"Intelligence is Self Teaching" A paranormal experience into A.I and Intelligence.

Who cares? Even the good parts of Western philosophy are 90% useless, and everything else is even worse.

That's a pretty impressive statement. Assuming that you are making this statement from the perspective of a sceptic and, as such, is suspicious of what you might consider philosophy to be; I would remind you of the relationship between philosophy and the sciences, both historical and current.
To reject one is impossible, the other, absurd.

I admit in modern times, especially post-Bacon, the association between the two disciplines has become lessened (though, I note, this a consequence he did find desirable), and the again modern desire to always further categorise, define and as a consequence, isolate the systems in which we work has driven the apparent wedge further between the two.

However I use the word 'apparent' since it is a deception. Both disciplines are and always have been inextricably entwined. By philosophy's own definition, scientific concerns are too concerns of philosophy, and on the other hand scientific enquiry is framed by philosophical propositions.To paraphrase Massimo Pigliucci, one is empirically-based hypothesis testing, the other reason-based logical analysis and they inform each other in an inter-dependent fashion (science depends on philosophical assumptions that are outside the scope of empirical validation, but philosophical investigations should be informed by the best science available in a range of situations, from metaphysics to ethics and philosophy of mind).



More on Google Consciousness

Speaking as a person who is currently working in the field of AI, I would suggest that the concept of Google conciousness, or infact any current artificial entity is being considered sentient, is only reasonable if your definition of conciousness is inexplicably broad. Somewhat amusingly you could argue that PixyMisa's definition of conciousness would be fine:
Consciousness is self-referential information processing. That's all there needs to be.
Though I am sure that was not what was intended :).

Simply put, the confusion between biological intelligence to electronic intelligence is that, though the complexities of the systems might become or be comparable, the actual function of the entities tend to consistently differ. It is hard to create an artificial intelligence without having the focus of getting it to mimic one or more observable biological functions, and as soon as that goal is in place, the intelligence is framed. And essentially, all that can occur is a clever rouse. Getting robots to mimic bird flocking behaviour is possible. but it does not make them concious of it.

I wouldnt suggest that it is not possible, but not in the sense that most suggest.



Yeah, I often wonder if the internet could become a sort of golem. If "true" AI ever does surface, it will be because humanity has psychically infused a system with "part" of its own consciousness. Not because some engineering or programming genius figured it out or stumbed on the answer.
I agree with your second statement, but not your first. I doubt the current direction in software based intelligence will yield anything truly intelligent, but to suggest "consciousness" is transferable like you are suggesting is wishful thinking. Dualism is provably wrong; the causal interaction problem it creates is very real, and as far as im concerned, not defeatable. Descartes' mind–body dichotomy lives on it seems. Wish he had stuck to maths :(

My perspective on the matter is centred from much more of a phenomenological point of view. I do not believe that the concious self and the physical self can be separated; we are embodied creatures. That is simply just how our existence is. Incidentally, one of the great hurdles I perceive in robotic AI is the need to introduce a true form of proprioception linked with short term memory. But I will leave it there since I am beginning to wander it seems.
 
That's a pretty impressive statement. Assuming that you are making this statement from the perspective of a sceptic and, as such, is suspicious of what you might consider philosophy to be; I would remind you of the relationship between philosophy and the sciences, both historical and current.
To reject one is impossible, the other, absurd.
As I said, 90% useless. I have all the time in the world for Popper and Hume, for example. The German philosophers, as a group, not so much.

However I use the word 'apparent' since it is a deception. Both disciplines are and always have been inextricably entwined. By philosophy's own definition, scientific concerns are too concerns of philosophy, and on the other hand scientific enquiry is framed by philosophical propositions.To paraphrase Massimo Pigliucci, one is empirically-based hypothesis testing, the other reason-based logical analysis and they inform each other in an inter-dependent fashion (science depends on philosophical assumptions that are outside the scope of empirical validation, but philosophical investigations should be informed by the best science available in a range of situations, from metaphysics to ethics and philosophy of mind).
The problem is, all too often philosophy is not reason-based logical analysis of any kind, but rather twaddle-based twaddle. Cf. Chalmers, Jackson, and Searle, who are, frankly, idiots.

