Are You Conscious?

[AlBell]

Yup and we end up with 'Kill the witch" and "African or European swallow."

Do you suggest that we will eventually just run all these semantic (but iyo physical) constructs through the system:

"Is is consistently observable? Is it measurable? Could there be a testable hypothesis about it? Could it be described by some mathematical model?

If so then it is physical."

and answer all questions "correctly" with the logical systems of math and physics?

If not, why not?

 

[Dancing David]

I am not sure I got the question, I will read it again. Sorry. There is a hoarde of third graders in the lab on my break.

 

[Woolgatherer]

I'm a legend when I'm not conscious. When I'm conscious I have to work really fast because I know the snack from break will soon render me unconscious.

 

[Robin]

I am not sure I got the question, I will read it again. Sorry. There is a hoarde of third graders in the lab on my break.

He is quoting something I said a while back and maintaining the typo in it.

I asked (of something, I forget what) :

"Is it consistently observable? Is it measurable? Could there be a testable hypothesis about it? Could it be described by some mathematical model?

If so, then it is physical."​

I am not sure why he is asking you.

 

[Dancing David]

AlBell, I don't get your point. Wether people like it or not some of us disagree with the kantian meta-space. There is no 'abstract' as a 'real' place. All abstractions are conceptual shorthand for physical events.

Now there are many different flavors of the alternative, those who argue that patterns in systems are not 'physical' up to full blown imaterialists.

My POV is that I am a 'methodological naturalist' (philosophical label) while I would currently label myself as a 'pragmatic nihilist'. I firmly believe that ontology has no bearing on anything. If we are matter/energy, butterfly dreams, godthought or BIVs does not make any difference. The world and reality would be exactly the same.

Immaterialism and materialism will behave exactly the same and both reduce to the same end result.

 

[Beth]

And am sorry at this time the "consciousness" in the OP, which some of us think we a) have and b) objectively demonstrate cannot be handled by the mathematics that describes and bounds your world of matter.

I would be very interested to see that objective demonstration, so please go ahead and present it.

This is an interesting idea to contemplate. What form could such a mathematical description take? How would you go about demonstrating that it isn't possible? Hmmm. Maybe using the uncertainty principle? Maybe using the incompleteness theorem?

More on this later.

Is language physical?

I think this is a key question.

In my opinion, yes.

While I think not. Why do I feel that way? Basically because I think it's simply too much of a stretch of the term physical. What about numbers? Will you call numbers physical too? I just can't do it. Such things are not physical to me. Things less substantial than rainbows and sunshine don't count as physical to me. Think of it as a cultural bias on my part. One I am unable or unwilling to discard.

Do you suggest that we will eventually just run all these semantic (but iyo physical) constructs through the system:

"Is is consistently observable? Is it measurable? Could there be a testable hypothesis about it? Could it be described by some mathematical model?

If so then it is physical."

and answer all questions "correctly" with the logical systems of math and physics?

If not, why not?

The problem isn't that we can't do that, the problem is that we can't do so satisfactorily.
I could define consciousness = 1 and dead = 0 and asleep = .5. That's a mathematical model of consciousness. It's just a very poor one.

We should eventually be able to get what engineers call "close enough". Right now, only folks like RD and Pixy think we're there. We're certainly developing better and more useful artificial intelligences.

On the other hand, I find it quite plausible that we'll never get all the way there. It might be possible to prove it mathematically. It's an interesting question. If our neural system turns out to make use of quantum theory in some way (which is possible - I read an article a week or so ago about how plants were making use of it to extract energy from the sun) I think that would establish it as fact quite nicely.

 

[rocketdodger]

This is an interesting idea to contemplate. What form could such a mathematical description take? How would you go about demonstrating that it isn't possible? Hmmm. Maybe using the uncertainty principle? Maybe using the incompleteness theorem?

I think it would be very difficult to provide a mathematical proof that mathematics is insufficient to describe consciousness.

Maybe providing a non-mathematical proof would be easier. But that just brings up the question of -- who cares about a non-mathematical proof? I certainly don't.

 

[Robin]

You need to be explicit about why.

While I think not.

That might be an interesting debate, but first you or Albell need to tell me your point.

I was stating that definitions should be, wherever possible, clear, precise and non-circular and that most words in consciousness debates tend to have definitions that are none of the above.

So Albell brought in the question about the ontology of language, but has not made the connection clear.

Is language excused from clarity if it is not physical?

 

[Robin]

The problem isn't that we can't do that, the problem is that we can't do so satisfactorily.
I could define consciousness = 1 and dead = 0 and asleep = .5. That's a mathematical model of consciousness. It's just a very poor one.

We should eventually be able to get what engineers call "close enough". Right now, only folks like RD and Pixy think we're there. We're certainly developing better and more useful artificial intelligences.

On the other hand, I find it quite plausible that we'll never get all the way there. It might be possible to prove it mathematically. It's an interesting question. If our neural system turns out to make use of quantum theory in some way (which is possible - I read an article a week or so ago about how plants were making use of it to extract energy from the sun) I think that would establish it as fact quite nicely.

