Has anybody actually read the 56 page report of this UNHRC? You can download it here:
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/15session/A.HRC.15.21_en.pdf
All this has been discussed in the other thread, but yet the accusations of disproportionality, collective punishment, bording in international waters, and conflicting eyewitness testimony resurface, with the same superficial interpretation of international law, coming from, who could've guessed, Richard Falk, the posterboy of objectivity in the UNHRC.
Be sure to read the claims, er, sorry, 'findings' under
Preparation and planning on the Mavi Marmara:
ie:
...Video evidence shows a meeting of about fifty to a hundred passengers on the ship on 30 May at which the IHH President and a number of other prominent passengers spoke with some bravado about preventing an Israeli takeover of the ship.
...
There is little evidence of any unified command to coordinate the defence of the ship.
...
Furthermore, the fact that some passengers engaged in last minute efforts to fashion rudimentary weapons shortly prior to the interception confirms the findings of the Mission that no weapons were brought on board the ship.
Just a taste of the logic of the findings.
Under:
Landing of soldiers from helicopters onto the Mavi Marmara
No evidence is provided for the same allegation of live fire from the helicopters when stating:
The Mission does not find it plausible that soldiers were holding their weapons and firing as they descended on the rope. However, it has concluded that live ammunition was used from the helicopter onto the top deck prior to the descent of the soldiers.
Eye witness testimony was used for the above, nothing more.
Under
Deaths of nine passengers and wounding of at least 50 other passengers, and the subsequent conclusions, albeit conflicting even here, this report concludes, predominantly by eyewitness testimony, that the IDF were justified in using lethal force, even after stating:
In the initial phases of fighting with the Israeli soldiers on the top deck, three Israeli soldiers were disarmed and taken inside the ship. At this point, there may have been a justifiable belief of an immediate threat to life or serious injury of certain soldiers which would have justified the use of firearms against specific passengers.
And then goes on to state, without any evidence beyond that of eyewitness testimony:
167. Nevertheless, throughout the operation to seize control of the Mavi Marmara, including before the live fire restriction was eased, lethal force was employed by the Israeli
soldiers in a widespread and arbitrary manner which caused an unnecessarily large number of persons to be killed or seriously injured. Less extreme means could have been employed
in nearly all instances of the Israeli operation, since there was no imminent threat to soldiers; for example in relation to the operation to move down to the bridge deck and seize
control of the ship and the firing of live ammunition at passengers on the bow deck of the ship. Even in a situation where three individual soldiers have been injured and detained, the objective of freeing these soldiers does not legitimate the use of force outside applicable international standards and soldiers must continue to respect and preserve life and to minimize injury and damage.
So there may have been an 'imminent threat', but not enough to justify the use of live fire because other modes were available to the boarding party. Those soldiers who were stabbed, beaten, and/or had their weapons used against them didn't have justification to use lethal force. And that the lethal force that was used, was 'arbitary', 'widespread', and 'extensive' without any evidence to support this and completely discounting that this was close-quarter combat and collateral damage could have occurred. No inclusion of possible alternatives are investigated, including the weapons that were taken from the boarding party might have caused some of the injuries/deaths.
The report then goes on to make assumptions:
168. In such circumstances the use of less extreme means, such as available less-lethal weaponry, would have been sufficient to achieve the required objective as required by
Principle 4 of the Basic Principles on the Use of Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. A well-trained force such as the Israeli Defence Force should have been able to successfully contain a relatively small group of passengers armed with sticks and knives and secure control of the ship without the loss of life or serious injury to either passengers or soldiers.
The slew of assumptions and retrospective reasoning in this report are too many to post here. I don't quite understand how one could make some concrete conclusions based on such a lack of solid evidence.
