Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Ichneumonwasp]

I disagree when you say that the simulation hasn't been run from scratch. Stick figure fella scanned the entire pattern as left behind by the careless monkeys (and I allowed that he did that in whatever order was required to keep "meaning" intact if anybody considers that to be an important requirement) in order to ensure the entire pattern conformed to a series of rule 110 productions when he was done. In other words he applied rule 110 at each point in the grid, but only changed things when required. I can't see why you would say this wasn't running a full simulation. Similarly, if someone (or a machine) effectively does the same thing, then I claim that is also equivalent to running the full simulation. Why would you have to move anything around if it was all already as you needed it to be?

I claim that scanning the full pattern and verifying it is correct is a "computation" just as much as creating the pattern from scratch by moving rocks around.

But I don't think that scanning a pattern and verifying its correctness is the same sort of activity as creating the pattern. It is following the rules that create the pattern that makes it a simulation.

 

[blobru]

Sorry, I missed your post.

No sweat. Wasn't saying much, it turns out.

I'm afraid I'm not following. How has the basic stuff changed? Stay in the 'real world' and we see 'stuff' -- possibly physical strings -- and in the simulation there is action (from our perspective). In the simulation the denizens see their world as begin composed of the same things we call physical strings. That we know they are wrong can be confusing if we lose sight of what we are discussing, but there is no dualism involved.

There is no change in basic stuff.

Not from the pov of the simulation, no. Everything would be simulated stuff.

I think it's the interaction between the simulating world's physical stuff, the physical switch sequences which create the simulated world, and the simulated world's simulated stuff, which requires a higher-level interpretation on top of the switch sequences, that was causing confusion. I felt (mistakenly, I guess; see discussion to follow) it was being claimed there was a necessary, uninterpreted connexion between some physical switching and specific simulated actions, which would smack of dualism, recalling Descartes' mysterious mediation of matter and soul via the pineal gland.

Could we do it? Who knows? Does it matter? I don't think so. It is a thought experiment after all; Pixy and RD originally proposed it as a reductio ad absurdum to show that resistance to it demonstrates folks' underlying dualism.

Ignoring the potential absurdity of the implementation, a perfect simulation would simulate consciousness, by definition.

The underlying physics supporting the simulation isn't visible or relevant within the simulation. All that is required is that the simulation covers every aspect of the simulated environment.

Yes. The simulation argument being that if our program describes the right kind of world, finely-grained, properly-ordered, sufficiently complex, entities within that world will be conscious. If we assume that is true, then trivially, it seems to me, the argument follows.

Of course, that reality is, effectively, nothing but descriptions of well-defined changes in definite physical states is a whole nother claim, as it may be impossible to implement (and if it can't be implemented [even in a thought experiment], trivially, it can't be true).

Ich_wasp laments above that those two claims are being confused.

My answer is no. Physical processes that have a one to one relationship to an imagined world do not make that world real. If a simulation is a physical system who's outputs or processes (or more specifically, a subset of them) are isomorphic to some imagined physical system, then the later is still imagined. If we remove the importance of the imagining and say it is isomorphic to an imaginable physical system, regardless of whether it has been actually imagined, then we would have to hold that there are an infinite amount of "real" simulated systems created by the infinite number of conceivable isomorphic mappings resultant from the physical systems that exist in the "real world". There is no reason (that I can see) to believe that there are actually an infinite number of "real" "worlds" created by the infinite number of conceivable isomorphic mappings. Mapping, analogy and relationship constructions are mental exercises, and would be otherwise meaningless.

Right, that would be a serious, seemingly fatal, implementation issue. As an illustration, consider an extremely simple universe: one entity with two states (fluctuating between big X and small x, say). Obviously, this universe can be represented by a single switch with two states: off & on. Easy enough. The problem is: which is which?

That is, within the world which the program creates, how will each state of the programmed switch be realized? Will "off" = X and "on" = x; or will "off" = X and "on" = x? In the simulating world, we have two choices for interpretation. So what's going on in the simulated world? When the switch is "off", does the simulated world consist of big X, or little x? (Or do we create two mirror worlds? Or is bigger and smaller an arbitrary illusion?)

