Fair enough. So, what fundamental errors is he making in the piece I linked earlier? What is he leaving out? Where does he go wrong?
Nick
"Intelligence is Self Teaching" A paranormal experience into A.I and Intelligence.
- Thread starter WWHP
- Start date
Fair enough. So, what fundamental errors is he making in the piece I linked earlier? What is he leaving out? Where does he go wrong?
Nick
well I still like you and consider you my friend, and when I say 'drain my blood' it's my frustration in our communication, because although we are friends, I seem to consider virtually everything you write, and you seem to skip over vast sections of what I write and just repeat things you think are contrary to what I am saying. Many of those things I agree with. For example, you keep on repeating that...
I mean, huh? That's not a point in contention whatsoever! I agree there is no self you can slice open and find and model. So why do you keep repeating this to me? I am not Descartes. This is how I figure you are still arguing with Descartes, and not me.
Please don't take my ribs as signs of anything personal between you and I as people. Who knows, I might join you at that bar one day and have a few with you! But as your friend, you also get my honesty, and honestly, when you provide commentary on Materialism, your model of materialism, i.e. how you explain it, is contradictory and therefore not useful to me in consideration. I don't mind you teasing me as a chum, so I hope you don't mind if I tease you as well.
As for deconstructing Dennet on this forum, that is way to big of a task to be meaningful, but the major problem I can address is this. It appears to me that he is not avoiding dualism at all, he has just moved dualism into a materialistic model between brain and mind, noun (brain) and verb (processing). That's duality too.
If you want, we can begin with that. I know that Dennet writing makes sense if your a materialist, but I suspect it's his personality that we like so much, his writing, and his vision/goal. When Deconstructed by me, he doesn't seem to do what he claims he does.
It was hard for me to finish Consciousness explained because to me, he started falling apart in the prologue! His 'simple' examples that he used to prep us for the bigger picture did not seem to hold up muster, so when I get to his bigger picture, it's already collapsed for me.
Nick, you have to consider, I am ultimately an agnostic on the matter. I am not really making a counter claim to dennet. I'm not arguing for a soul, I'm not taking the opposite side of the argument. I am a scientific humanist who finds his wonder and philosophical consideration in Futurism, not creationism. If Dennet and that whole camp cannot convince me, then who can they convince outside of the choir they are preaching to?
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Well, for me, you come across as someone very attached to ideas. I'm your friend if I agree with you and not otherwise, so on and so forth. And, if this is so, then it again makes sense that the materialist model of consciousness will be perceived by you as a threat. Ideas suggest a self, a mental self that is "having the ideas." When one is attached to one philosophy there is this rigidity, this investment, and because there is this identification with one philosophy, it can be scary to consider that maybe it's totally wrong. You keep saying I'm a futurist, I'm a futurist and I can't help but wonder if you don't like some philosophy coming along and challenging this.
So, when I perceive you (rightly or wrongly) with this big investment in not grasping the mettle of materialism, it makes sense to me to consider that you are quite scared to let go of this view of who you are. Perhaps I'm wrong.
Personally, I can pick up and drop materialism as I fancy. I don't need philosophy, at least not often. It is simply that to me materialism makes the most rational sense. It's the model that best fits data.
Dennett's just saying that the mind is what the brain does. This is not dualism.
Then deconstruct away and we can take a look.
Example?
You keep saying this, BF, like it's a some kind of mantra. I'm a futurist, I'm a futurist. I guess a psychologist might ask "Are you running away from your past?" But let's not go there!
Well, it's up to you whether you allow logic or folly to rule your mind. You still have the choice.
But as the years go by, and with each one of them the power given to psychology decreases, so finally the consensus will have to come around to Strong AI and the materialist model. In the last year both depression and PTSD, previously believed to be purely psychological, have been tracked to brain malfunction or genetic disposition. Each year there's more. The only real issue I see is selfhood. Because Strong AI is so counter-intuitive it's a struggle for the individual human mind, PhD regardless, to really go for it. But finally I figure it will have no choice.
Nick
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well your not paying attention to what I am writing then. I am solely here because I want the challenge! Do you see me posting on futurism discussion boards?
