Not so. Try reading the judgment for comprehension. The court accurately set out the law: that on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a proper claim, while a court must accept as true properly pleaded factual allegations, a court need not accept as true allegations that are merely conclusionary, speculation or conjecture, and not factual allegations.
I have looked at the post that you seem to take exception to. The part you are arguing with is, in fact, that which I quoted from the court's ruling. I quoted the court's statement of standard that must be applied to motions of the type the court had before it and the court's ipso facto, unsubstantiated, reliance upon what the court said was, or rather, was not plausible.
I don't know why you think you can expand upon what the court said; or, even if you do, why your declaration is any more substantiated than that of the court. It is one thing to claim something is implausible; or, to use your terms, that something is "merely conclusionary, speculation or conjecture, and not factual allegations" and it is quite anothert to substantiate that claim.
As I pointed out by way of example, it is not possible to make an affirmative declaration about what the vice president did as the vice president did not say what he did and did not provide a public record of his actions.
Given that the event itself was a tremendous humiliation for the US military apparatus that resulted in the nation's military HQ being hit and the entire military response apparatus being caught totally off-guard and "out to lunch" from top to bottom and all points in between, one can reasonably assert that somebody has "some splainin' to do." It is certainly unreasoned in the uttermost to claim April Gallop had not made a plausible statement without demonstrating its implausibility.
That is, unless we accept and acknowledge that the common storyline of 9/11 is sacrosanct. It isn't. However it will be very painful to examine what happened. I will concede that much.
The court properly determined that very little in Gallop's complaint rose to the level of factual allegations, and the bits that did reach that level were an insufficient basis upon which to ground the lawsuit. The court quite correctly found that Gallop's complaint was, as a matter of law, factually baseless.
Your repitition with different words of your same rationalization for the miscarriage of justice requires no further comment here. April Gallop's case should not have been dismissed as what happened at the Pentagon has not ever been explained.
Furthermore, just as a prima facie issue, the iconic video of the event plainly (no pun intended) does not show the presence of a jetliner. I here assert that as a matter of law, that piece of evidence should have been sufficient, standing alone, to defeat a motion to dismiss.
Which is kind of silly, considering that she previously negotiated a settlement in another lawsuit (against airlines, et al) on the basis that a jetliner did, in fact, hit the Pentagon, causing injury to herself and her son.
Alternative theories are not uncommon in lawsuits. However, that said, it does not appear the judge's decision is based upon that factor which would have involved use of different legal theories. Rather, the judge mentioned the prior lawsuit in a footnote and did not discuss or analyze that issue further.
No, she has little chance on appeal because her complaint is factually baseless.
She has little chance on appeal, but should, in my opinion take that chance. Her complaint has merit.
Ms. Gallop may be an example of something, but not that which you purport to imagine. There's the inconvenient fact that she also sued the airlines (while simultaneously claiming that there was no airplane), and she also sued banks through which she alleged the terrorist highjackers' funds were channeled (while simultaneously claiming that there were no terrorists or airplanes). What's that an example of again?
Alternative claims and throries are an everyday, commonplace occurrence and the fact that Gallop may have relied on alternative claims is neither unique nor surprising. Let me illustrate this further and ask whether you are aware of what position was taken by the airlines she sued?
Did they admit or deny liability?
If they denied it, to what extent did they do so? Did the denial extend to the issue of whether or not a jetliner crashed?
If you did not know the answers to those queries before posting what you posted, why did you imply that her pleading was improper?
Again, try reading the judgment for comprehension.
Do all who disagree with you do so solely because they do not read for comprehension? You make it sound almost as if you have a monoply on reading comprehension, LashL, and that I can't read for beans. Is it really necessary to place our disagreement in that context, LashL? Why can't we just have a disagreement in principle and not one based on a claimed lack of reading comprehension?
The decision is correct, which is not at all surprising.
The above is the essence of "conclusionary."
When is that day? I'd like to pencil it into my calendar.
Economics writer, Jim Willie, gives a 20% chance to the unraveling of the 9/11 coverup occurring during 2010. I'd say that is about right, as far as predictive ability is concerned.
I understand LasVegas casinos allow people to bet on almost anything. I wonder if there's a line on when the 9/11 coverup will unravel?