Are You Conscious?

[PixyMisa]

Why does pain hurt? Why is there an unpleasant sensation(qualia, if you will), when I stub my toe?

Because it's a behavioural modification routine.

Pain simply means, this behaviour is bad, don't do it.

Pleasure simply means, this behaviour is good, do it more.

Critters that have this wired the wrong way tend not to survive to reproduce.

 

[Frank Newgent]

I did a lot of reflection last night and I'm quite sure I came up with an unassailable explanation for consciousness and being that when people realize it's true - they'll immediately be able to put it to use to solve all the world's problems. I'd tell you about it but they're having a sale on Snuggies on QVC right now. And after that, Oprah's got another of her "favorite things" shows.... can't miss that...

http://www.theonion.com/content/node/32228

 

[PixyMisa]

But why does the the first organism experience pain? Why not just mechanically move away, like some creatures do? Surely the answer has something to do with the way in which the reaction evolved.

Well, with multitude of signals coming in from various senses, you need to weigh them to determine which to respond to.

If you're busy mating (good) and there's a rock poking one of your legs (bad) you might make one decision; if there's a tiger chewing on one of your legs (very bad), you need to make a different one, and fast.

 

[PixyMisa]

That doesn't explain why I have the subjective experience of pain. Are you claiming pain is a necessary condition for an organism (or machine) to "reduce or remove damage"? I believe you could design a pretty simple machine to "reduce damage" to itself. Would you say it's in pain?

Would you not? If not, why not?

When you touch a hot stove, what happens first, the sensation of pain or the reflexive withdrawal of the hand?

Depends on how you define sensation of pain.

So, exactly what stage of the nociception pathway are you referring to?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

He was? So the value systems in the dark ages were better?

Yes, according to Nietzsche. So lots of poor people got trodden on...doesn't matter so long as a few individual humans acheive greatness.

What's the problem to be solved, again?

Too many humans, not enough resources, political stalemate, idealogical bankruptcy, literal bankruptcy, almost complete denial of reality from most of the population.

How does that feed all the poor bastards in Africa?

It doesn't. They're screwed whatever happens. The question is whether the developed world gets sucked down into the same abyss, or whether we manage to collectively wake up in time to stop it happening.

If overpopulation is a real problem, it isn't going to be solved by any touchy-feely quasi-religious coming together of humanity.

That said, why can't we all just get along?

Yeah, try answering your own question. You will end up being forced back into a discussion of science, religion, truth and morality.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Need ? What possible advantage is there to NOT having an immortal soul ?

Personally, I'd rather not live forever...

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Personally, I'd rather not live forever...

Amen, brother!

~~ Paul

 

[PixyMisa]

Amen, brother!

Pah!

My to-do list grows faster than I can cross things off it, and has done since about 1985, and it's accelerating. Eternity is not nearly long enough!

 

[AkuManiMani]

As I've pointed out before, any proposed theory of consciousness that cannot meaningfully distinguish between my own conscious and unconscious processing, or provide a coherent predictive model for the mechanism of subjective states and their rules of variation, is rubbish. I really don't care how 'coherent' it sounds on paper if it can't even answer basic questions about the phenomena is alleges to explain.

Then any theory of consciousness at all will be rubbish, because the only distinguishing method between your own conscious and unconscious processing is the same as the distinguishing method between your conscious processes and those of another being, and so on. The subjective state is not somehow special or unique or defining; it simply is. There's nothing to predict. It's a simple, tautological fact: experiences are.

Not all experiences are the same since we are able to subjectively distinguish different sensations from one another. As conscious subjects we all know THAT subjective experiences are. The root of the problem is that we do not know WHAT they are in any objective sense. Consciousness is a much an ontological problem as it is an epistemic one.

Saying pain is "information conveyed by neurons" is about as useful as saying a photon is "stuff emitted by the sun". What is needed is a more concrete definition of the sensation of pain, and every other subjective experience, and an explanation of how those experiences relate to physics in general.

More concrete than the actual physical process involved? How can you get more concrete than that? The problem I see with you, Aku, is that the more someone relates a subjective experience to physics, the LESS you like their answer.

ALL sensation is information transfer via neurons. ALL of it. Every vision, every sound, every smell; every thought, every dream, every fleeting fancy of the human spirit; it's all chemo-electrical transfer of signals among neurons. It's a process that can be duplicated via other forms of computational device, which means all sensation can be recreated artificially.