Speaking as a person who is currently working in the field of AI, I would suggest that the concept of Google conciousness, or infact any current artificial entity is being considered sentient, is only reasonable if your definition of conciousness is inexplicably broad. Somewhat amusingly you could argue that PixyMisa's definition of conciousness would be fine:

Though I am sure that was not what was intended :).
Hmm? Could you expand on this?
 
Originally Posted by Bubblefish
Wonderful! You finally made the distinction between experience and and objective reality
No, between internally constructed images and objective reality.

ahhh, more contradiction, so the 'internally constructed images' are not what is experienced, therefore 'experience', in your model, must not either exist or must relate to something entirely different.

Whilst you continue to insist "experience" to be a priori, you will not be able to grasp materialism at a deep level, and will inevitably be consigned to some haphazard dualist wilderness. There's no alternative.

Nick, are you drinking? Are you cognizant in this discussion? are you even bothering to read anything? You really failing in comprehending even the most basic of points that I have made, and your repeating yourself over and over, similar to someone who had too many drinks at a bar, telling his buddies over and over the reasons his gf left.

Until you can see for yourself that there is no experiencer in actuality, that the brain is simply processing information, you are stuck in this place.

The 'experiencer' is and can only be the actual physiological system. There is a physiological self that exists not inside the brain, but outside the brain.

Your the one, along with dennet, who is on a ghost hunt trying to prove that there is not a man inside of the brain pulling strings, as if that is the only argument provided.

Your repeating yourself, not considering, not listening, not comprehending anything in this discussion. Your not even aware of your own dualistic framework, your not even aware of the duality between 'noun' and 'verb' that exists in Dennet's model. The fact is that the 'Mind' is a 'becoming' (verb, processing) of what the brain (matter- noun) is doing is a dualistic system. You can't just move one dualism into another, claim yourself having to avoided it just because you have tossed out some 17th century idea that there is a man in the brain pulling strings.

Congratulations, you have defeated 17th century ideas about consciousness. You have trumped one duality only to supplant it with another.

It's probably the drugs. With these types of tryptamine (nnDMT) you can get a big ego reinforcement. I've seen it many times. I guess you believe in reincarnation too. It would make sense as the only possibility your mind could cling to in order to move forwards.

In your alcoholic stupor, your arguing with the bubblefish in your head once again. Your projecting your argument with Descartes on to me. Your not paying attention, I am a futurist, and us futurists can consider all kinds of technologies that can allow for 'reincarnation' using nothing more than materialistic models of consciousness and intelligence. Go have a nice read of Kurzweil, especially his book 'The Age of Spiritual Machines'. Try not to confuse him with Descartes either, ok? Then come back to this discussion once you have sobered up.
 
That of course is the problem. Using plants from the jungle as medicine is what these people have been doing for thousands of years. It would be pretty simple for a "Curandero" to try various plants and things to see what works before he tells anybody about them, then when he does tell people about the great new constipation remedy he found, he says the plant spirits told him about it.

What I want to see is a Curandero who comes back from his trip with information not available to him in mundane ways. That's why I asked if any of them came back with knowledge of electronics or rocketry, I was of course being facetious. But did anyone ever come back from a trip knowing something that conflicted with the prevailing tribal customs?

If that truly is information you want, then you have a few options. In my article I provided a anecdotal story of something I learned from the 'plants'. Descartes himself had a dream about an angel in his youth, telling him the mastery of nature was to occur via number and measure, which is the foundation for the scientific materialism. That the foundation of western materialistic thought is potentially founded upon a dream by an angel is another irony altogether.

You can read the literature out there, I already supplied a few but there are many more, or you can simply go down to the Amazon yourself and try it and see what happens. Jeremy Narby is a quick and easy read. In his book, he took three molecular biologists to the amazon to take ayahausca with a curandero. 2 of them thought they learned something they did not know, the third said he did learn something, but believed it was already in his brain somehow (he probably read Fenyman's experiences beforehand with entheogens, which potentially corrupted his experience). All of them felt that curanderos actually did something very similar to natural scientists. So read the literature.