Yes, you are mistaken in your assessment.
materialism is integrated into my philosophy and I have not rejected it.
it IS dualism. verb/noun. mind is 'becoming' what the brain is doing. mind/brain. those are dualities. This is where I get stopped when dissecting Dennet. Mind is the verb to the noun of the brain. He has simply moved one duality brain/spirit - and called it brain/mind.
above is fine. Explain to me how mind/brain is not a duality?
lol, that was kind of funny. We can go there. The past gets farther and farther away everyday, and the future gets closer and closer, so you may be onto something
EXACTLY! I follow LOGIC. and I find contradictions, so I reject models that seem contradictory. Dennet's model seems contradictory to me. There is no 'monoism' in his model. His model to me appears to be nothing more than an illusion, his illusion, which uses science to find a new place to put duality.
So your willing to accept that Google may have some form of consciousness?
!Kaggen
Illuminator
- Joined
- Jul 12, 2009
- Messages
- 3,874
Perhaps the best place to start understanding were I am coming from is here
http://wn.rsarchive.org/Books/GA003/English/RSPI1963/GA003_index.html
http://wn.rsarchive.org/Books/GA002/English/AP1985/GA002_index.html
http://www.amazon.com/Wholeness-Nature-Goethes-Conscious-Participation/dp/0940262797
and here
http://www.nct.anth.org.uk/counter.htm
http://www.amazon.com/Science-between-Space-Counterspace-Significance/dp/1902636023/ref=pd_sim_b_4
http://www.amazon.com/Space-Counterspace-Science-Gravity-Light/dp/0863156703
http://www.amazon.com/Projective-Geometry-Lawrence-Edwards/dp/0863153933/ref=pd_sim_b_2
http://www.amazon.com/Vortex-Life-Natures-Patterns-Space/dp/0863155510/ref=pd_sim_b_1
http://www.amazon.com/Toward-Phenomenology-Etheric-World-Investigations/dp/0880101156/ref=pd_sim_b_4
http://www.scribd.com/doc/6372540/Physical-and-Ethereal-Spaces
Language is inherently dualistic as you pointed out. The idea of projective geometry as well as Goetheanistic phenomenology is to develop an intuitive sense of the relationship between percepts and concepts. The language used to describe these techniques is of course loaded, but the idea is not to become stuck in the language, but only be guided by it to a direct perception of this relationship. This is were the genius of Goethe as an artist-scientist is useful since he showed us a way to use art to transcend the limitations of the object/subject scientific consciousness, but remain within waking consciousness.
The difference between this method and the use of an entheogen is that it is more suited to the current state of human consciousness i.m.o.
However widespread ignorance of the use of entheogens in the evolution of consciousness is certainly not useful and for me the work of Prof. Lewis-Williams I referred to in an earlier post goes a long way in putting this part of humanity into perspective.
The real duality is the percept of a tree (photograph, imagined image or sensory perception) and the concept "tree". Abstracting from the cognitive process and calling the one real and the other not is metaphysics. I do not see the cognitive process as complete until the "percept" of a tree and the "concept" of a tree is joined to form complete knowledge of a tree. Talk of real or unreal trees is simply being superstitious about the cognitive process.
This is the important difference between just a percept and concepts joined to a percept. The euclidean space revolves around percepts and point-like atoms and ignores the depth that concepts contribute to percepts to provide a complete knowledge of the world. Projective space however is all about the interplay between the point-wise atoms and point-wise depth.
It is not so much that one is real and the other not, but that one is more complete whilst the other is only part of the story.
The problem with the current epistemology is the starting points.
They make unjustified assumptions.
Idealism assumes the materialism it refutes by naively adopting a priori a brain.
Materialism assumes the idealism it claims is impossible by adopting a priori a thought.
Both are stuck within thinking, but refuse to recognize thinking as a part of the world process. In fact the start of the world process.
The only way around this is to use thinking to reverse the cognitive process artificially to arrive at the starting point of cognition.
One uses thinking thus not to add on to a naive assumption but to remove from the cognitive process that which adds knowledge.
One arrives at "the given" which has no differentiation.
Once arrived one realises that within "the given" their appears to be something which is not given, these are the concepts/ideas which we ourselves produce in the act of cognition.
Even the "I" is not postulated before cognition begins, but is discovered thereafter as part of the given.
The important point of this epistemology is that it does not naively ignore thinking and then just use it, but starts from thinking and thinks about thinking and in this way builds a basis for knowledge solely around the cognitive process. There is no need to assume an "I", a will, matter, mind etc etc. These concepts are all the result of the cognitive process and their a priori reality or not is irrelevant metaphysical speculation. What is important is our ability in forming the correct concept for each percept in order to communicate sensibly.