The sensation of "cold" in a subject is identical to low temperature -- its one of many possible subjective responses to sense-data regarding temperature. A synesthete could just as easily experience the same sense-data as the qualia of "bitter", "rough", or "green" with combinations of varying shades of pain, pleasure or any other subjective responses. On top of that, most information conveyed by neurons is not experienced as any sensation whatsoever.

Its obvious THAT each qualia is related to "chemo-electrical transfer of signals among neurons". I want to know what the coupling rules between a given "chemo-electrical" and a given subjective state. I want to know what the necesarry PHYSICAL [i.e. not FUNCTIONAL] conditions are for there to be subjective experience. I want to know WHAT consciousness is in the same sense that scientists through history have wondered WHAT light is, or WHAT electricity is. I want to know WHAT minds are made of, in the same sense that we currently know WHAT genes are made of. I want to know, in physics terms, the difference between the different shades and variations of qualia, how they interact, and how to identify them as reified OBJECTS in the same way that science has identified the OBJECTS we call "atoms" and the physical rules that govern their behavior and interaction.

Simply chanting "consciousness is self-referential information processing" answers NONE of these fundamental questions and does absolutely NOTHING to improve our understanding of it. Its a cargo cult theory parading itself as science. I don't buy it and I'm frankly appalled that someone of your apparent intelligence can willingly accept it as science.

The difference between you and I is that I can at least acknowledge this ignorance and not be content to fill it in with a God-Of-The-Gaps platitude just because it has the trappings of logic.

No, the difference between you and I is that you cannot be content with a logical explanation that also includes things you personally choose to not believe are conscious, even though you are utterly unable to define why you choose to believe this way.

The fact that I KNOW that I'm not conscious [i.e. not having an subjective experiences] even when my brain/body is performing SRIPs is sufficient to unequivocally demonstrate that the definitional criteria being proposed is NOT sufficient. Ergo, SRIP does NOT indicate consciousness.

The problem is that we have no -objective- way of discerning -subjective experiences- in any entities other than ourselves. Nor do we have any knowledge of the physical rules of variation that determine the shades of our own experiences. The fact that we don't even know if systems other than carbon based organisms can support consciousness says volumes about our ignorance in this area.

Rather, it speaks volumes about how poorly defined consciousness really is. Actually, we don't even know if other carbon based organisms can support consciousness. I don't even know if you can support consciousness. Nor you, I.

What does that speak volumes about? Lack of a good definition.

Centuries ago we had a "good definition" of electricity. Having a definition of electricity was not the same as knowing what it is, how to generate it, or how to produce it.

A living body is required to grow and support a consciousness producing brain.

Really? How do you know this?

Severely compromise or destroy the viscera, and consciousness will be lost.

Again, how do you know? You don't. You yourself just admitted we have no objective way of discerning subjective experiences.

Because, based on what scientific knowledge we DO have regarding consciousness, we are more than reasonably sure that its inextricably linked to living brain activity. We know that effecting the brain can effect one's experience of the world, and even their ability to experience at all. If one kills the body, they kill the brain and, presumably, the consciousness it supports.

It might well be that consciousness is NOT lost, but merely loses its ability to control the body or communicate. It might well be that consciousness changes, or leaves the body and wanders around free, or that consciousness dies every second to be replaced with a newborn consciousness, or that it never existed in the first place.

Look, if you wanna argue that consciousness continues on after death, be my guest. If you're able to prove it then you would be eligible for the MDC.

You contradict yourself within your own post.

There is no contradiction. Knowing THAT conscious experience is correlated/dependent upon brain activity is not the same as knowing WHAT it is.

 

[AkuManiMani]

The question you should asking yourself is: Whats the "golden key" that separates conscious from unconscious processing in the very same meat-computer?

I think 'unconscious processing' is a poorly defined term, as well; it may well be that what we perceive as 'unconscious processing' is, simply, another conscious process which lacks the ability to communicate its consciousness.

We don't perceive our unconscious processing. Thats what makes it UNconscious.

If one doesn't know what the key property is that allows our own biology to produce consciousness they cannot seriously propose knowledge of how to produce it in another substrate.

But first, we have to define consciousness.

I.E. We have to identify WHAT it is.

