Has consciousness been fully explained?

[westprog]

I find that your definitions of words tend to be much too liberal. For instance, your definition of "information processing" which includes entropic processes. It's like saying a toilet bowl is a "food processor". Sure, "food" undergoes a "process" in a toilet bowl, but I don't think Cuisinart will be branching out anytime soon.

Then give a physical definition that is more appropriate. Mine corresponds with what the physicists use.

Can we at least *try* to be more precise? Neither a brain nor a Turing machine can catch a ball.



Both the brain and the hardware which instantiates the Turing machine can control some physical system (a body) which can catch a ball.

No, you're entirely wrong here. There's nothing in the definition of a Turing machine that allows it any kind of real time action. That's the fundamental difference between a brain and the conceptual Turing machine. That's where the claim that the Turing machine can do anything a brain can do falls apart.

 

[westprog]

Yes, I said so in the first place and then drew attention to the wording when you appeared to have missed it.

So I think the sarcastic "Ah, I see" is completely uncalled for since the fact is that you failed to read what I said. Twice.

If you had read my definition in the first place you could have gone straight in to asking what I mean by precise instead of wasting both of our time.

By precise I mean exact. Any set of independent measurements (correctly done) of the same thing will return exactly the same [strk]symbolic representation[/strk] value (edit).

This is the same in every case.

For example if the measurement is whether the voltage across silicone junctions is below or above certain threshholds then there is an exact symbolic representation. Not only that, the symbolic measurement of this information uniquely implies the next state of the thing being measured, as long as the method of measurement is kept the same.

C'mon, now. Are you denying that there's a margin for error in measuring the voltage across silicon junctions? (I assume you don't really go measuring silicone junctions. You could get into trouble that way.)

 

[Robin]

Ah, I see - it's precise representations you mean. So is precision an absolute..

Or to give the short answer - yes, absolute.

 

[Robin]

C'mon, now. Are you denying that there's a margin for error in measuring the voltage across silicon junctions?

But again, you did not read what I said. I said "For example if the measurement is whether the voltage across silicone junctions is below or above certain threshholds " In this case the precise voltage does not matter.

(I assume you don't really go measuring silicone junctions. You could get into trouble that way.)

Yes I do and so do you. You are doing it right now.

 

[Philosaur]

For all concerned - I would be interested in your opinion.

Suppose that there was a sufficiently detailed computer model of a human brain, and say this brain is given realistic sense data, including modelling of the sense data associated with body control and feed back.


Perhaps it starts as a model of an embryo and models the brain development up to birth and then childhood even adulthood - obviously this would take vast computing power.

But suppose that could be done - do you think it possible that the virtual human being modelled would exhibit human like behaviour?

For my own part I cannot see any reason why it would not exhibit human like behaviour.

I think it would exhibit human-like behavior too.

 

[Piggy]

There is nothing to be pulled off, no additional mechanism required, nothing more to execute, and no end of the algorithm.

Conscious is not the output of a program. It's the ongoing self-referential operation of the program.

It's a verb, not a noun. I remember someone saying something similar before. Who might that have been?

How does the operation of the program result in an actual phenomenon -- a real-world event -- without an additional mechanism to make the phenomenon occur?

That's the Achilles heel of IP-only theories.

 

[Piggy]

An algorithm is an abstraction of a physical process, but that's irrelevant, because an algorithm doesn't do anything until you instantiate it in a physical system.

That's certainly true, but what is the result of that instantiation?

 

[Philosaur]

Then give a physical definition that is more appropriate. Mine corresponds with what the physicists use.

Sure, and 2 + 2 = 5, for sufficiently large values of 2.

No, you're entirely wrong here. There's nothing in the definition of a Turing machine that allows it any kind of real time action. That's the fundamental difference between a brain and the conceptual Turing machine. That's where the claim that the Turing machine can do anything a brain can do falls apart.

You are being so disingenuous here that it's hard to continue to take you seriously.

Do you honestly think that any serious AI researcher or advocate thinks that a bare theoretical Turing machine, uninstantiated, could exhibit consciousness?

