Thank you for providing commentary sans emotion. Welcome back to the discussion
WARNING: this post is rather long, so all of you, please take time to appreciate this and question me where you do not understand me clearly. Don't assume you think I am saying something unless you are perfectly clear, and feel free to ask where my communications leave out something necessary for full consideration, ok?
I really want to see what you all mean. I really do. But I also want you to see what I mean, and hopefully, we can find resolution together.
In the interests of trying to get to something interesting to talk about:
The problem is not now, nor has it ever been, that there may exist dualities in a theory. As you have so aptly pointed out, you can find dualities everywhere.
OKAY! how is it this is NOT ADDRESSED? how is it than both mental and physical reality appears to take on something that is almost computational and the two never seem to be linked in any relevant way when discussing consciousness?
The problem with Cartesian dualism is that Descartes gave no clear explanation of how the mind and body interact. When pressed, Descartes said it all happened in the pineal gland--which is a non-answer, like others (Google 'occasionalists') who said "God does it."
So, once again, the problem is NOT with dualities. If some other system contains dualities, well--whatever. The problem is with the unexplained interaction between mind and body.
If Dennets sole claim was to simply explain how the brain interacts with 'mind' and body, then I have no problems with ANY of his claims and would accept most of them
Now, since there is no particular problem with dualities, then your objection that Dennet invokes a duality is a non-issue. Dennet's duality does not beg the question "how do minds and bodies interact?", since the mind is merely the action of the brain.
I understand the problem with Cartesian Dualism. I'm not arguing for Cartesian Dualism. My question is, what value do we have in the value of a materialistic model as the dominant one if it still NEEDS a dualism and that dualism is accounted for in Eastern Systems of thought?
And since we agree that dualities are inherent, as both a property of mind and a property of reality, then how is it then that Dennet fails to account for them?
page 33, Consciousness Explained, Dennet has a sub chapter titled "Why Dualism is forlorn" Note he does not say Cartesian Dualism, he says dualism, as in the mind is NOT distinct from the brain, thus inferring there is NO duality there, right? So I don't accept that he allows for any form of duality other than Cartesian, and I fail to see how he allows for a distinction between 'experience' and 'brain' as two distinct realities simply because he
can't by the very nature of a scientific materialistic physical model that removes the very property of the mind (duality) from the very model he is explaining.
Now, my
interpretation of this is that he needs something like Cartesian Dualism to refute, because it is a dualism that he can refute, since Decartes assumed there must be some sort of 'stuff' to the mind. There is no 'stuff' of the mind other than what the brain can allow for. There is simply
nothing material there to evaluate other than brain functioning. Well that's also very eastern, and inside of eastern thought, we can actually do a lot more with consciousness than Dennet seems to allow for in his model. The mind simply is NOT there, it is soley an illusion, and only supported by illusion after illusion after illusion. It would have been really nice if Dennet instead attacked more refined eastern models of consciousness, but he didn't (as far as I know, I could be wrong and please make the correction if I am)
I don't believe this is helpful regarding the deeper levels of mind, consciousness, and being, because when you study consciousness from the other side (meaning by direct experience via a plethora of various techniques and methods, some but not all of which are drugs) experience does indeed happen 'outside' of the brain, can be projected outwards, experienced outwards, and can encounter many of the various 'strong hallucinations' that he says are simply 'impossible', and Dennet also suggests we should be skeptical of all such claims. Well fine, be skeptical of them, but you can also (if your brave and dedicated, because they do not come easy) experience them. And when you do, what are you left with in deciphering Dennet's model, you own experience told you something that is directly contradictory to what he says is possible!
And please, before we get a knee jerk reaction by what I mean by 'two realities', let me explain. By 'two realities', I could also mean 'two distinctions of reality'. There is an objective, material, governed by the laws of physics reality. That reality is foundational. It IS the brain. (in taoism, it would be called 'Yin', earth) Material reality most likely is a infinite collection of finite systems, orderings and organization of things, right? (I ask here to find where we have agreement, and disagreement. You would be surprised about how much agreement we have if you can put aside your ideas about who I am) But the space of my mind is not a collection of distinctions, it IS the distinction itself and can expand infinitely beyond the property which supports it. It can also wreck havoc on the very physical laws of reality that support it. It holds absolutely NO REGARD for the laws of physics whatsoever as a body of experience.
The mind is NOT composed of foundational reality because it is just experience. Like blubro and I agree, Poetry is neither in the book, nor in the brain, it's in the mind. I can't cut open my brain and find walt whitman verse.
MIND is not composed of ANY reality other than PURE PERCEPTION/EXPERIENCE. It may not be 'stuff', but it has 'dimension' and 'space'. ( I am going to allow both perception and experience to be allowed for as 'mind', although in some systems, they are different). The brain may be causing that perception of dimension and space too, I'm not arguing for that or against that (not yet anyway).
So WE AGREE that it DOES NOT EXIST. WE AGREE that my imagination is imaginary, that my illusion is illusion. We agree that subjectivity is not objectivity, right? Follow so far?
Now inside the set of my experience, I can mark that distinction, two forms of reality, one real, one fake-o, but present constantly none the less.
All I am doing, is making NOTE of that obvious distinction, and NOTHING else. I am not making any claim other than HOW materialism APPEARS to explain consciousness TO me does not SEEM complete. I also am allowing that there may be data or explanation that so far has not been presented to me so I am allowing for possible ignorance on my part.
Follow so far?
Now, in terms of semantics, the word for mind in German is Giest, which also translates as 'spirit'. So 'spirit' stuff can also simply be understood as a property of mind then, right?
So when a property of mind, 'spirit' can actually take on a form as an other, with a whole other set of personality, knowledge, experience, POV, and then speak to the rational observer who can question it and enter into a relationship with it, I myself can find no rational explanation of that ( charges of psychosis and schizophrenia are neither elucidating nor helpful) other than Julian Jaynes Bi-Cameral Mind theory, which has (as pixymisa pointed out) been utterly trashed by most academics (but oddly enough dennet himself is fond of it)
The fact is, that is what my EXPERIENCE is composed of. And that is what materialism as explained, to me, fails to account for us 'seasoned' practitioners and disciples of mind/consciousness/intelligence.
It is irrelevant if the material reality is the sole cause of the other reality, it does not matter (not at this point in our discussion), we still have two distinct realities that perform serendipitously, together, even if it is an illusion that there are two realities, it doesn't matter.
Keep in mind, I have other issues with Dennet's model, this one just seems the easiest to address here. It's where i get stuck in accepting materialism as a 'dominant' model of consciousness. This is not to say that there is no value in Dennet's model, I'm just saying it's an incomplete model because he makes pains to avoid dualism and to disqualify the truth value of perception, which although distinct from the truth value of material reality, still exists in some sense.
I may not have time to address other responses for a bit, I hope some of you can digest this and grill away, I promise to return when I can.
Cheers to all and thank you for coming back to the discussion, Philosaur, in a way in which I can understand you.