Until you do that, your argument is no better than a shaman being skeptical that people can learn about plants in encyclopedias, simply because there are other ways they can learn that information.
 
Originally Posted by PixyMisa
No, that's not why. The "hard problem" of consciousness exists only if your metaphysical position is internally self-contradictory. Otherwise, the hard problem itself is internally self-contradictory.
Those who refuse to see the hard problem within them are perforce driven to recreate it in their philosophy, to paraphrase Carl Jung. Nick

One day, perhaps the materialists here will be able to make a distinction between 'metaphysical' and 'metaphysiological'. Until they do that, they are continuing to have an argument with a 17th century philosopher in a discussion with a 21st century scientific humanist.

When ya'all gonna upgrade?
 
Hey Kaggen, you bring up an interesting point, one which so far everyone else has failed to address. I want to see what you mean a bit more here...

The best way, I have found, to conceptualize the space which thought/mind and brain occupies (i.e. exists) without falling into a type of dualism (object/subject, real/illusion) is the projective space of Projective Geometry.

Okay, let me tell you the problems I have here, and maybe you can help me understand it a bit, because I am seeing the same problem here that I am with almost every model that claims not to invoke dualism.

mind/brain is a dualism of verb/noun as described by the materialistic model. I'm not seeing how dualism is not used to model at all. I'm not a mathematician, but projective geometry still needs 'points' and 'lines', another duality. Also 'projection' needs both a 'source' and a 'receiver'.

So here is where I am getting stopped. Show me the error in my thinking here. I'm seeing all kinds of duality in these materialistic models. To me, all they are doing is taking one duality and trading it in for another while at the same time not allowing for it. It just seems continually contradictory.

The problem is one of intuition, were our normal intuition is guided by Euclidean space which restricts relationships to points.
I think there is something meaningful here, just not quite so sure how it transcends dualism.

Another way to understand the problem is to ask what is the difference between a photograph of a tree and an imaginative picture of a tree in ones mind.
Which is more real?

neither are real trees, both are images. One can be touched and analyzed, one can be experienced. still a duality there, and this concept is played with much in the art world

http://bit.ly/dCJrvM

The photo is a point-wise exact visual replica only which excludes dynamics such as the relationship between observer and tree (emotional, mental, willful) movement and growth whilst the imaginative picture includes these.

Yes, the imagination comes with more 'depth' than the physical. Not sure what this provides though, can you help me understand?

We have become trapped in believing only the photo is real and the imagination is not because we cannot visualize a relationship between the imagination and the imagined.

I have plenty problems with this model, see above. Not sure if it resolves anything, but i can be mistaken, please help me understand and 'see' what you mean.
 
I still like Dennett's "fame in the brain" paper from a decade ago.

Nick

well since you have only been reading philosophy for a year and a half, time for you to upgrade. Dennet's fame argument is not as elegant as the Google consciousness argument in my opinion.

You must accept therefore that Google can be conscious in some sense, right?
 
Hello Eimhin, thank you for joining this forum and discussion, I look forward to learning from you.

Speaking as a person who is currently working in the field of AI, I would suggest that the concept of Google conciousness, or infact any current artificial entity is being considered sentient, is only reasonable if your definition of conciousness is inexplicably broad. Somewhat amusingly you could argue that PixyMisa's definition of conciousness would be fine: Though I am sure that was not what was intended :).

Well I think we are on the same page thus far. In a way, it was exactly what was intended by this playful analogy of Google consciousness. I believe the 'SEO' model of consciousness is a reasonable metaphor/model for the materialistic model of consciousness as explained by Dennet and a few materialists, of which pixymisa is a strong proponent. I personally do not believe that google will produce consciousness, although my assumption there is more intuitive than analytical.

To me, the idea that any self referencing processing IS consciousness is a very very broad term of consciousness that really isn't defining consciousness as much as it is self referencing processing, i.e. it appears nothing more than a tautology to me, and one that is fraught with contradictions when anyone tries to explain it as a way to avoid dualism.
 