 

[nescafe]

No, you're entirely wrong here. There's nothing in the definition of a Turing machine that allows it any kind of real time action. That's the fundamental difference between a brain and the conceptual Turing machine. That's where the claim that the Turing machine can do anything a brain can do falls apart.

Yes, and any real instantiations of Turing machines are capable of real time action. Your claim that an abstract turing machine cannot simulate a brain because there is no notion of time in the Turing machine model is misleading and wrong -- at worst, we would have to simulate an entire Universe, and if we are going to do that we may as well simulate all possible universes, which is easier anyways. Please skip to the more interesting arguments.

 

[Dancing David]

Then give a physical definition that is more appropriate. Mine corresponds with what the physicists use.

Vague on that, which physicists and in which context?

No, you're entirely wrong here. There's nothing in the definition of a Turing machine that allows it any kind of real time action. That's the fundamental difference between a brain and the conceptual Turing machine. That's where the claim that the Turing machine can do anything a brain can do falls apart.

 

[Piggy]

To PixyMisa, Philosaur, Rocket Dodger, and others:

The reason I've been asking the questions I've been putting to you lately, and coming back to the notion of consciousness as phenomenon/event, and offering the examples of other bodily functions, and commenting on the abstract nature of IP is this....

If we get down to brass tacks and consider what's happening in physical reality -- without the distracting overlay of the abstract notion of "information processing" -- what we're left with is the firing of neurons.

And the firing of neurons results in the firing of neurons.

No argument there, I would imagine.

But if the firing of neurons is to result in some other type of event, some other type of phenomenon, then it must trigger some other mechanism to carry that out.

There has to be some other mechanism involved for the firing of neurons to trigger, say, blinking, or shivering, or contracting a muscle, or focusing light on a retina.

(The computer homolog is the display of pixels on a screen, or the generation of a printout, or the playing of a CD.)

Clearly, consciousing is an event, a phenomenon, that takes place in real time in the real world. It's something our bodies do. It's unique in that it's the only such thing that is done entirely by the brain, and it's fundamentally unlike these other examples which we readily understand because we know where to look for the mechanism when it comes to them. But nevertheless, it's something our bodies do.

So if we only consider the firing of the neurons, we're never going to get beyond the firing of the neurons.

In other words, without some other mechanism, there can be no other event besides the neural signaling itself.

But because we're faced with the undeniable phenomenon of conscious events, we're forced to conclude that some mechanism is involved which we haven't yet been able to determine.

And this is not surprising, considering how difficult it is to peer inside a working brain. That, and the fact that we don't know in advance what to look for.

The thing is, running the logic results in running the logic.

Firing of neurons results in firing of neurons.

So if you're going to stop there, then to bridge the gap between that -- which is involved in all the other processes mentioned which do not require the participation of consciousness -- you have to insert that step from the famous New Yorker cartoon: "And then a miracle happens".

In other words, you're leaving the ghost inside the machine.

There is no reason to make any sort of exception for consciousing, even though it's unique in many ways, even though we don't fully understand how it's done or even what it is.

We do know it's a function of the body, and as such, it requires a mechanism of some sort to pull it off. Executing logic is not sufficient, because it cannot be sufficient.

To say that consciousness happens without an executing mechanism is just as nonsensical as saying that blinking or shivering can happen without any such mechanism, even though these bodily functions are quite different from one another.

So.... Even if we can conclude that SRIP is involved in all of this -- just as other types of IP, or SRIP, are involved in all the other examples -- we have not explained consciousness until we figure out the specific physical process which does something more than to instantiate the logic. It must instantiate the actual real-time, real-world phenomenon.

And merely running the logic is incapable of doing that.

Which is why I'm confident in saying, in response to the OP, that no, we have not yet explained consciousness.

 

[Malerin]

To PixyMisa, Philosaur, Rocket Dodger, and others:

The reason I've been asking the questions I've been putting to you lately, and coming back to the notion of consciousness as phenomenon/event, and offering the examples of other bodily functions, and commenting on the abstract nature of IP is this....