With no necessary connection between physical switching and our competing interpretations of the switching (what it makes sense to us to describe it as), we lose any necessary connection between physically constrained forms of experience [physical interpretations of substance] and substance. The same switches may represent logically equivalent but describe physically different worlds (in our simple example, one where x is expanding, another where X is shrinking). Maybe that's the case -- sounds a little, though only a little, like many worlds quantum theory -- but whatever it is, it's not as simple as every physical representation uniquely prescribes a virtual world... voila!

But that's an implementation issue: a serious hurdle for the claim that reality is, in fact, a simulation; but not for the claim that if it is a simulation, then so is our consciousness.

 

[!Kaggen]

Ignoring the potential absurdity of the implementation, a perfect simulation would simulate consciousness, by definition.

This is what I have a problem with. Consciousness is being defined as a simulation. i.e. our reality is a simulation. Then the claim follows that consciousness can therefore be simulated. Its a circular argument.

But that's an implementation issue: a serious hurdle for the claim that reality is, in fact, a simulation; but not for the claim that if it is a simulation, then so is our consciousness.

Exactly, the problem boils down to the relationship between concepts and percepts. We can conceptualize our reality as a simulation, but we also need to perceive it as such before we can claim we have knowledge that a simulation can re-create reality. This is the essence of the Turing Test. It is not a thought experiment.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

This is what I have a problem with. Consciousness is being defined as a simulation. i.e. our reality is a simulation. Then the claim follows that consciousness can therefore be simulated. Its a circular argument.

No one made that claim. I brought up the issue of our not knowing if we were in a simulation to try to focus people on the simulation that was proposed -- because it seems to me that people are dismissing it without taking it seriously. The responses I have seen lately sound like rationalizations after the simulation idea is rejected out of hand. A perfect simulation should simulate consciousness unless you believe there is something more to consciousness than the interaction of particles and forces.

Exactly, the problem boils down to the relationship between concepts and percepts. We can conceptualize our reality as a simulation, but we also need to perceive it as such before we can claim we have knowledge that a simulation can re-create reality. This is the essence of the Turing Test. It is not a thought experiment.

I don't think anyone here subscribes to the idea that we could actually create such a simulation and I don't know where you got the idea that we were arguing for its reality. It is a thought experiment. We are not deriving any new information from it. It begins with the idea that the world is perfectly recreated in the simulation and asks the question -- do you believe that in a perfectly recreated world we would see consciousness? It is no more complicated than that. If you don't think consciousness would be in that perfect simulation, then you believe that consciousness arises from something other than energy and physical forces.

 

[westprog]

This is accurately modelled in the simulation. To the simulated people it's totally 'real'

The existence of simulated people, and their ability to experience time at all, is the point at issue. Does a picture of a person standing under a waterfall experience water?

As has been pointed out by Greg Egan, the simulation could be played back in any order, and the supposed simulated people would experience the same way.

 

[westprog]

I disagree when you say that the simulation hasn't been run from scratch. Stick figure fella scanned the entire pattern as left behind by the careless monkeys (and I allowed that he did that in whatever order was required to keep "meaning" intact if anybody considers that to be an important requirement) in order to ensure the entire pattern conformed to a series of rule 110 productions when he was done. In other words he applied rule 110 at each point in the grid, but only changed things when required. I can't see why you would say this wasn't running a full simulation. Similarly, if someone (or a machine) effectively does the same thing, then I claim that is also equivalent to running the full simulation. Why would you have to move anything around if it was all already as you needed it to be?

I claim that scanning the full pattern and verifying it is correct is a "computation" just as much as creating the pattern from scratch by moving rocks around.

What if the pattern were laid out on the moon? Would just looking up do the trick? How close would you have to be? Would you have to understand the rules, or would just looking at all the rocks be enough? Suppose you partway understood the rules - would you create people who sort of half-existed?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Not from the pov of the simulation, no. Everything would be simulated stuff.

I think it's the interaction between the simulating world's physical stuff, the physical switch sequences which create the simulated world, and the simulated world's simulated stuff, which requires a higher-level interpretation on top of the switch sequences, that was causing confusion. I felt (mistakenly, I guess; see discussion to follow) it was being claimed there was a necessary, uninterpreted connexion between some physical switching and specific simulated actions, which would smack of dualism, recalling Descartes' mysterious mediation of matter and soul via the pineal gland.