UPDATE:

So far, this article and the complimentary discussions have produced inside of me some very interesting integrations that are neatly expressed in three axioms.

1.) Intelligence is Self Teaching.

2.) Intelligence is Self Referring.

3.) Intelligence is Self Transcending.

A trail of these integrations are found primarily in this discussion.
 
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One day, perhaps the materialists here will be able to make a distinction between 'metaphysical' and 'metaphysiological'. Until they do that, they are continuing to have an argument with a 17th century philosopher in a discussion with a 21st century scientific humanist.

As Jung put it, the psychological rule does still apply. If you refuse to deal with the inevitable inner conflict then you have no choice but to externalise it and see it in the world outside.

The reality of selfhood is necessarily counter-intuitive. It inevitably creates havoc for the mind. I see people reeling all the time. There was a guy just yesterday over on the R&P, faced with the classic teletransporter dilemma. It's like...whoa, no, this can't be right! Hang on a mo. Really, this can't be right! I need to get out of this thread, it's doing my head in. This is what it's like when the mind starts to deal with the reality of the self. It's full on confrontational for most.

But, of course, if you cannot accept this world turned upside down, if you cannot be with it, then you are driven to insist that there must exist a hard problem.

Nick
 
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well since you have only been reading philosophy for a year and a half, time for you to upgrade. Dennet's fame argument is not as elegant as the Google consciousness argument in my opinion.

Well, elegance wasn't one of my core criteria in assessment, I'm afraid. I flicked through the Hankins piece, but it seemed to me he wasn't really taking a stance on what consciousness is, rather generalising about aspects of Google compared with aspects of the brain. Does he take the position that Strong AI is correct? I don't see that. It's just a general, lightweight piece. That was my impression.

I mean, in his decade old piece, Dennett really breaks it down. There's not a great deal left to really dispute unless you have some inner investment in the old HP, if you ask me.

You must accept therefore that Google can be conscious in some sense, right?

I actually don't know anywhere near enough about it, to be honest. I mean, you'd need to provide a decent quantitative definition of what consciousness is, for a start. But, personally, I'd say it's conscious. Sure, why not? Big computer churning away. I guess it also depends how much internal feedback you need to see to consider something conscious. Some people in AI work this way, I think.

Nick

eta, flicking back through Dennett's piece, I mean you have to hand it to him. Check this out...

DD said:
On the other hand, if your theory still has tasks for a Subject to perform, still has a need for the Subject as Witness, then although you can be falsely comforted by the sense that there is still somebody at home in the brain, you have actually postponed the task of explaining what needs explaining. To me one of the most fascinating bifurcations in the intellectual world today is between those to whom it is obvious-obvious-that a theory that leaves out the Subject is thereby disqualified as a theory of consciousness (in Chalmers's terms, it evades the Hard Problem), and those to whom it is just as obvious that any theory that doesn't leave out the Subject is disqualified. I submit that the former have to be wrong, but they certainly don't lack for conviction, as these recent declarations eloquently attest:

If, in short, there is a community of computers living in my head, there had also better be somebody who is in charge; and, by God, it had better be me. (Fodor, 1998, p207)

Of course the problem here is with the claim that consciousness is 'identical' to physical brain states. The more Dennett et al. try to explain to me what they mean by this, the more convinced I become that what they really mean is that consciousness doesn't exist. (Wright, 2000, fn. 14, ch.21)


Daniel Dennett is the Devil. . . . . There is no internal witness, no central recognizer of meaning, and no self other than an abstract 'Center of Narrative Gravity' which is itself nothing but a convenient fiction. . . . For Dennett, it is not a case of the Emperor having no clothes. It is rather that the clothes have no Emperor. (Voorhees, 2000, pp55-56)


This is not just my problem; it confronts anybody attempting to construct and defend a properly naturalistic, materialistic theory of consciousness. Damasio is one who has attempted to solve this pedagogical (or perhaps diplomatic) problem by appearing to split the difference, writing eloquently about the Self, proclaiming that he is taking the Subject very seriously, even restoring the Subject to its rightful place in the theory of consciousness-while quietly dismantling the Self, breaking it into "proto-selves" and identifying these in functional, neuroanatomic terms as a network of brain-stem nuclei (Parvizi and Damasio).

