define everything as action. But the problem with that is that action would lose meaning, because it is by definition a change in a thing and as yourself said, an action is not a thing. Again this may be a point where we'd disagree.

As for actions being carried out on actions and your example of the concept 5: I understand your argument, but I don't agree with it, because I don't agree that actions can be carried out on actions. It's easy to think of them that way, but these actions (e.g. "adding the number 5 to the number 3") are just complex actions of "things" (e.g. changes in the brain). The argument is not a bad one though.

 

[!Kaggen]

A simulated chess player will really beat you in a real game of chess, even though it never moves an actual solid playing piece on an actual wooden board. You, the real world person, will have been really beaten in a real game of chess. (Unless you're really good, or the program sucks).

To say that an instance of the game of chess exists independently from the physical chess set with which it's played is not an extraordinary claim (for one thing, chess games can be printed in books, but wooden chess sets cannot) and it is not dualism; it's simply recognizing the existence of categories of processes (chess games, evolution, rolling, aerodynamic flight) that are distinguishable from the objects (chess sets, populations of creatures, round rocks, birds) undergoing them, and can be replicated in systems that are analogs of the functionality of those objects (chess programs, populations of genomes in a genetic algorithm, wheels, airplanes).

Of course, an argument could be made that any flying machine would only be a simulation of a bird, and as such, could not possibly be expected to really fly in the real world.

That argument hasn't been heard so much recently.

The only difference between that argument about flying machines, and the current one regarding whether a consciousness machine could actually be conscious in the real world, is that at present there is a better understanding, in the flying machines case, of the underlying processes e.g. acceleration of air to generate thrust forces.

But, there are only two possibilities: consciousness actually does result entirely from underlying processes describable by physical laws, or it does not. If it does, then a machine sufficiently replicating all those processes would also be conscious. (Whether it would be feasible to build such a machine is beside the point. Birds flew by the same means before, and after, the technology to make a working airplane existed.) If it does not, then by definition it is magic. The latter is the actual dualistic view.
Respectfully,
Myriad

Huh?

So your saying an unquestioning belief in mathematics is required for the one true monism.

We will conquer all naysayers with "the mathematical truth" and we will fly!!!

What is it with the human need for religion?

Why do we need to believe we have the one true way?

Humility is a rare thing.

 

[rocketdodger]

I just said the exact opposite. But carry on.

You specifically said that computer science is NOT science, rather it is either engineering or mathematics.

Sorry if it is difficult for you to read your own posts ...

 

[rocketdodger]

I can distinguish between reality and simulation. So what is your point?

The point is that because I can distinguish between rocks and cells there exists a description of one that cannot be satisfied by the other. This is a fact.

Likewise for computers. This is a fact.

Any assertion to the contrary is nothing but ignorance or delusion or both.

 

[Beth]

The point is that because I can distinguish between rocks and cells there exists a description of one that cannot be satisfied by the other. This is a fact.

I think it's not too difficult to find descriptions of one that cannot be satisfied by the other for cells and rocks. I think the more difficult general solution i.e. that there exists a definition that distinguishes between life and non-life, is not a fact, but a conjecture. Until such a definition is actually produced, it is only a conjecture to say that it exists. Were you arguing for the more general case or referring only to cells and rocks?

Although, on rereading this, what occurs to me is the problem is not that we cannot arrive at such a definition, but that we have difficulty making the distinction ourselves for borderline cases like viruses, both bio and machine.

 

[Meed]

The point is that because I can distinguish between rocks and cells there exists a description of one that cannot be satisfied by the other. This is a fact.

And I can distinguish between computers and cells. So what is the point of your point?

 

[Malerin]

A simulated chess player will really beat you in a real game of chess, even though it never moves an actual solid playing piece on an actual wooden board. You, the real world person, will have been really beaten in a real game of chess. (Unless you're really good, or the program sucks).

What is a "real game of chess"? Where does a "real game of chess" exist, other than in a person's mind? We define "chess" as just moving things around by a set of rules with certain objectives. It takes an observer to give any game any meaning. So I would object to "simluated chess player" right off the bat.