That is rather confusing. Since our neural system are build from the fundamental particles then they do use quantum theory.

How would that establish as fact that there can't be a mathematical model of consciousness?

 

[Darat]

...snip.... If our neural system turns out to make use of quantum theory in some way (which is possible - I read an article a week or so ago about how plants were making use of it to extract energy from the sun) I think that would establish it as fact quite nicely.

That seems to be contradictory? What you are saying is that if our neural system can be accurately modeled by a mathematical theory (i.e. quantum mechanics) that would prove that consciousness can't be mathematically described?

 

[Beth]

You need to be explicit about why.

I think it's key because I think that is the question that delineates people who are materialists from those who do not consider themselves to be materialists. Why do you consider language physical?

That might be an interesting debate, but first you or Albell need to tell me your point.

I was stating that definitions should be, wherever possible, clear, precise and non-circular and that most words in consciousness debates tend to have definitions that are none of the above.

So Albell brought in the question about the ontology of language, but has not made the connection clear.

Is language excused from clarity if it is not physical?

I wouldn't say 'excused'. It's more like inherent. It's part of the whole subjective/objective debate. Can something that is inherently subjective ever be described as clearly as something that can be objectively measured? I don't think so.

That is rather confusing. Since our neural system are build from the fundamental particles then they do use quantum theory.

How would that establish as fact that there can't be a mathematical model of consciousness?

I should have been more precise about what I was saying. Clearly there can be mathematical models of consciousness. I gave one in my previous post. But if quantum effects are used by our neural system in constructing consciousness, then I don't think it can ever be perfectly described by a mathematical model. We will only be able to make mathematical models that approximately represent consciousness. Much like we can never have a complete decimal representation of pi or the square root of two. We can only approximate irrational numbers with the decimal system.

 

[westprog]

And sometimes we misunderstand. And sometimes we think we understand, but don't. So what is the criteria that we use to determine, "I understand" or "you understand"?

We carry on the conversation. That's why we don't spend long talking to the Chinese guy who doesn't speak English. We don't understand him and he doesn't understand us.

This is not esoteric - this is how we live.

 

[Robin]

I think it's key because I think that is the question that delineates people who are materialists from those who do not consider themselves to be materialists.

No, I mean what does it have to do with the point that AlBell was responding to about words and definitions.

Why do you consider language physical?

If you are really interested, please start a new thread and I will respond there. For the moment I am more interested in the point I was making - the one that AlBell was responding to.

I wouldn't say 'excused'. It's more like inherent. It's part of the whole subjective/objective debate. Can something that is inherently subjective ever be described as clearly as something that can be objectively measured? I don't think so.

The words I was using for an example were "understand" and "sensation". Are these things inherently subjective? Could these things never have an objective definition?

I should have been more precise about what I was saying. Clearly there can be mathematical models of consciousness. I gave one in my previous post. But if quantum effects are used by our neural system in constructing consciousness, then I don't think it can ever be perfectly described by a mathematical model. We will only be able to make mathematical models that approximately represent consciousness. Much like we can never have a complete decimal representation of pi or the square root of two. We can only approximate irrational numbers with the decimal system.

But everthing else works by quantum mechanism - the Sun, the Moon, plants etc. None of these things will ever be perfectly described by mathematical models.

And even if this were a Newtonian Universe we could still never describe anything perfectly using mathematical models - not even in principle.

But the Sun is still physical by my definition. My definition did not exclude probability as a branch of mathematics.

 

[Robin]

We carry on the conversation. That's why we don't spend long talking to the Chinese guy who doesn't speak English. We don't understand him and he doesn't understand us.

So you're criterion for deciding if somebody understands you is that they continue the conversation with you?

Has nobody ever misunderstood something you said and yet continued the conversation?

This is not esoteric - this is how we live

It is also completely in line with my definition of "understand".

 

[Beth]

No, I mean what does it have to do with the point that AlBell was responding to about words and definitions.

If you are really interested, please start a new thread and I will respond there. For the moment I am more interested in the point I was making - the one that AlBell was responding to.

Fair nuff, but I'm not able to spend much time posting at the moment. Perhaps some other time.

The words I was using for an example were "understand" and "sensation". Are these things inherently subjective? Could these things never have an objective definition?

I think so. We can get close with consensus regarding the definitions, but the current consensus is not objective. I see no reason to presume that someday there will be such a definition

But everthing else works by quantum mechanism - the Sun, the Moon, plants etc. None of these things will ever be perfectly described by mathematical models.

Right. Which is way, as I said, I am comfortable with that conclusion.

And even if this were a Newtonian Universe we could still never describe anything perfectly using mathematical models - not even in principle.

But the Sun is still physical by my definition. My definition did not exclude probability as a branch of mathematics.

Probability is a way to make approximate models. I'm comfortable accepting that nothing in our universe can be perfectly described by mathematical models. The only thing mathematical models describe perfectly are mathematical realms.

This doesn't mean that I can't make a distinction between things like the sun - a large material object - and language, which isn't material IMO. Basically, I think we have mathematical models are sufficiently accurate in predicting things like planetary orbits that the difference between reality and the predictions are not worth niggling over. Sure, there are very low probability events that we are unable to predict at this time, but it's close enough to satisfy me.