The call for evidence witnessed for instance in this forum amuses me sometimes as the request assumes a percept as evidence, but only understands it when clothed in a concept that makes sense. It is really the same form of superstition which demands visible ghosts and miracles to justify spiritual concepts.
After all we have no other choice, but just to start thinking. The special thing about thinking is that it alone is able to "perceive itself". This is also where any justification for free-will must arise.
http://wn.rsarchive.org/Books/GA003/English/RSPI1963/GA003_index.html
http://wn.rsarchive.org/Books/GA002/English/AP1985/GA002_index.html
http://www.amazon.com/Wholeness-Nature-Goethes-Conscious-Participation/dp/0940262797
and here
http://www.nct.anth.org.uk/counter.htm
http://www.amazon.com/Science-between-Space-Counterspace-Significance/dp/1902636023/ref=pd_sim_b_4
http://www.amazon.com/Space-Counterspace-Science-Gravity-Light/dp/0863156703
http://www.amazon.com/Projective-Geometry-Lawrence-Edwards/dp/0863153933/ref=pd_sim_b_2
http://www.amazon.com/Vortex-Life-Natures-Patterns-Space/dp/0863155510/ref=pd_sim_b_1
http://www.amazon.com/Toward-Phenomenology-Etheric-World-Investigations/dp/0880101156/ref=pd_sim_b_4
http://www.scribd.com/doc/6372540/Physical-and-Ethereal-Spaces
Bubblefish said:
Language is inherently dualistic as you pointed out. The idea of projective geometry as well as Goetheanistic phenomenology is to develop an intuitive sense of the relationship between percepts and concepts. The language used to describe these techniques is of course loaded, but the idea is not to become stuck in the language, but only be guided by it to a direct perception of this relationship. This is were the genius of Goethe as an artist-scientist is useful since he showed us a way to use art to transcend the limitations of the object/subject scientific consciousness, but remain within waking consciousness.
The difference between this method and the use of an entheogen is that it is more suited to the current state of human consciousness i.m.o.
However widespread ignorance of the use of entheogens in the evolution of consciousness is certainly not useful and for me the work of Prof. Lewis-Williams I referred to in an earlier post goes a long way in putting this part of humanity into perspective.
Perhaps your experiences with entheogen's will help here. The point is intuitively regarded as solid and finite. The "self" is also experienced as point-like in everyday waking consciousness. However it is also experienced as infinite in depth. "Know thyself" is a lifelong task. Under an entheogen the self can be experience as "spread out" over the environment and thus the "spiritual" experience of the relationship between ourselves and the world. In projective geometry the point can be composed of infinite lines or planes with infinite length/width which intercept at the same place and therefore have "infinite depth" which is experienced as infinite space.Bubblefish said:
Bubblefish said:
The real duality is the percept of a tree (photograph, imagined image or sensory perception) and the concept "tree". Abstracting from the cognitive process and calling the one real and the other not is metaphysics. I do not see the cognitive process as complete until the "percept" of a tree and the "concept" of a tree is joined to form complete knowledge of a tree. Talk of real or unreal trees is simply being superstitious about the cognitive process.
Bubblefish said:
This is the important difference between just a percept and concepts joined to a percept. The euclidean space revolves around percepts and point-like atoms and ignores the depth that concepts contribute to percepts to provide a complete knowledge of the world. Projective space however is all about the interplay between the point-wise atoms and point-wise depth.
It is not so much that one is real and the other not, but that one is more complete whilst the other is only part of the story.
Bubblefish said:
The problem with the current epistemology is the starting points.
They make unjustified assumptions.
Idealism assumes the materialism it refutes by naively adopting a priori a brain.
Materialism assumes the idealism it claims is impossible by adopting a priori a thought.
Both are stuck within thinking, but refuse to recognize thinking as a part of the world process. In fact the start of the world process.
The only way around this is to use thinking to reverse the cognitive process artificially to arrive at the starting point of cognition.
One uses thinking thus not to add on to a naive assumption but to remove from the cognitive process that which adds knowledge.
One arrives at "the given" which has no differentiation.