My own experience is that consciousness is self-referential sensation processing, and absolutely nothing else.

Thats not your "experience". Its just a platitude that you've chosen to accept as substantive fact.

Hence, if a thing has senses, the means to process them, and an awareness of self, it has consciousness. The medium is meaningless.

And here you go assuming your conclusion in you definition. Thats a form of question begging, Z.

As I've said before, and read from Pixy's posts, if you have a clear, concise, and solid definition of consciousness that varies from this, please, offer it for discussion.

I've already defined the terms I'm using in other threads. I'll just repeat them here:

Mind is basically a kind of virtual space generated by the "wetware" of the brain which contains all the elements of one's psyche, like memories, memes, etc. -- kind of like a biological database. [It may be a feature specific to neural tissue -- I'm still entertaining the notion that other tissue types may support something equivalent]

Consciousness would be a kind of active brain state during which the "lights" of the mind are "turned on", in some sense. Its during this state that the subject can subjectively experience mental elements as qualia. One's conscious mental activity is more energy intensive and, I suspect, is denoted by the metabolically more active areas of the brain seen in PET scans and the like.

Lucidity would be the degree of vividness of one's conscious experience; how "brightly" the dimmer switch of one's mind is turned. High lucidity would be the period's when the subject is fully awake, or when they're experiencing a highly vivid hallucination/dream. Periods of low lucidity would be mental states like delirium or when the subject is "fading" into sleep. Zero lucidity would be mental states of complete unconsciousness, like comas and deep sleep.

Awareness is the mental extent of their short-term memory which -- to stick with the computer analogy -- would be equivalent to one's RAM. One's awareness would be a rough measure of how many different mental elements one can be conscious of [i.e. the mental scope of their lucidity]. The portions of one's awareness with the highest lucidity denote things we are most conscious of [i.e. the focus of one's awareness]. The farther into the periphery of a subject's awareness a mental element is, the less conscious of it they are. Mental elements that a subject is not conscious of at all would be completely outside of their awareness.

CAM is an acronym for Consciously Accessible Mind. As would be expected, this denotes the mental speace that one's conscious activity is confined to.

Qualia are mental datum within a subject's awareness.

Experience collectively refers to all the qualia within a subject's awareness.

When we identify what physically constitutes mind & consciousness and posses a scientific theory of such [complete with falsifiable predictions] I'll be content. Until then I'll continue to maintain that we don't know what consciousness is, and you can continue to suck on your SRIP pacifier.

 

[Z]

That doesn't explain why I have the subjective experience of pain.

Because without it, your species would not survive.

Are you claiming pain is a necessary condition for an organism (or machine) to "reduce or remove damage"?

Exactly.

I believe you could design a pretty simple machine to "reduce damage" to itself. Would you say it's in pain?

Yes, I would.

When you touch a hot stove, what happens first, the sensation of pain or the reflexive withdrawal of the hand?

Apparently, according to modern research, first their is the sensation of pain in portions of the brain which are not part of our consciousness; then, the reflexive action; finally, the conscious sensation of pain and subsequent reactions.

 

[Z]

Not all experiences are the same since we are able to subjectively distinguish different sensations from one another. As conscious subjects we all know THAT subjective experiences are. The root of the problem is that we do not know WHAT they are in any objective sense. Consciousness is a much an ontological problem as it is an epistemic one.

What's so hard about it?

The sensation of "cold" in a subject is identical to low temperature -- its one of many possible subjective responses to sense-data regarding temperature. A synesthete could just as easily experience the same sense-data as the qualia of "bitter", "rough", or "green" with combinations of varying shades of pain, pleasure or any other subjective responses.

Its obvious THAT each qualia is related to "chemo-electrical transfer of signals among neurons". The type of information I want to know the necessary coupling rules between a given "chemo-electrical" and a given subjective state and I want to know what the necesarry PHYSICAL [i.e. not FUNCTIONAL] conditions are for there to be subjective experience.

Obviously, some kind of sensor and the processors necessary for manipulating the data received by sensors. And eventually, neuroscience will fully map this. But it's a complex project that takes a lot of time, further complicated by the fact that not every brain maps information the same way. There's no programmer's guide to the brain; each brain manages its sensory information in slightly different ways.

I want to know WHAT consciousness is in the same sense that scientists through history have wondered WHAT light is, or WHAT electricity is.