On the other hand, the mathematical models we have describing more ethereal subjects such as music and language are not. The question then becomes do we wish to presume that we will be able to develop better and better models until the accuracy approaches that of calculating planetary orbits? Or do we presume otherwise? I see no reason to prefer one presumption to the other. Maybe someday, but I don't expect to see anything like that in my lifetime. It is a leap of faith to accept either presumption as true.

 

[Robin]

Probability is a way to make approximate models.

No, if it is a probabilistic model and the underlying system is random then it is not an approximate model, it is an accurate model.

If a model of a dynamic system does not give an exact prediction and according to the model we should not be able to get an exact prediction then that is also an accurate model.

If the model says that we should only be able to get a prediction within a certain error margin and our prediction is correct within that error margin then it is an accurate model.

Now there are things, like the weather, which we can only model approximately, not because our model is wrong but because of the complexity of the system. The human brain is also massively complex.

This doesn't mean that I can't make a distinction between things like the sun - a large material object - and language, which isn't material

I can make that distinction too. Language is not an object, it is a process.

 

[Beth]

No, if it is a probabilistic model and the underlying system is random then it is not an approximate model, it is an accurate model.

If it is random, then it cannot be modeled perfectly. Probabilistic models are the best we can do, but they are approximations by their very nature. Accuracy is another issue. Approximations can be very accurate. For example, the value of pi cannot be expressed an a decimal. Although we can use a decimal value that has whatever level of precision we want, it remains an approximation.

If a model of a dynamic system does not give an exact prediction and according to the model we should not be able to get an exact prediction then that is also an accurate model.

If the model says that we should only be able to get a prediction within a certain error margin and our prediction is correct within that error margin then it is an accurate model.

Now there are things, like the weather, which we can only model approximately, not because our model is wrong but because of the complexity of the system. The human brain is also massively complex.

"All models are wrong. Some models are useful" - Dr. George W. Box.

I don't understand what point you are trying to make here. I agree that some models make approximations that are very accurate and the more complex the system the more difficult it is to create models with a useful level of accuracy.

Whether or not subjective 'things' like language or consciousness can ever be modeled to the degree of accuracy that we can obtain for more material things is an unanswered question. One not likely to be answered in my lifetime.

You didn't respond to this part of my previous post and I'm still curious to know your opinion.

The question then becomes do we wish to presume that we will be able to develop better and better models [of subjective things? processes?] until the accuracy approaches that of calculating planetary orbits? Or do we presume otherwise?

I can make that distinction too. Language is not an object, it is a process.

Do you consider a process to be a material thing? If so, what material components is it made of? If it isn't a material thing, doesn't that make it a non-material thing? I tend to favor the latter POV. Whether you describe it as a process, a pattern, or an idea, such things seems wholly immaterial to me. Consider the quote in my sig: What are we if we are not the stuff we are made of?

 

[westprog]

So you're criterion for deciding if somebody understands you is that they continue the conversation with you?

Yes. I suspect that it's approximately your criterion as well.

Has nobody ever misunderstood something you said and yet continued the conversation?

As you've pointed out, all systems work to a degree of accuracy.

It is also completely in line with my definition of "understand".

 

[Robin]

If it is random, then it cannot be modeled perfectly. Probabilistic models are the best we can do, but they are approximations by their very nature.

No, if it is random then a probabilistic model describes it perfectly.

Accuracy is another issue. Approximations can be very accurate. For example, the value of pi cannot be expressed an a decimal. Although we can use a decimal value that has whatever level of precision we want, it remains an approximation.

You are confusing a random system with a continuous deterministic system.

I don't understand what point you are trying to make here.

That is what I am trying to find out from you. My point is about language and definitions. You and AlBell keep dragging ontology into it and you will never tell me what it has to do with my original point

I agree that some models make approximations that are very accurate and the more complex the system the more difficult it is to create models with a useful level of accuracy.

Whether or not subjective 'things' like language or consciousness can ever be modeled to the degree of accuracy that we can obtain for more material things is an unanswered question. One not likely to be answered in my lifetime.

You didn't respond to this part of my previous post and I'm still curious to know your opinion.

I said already - if you want to argue the toss about whether language is physical - start a new thread.

The point I made was that, as in all consciousness debates, we are talking across each other because we have no agreed definition of the key term.

So I have suggested that we focus on looking at the meaning of the word and seeing if we can agree a definition.

If we can't agree a definition for the key term of the debate then it is probably time to stop talking.

But then you and AlBell start dragging ontology into it without saying what it has to do with my point.

 

[Robin]

Yes. I suspect that it's approximately your criterion as well.

Yes, I defined understanding behaviourally, but merely talking back at someone is not sufficient.

If I make a point and someone comes back talking gibberish about how I must believe in angelic unicorns that travel faster than light then I don't even consider that this person has even the faintest glimmering of comprehension about what I was saying. Or what they are saying, for that matter.

As you've pointed out, all systems work to a degree of accuracy.

And the accuracy of just about any system can be improved.