It's circular reasoning in the same way Westprog pointed out: a "simluated chess player" could only be a "real" chess player if it were the type of thing that could give meaning to the rules of a game- if it could know it was playing a game. But that is the very thing that's being questioned: is a simulation capable of understanding that above and beyond the rules and objectives of a game is the abstract concept of the game itself?

To say that an instance of the game of chess exists independently from the physical chess set with which it's played is not an extraordinary claim (for one thing, chess games can be printed in books, but wooden chess sets cannot) and it is not dualism; it's simply recognizing the existence of categories of processes (chess games, evolution, rolling, aerodynamic flight) that are distinguishable from the objects (chess sets, populations of creatures, round rocks, birds) undergoing them, and can be replicated in systems that are analogs of the functionality of those objects (chess programs, populations of genomes in a genetic algorithm, wheels, airplanes).

This sounds awfully like Platonism: "Game of Chess" exists in some realm indpendent from physicality? Why not go with the common-sense definition of "chess": it's a label we give to a set of pieces, rules, and objectives. Nothing more.

Of course, an argument could be made that any flying machine would only be a simulation of a bird, and as such, could not possibly be expected to really fly in the real world.

That argument hasn't been heard so much recently.

A "flying machine", by definition, flies. Unless it's broken. It doesn't simulate flight: it flies. The claim being made by computationalists is that simulated flight is "real in the simulated world", but not real in "our world". Some of us see that as dualism. A machine that actually flies isn't a simulation.

The only difference between that argument about flying machines, and the current one regarding whether a consciousness machine could actually be conscious in the real world, is that at present there is a better understanding, in the flying machines case, of the underlying processes e.g. acceleration of air to generate thrust forces.

I think conscious machines are possible. If you slowly replace neurons with transistors, I don't see why consciousness would disappear. But this is much different than the claims that simulated consciousness is actual consciousness.

But, there are only two possibilities: consciousness actually does result entirely from underlying processes describable by physical laws, or it does not. If it does, then a machine sufficiently replicating all those processes would also be conscious. (Whether it would be feasible to build such a machine is beside the point. Birds flew by the same means before, and after, the technology to make a working airplane existed.) If it does not, then by definition it is magic. The latter is the actual dualistic view.

If a machine replicated a human brain entirely, it should be conscious. If it weren't I don't know if "magic" would enter the picture. It could be that consciousness is limited to biological creatures in some strange way we don't yet understand.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Why are they wrong? From their frame of reference, it fits the definition of dualistic.

Not necessarily, no it doesn't. If the nature of reality is that they are simply actions in a computer and Ultimate Reality is matter, then their belief that they know what matter is simply is wrong (from the viewpoint of Ultimate Reality), and there is no dualism involved. Someone could, of course, read dualism into it, but that wouldn't make it be dualistic.

I prefer 'mathematics' rather than 'god', but that basically that fits my understanding of idealism.

Doesn't matter what the label is, as you know.

Um, I'm not sure where you get this idea that idealists think human consciousness is something other than thoughts in the mind of God. It's pretty clear to me that they realize exactly what you just said.

Most do, but some do not. Hammy, for instance was very strict in his thinking. I have encountered others who are not so strict in the way they approach the subject.

I'm confused here. Do you think that idealists think that matter is some independent 'thing'? Because that's not my impression at all.

No, did I imply that they did? That would be dualism. What I implied is that there are some who identify as idealists who, when you talk to them in detail, prove to be dualists. They seem to think that human consciousness is some other thing. They do not say they think this, but that is where many of the arguments lead.

No, I do not think this of all people who identify as idealists. There are many, many idealists who stick to their monism very nicely.

My own perspective is that I think it is not necessary to identify as idealist, materialist or whatever since it's all the same.