What's wrong with 'self-referential sensation processing' as a reasonable definition? Consciousness is not a WHAT in terms of noun; it's a WHAT in terms of verb.

And we still don't fully comprehend WHAT light or electricity are, either.

I want to know WHAT minds are made of, in the same sense that we currently know WHAT genes are made of.

Minds are a useful fiction to explain brain activity. Genes are made of proteins.

There. Wasn't that easy?

I want to know, in physics terms, the difference between the different shades and variations of qualia, how they interact, and how to identify them as reified OBJECTS in the same way that science has identified the OBJECTS we call "atoms" and the physical rules that govern their behavior and interaction.

Then you'll never be satisfied, because qualia are not objects whatsoever.

Simply chanting "consciousness is self-referential information processing" answers NONE of these fundamental questions and does absolutely NOTHING to improve our understanding of it. Its a cargo cult theory parading itself as science. I don't buy it and I'm frankly appalled that someone of your apparent intelligence can willingly accept it as science.

It's the most logical and rational explanation yet offered. I'm appalled that someone of your apparent intelligence is so badly hung up on metafictional constructs such as 'qualia' and 'mind', so much so that they cannot recognize the obvious, observable, simple truth of consciousness, sensation, and awareness.

The fact that I KNOW that I'm not conscious [i.e. not having an subjective experiences] even when my brain/body is performing SRIPs is sufficient to unequivocally demonstrate that the definitional criteria being proposed is NOT sufficient. Ergo, SRIP does NOT indicate consciousness.

That assumes that your brain/body and your consciousness are supposed to be one; the fact is, your brain has numerous other consciousness of which you are not aware of. Ergo, SRIP/SRSP DOES indicate consciousness. Your own ignorance of the companion consciousnesses within your body is irrelevant.

The fact that accidents and experiments have revealed other personalities in other parts of the brain strongly indicates that SRIP/SRSP is consciousness, and that the brain is a group consciousness containing many singular but interrelated conscious elements, only one of which identifies as 'I'.

Centuries ago we had a "good definition" of electricity. Having a definition of electricity was not the same as knowing what it is, how to generate it, or how to produce it.

We don't have to know what it is in order to produce it, either. Just like consciousness.

Because, based on what scientific knowledge we DO have regarding consciousness, we are more than reasonably sure that its inextricably linked to living brain activity. We know that effecting the brain can effect one's experience of the world, and even their ability to experience at all. If one kills the body, they kill the brain and, presumably, the consciousness it supports.

That is the presumption, yes. But you don't KNOW that, 100%. Just like you don't really KNOW anything.

Look, if you wanna argue that consciousness continues on after death, be my guest. If you're able to prove it then you would be eligible for the MDC.

Not my thing. I'm just pointing out that neither you, nor I, nor the greatest minds in all the world, know anything except their own consciousness exists.

There is no contradiction. Knowing THAT conscious experience is correlated/dependent upon brain activity is not the same as knowing WHAT it is.

If there is no other identifiable component, what else can it be?

 

[Malerin]

That doesn't explain why I have the subjective experience of pain.

Because without it, your species would not survive.

Are you claiming the subjective experience of pain confers an evolutionary advantage? Do you admit that qualia exist?

Are you claiming pain is a necessary condition for an organism (or machine) to "reduce or remove damage"?

Exactly.

So it's impossible for an organism or machine to "reduce or remove damage" without having a subjective experience of pain?

I believe you could design a pretty simple machine to "reduce damage" to itself. Would you say it's in pain?

Yes, I would.

When you touch a hot stove, what happens first, the sensation of pain or the reflexive withdrawal of the hand?

Apparently, according to modern research, first their is the sensation of pain in portions of the brain which are not part of our consciousness; then, the reflexive action; finally, the conscious sensation of pain and subsequent reactions.

So...you're claiming simplistic machines feel pain (probably my anti-virus software too) and unconscious sensations of pain occur.

And people think I have weird beliefs?

 

[Malerin]

Minds are a useful fiction to explain brain activity.

Do you not realize how absurd you sound? Why would anyone take you seriously?

 

[Z]

We don't perceive our unconscious processing. Thats what makes it UNconscious.

You're right - the part of your brain that identifies as 'you' does not perceive the parts of the brain that do not identify as 'you'; this doesn't mean they're not conscious themselves; only that they are not a part of YOUR consciousness.