I'm not sure where the confusion arises. It very likely does arise from that interaction. I tried to make it easier for folks to see what was going on by mentioning the actual physical changes but likely muddled it more thoroughly.

There is no way that a simulation could proceed with no interpretation between what occurs in the simulation and the switches of the computer; it would be meaningless without it. That is why earlier I tried to make the distinction between the bottom-up meaning that we have (through natural selection) and the top-down meaning of a computer system (where we impose meaning by arranging which gates will open and when).

Ignoring the potential absurdity of the implementation, a perfect simulation would simulate consciousness, by definition.

Yes. The simulation argument being that if our program describes the right kind of world, finely-grained, properly-ordered, sufficiently complex, entities within that world will be conscious. If we assume that is true, then trivially, it seems to me, the argument follows.

Of course, that reality is, effectively, nothing but descriptions of well-defined changes in definite physical states is a whole nother claim, as it may be impossible to implement (and if it can't be implemented [even in a thought experiment], trivially, it can't be true).

Yep.

Right, that would be a serious, seemingly fatal, implementation issue. As an illustration, consider an extremely simple universe: one entity with two states (fluctuating between big X and small x, say). Obviously, this universe can be represented by a single switch with two states: off & on. Easy enough. The problem is: which is which?

That is, within the world which the program creates, how will each state of the programmed switch be realized? Will "off" = X and "on" = x; or will "off" = X and "on" = x? In the simulating world, we have two choices for interpretation. So what's going on in the simulated world? When the switch is "off", does the simulated world consist of big X, or little x? (Or do we create two mirror worlds? Or is bigger and smaller an arbitrary illusion?)

With no necessary connection between physical switching and our competing interpretations of the switching (what it makes sense to us to describe it as), we lose any necessary connection between physically constrained forms of experience [physical interpretations of substance] and substance. The same switches may represent logically equivalent but describe physically different worlds (in our simple example, one where x is expanding, another where X is shrinking). Maybe that's the case -- sounds a little, though only a little, like many worlds quantum theory -- but whatever it is, it's not as simple as every physical representation uniquely prescribes a virtual world... voila!

But that's an implementation issue: a serious hurdle for the claim that reality is, in fact, a simulation; but not for the claim that if it is a simulation, then so is our consciousness.

As I have repeated often, I haven't the slightest idea if we could actually create this sort of simulation. I have no idea how it could be done, if we could interact with such a simulation if we could create it, or even how one would go about programming something that acts like a particle and then how to program the 'physical forces'.

It certainly seems as though it should be possible, though. I haven't heard an argument against it being possible that seems to stand.

There is no question that we must define meaning in such a system, but that is not the same as saying that we must observe its implementation for it to occur or to have meaning. We devise the meaning in the system from the outset. If we were to map the output of a simulation onto the 'real world' we would have to devise how it maps as well.

It has been mentioned repeatedly that this follows the simple dictum that all meaning is observer dependent, and it certainly does. The problem with the 'dictum', however, is that it is not at all clear that all meaning is observer dependent. This depends, of course, on how 'observer' is defined. Meaning is decoded (imposed) from the environment every time a sensory receptor is activated because receptors only respond to certain types of inputs and they provide information that is maintained throughout transmission (location, duration, intensity, modality, etc.). We can define receptors as observers, but they are certainly not conscious observers.

 

[dlorde]

I disagree when you say that the simulation hasn't been run from scratch. Stick figure fella scanned the entire pattern as left behind by the careless monkeys (and I allowed that he did that in whatever order was required to keep "meaning" intact if anybody considers that to be an important requirement) in order to ensure the entire pattern conformed to a series of rule 110 productions when he was done. In other words he applied rule 110 at each point in the grid, but only changed things when required. I can't see why you would say this wasn't running a full simulation. Similarly, if someone (or a machine) effectively does the same thing, then I claim that is also equivalent to running the full simulation. Why would you have to move anything around if it was all already as you needed it to be?