If we get down to brass tacks and consider what's happening in physical reality -- without the distracting overlay of the abstract notion of "information processing" -- what we're left with is the firing of neurons.

And the firing of neurons results in the firing of neurons.

No argument there, I would imagine.

But if the firing of neurons is to result in some other type of event, some other type of phenomenon, then it must trigger some other mechanism to carry that out.

There has to be some other mechanism involved for the firing of neurons to trigger, say, blinking, or shivering, or contracting a muscle, or focusing light on a retina.

(The computer homolog is the display of pixels on a screen, or the generation of a printout, or the playing of a CD.)

Clearly, consciousing is an event, a phenomenon, that takes place in real time in the real world. It's something our bodies do. It's unique in that it's the only such thing that is done entirely by the brain, and it's fundamentally unlike these other examples which we readily understand because we know where to look for the mechanism when it comes to them. But nevertheless, it's something our bodies do.

So if we only consider the firing of the neurons, we're never going to get beyond the firing of the neurons.

In other words, without some other mechanism, there can be no other event besides the neural signaling itself.

But because we're faced with the undeniable phenomenon of conscious events, we're forced to conclude that some mechanism is involved which we haven't yet been able to determine.

And this is not surprising, considering how difficult it is to peer inside a working brain. That, and the fact that we don't know in advance what to look for.

The thing is, running the logic results in running the logic.

Firing of neurons results in firing of neurons.

So if you're going to stop there, then to bridge the gap between that -- which is involved in all the other processes mentioned which do not require the participation of consciousness -- you have to insert that step from the famous New Yorker cartoon: "And then a miracle happens".

In other words, you're leaving the ghost inside the machine.

There is no reason to make any sort of exception for consciousing, even though it's unique in many ways, even though we don't fully understand how it's done or even what it is.

We do know it's a function of the body, and as such, it requires a mechanism of some sort to pull it off. Executing logic is not sufficient, because it cannot be sufficient.

To say that consciousness happens without an executing mechanism is just as nonsensical as saying that blinking or shivering can happen without any such mechanism, even though these bodily functions are quite different from one another.

So.... Even if we can conclude that SRIP is involved in all of this -- just as other types of IP, or SRIP, are involved in all the other examples -- we have not explained consciousness until we figure out the specific physical process which does something more than to instantiate the logic. It must instantiate the actual real-time, real-world phenomenon.

And merely running the logic is incapable of doing that.

Which is why I'm confident in saying, in response to the OP, that no, we have not yet explained consciousness.

You would think it's undeniable...

 

[ThatSoundAgain]

Piggy, excuse me for butting in as an interested observer. to start off with, I should say that I agree it's too bold to say consciousness has been explained.

But I don't see how we get to your miracle either? Specifically,

The thing is, running the logic results in running the logic.

Firing of neurons results in firing of neurons.

Yes, and consciousness appear to be a function of running the logic. It's (part of) what neurons do when they fire.

We know this beacuse affecting the neurons affect the consciousness. And, say, restraining a muscle or anaesthesizing the eyelids doesn't in the same way.

That said, the interesting and unanswered question is exactly how this happens.

I'm a bit puzzled because you, as far as I remember, agreed to as much upthread. Or did I misunderstand?

So.... Even if we can conclude that SRIP is involved in all of this -- just as other types of IP, or SRIP, are involved in all the other examples -- we have not explained consciousness until we figure out the specific physical process which does something more than to instantiate the logic. It must instantiate the actual real-time, real-world phenomenon.

And merely running the logic is incapable of doing that.

I think we all agree that any consciousness would need an interface to the world, or we can't know that it's conscious. But that is what our senses and bodies are.

 

[Piggy]

Piggy, excuse me for butting in as an interested observer. to start off with, I should say that I agree it's too bold to say consciousness has been explained.

But I don't see how we get to your miracle either?

[snip]

Yes, and consciousness appear to be a function of running the logic. It's (part of) what neurons do when they fire.