I.E. We have to identify WHAT it is.

Which requires defining what we're looking for.

Thats not your "experience". Its just a platitude that you've chosen to accept as substantive fact.

No, that's my experience. I'm really quite aware of what my experiences are.

And here you go assuming your conclusion in you definition. Thats a form of question begging, Z.

Show me what else consciousness involves, and we'll talk.

I've already defined the terms I'm using in other threads. I'll just repeat them here:

Mind is basically a kind of virtual space generated by the "wetware" of the brain which contains all the elements of one's psyche, like memories, memes, etc. -- kind of like a biological database. [It may be a feature specific to neural tissue -- I'm still entertaining the notion that other tissue types may support something equivalent]

No big problem with this one.

Consciousness would be a kind of active brain state during which the "lights" of the mind are "turned on", in some sense. Its during this state that the subject can subjectively experience mental elements as qualia. One's conscious mental activity is more energy intensive and, I suspect, is denoted by the metabolically more active areas of the brain seen in PET scans and the like.

Several problems:

1) 'Active brain state' assumes that brains are necessary for consciousness. Now, that's not to say we should assume consciousness can exist without any brain; but it also implies that only a brain - i.e. the mass of fat and neurons in our skulls - can produce consciousness. I would replace that with 'sensory processing state'.

2) Use of the word 'mind' in the definition is inherently dualistic to some people, but given your definition of 'mind' as a virtual workspace, it's not a large problem.

3) Use of the term 'qualia' is redundant, pointless, and irrelevant. Shorten that statement to 'the subject can experience mental elements'. Or, since we're talking about a mental activity to begin with, simply 'the subject can experience'.

Lucidity would be the degree of vividness of one's conscious experience; how "brightly" the dimmer switch of one's mind is turned. High lucidity would be the period's when the subject is fully awake, or when they're experiencing a highly vivid hallucination/dream. Periods of low lucidity would be mental states like delirium or when the subject is "fading" into sleep. Zero lucidity would be mental states of complete unconsciousness, like comas and deep sleep.

No problem there. There's also non-lucid full awareness, or the zombie-like state that many people involved in a routine fall into.

Awareness is the mental extent of their short-term memory which -- to stick with the computer analogy -- would be equivalent to one's RAM. One's awareness would be a rough measure of how many different mental elements one can be conscious of [i.e. the mental scope of their lucidity]. Stimuli and mental elements that a subject is not conscious of at all would be completely outside of their awareness.

Not so sure about this one; the distinction between 'awareness' and 'lucidity' seems vague in your definition. It is, after all, possible to be aware of things on one level without being consciously aware of them on another. There is a level of sensory awareness which remains subconscious, and allows us to react to stimuli we are otherwise unconcious of, for example. Then, of course, we can get into questions of peripheral awareness, sensory assimilation, and so forth.

CAM is an acronym for Consciously Accessible Mind. As would be expected, this denotes the mental speace that one's conscious activity is confined to.

'Consciousness' works well without adding extra terms.

Qualia are mental datum within a subject's awareness.

Or 'sensations'.

Experience collectively refers to all the qualia within a subject's awareness.

Or 'consciousness'.

When we identify what physically constitutes mind & consciousness and posses a scientific theory of such [complete with falsifiable predictions] I'll be content. Until then I'll continue to maintain that we don't know what consciousness is, and you can continue to suck on your SRIP pacifier.

May I ask - why do you feel the need to be rude and uncivil during these discussions? Does it add anything to the discussion that was not present? Does it 'score points'? I think not.

What physically constitutes mind & consciousness? Chemo-electrical activity. That's it. That's the entire she-bang. There - are you happy now?

Overall, your definitions are Ok; but your definition of 'consciousness' includes terms and concepts that, themselves, are unproven and unsupportable, and are possibly irrelevant. I think that's why we cannot agree as to the nature of consciousness to begin with. If you and I were to enter into this discussion rationally, I think you'd have to begin by expaining and defining qualia, mind, and such, and we'd have to work toward a mutual understanding of these terms. I, for one, think qualia (conceptually) exist, but are utterly irrelevant; my sense of 'redness' is no more relevant than your sense of 'salmon-flavored'; the two can even be the same sense. What IS relevant is that my sense of 'redness' applies to those objects I call 'apples', and that your sense of 'salmon-flavored' does not.