What's so inelegant about this, BF? He completely breaks it down. You have all these intellectuals desperately trying to avoid dealing with their own inner reality, and Dan just unrelentingly explaining how the brain goes about deluding itself.
 
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ahhh, more contradiction, so the 'internally constructed images' are not what is experienced, therefore 'experience', in your model, must not either exist or must relate to something entirely different.

There are pictures. There is sensory data. But there is in actuality no one experiencing it. If you just sit down and watch you can see it happen. There are these thoughts, they create this story..."I this, you that." Really, it's plain apparent if you just sit down and watch closely.

It's not that experience is wrong. It's just that it's not an empiric reality, it's just a social phenomena. When you make it that there is, in reality, in your theory of consciousness, an actual experiencer, then it is like you believe that a soap opera story or a children's story is reality. Santa Claus has uses. But there is no actual Santa.



The 'experiencer' is and can only be the actual physiological system. There is a physiological self that exists not inside the brain, but outside the brain.

There's a body, yes. And for sure you can say, in conversation, my body experiences pain. I mean, it's more likely you say "I experience pain," but you can make it the body.

But, inside the body, there is no experiencer. There is just this neural substrate processing away. It seems that there must be someone that observes this processing, but of course this is not reality. It's just the fairy tale.

Congratulations, you have defeated 17th century ideas about consciousness. You have trumped one duality only to supplant it with another.

The nature of the self is inevitably contradictory. There are these stories, going on in the head. It seems as though there must be someone who hears them. But it is just more stories. It is better to be aware of this inner contradiction that to refuse to examine it rationally. If you can't deal with the reality of self, yourself, you are inevitably left constructing fantasies and hard problems. You have no choice. If you can't accept the inner contradiction you have to put it outside.

In your alcoholic stupor, your arguing with the bubblefish in your head once again. Your projecting your argument with Descartes on to me. Your not paying attention, I am a futurist, and us futurists can consider all kinds of technologies that can allow for 'reincarnation' using nothing more than materialistic models of consciousness and intelligence. Go have a nice read of Kurzweil, especially his book 'The Age of Spiritual Machines'. Try not to confuse him with Descartes either, ok? Then come back to this discussion once you have sobered up.

I mean, you acuse me of this...or that. You try and pigeonhole me here...or there. Did you never stop to wonder why your mind wants to do this stuff? In one of our first exchanges you figured me for your new best friend, or some similar term, simply because I agreed with your post and disputed something Pixy had said to you. I thought "Oh, ok, if I agree with you I'm your friend!" It's BS, man. You're totally identified with a set of ideas, to the point where you regard those who defend your position as friends and those who oppose your ideas as enemies.

Wake up, BF! They're just ideas. This self, that you imagine to be the "owner" of these ideas, it doesn't exist. It doesn't ******* exist! Wake up, man.

Nick
 
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Is there anyone else here who can explain the materialistic model proposed by Dennet other than Nick? If I have to slice through his contradictions one more time, I may have to drain my blood.
 
As Jung put it, the psychological rule does still apply. If you refuse to deal with the inevitable inner conflict then you have no choice but to externalise it and see it in the world outside.

The reality of selfhood is necessarily counter-intuitive. It inevitably creates havoc for the mind. I see people reeling all the time. There was a guy just yesterday over on the R&P, faced with the classic teletransporter dilemma. It's like...whoa, no, this can't be right! Hang on a mo. Really, this can't be right! I need to get out of this thread, it's doing my head in. This is what it's like when the mind starts to deal with the reality of the self. It's full on confrontational for most.

But, of course, if you cannot accept this world turned upside down, if you cannot be with it, then you are driven to insist that there must exist a hard problem.

Got any music to go along with that speech?
 
I'm quite familiar with Dennet's writings, have a few of his books. Also have google. thanks
 

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