OIC - I may have misunderstood what you were saying. If you mean that by scanning and analysing every position and applying the rule the stick man has effectively re-run the simulation in his head, then I'd have to (provisionally) agree. But the simulation that was being run using the rocks, currently paused for correction, remains static during this period.

I claim that scanning the full pattern and verifying it is correct is a "computation" just as much as creating the pattern from scratch by moving rocks around.

OK, I'll go along with that - if you can execute every move in your head, you're running a mental simulation.

 

[Robin]

Are you guys still here?

I think it is time to go read Goedel, look at Eschers and listen to Bach

 

[dlorde]

The existence of simulated people, and their ability to experience time at all, is the point at issue.

The simulation includes people - they exist in the simulation, and as the simulation progresses so simulation time passes. If it's a simulation using rocks as its substrate, the quantum of time would be the movement of a rock.

Does a picture of a person standing under a waterfall experience water?

Is a picture of a person standing under a waterfall a simulation of a person standing under a waterfall, or just a picture?

As has been pointed out by Greg Egan, the simulation could be played back in any order, and the supposed simulated people would experience the same way.

Let's assume, for the purpose of argument, that the simulation is an accurate reproduction of our reality, and that the arrow of time emerges according to the laws of thermodynamics in the same way.

 

[!Kaggen]

No one made that claim. I brought up the issue of our not knowing if we were in a simulation to try to focus people on the simulation that was proposed -- because it seems to me that people are dismissing it without taking it seriously. The responses I have seen lately sound like rationalizations after the simulation idea is rejected out of hand. A perfect simulation should simulate consciousness unless you believe there is something more to consciousness than the interaction of particles and forces.






I don't think anyone here subscribes to the idea that we could actually create such a simulation and I don't know where you got the idea that we were arguing for its reality. It is a thought experiment. We are not deriving any new information from it. It begins with the idea that the world is perfectly recreated in the simulation and asks the question -- do you believe that in a perfectly recreated world we would see consciousness? It is no more complicated than that. If you don't think consciousness would be in that perfect simulation, then you believe that consciousness arises from something other than energy and physical forces.

Repeating the PM mantra that a lack of belief in simulations involves a belief in magic is getting boring. By all means chant it in the church of computation, but don't expect anyone outside the church to be hypnotized by it.
The bottom line is, I do not believe that thought experiments are knowledge.
When you can create a simulation that passes the Turing test then I will believe in simulations, before that I won't.

 

[!Kaggen]

Are you guys still here?

I think it is time to go read Goedel, look at Eschers and listen to Bach

You don't get it obviously.
The idea is to attract an audience using a title with geniuses and then spin them into a strange loop from which there is no escape.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Repeating the PM mantra that a lack of belief in simulations involves a belief in magic is getting boring. By all means chant it in the church of computation, but don't expect anyone outside the church to be hypnotized by it.
The bottom line is, I do not believe that thought experiments are knowledge.
When you can create a simulation that passes the Turing test then I will believe in simulations, before that I won't.

No one claims that a thought experiment is knowledge.

Saying that you do not believe that it is possible until you see it is a perfectly valid perspective. I have no idea if it is actually possible, but I haven't heard a good explanation as to why it is not.

The issue is with those who want to argue that it is not possible even in theory; if you are not one of those people then there is nothing to argue about. Anyone who wants to argue that it is not possible needs to provide a rationale. There are two obvious approaches -- one holds that computation can't possible account for such a world and the other is dualism.

If you believe that computation can't do it (even in theory), then you should provide an argument showing that computation can't do it. It is perfectly valid to counter with -- no, you should show me the money and prove that it is possible. That is why Pixy repeatedly invokes Church-Turing. According to that theory this sort of simulation should be possible even if bringing to fruition would be horribly difficult.

 

[Robin]

You don't get it obviously.
The idea is to attract an audience using a title with geniuses and then spin them into a strange loop from which there is no escape.

Perhaps you shouldn't try to analyse throw away lines

 

[AlBell]

...
We can define receptors as observers, but they are certainly not conscious observers.

And now haven't we reached the confusion level about what are the 'real implications' of qm interactions and how/why does a specific one arise?

Cramer tried to address the problem with his Transactional Interpretation; I'm not sure that it's been demonstrated as clearly wrong.