We know this beacuse affecting the neurons affect the consciousness. And, say, restraining a muscle or anaesthesizing the eyelids doesn't in the same way.

Butting in? Hey, nobody's butting in, here. We're all part of the discussion, no?

Anyway, let's think it through here.

If consciousness is a result of running the logic plus the mechanism that mediates between the logic and the real-world event (just as contracting and expanding the iris mediates between the neural activity and focusing light on the retina) then of course disrupting either the neural activity or the executive mechanism will throw a wrench into the system.

So yes, affecting the neurons affects consciousness. There's no other way for things to be.

But that fact does not change the other fact: That some sort of mechanism beyond firing-neurons must be part of the chain of events in order for the phenomenon of consciousness to be instantiated.

When you say "restraining a muscle or anaesthesizing the eyelids doesn't in the same way", that may well be true, but the problem is that we can't run a similar experiment (yet) on consciousness because we haven't yet determined/discovered the mechanism.

Once we have figured it out, then we can go about determining the differences between disrupting the executive mechanism in this way or that, and disrupting the neural pathways at various points.

 

[Piggy]

I think we all agree that any consciousness would need an interface to the world, or we can't know that it's conscious. But that is what our senses and bodies are.

It would be a fundamental mistake to think of any "interface to the world" for consciousness.

Would you talk of any "interface to the world" for blinking?

There is no "interface".

To claim that there is such an interface is to imagine blinking, or consciousness, as some Platonic ideal hovering out there somewhere.

Blinking is a combination of neural activity and other types of physical activity. There is no abstract "blinking" looking for an interface to express itself.

Similarly, there is no abstract "consciousness" looking for an interface to express itself.

Like blinking, consciousing is a combination of neural activity plus whatever (as yet undetermined) mechanism enables the actual phenomenon/event.

The best example I can think of is the case of Marvin, a fellow who had a stroke that disrupted the pathways which allowed him to be conscious of his emotional states.

He still had those states, but as odd as it seems, he had to logically infer, for example, that he was amused when his body reacted to something by laughing. He had no conscious sensation of being amused, just as we all have no conscious sensation of our visual blind spots.

It would make no sense to imagine, for instance, Marvin's "emotional consciousness" searching for an interface. He simply had no emotional consciousness.

 

[ThatSoundAgain]

Butting in? Hey, nobody's butting in, here. We're all part of the discussion, no?

yeah, sure. I just wanted to aknowledge that your post had specific names up front, and that I've been quietly reading along for 14 pages.

Anyway, let's think it through here.

If consciousness is a result of running the logic plus the mechanism that mediates between the logic and the real-world event (just as contracting and expanding the iris mediates between the neural activity and focusing light on the retina) then of course disrupting either the neural activity or the executive mechanism will throw a wrench into the system.

So yes, affecting the neurons affects consciousness. There's no other way for things to be.

Yes, except it appears you can have different configurations of interfaces. It's (sadly) possible to be both blind and deaf, and very much conscious.

Which makes me think that these interfaces and actuators are crucial tools for consciousness, but that they are not integral.

(there's also the fact that the brain and the rest of the nervous system are not always clearly defined - I tend to think of the eyes as part of the brain, for instance.)

But that fact does not change the other fact: That some sort of mechanism beyond firing-neurons must be part of the chain of events in order for the phenomenon of consciousness to be instantiated.

Yes, if the consciousness doesn't have some sort of interface (say, text input/output in the Turing test), it's difficult to recognize it as conscious.

When you say "restraining a muscle or anaesthesizing the eyelids doesn't in the same way", that may well be true, but the problem is that we can't run a similar experiment (yet) on consciousness because we haven't yet determined/discovered the mechanism.

Those were aimed at your examples of blinking and contracting muscles. I didn't name them as experiments as such, I just wanted to agree that they're different than (and irrelevant to) consciousness.

Once we have figured it out, then we can go about determining the differences between disrupting the executive mechanism in this way or that, and disrupting the neural pathways at various points.