'Qualia', then, are a non-issue with me. It seems readily apparent - blatantly obvious, in fact - that anything with sensations has qualia. Even machines.

And quite a few of your terms above - 'CAM', for example - seem redundant, when other terms already exist that encompass those concepts.

Still - at least you're willing to offer your definitions. That's a good start. And I've offered my objections to your definition of 'consciousness', or at least, where I perceive we need to start to reach some level of agreement. That's a far better start than many have made here.

Thanks!

 

[Z]

Are you claiming the subjective experience of pain confers an evolutionary advantage? Do you admit that qualia exist?

It is self-evident that the experience of pain confers an evolutionary advantage.

'Qualia' exist but are irrelevant, as I've explained in other posts.

So it's impossible for an organism or machine to "reduce or remove damage" without having a subjective experience of pain?

Think about it for a moment, Mal. I mean, really think. Put away your knee-jerk reactions and your emotional appeals, and think.

What is pain? An undesirable sensation - that is, a sensation we have and instinctually avoid or try to escape from. We do so because when we do so, we reduce or remove the damaging effect or element, thus increasing our chances of survival and, ultimately, reproduction.

So in order for a machine to reduce or remove damage, it must first be aware of that damage - hence, some form of sensation must occur. It must desire that this damage not occur, or that it be repaired; i.e. that the sensation of damage is undesirable. Therefore, it has a subjective experience that it does not seek, that it does not want to pursue, and that it will take steps to reduce or eliminate. That sounds exactly like pain to me.

Without that sensation, it will not do anything to reduce or remove the damaging effect.

So, yes, it is impossible for a mechanism to reduce or remove damage without a subjective experience that is pain.

So...you're claiming simplistic machines feel pain (probably my anti-virus software too)

Yes, I am.

and unconscious sensations of pain occur.

Of course they do. The scientific research backs that.

Mal, are you aware of the current state of neuroscience? Are you aware that most sensations pass through non-conscious areas of the brain first, and that reactionary 'fight or flight' processing occurs before consciousness is ever aware of the stimulus involved?

Consciousness isn't the 'be all and end all' of brain activity; it's only a tiny, tiny part of what the brain does. And not even the most important part, at that.

And people think I have weird beliefs?

Um... yeah. They do.

Personally, I don't think it's so much 'weird' as 'poorly thought out'. But that's my personal opinion, not fact.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Minds are a useful fiction to explain brain activity. Genes are made of proteins.

Alright -- hold the phone. As I was reading over your post this statement really jumped out at me. I'll get to the rest of your response but this part irks me enough to deal with it separately.

First of all, I'm getting really tired of seeing this asinine cliché repeated as if it were holy writ. Saying that "Minds are a useful fiction to explain brain activity" is like claiming that genes are a "useful fiction" to explain heredity.

Second of all, genes are not made out of proteins. Genes are composed of nucleic acids and serve as templates for proteins, which are themselves composed of amino acids. If every scientist had taken the same attitude towards heredity that you and Pixy have regarding consciousness mankind would have never discovered DNA.

 

[Z]

Do you not realize how absurd you sound? Why would anyone take you seriously?

Explain why it sounds absurd. Please. And I'm not asking to be facetious; I'm asking because I can in no way improve the way in which I present ideas unless people who find them 'absurd' explain why it sounds absurd. It sounds to me perfectly rational. Conversely, those who have, in the past, thought the idea sounds 'absurd' have, unfortunately, then presented ideas which I found absolutely absurd - like that minds are non-physical entities which manifest matter, or that consciousnesses are all part of the uber-mind of God, or that none of us exist at all and it's all one big illusion.

As for why anyone would take me seriously - beats the heck out of me. I don't take myself seriously, so why should anyone else? I'm a Wiccan priest who believes in faeries, dragons, ghosts, and psychic powers even though I've never personally experienced any of them; who believes Jesus existed but was an inspired, but fully mortal, rabbi and teacher; and who believes mysticism is just materialistic phenomena that we have yet to find a scientific means of understanding. So you tell me - why should anyone take me seriously? I don't.

 

[Z]

Alright -- hold the phone. As I was reading over your post this statement really jumped out at me. I'll get to the rest of your response but this part irks me enough to deal with it separately.