 

[Beth]

No, it's not. Their water is composed of electrical impulses on a computer. Those electrical impulses are programed to simulate water. They might have even been programmed to simulate the behavior of hydrogen and oxygen atoms of our reality, but that isn't the same as water in our reality.

You are simply confusing the levels of discussion. In their world, water is made of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. If you do not understand that this is the case, then you do not understand the simulation as reductio or as thought experiment. It really is that plain and simple.

That we, using our god's eye level, can see that they have the wrong idea about reality from our perspective is entirely beside the point as far as they are concerned.

But it's not beside the point as far as WE are concerned. I'm not confused about there being different levels of discussion. I'm pointing out that the different levels of perception in this scenario seem isomorphic to dualism.

No. But I can define the difference between a hydrogen atom and electrical impulses in a computer programmed to simulate a hydrogen atom.

I don't understand why you said this last sentence. Yes, that's one simulation of hydrogen and yes, that's not what we are discussing here. What point were you trying to make?

OK, you are now demonstrating to me that you don't understand the simulation at all.

This doesn't answer my question.

Yes, there are. There is 'real' in the sense that you can drink water to satisfy thirst. And there is 'real' in the sense of simulated water satisfies the thirst of simulated creatures, but can never satisfy our thirst. That is two different meanings of 'real'.

All I see is one meaning of the world real and two entirely different frames of reference. From one frame of reference only one of the two meanings of 'real' is correct.

The fact that there are two different frames of reference referring to different things by using the word 'real' to me is two different meanings. I'm not sure why you don't think that constitutes two different meanings of the word 'real'.

As you point out above, we might be in the same situation. Don't you term that conception of reality dualist when someone on this forum suggests it might be true for us? If not, could you explain what the difference you perceive is between the two situations aside from the role reversal? Or does the role reversal affect the definition of dualist?

For us to be actual creatures based in matter and for there to be an entirely different type of creature 'above' us made of an entirely different type of substance is dualism.

That we are just the actions in a computer and not made of matter from a different frame -- say there really is some other type creature made of matter and we are simply actions and not 'things' -- is not dualism. That still fits within the realm of monism.

To the denizens of a simulation, we would be an entirely different type of creature 'above' them made of [from their frame of reference] an entirely different type of substance than they can perceive in their simulated reality. That is dualism from their frame of reference. How does it differ from dualism in our frame of reference?

That's possible. It's easy to get confused in all the levels of abstraction.

I'm sorry, and I don't intend to be mean, but I don't know how else to say this: I'm really getting the sense that you guys actually don't understand the basic argument.

It's okay. I feel the same way.

 

[AlBell]

Let's assume, for the purpose of argument, that the simulation is an accurate reproduction of our reality, and that the arrow of time emerges according to the laws of thermodynamics in the same way.

Since this is by definition a simulation based on computer operations, what have we done if we recode it to reverse all that occured before, or have we lost information such that that is not possible?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

But it's not beside the point as far as WE are concerned. I'm not confused about there being different levels of discussion. I'm pointing out that the different levels of perception in this scenario seem isomorphic to dualism.
This doesn't answer my question.

The fact that there are two different frames of reference referring to different things by using the word 'real' to me is two different meanings. I'm not sure why you don't think that constitutes two different meanings of the word 'real'.

To the denizens of a simulation, we would be an entirely different type of creature 'above' them made of [from their frame of reference] an entirely different type of substance than they can perceive in their simulated reality. That is dualism from their frame of reference. How does it differ from dualism in our frame of reference?



It's okay. I feel the same way.

Ah, OK, I think I understand the misunderstanding a bit better.

The answer to the dualism issue is that if there is a simulation that is based in action, then the people in the simulation are simply wrong about what they think the nature of reality is.

They think that their world is made of atoms because that is their experience, but the 'higher reality' is that their world is actually just actions of electrons passing through gates. Actual reality is based (in this scenario) in what we call matter and what they think is matter actually isn't matter (as we label it) but a simulation of what we call matter.

This is why I said that the situation is like idealism. Idealism as a monism is generally felt to consist of God. God is the ultimate reality. Everything that we think is matter is not actually matter -- it is thought from the mind of God.