Sure, that sounds interesting if potentially a bit unethical.

Bottom line is, I still can't quite figure out what it is you think is necessary for consciousness besides brain process (computation). Is it an interface to the world in the form of senses?

If not, your objection sounds dangerously near to one a dualist would make. I.e. that a "soul" of some sort is needed to explain consciousness.

 

[Dancing David]

To PixyMisa, Philosaur, Rocket Dodger, and others:

The reason I've been asking the questions I've been putting to you lately, and coming back to the notion of consciousness as phenomenon/event, and offering the examples of other bodily functions, and commenting on the abstract nature of IP is this....

If we get down to brass tacks and consider what's happening in physical reality -- without the distracting overlay of the abstract notion of "information processing" -- what we're left with is the firing of neurons.

And the firing of neurons results in the firing of neurons.

No argument there, I would imagine.

But if the firing of neurons is to result in some other type of event, some other type of phenomenon, then it must trigger some other mechanism to carry that out.

Activation of muscles?
Activation of hormonal release?

There has to be some other mechanism involved for the firing of neurons to trigger, say, blinking, or shivering, or contracting a muscle, or focusing light on a retina.

It is not as though the neurons exist outside the body, they are part of the PNS as well.

(The computer homolog is the display of pixels on a screen, or the generation of a printout, or the playing of a CD.)

Clearly, consciousing is an event, a phenomenon, that takes place in real time in the real world. It's something our bodies do. It's unique in that it's the only such thing that is done entirely by the brain,

Not really, where do sensations come from?

and it's fundamentally unlike these other examples which we readily understand because we know where to look for the mechanism when it comes to them. But nevertheless, it's something our bodies do.

So if we only consider the firing of the neurons, we're never going to get beyond the firing of the neurons.

the neurons are integrated into the body, by many means, they are body.

In other words, without some other mechanism, there can be no other event besides the neural signaling itself.

Poke your eye out, record your experience, what happens and why.

But because we're faced with the undeniable phenomenon of conscious events, we're forced to conclude that some mechanism is involved which we haven't yet been able to determine.

In part yes, in part no.

And this is not surprising, considering how difficult it is to peer inside a working brain. That, and the fact that we don't know in advance what to look for.

The thing is, running the logic results in running the logic.

Firing of neurons results in firing of neurons.

What are you a brain in a freaking vat?

How does your brain get glucose for ATP? Ripped out your eyes yet or your PNS?

So if you're going to stop there, then to bridge the gap between that -- which is involved in all the other processes mentioned which do not require the participation of consciousness -- you have to insert that step from the famous New Yorker cartoon: "And then a miracle happens".

What happened to the rest of your body Piggy? Are you a disembodied brain?

In other words, you're leaving the ghost inside the machine.

No you are acting like the PNS and sensory organs do not exist. Are you feeling okay?

There is no reason to make any sort of exception for consciousing, even though it's unique in many ways, even though we don't fully understand how it's done or even what it is.

Not fully, but not incompletely either.

We do know it's a function of the body, and as such, it requires a mechanism of some sort to pull it off. Executing logic is not sufficient, because it cannot be sufficient.

not all of us are strong AI people here.

To say that consciousness happens without an executing mechanism is just as nonsensical as saying that blinking or shivering can happen without any such mechanism, even though these bodily functions are quite different from one another.

the mechanism is the neural network and its interaction with the rest of the body.

So.... Even if we can conclude that SRIP is involved in all of this -- just as other types of IP, or SRIP, are involved in all the other examples -- we have not explained consciousness until we figure out the specific physical process which does something more than to instantiate the logic. It must instantiate the actual real-time, real-world phenomenon.

Only a few are claiming it is solely IP or SRIP, it is also developed, conditioned and learned.

And merely running the logic is incapable of doing that.

Which is why I'm confident in saying, in response to the OP, that no, we have not yet explained consciousness.

Partly yes, mostly no.

 

[Dancing David]

It would be a fundamental mistake to think of any "interface to the world" for consciousness.

