Jeff Corey
New York Skeptic
- Joined
- Aug 2, 2001
- Messages
- 13,714
To PixyMisa, Philosaur, Rocket Dodger, and others:
The reason I've been asking the questions I've been putting to you lately, and coming back to the notion of consciousness as phenomenon/event, and offering the examples of other bodily functions, and commenting on the abstract nature of IP is this....
If we get down to brass tacks and consider what's happening in physical reality -- without the distracting overlay of the abstract notion of "information processing" -- what we're left with is the firing of neurons.
And the firing of neurons results in the firing of neurons.
No argument there, I would imagine.
But if the firing of neurons is to result in some other type of event, some other type of phenomenon, then it must trigger some other mechanism to carry that out.
There has to be some other mechanism involved for the firing of neurons to trigger, say, blinking, or shivering, or contracting a muscle, or focusing light on a retina.
(The computer homolog is the display of pixels on a screen, or the generation of a printout, or the playing of a CD.)
Clearly, consciousing is an event, a phenomenon, that takes place in real time in the real world. It's something our bodies do. It's unique in that it's the only such thing that is done entirely by the brain, and it's fundamentally unlike these other examples which we readily understand because we know where to look for the mechanism when it comes to them. But nevertheless, it's something our bodies do.
So if we only consider the firing of the neurons, we're never going to get beyond the firing of the neurons.
In other words, without some other mechanism, there can be no other event besides the neural signaling itself.
But because we're faced with the undeniable phenomenon of conscious events, we're forced to conclude that some mechanism is involved which we haven't yet been able to determine.
And this is not surprising, considering how difficult it is to peer inside a working brain. That, and the fact that we don't know in advance what to look for.
The thing is, running the logic results in running the logic.
Firing of neurons results in firing of neurons.
So if you're going to stop there, then to bridge the gap between that -- which is involved in all the other processes mentioned which do not require the participation of consciousness -- you have to insert that step from the famous New Yorker cartoon: "And then a miracle happens".
In other words, you're leaving the ghost inside the machine.
There is no reason to make any sort of exception for consciousing, even though it's unique in many ways, even though we don't fully understand how it's done or even what it is.
We do know it's a function of the body, and as such, it requires a mechanism of some sort to pull it off. Executing logic is not sufficient, because it cannot be sufficient.
To say that consciousness happens without an executing mechanism is just as nonsensical as saying that blinking or shivering can happen without any such mechanism, even though these bodily functions are quite different from one another.
So.... Even if we can conclude that SRIP is involved in all of this -- just as other types of IP, or SRIP, are involved in all the other examples -- we have not explained consciousness until we figure out the specific physical process which does something more than to instantiate the logic. It must instantiate the actual real-time, real-world phenomenon.
And merely running the logic is incapable of doing that.
Which is why I'm confident in saying, in response to the OP, that no, we have not yet explained consciousness.
I agree with your conclusion, but don't follow your reasoning.
Mine is more simplistic.
What you all are calling consciousness, thinking, cognition and the like are all what Skinner called "private events". Other people can't see them. They are not reliably observable, consequently not empirical data.
But they are real behavior. We all agree we have then. I think. You think. Maybe my dog thinks.
fMRIs can show us what lobe is active during picturing an elephant. Another when we re subvocally recite a dirty limerick from Nantucket.
But that's not explaining consciousness.