Once arrived one realises that within "the given" their appears to be something which is not given, these are the concepts/ideas which we ourselves produce in the act of cognition.
Even the "I" is not postulated before cognition begins, but is discovered thereafter as part of the given.
The important point of this epistemology is that it does not naively ignore thinking and then just use it, but starts from thinking and thinks about thinking and in this way builds a basis for knowledge solely around the cognitive process. There is no need to assume an "I", a will, matter, mind etc etc. These concepts are all the result of the cognitive process and their a priori reality or not is irrelevant metaphysical speculation. What is important is our ability in forming the correct concept for each percept in order to communicate sensibly.
The call for evidence witnessed for instance in this forum amuses me sometimes as the request assumes a percept as evidence, but only understands it when clothed in a concept that makes sense. It is really the same form of superstition which demands visible ghosts and miracles to justify spiritual concepts.
After all we have no other choice, but just to start thinking. The special thing about thinking is that it alone is able to "perceive itself". This is also where any justification for free-will must arise.
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There is only a duality if you consider there to be mental events which are different or separated from physical events. Once you've removed the notion of an inner self, which pretty everyone agrees cannot exist no matter how things seem to be, then it can simply be that the mind is what the brain is doing. This view is now I think pretty much standard in modern neursocience. It is not to say that we entirely understand the process of say, vision. But it is to say that once mental selfhood can be seen for what it actually is so the most straightforward possibility is almost certainly true.
Sure, I said that a few posts back.
Nick
eta: I know it seems that there simply must be a huge explanatory gap between brain events and sensory awareness, but when mental selfhood is seen for what it really is, so this gap does shrink to the point where the mind can start to see that it can be that the two are one and the same.
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Bubblefish,
This jumped out to me, and I want to make sure we all understand your objection to Dennet. You're using the terms "duality" and "dualism" interchangeably, but I want to draw a distinction:
a) "dualism" is the intellectually bankrupt Cartesian dualism, and
b) "duality" is a general term meaning a pair of entities
Again, just to be clear, and to give you a chance to retract what is currently a completely vacuous objection--
Do you really disagree with Dennet because he employs a duality in his model?
You claim to understand the problem with Cartesian dualism, and you're saying the same problem applies to Dennet's model?
Is 'monoism' in irony quotes? I hope so, because otherwise I'd find it hard to take seriously your laundry list of credentials and your decades of philosophic study. Or maybe English isn't your first language...
PixyMisa
Persnickety Insect
This is the most fatuous objection imaginable. Are you honestly expecting the brain to do nothing?
No.
Explain to me how calling it a duality is in any way meaningful.
PixyMisa
Persnickety Insect
So you did.
Wow, posts here move on fast.
Firstly:
(If I were to give my opinion on the matter, the phenomenon of conciousness is an artefact created predominantly by short term memory.)
and as i scroll down:
Firstly:
Incidentally, that should read "he did not find desirable". I cannot see the edit post button, I assume it disappears after a certain amount of time/posts?
I think I see you point. When you say "the good parts of Western philosophy are 90% useless", I assumed you mean the discipline itself, but if you mean the majority of modern philosophy, I can at least appreciate your opinion. Still I find it a slightly strange assertion; we learn from mistakes as much, if not, more than successes, be them our own or other people's, and I would have thought you would have more relished the opportunity to temper your own position by observing the flaws in others?
Interesting selection there. I think they have some virtues. For instance Mary's room I find interesting experiment, not actually due to the reason it was created, but interesting in the sense of identity, epistemology and ontological systems.
Haha. From that I can assume you have had some experience with Heidegger
In recent times, there have been many attempts to suggest that certain artificial systems could be considered to be either 'sentient', or 'conscious'. And though the arguments generally work, they only work because they propose the definition of conscious to be unreasonably wide; in my opinion, false. I took your earlier definition of "Consciousness is self-referential information processing" as an example as such. It is the kind of definition one might see used in such an argument for the Google algorithms acting to create a 'conscious' or 'aware' system. I have no doubt the result is 'Intelligent', but not even close to the same way in which biological systems are intelligent. I said amusing since I am almost certain from reading the 1 or 2 posts of yours that I have, that you would not consider the google search engine or the like to be conscious. Do correct me if that was a misjudgement though.
(If I were to give my opinion on the matter, the phenomenon of conciousness is an artefact created predominantly by short term memory.)