From their frame of reference, why are they wrong? Isn't what they term "ordinary matter" the only stuff they can perceive? Isn't there other stuff, completely different - i.e. not composed of the electrical impulses within the simulation machine that we built? Stuff that they cannot actually perceive in any way, but that underlies and gives rise to their reality? Why wouldn't a dualist approach be a completely accurate description of both their internal reality and the greater reality of our universe and minds which build and programmed theirs?

I never said they were wrong from their frame of reference if they don't know they are part of a simulation.

No, their other stuff is not completely different, because their other stuff consists in the actions of the computer; that is what creates it; it does not have a separate reality aside from the actions of the computer.

From the reference of Ultimate Reality, as though we knew what it is, they are wrong. In this scenario we have knowledge that matter is Ultimate Reality and their belief that they know what is real is wrong. From their perspective they would think that they are correct and continue calling what they call matter 'real'.

That is not two different uses of the word 'real'. They have a belief about what is real and, if they are not aware that they are in a simulation, then they would continue to believe that what they call matter is Reality. From our perspective, we would say that they are wrong (if we could access that world) and that what is real is what we call matter and they are just living in a simulation.

There is no dualism involved from our perspective or theirs.

The problem with them deciding on dualism would be the same as any of us deciding on dualism -- how can two entirely different types of substance interact? The reason that they are called different substances is because they cannot interact. No one can solve that problem because it doesn't have a solution.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

That is a clearer way of putting it. The problem I have is when you say things like "the water is real in the simulation" or "the person is real in the simulation". Why? I don't consider water to be an action and I don't consider a person to be an action. Maybe this is where we'd disagree. I would say that a simulation of water is a pattern of action by the computer that is isomorphic to the patterns of action exhibited by water. It makes no sense to me to say that "the water is real in the simulation" unless you define everything as action. But the problem with that is that action would lose meaning, because it is by definition a change in a thing and as yourself said, an action is not a thing. Again this may be a point where we'd disagree.

That's all fine with me. It's clunkier language, but it's certainly clearer. Trying to relay this information in short posts on the internet creates potential confusions, but I don't think we disagree all that much. And I hope you also see that when we speak of 'water in the simulation' we are speaking as though we are denizens of the simulation.

As for actions being carried out on actions and your example of the concept 5: I understand your argument, but I don't agree with it, because I don't agree that actions can be carried out on actions. It's easy to think of them that way, but these actions (e.g. "adding the number 5 to the number 3") are just complex actions of "things" (e.g. changes in the brain). The argument is not a bad one though.

OK, but I'm not sure how they differ, really. With the computer the description/concept of particle is really just complex actions of things (changes in the computer) that is acted upon by other commands in the computer (simulation of laws of physics), which are, in turn, just things more actions of electrons moving around. The simulation is like a grander scale version of us adding in our heads.

If there is a physical 'thing' in the brain that is the '5', then there is a physical 'thing' in the computer that is the 'particle'. For the brain it is complex movements of ions in several neurons; in the computer it is a certain set of gates allowing electrons to pass.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

We see pixels on the screen. Pixels are not "in the simulation", they are in the "real world". If we were able to look at the inner workings of the machine we would see electrons moving through gates. They are not "in the simulation", they are in the "real world". Nothing is going on that is not in the real world. Hence, there is no "in the simulation". There is a simulation and that simulation is part of the real world. If we think of it as another world, that is simply a mental exercise.



Why?



I obviously disagree with the bolded portion (bolding mine).

I wasn't talking specifically about a simulation of the entire universe. I'm not sure if that's important to your point.

OK, but I don't know what else to call it.

For illustrative purposes, assume that we are part of a simulation -- we call what we see around us 'our world'. A perfect simulation should be able to produce people who would say the same thing -- they would speak of their 'world'.

That we know that their reality is actually caused by something other than what they think wouldn't stop them from speaking of what they see as their world. It is in that sense that I speak of it as well.

 

[Myriad]

Huh?

So your saying an unquestioning belief in mathematics is required for the one true monism.

We will conquer all naysayers with "the mathematical truth" and we will fly!!!

What is it with the human need for religion?

Why do we need to believe we have the one true way?

No, I didn't say any of those things.