Would you talk of any "interface to the world" for blinking?

There is no "interface".

To claim that there is such an interface is to imagine blinking, or consciousness, as some Platonic ideal hovering out there somewhere.

Blinking is a combination of neural activity and other types of physical activity. There is no abstract "blinking" looking for an interface to express itself.

Similarly, there is no abstract "consciousness" looking for an interface to express itself.

Like blinking, consciousing is a combination of neural activity plus whatever (as yet undetermined) mechanism enables the actual phenomenon/event.

The best example I can think of is the case of Marvin, a fellow who had a stroke that disrupted the pathways which allowed him to be conscious of his emotional states.

He still had those states, but as odd as it seems, he had to logically infer, for example, that he was amused when his body reacted to something by laughing. He had no conscious sensation of being amused, just as we all have no conscious sensation of our visual blind spots.

It would make no sense to imagine, for instance, Marvin's "emotional consciousness" searching for an interface. He simply had no emotional consciousness.

This makes sense there is no Cartesian theater.

 

[Piggy]

yeah, sure. I just wanted to aknowledge that your post had specific names up front, and that I've been quietly reading along for 14 pages.

I admire you for slogging thru it all! But that's why I included "and others".

Yes, except it appears you can have different configurations of interfaces. It's (sadly) possible to be both blind and deaf, and very much conscious.

Indeed. But none of these faculties involve any interfaces, which is what I was trying to get across.

There is no "seeing" looking for an interface. There is no "hearing" looking for an interface. There is no "being conscious" looking for an interface.

All of these functions are a combination of neural activity and executive mechanism. Consciousness is no different from seeing an hearing in that regard.

Case in point... Terry Schiavo was able to see and hear, and to respond reflexively to what she saw and heard, but there was no mechanism which could make any of that information available to conscious awareness because she had lost all capacity to be aware of anything at all.

Yes, if the consciousness doesn't have some sort of interface (say, text input/output in the Turing test), it's difficult to recognize it as conscious.

Ok, let's drill down, here.

It is certainly possible to be conscious and also unable to communicate to the world that you're conscious.

Scary as hell, but possible.

However, that doesn't mean that consciousness has an "interface".

What it means is that both the neurology and the executive mechanism of consciousness are working just fine, but the mechanisms for speech and motor functions -- different processes -- are damaged.

If the neurology of consciousness is fatally damaged, as in Schiavo's case, there is no consciousness. If the executive mechanism for consciousness (whatever it may turn out to be) is fatally damaged, there is no consciousness.

The situation you're describing is one in which both those functions are working, but either the neurology or the executive mechanism (or both) for other functions are fatally damaged, so that outside observers can't determine that the consciousness function is intact.

Bottom line is, I still can't quite figure out what it is you think is necessary for consciousness besides brain process (computation). Is it an interface to the world in the form of senses?

If not, your objection sounds dangerously near to one a dualist would make. I.e. that a "soul" of some sort is needed to explain consciousness.

Bottom line: We have no clue what the missing mechanism is yet. There must be one, but we're currently in a kind of black box situation.

The sensory mechanisms have nothing to do with it. We know this because we are aware of our dreams during physical states in which the physical senses are, usually, disconnected from what the mechanism of awareness is doing.

There is some sort of mechanism in the brain that bridges the neural activity and the actual real-world behavior. But what that is, no one yet knows.

 

[ThatSoundAgain]

I admire you for slogging thru it all! But that's why I included "and others".

Heh, trust that I feel no obligation. It's just an interesting discussion.

Bottom line: We have no clue what the missing mechanism is yet. There must be one, but we're currently in a kind of black box situation.

The long and short of it: Yes, I agree that the exact mechanism is not explained at all.

That said, I think at this stage anyone claiming that there's any component to consciousness but brain activity (neurons firing) had better bring some very compelling evidence. And since it appears to be all brain activity, I don't see why it couldn't be replicated on a non-organic computer if and when it's sufficiently understood.

All in all, I'd better read this more carefully tomorrow.