Thank you
It should be noted that dualism is the proposition that there is two types of fundamental substance, whereas Dennett makes no such claim.
and as i scroll down:
beat me to it too
Yes, 2 hours.
Yet we learn from mistakes by recognising them as mistakes. Also a valid position, no? What I personally like about the JREF is that people do get out there and take a confrontational position. Bubblefish himself says he likes the challenge. I don't see that he can really meet it, but he apparently likes it nonetheless.
"not even close to the same way"? You mean there is a fundamental qualitative difference between machine and biological consciousness?
Nick
And if you've studied this for any length of time, you know there's no rigorous, scientific definition of consciousness that excludes Google or a thermostat.
The way I see it, many popular "definitions" of consciousness are indicative of psychological recoil from being lumped together with insects, automobiles, and search engines, and knocked off the pedestal of universal human superiority.
@the group here.
Okay, so a quick note on duality and cartesian dualism. Yes I do see that there is a distinction between them, and Dennet seeks to avoid one. I wrote my objection sloppy, my apologies. This is only one of a number of problems I have with Dennet's argument, but it highlights what has been raised in this thread so I will focus here.
So here is one of the things I believe about Dennet's argument, help point out my flaws in thinking here.
I see that Dennet seeks to do away with Cartesian dualism, but I'm still not sure what that is resolving relevant to his concerns.
While there may not be two substances as Cartesian Dualism expresses, there certainly is two distinct realities going on here, the reality of the mind experiencing and the reality of the material brains and neurons firing.
That's the important 'duality' that Dennet must erase in his explanation. The fact there is no 'substance' is, to me, irrelevant. So here is something fundamental to me that Dennet appears thus far to be missing.
So let me try to make one of my objections to Dennet clear; by avoiding cartesian dualism, he is invoking the inherent (but resolvable) duality in taoism. Is that really helpful in supporting a materialistic interpretation of reality?
He thinks he is doing away with the Mystery, but I do not see the evidence of this. To me, he has taken the mystery away from matter (substance) and has placed it in 'doing', action, or process. That the self is a 'process' and not a 'thing' is a very old idea about consciousness/being in the east (and actually a few old western traditions as well). He has simply made the Mystery far more mysterious by trying to avoid it. It is an illusion that he has eradicated it.
If anything, Dennet is supplying material evidence for the eastern perspective, I don't think he is aware of that, and I don't see it helpful in supporting a materialistic position, he still has a set of dualities that he is not accounting for.
Where am I mistaken here?
Okay, so a quick note on duality and cartesian dualism. Yes I do see that there is a distinction between them, and Dennet seeks to avoid one. I wrote my objection sloppy, my apologies. This is only one of a number of problems I have with Dennet's argument, but it highlights what has been raised in this thread so I will focus here.
So here is one of the things I believe about Dennet's argument, help point out my flaws in thinking here.
I see that Dennet seeks to do away with Cartesian dualism, but I'm still not sure what that is resolving relevant to his concerns.
While there may not be two substances as Cartesian Dualism expresses, there certainly is two distinct realities going on here, the reality of the mind experiencing and the reality of the material brains and neurons firing.
That's the important 'duality' that Dennet must erase in his explanation. The fact there is no 'substance' is, to me, irrelevant. So here is something fundamental to me that Dennet appears thus far to be missing.
So let me try to make one of my objections to Dennet clear; by avoiding cartesian dualism, he is invoking the inherent (but resolvable) duality in taoism. Is that really helpful in supporting a materialistic interpretation of reality?
He thinks he is doing away with the Mystery, but I do not see the evidence of this. To me, he has taken the mystery away from matter (substance) and has placed it in 'doing', action, or process. That the self is a 'process' and not a 'thing' is a very old idea about consciousness/being in the east (and actually a few old western traditions as well). He has simply made the Mystery far more mysterious by trying to avoid it. It is an illusion that he has eradicated it.
If anything, Dennet is supplying material evidence for the eastern perspective, I don't think he is aware of that, and I don't see it helpful in supporting a materialistic position, he still has a set of dualities that he is not accounting for.
Where am I mistaken here?
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First, assuming that the "duality inherent in Taoism" is Yin and Yang, there's no way you can seriously interpret Dennet to be talking about this at all. If there's a more obvious duality in Taoism, you should make it clear. Anyway, if it's resolvable, as you claim, then why is it a problem if Dennet alludes to it?