What I said was, there are only two possibilities: consciousness actually does result entirely from underlying processes describable by physical laws, or it does not. If it does, then a machine sufficiently replicating all those processes would also be conscious. If it does not, then by definition it is magic.

Take your pick, but the latter is the dualistic view.

Respectfully,
Myriad

 

[Frank Newgent]

No, I didn't say any of those things.

What I said was, there are only two possibilities: consciousness actually does result entirely from underlying processes describable by physical laws, or it does not. If it does, then a machine sufficiently replicating all those processes would also be conscious. If it does not, then by definition it is magic.

Take your pick, but the latter is the dualistic view.

Respectfully,
Myriad

Describe in detail how, specifically, Mozart's Requiem results from underlying processes. Not Henryk Gorecki's Symphony No. 3. Not "Earth Died Screaming" by Tom Waits.

Mozart's Requiem.

If you can't it must have been produced by magic.

 

[dlorde]

Why does times arrow exist in the simulation? What happens if we run it in reverse?

It's a simulation of our world - statistical mechanics.

If this isn't relevant, please ignore it.

You don't appear to want to discuss the relevant stuff, so in future I will.

 

[dlorde]

But the super-wonderful planck-scale perfect simulation would have exactly the same limitation as the painting - it's not the thing itself. The picture reproduces some of the relationships between objects. Other relationships will not be present.

Obviously it's not the thing itself, it's a simulation...

This is leaving aside the fact that a computational simulation of the current universe as we understand it would not be possible at any scale. Or that we have no knowledge of how nature works at the planck scale.

Thought experiment, remember?

 

[AlBell]

You don't appear to want to discuss the relevant stuff, so in future I will.

You one of those dicks Plait worries about, or just having a bad day?

 

[AlBell]

It's a simulation of our world - statistical mechanics.

Missed the point, I see.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Missed the point, I see.

I guess I missed it too. Could you explain? Time's arrow is a part of the simulation because it is a part of our physical universe and the simulation simulates the physical universe. We program it into the simulation.

I don't know what would happen if we ran it in reverse. Part of the rules of the simulation, however, would be that we couldn't run it in reverse, since the physical universe doesn't run in that direction.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Describe in detail how, specifically, Mozart's Requiem results from underlying processes. Not Henryk Gorecki's Symphony No. 3. Not "Earth Died Screaming" by Tom Waits.

Mozart's Requiem.

If you can't it must have been produced by magic.

I'm not sure what you are asking since there are many things that we do not know.

Myriad reported the logical possibilities. There is either one substance with its underlying physical laws (and a sufficiently sophisticated machine could replicate those laws and therefore simulate that reality) or there is not. If there is not one substance, then there are two or more. If there are two substances, then we have magic, since that word describes the interaction between completely different substances.

Do you have a problem with the ability of a machine to theoretically simulate physical laws/reality or the question over what dualism really means? I assume you are not trying to point out that we are ignorant, since that has no bearing on the logical possibilities.

 

[JJM 777]

I don't want to change the topic after 60 pages,
neither will I read those 60 pages,
so feel free to start a new thread on this if the topic is of greater interest than just a small comment quickly disappearing into this huge thread:

What are the prevalent theories about how the human brain makes decisions, why different (and the same!) people make different decisions, and why some people tend generally to make more selfish or criminal decisions than some others.

Determinists say that there is no free will, I guess they view the human brain like a tabula rasa computer, everything what a human being ever thinks or "decides" is simply a logical consequence of the earlier cumulative input received by the brain.

I tend to think that humans certainly have a free will, or at least some kind of random generators that produce slightly random thoughts and decisions, which makes humans creative and unpredictable, and impossible to completely homogenize psychologically.

 

[westprog]

And I can distinguish between computers and cells. So what is the point of your point?

Nobody has ever claimed that there's no way to distinguish between cells and rocks, and yet it's the constant rebuttal. It's the claim that computers and life have some special quality that rocks don't have that's in dispute, and always has been.

I don't see what the point is in constantly rebutting a claim that nobody has made.