Where some folks go wrong with idealism is that they think that human consciousness is something other than thoughts in the mind of God and that realizing that everything is just thoughts in the mind of God is some sort of great realization, when actually it would only be God thinking that everything is God and God thinking (which is no great realization).

The way it works from a monistic perspective is: God --> God's thought *is* 'matter' --> matter interacts to create other beings -- > some of the matter acts to create human thinking which is created through the actions of human brains.

The actual reality is God and everything else is a function of God thinking.

Considering idealism, we are wrong to think that matter is some independent 'thing'.

The denizens of the simulated world would think that what they see as matter is some 'thing' that is independent, that it is the originary substance. But they would simply be wrong, since what they consider matter is actually something created through the simulation by whizzing electrons, which (again, only in this scenario) is the only real stuff.


The issue about the use of 'real' -- real is used to mean 'what I experience', not fantasy. That one can be wrong about the nature of the real is always an issue. I am not claiming that anyone who uses the word 'real' is necessarily correct about it.

 

[!Kaggen]

No one claims that a thought experiment is knowledge.

Saying that you do not believe that it is possible until you see it is a perfectly valid perspective. I have no idea if it is actually possible, but I haven't heard a good explanation as to why it is not.

The issue is with those who want to argue that it is not possible even in theory; if you are not one of those people then there is nothing to argue about. Anyone who wants to argue that it is not possible needs to provide a rationale. There are two obvious approaches -- one holds that computation can't possible account for such a world and the other is dualism.

If you believe that computation can't do it (even in theory), then you should provide an argument showing that computation can't do it. It is perfectly valid to counter with -- no, you should show me the money and prove that it is possible. That is why Pixy repeatedly invokes Church-Turing. According to that theory this sort of simulation should be possible even if bringing to fruition would be horribly difficult.

If you took the time to read through my replies to PM in this thread and other threads you will se that it is not the hypothesis with which I have quibbles. I have already stated that the mathematics behind the hypothesis is exemplary and cannot be faulted. It is the idea that we must accept the hypothesis as a fact because the mathematics is correct that I have an issue with as I believe this will influence the outcome of the Turing Test.

If humans are persuaded the maths says it will work they may be biased as a judge in the Turing Test.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Cornsail,

I don't know if this will help this time, but I think it is worth trying again just to reach understanding (I am not interested in people changing their minds on this, only that the arguments make sense).

We use actions to perform other actions all the time; and that is the nature of the simulation.

So, when I think of the number 5, there is no physical 5 out there that I can touch. The concept of 5 exists in the function (action) of my brain. I can then use that action (concept of 5) and add (perform another type of action) it to another concept of 5 (action) to produce a new type of output -- the point being that with an underlying mental substrate I can perform actions on actions to produce an output (which is, itself, another concept or action).

The simulation is the same -- it consists in the action of the computer. It begins with a description of atoms and the substrate (computer) performs new actions on the action that is the description of atoms, applying rules that amount to the laws of physics.

What results is an action, a concept. The concept is created in the function of the computer, though, so we could theoretically interact with it by trying to understand the pattern of electron movement.

No one has to observe the action from the outside for it to have meaning (except to us as observers), because the meaning is encoded in the constraints of the way the system operates. There has to be an original observer to create meaning within the system (top-down), but for the system to continue producing the simulation no one theoretically has to interpret it.

Now, I can see a real problem with what you mentioned in an earlier post, which amounts to how we could interact with such a simulation. We would have to map the output of the electron movements in the computer to match what occurs in the simulation representing consciousness; and the way that is carried out depends on someone being able to interpret those electron movements as something intelligible. I would be concerned that we fooled ourselves in the implementation of that mapping into thinking that consciousness occurs in the simulation; how could we really tell?

If we could do it, then once the mapping rules are set up, then we should be able to interact with the simulation in future and see new outputs that convince us that the simulated people carry out conscious activity. But the engineering issues would be an absolute bear, and I agree that in their implementation they introduce a level of uncertainty that I don't think we can really overcome. I don't see how we could tell for sure that we have mapped 'conscious action' in the simulation properly, because I don't know how we could tell what electron movements meant what.

We would truly have to be gods to do such a thing.