Second, pointing out that some ancient Eastern mystics already had the idea that the self is a process and not a substance is irrelevant. It's one thing to make a proposition, it's another to tell a coherent story about how it works. This is a basic epistemological point: who cares if someone happens to get the fact right. The question is, are you justified in believing it?
Third, the duality of substances/processes in no way violates materialism. Materialism doesn't say that the universe is comprised of a single *immutable* substance. If you don't allow a substance (like the brain) to undergo processes (like thinking), then you disallow pretty much everything. This is what PixyMisa was alluding to in his/her* post.
Finally, Dennet doesn't talk about "the Mystery"--not because he's trying to avoid it, but because it's irrelevant. Notice, he also doesn't talk about the Jabberwock. Is he trying to avoid it? You are the one talking about "the Mystery", so *you* have to give an account for it, not Dennet.
Anyway, at best your post indicates that Dennet may have been influenced by Eastern thought. But you can't get from that to "therefore Dennet can't support materialism" without quite a few intervening logical steps you are conspicuously leaving out.
* Am still not clear on this. Not that it's terribly important.
Second, pointing out that some ancient Eastern mystics already had the idea that the self is a process and not a substance is irrelevant. It's one thing to make a proposition, it's another to tell a coherent story about how it works. This is a basic epistemological point: who cares if someone happens to get the fact right. The question is, are you justified in believing it?
Third, the duality of substances/processes in no way violates materialism. Materialism doesn't say that the universe is comprised of a single *immutable* substance. If you don't allow a substance (like the brain) to undergo processes (like thinking), then you disallow pretty much everything. This is what PixyMisa was alluding to in his/her* post.
Finally, Dennet doesn't talk about "the Mystery"--not because he's trying to avoid it, but because it's irrelevant. Notice, he also doesn't talk about the Jabberwock. Is he trying to avoid it? You are the one talking about "the Mystery", so *you* have to give an account for it, not Dennet.
Anyway, at best your post indicates that Dennet may have been influenced by Eastern thought. But you can't get from that to "therefore Dennet can't support materialism" without quite a few intervening logical steps you are conspicuously leaving out.
* Am still not clear on this. Not that it's terribly important.
Bubblefish:
I just had a couple of thoughts that may resolve part of this debate about Dennet.
1. Dennet doesn't require there to be a duality at all.
If it helps, you could think of it as a trinity: the brain, the processes of thought, and the model (the multiple drafts) the processes operate upon. The model is certainly not the brain. It's also not the processes (thought it could include a model of the processes...). Now, you could argue about whether and where to draw the line between the processes and the model (or the code and the data, for you computer types), and if it's appropriate to do so...
2. Dennet's account assumes a materialist position in order to attack the notion of the Cartesian theater. So it's no wonder you find little evidence to prove materialism. Using Dennet to prove materialism might be like using Robert's Rules of Order to justify representative democracy.
I just had a couple of thoughts that may resolve part of this debate about Dennet.
1. Dennet doesn't require there to be a duality at all.
If it helps, you could think of it as a trinity: the brain, the processes of thought, and the model (the multiple drafts) the processes operate upon. The model is certainly not the brain. It's also not the processes (thought it could include a model of the processes...). Now, you could argue about whether and where to draw the line between the processes and the model (or the code and the data, for you computer types), and if it's appropriate to do so...
2. Dennet's account assumes a materialist position in order to attack the notion of the Cartesian theater. So it's no wonder you find little evidence to prove materialism. Using Dennet to prove materialism might be like using Robert's Rules of Order to justify representative democracy.
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Sorry for the serial posting, but upon re-reading your post I noticed this:
This, more than, anything, indicates that you don't grasp the notion of Cartesian duality. You cannot say in the same breath, "There may not be two substances" and "there certainly is two distinct realities". One statement implies the other, if you understand the philosophic notion of substance.
Descartes believed there were two substances: res extensa (extended, or physical, stuff like houses, candle wax, and bodies) and res cogitans (thinking stuff, thoughts, ideas). The problem with Cartesian dualism is there is no conceivable way for the two substances (the two realities, as you put it above) to interact. And if they *can* interact, are they really two distinct substances/realities?
Material stuff undergoing changes and enacting processes is *not* the same as this Cartesian dualism. In fact, I challenge you to formulate the same objection to Dennet as philosophers historically have against Descartes (the problem of interaction).
This, more than, anything, indicates that you don't grasp the notion of Cartesian duality. You cannot say in the same breath, "There may not be two substances" and "there certainly is two distinct realities". One statement implies the other, if you understand the philosophic notion of substance.
Descartes believed there were two substances: res extensa (extended, or physical, stuff like houses, candle wax, and bodies) and res cogitans (thinking stuff, thoughts, ideas). The problem with Cartesian dualism is there is no conceivable way for the two substances (the two realities, as you put it above) to interact. And if they *can* interact, are they really two distinct substances/realities?
Material stuff undergoing changes and enacting processes is *not* the same as this Cartesian dualism. In fact, I challenge you to formulate the same objection to Dennet as philosophers historically have against Descartes (the problem of interaction).
Look, it has **** all to do with Daoism. I know you don't like people giving you a hard time, BF, but some of this stuff you post is just woeful.
Rubbish. Neither Buddhism nor Advaita Vedanta, the 2 proto-materialist doctrines of the East, say self is a process. They say self doesn't exist, or in the case of the latter, that it only exists at a certain level.
What Dennett is doing is removing the "gap" that dualists or HP fans insist must exist between brain function and awareness. As he succintly put it 10 years ago...
Dennett said:
Dennett is proposing that no gap exists. The jury is, in all fairness, out. But...given that each year we dig deeper into the brain and resolve more and more of Chalmers' so-called "easy problems", AND no one finds any mystery, so it becomes apparent to more and more researchers that in all liklihood the HPC is simply a very human misunderstanding of how things are.
dear god! This is so deeply delusional you really should get some kind of award.
There's no point in answering that question as you have shown time and again that you cannot take feedback unless you're shown some level of professional respect. I cannot do that because you actually have bugger all understanding of the subject matter and it's not in my nature to patronise idiots with ego-lathering bs.
GO AND READ A BOOK ON CONSCIOUSNESS, BF. Consciousness, An Introduction, by Susan Blackmore, would at least allow you to participate in a discussion on the subject. You're not ready to take on Consciousness Explained yet. It's clear.
Nick
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Well, what I'm saying is that Dennet is drawing a conclusion about consciousness that is identical to a conclusion drawn in eastern philosophy. Since I am more versed in Taoism, I can use the Taoist example. And yes I can say that they are concluding the same thing. Dennet is saying that consciousness is 'process' and not 'stuff'. Taoists are saying that consciousness is 'process' and not 'stuff'.
process/stuff mind/brain/ spirit/body yin/yang who cares the semantics, it's about the relationship. And it is resolvable in taoism, but Dennet does not resolve it himself, he leaves it dangling. Or so that I what I am suggesting. I'm also saying that I could be wrong, this is very delicate subject matter, not saying I know the ultimate answer.
Oh I agree with that, but then we just have one philosophy that has evolved over cultures and generations and not two philosophies. We have something cohesive. And since we have a few cultures that have spent millennia exploring the 'process' and what you can do with it, we should then consider what they have to say on the matter as well.
Sure, if your talking epistemology. Who cares who created the first knowledge of fire, we all got it now. But that's not what we are talking about.
I agree with my understanding of materialism, but I'm not so sure that is shared here yet.
but it is saying that material reality is the PRIMARY and SOURCE reality. Whereas 'non material' philosophy states that CONSCIOUSNESS or BEING is the PRIMARY or SOURCE reality.
Well I don't respond/read/pay attention much to pixy mesa's posts, they seem incoherent to me, but I follow you, and agree.
so you accept that process/substance is a duality that is necessary for the explanation of consciousness? That it is simply in coherent to explain consciousness without some form of duality, correct?
Well in consciousness explained, he talks about the mystery a lot. He uses the exact word, 'mystery', and doesn't like to include it in a model of consciousness. It's sort of foundational to his framework, to invoke some sort of mystery into the materialistic model of consciousness is defeatism.
Well he does give an account for it, he calls it 'brain processing'.
I don't think Dennet has been influenced by eastern thought. I think Dennet has been influenced by western thought and argues against Descartes, who did sort of a bad job of explaining self from an Eastern Perspective.
I am saying that Eastern and Western may be two ways of coming to one conclusion, two points of view, not one. But that's also not terribly important