First of all, I'm getting really tired of seeing this asinine cliché repeated as if it were holy writ. Saying that "Minds are a useful fiction to explain brain activity" is like claiming that genes are a "useful fiction" to explain heredity.

Not at all. We can see genes in the microscope. We can't see minds at all.

Sure, it's a cliche. I prefer your virtual workspace definition, myself. But at the end of the day, there's no object anywhere that we can point to and say 'here's a mind'. It's process, and probably a number of disparate processes that differ between individuals. But it's a far, far cry from genes.

Second of all, genes are not made out of proteins. Genes are composed of nucleic acids and serve as templates for proteins, which are themselves composed of amino acids.

I stand corrected. I often mix up proteins, amino acids, and related base structure. I should have said, 'genes are molecular structures'.

But since we know what they are, the point remains the same.

If every scientist had taken the same attitude towards heredity that you and Pixy have regarding consciousness mankind would have never discovered DNA.

Nonsense. DNA is a physical object. Consciousness isn't.

You're comparing apples and harvesting.

 

[FedUpWithFaith]

Funny - I get much the same result when I speak to the Korean lady down the street. She must not be conscious, either.

ETA: Language failure does not equal consciousness failure.

I think you missed the point, actually several points. Your guru Pixi claimed we'd see evidence of consciousness if we asked SHRDLU if it was conscious. He told us to ask it. It didn't even understand the question. And that's all it's telling us. Its replies, basically just questions asking what the words mean, for all we know, could have been generated by a static lookup table. And when Aku kept extending and reflecting words whose meaning could be inferred, SHRDLU couldn't infer anything or tie anything together to show it had awareness of any process or thing.

As far as public behavior goes, we have absolutely no evidence to conclude its conscious. As far as SHRDLU is concerned you could have substitituted one of those 8-balls you shake that gives messages like, "I don't know, try again".

The only reason that SHRDLU is supposedly conscious is because it utilizes some VERY BASIC forms of self-referential processing to translate I/O (its private behavior). And, according to your and Pixi's explanation for consciousness, which you have the gall to call a proven definition, the fact that some of SHRDLU's processing is self-referential is somehow sufficient to say SHRDLU is self-referential in the formal philosophical sense (its fine in the informal semantic sense). Do you realize the leap you're making there? Obviously not. The fact that SHRDLU utilizes SRIP is a necessary condition to assert that SHRDLU is SRIP but it is not sufficient. If you can demonstrate to me how or why it is sufficient by not tautologically telling me it's conscious and therefore must be (is) SRIP, you could change my mind. Can you do it?

If that's not bad enough, I pulled this quote from you too:

To say that consciousness depends upon SRIP is to say that consciousness is a separate thing from SRIP, and so far, no one can prove that to any reasonable degree. It's like claiming that light is dependent upon photon/waves, rather than that light IS photon/waves;

OK, where to begin...

Well, you've done it again, used a tautological definition to "prove" your point. A photon is defined as a particle of light. To define light by a photon is tautological and incoherent. Here is a definition I can agree with: Light is a form of particle and a form of EM wave (not radio waves). But this definition doesn't really tell us much. It may be fine for laymen or dilletantes like yourself but the real essence of understanding in this definition lies in understanding exactly what a particle is, what an EM wave is, and what forms they come in. The real definition requires Maxwell's equations and Relativity, and QM which have enabled us, over many years, to understand what is also an observable called "light" that before science would have been correctly defined, and still is, as stuff that comes from the sun, moon, stars, fires, and fireflies and renders everything visible to our visual perception.

Your hopeless analogy therefore breaks down by several lines of reasoning and evidence. Unlike the definition of light I gave, we don't have the science yet to elucidate the forms and functions of all the forms of SRIP that I also believe gives rise to consciousness and is consciousness nor do we understand how it ties to the essential observable of consciousness which is qualia, by definition (I keep saying this and I keep getting accused of waffling and hand waving - what could be more clear?). Moreover, you and Pixi keep insisting this observable doesn't exist or is irrelevant. To say consciousness is SRIP AND qualia don't exist, are meaningless, or irrelevant is like saying light is photons/waves and the stuff we see from the sun doesn't exist, is meaningless, or irrelevant.

There are so many things wrong with what you've written I could go on for days but i expect I'll soon be on your ignore list too so here's just one last reasoning error you and Pixi keep making.

I agree that we know enough about physics to define light (though perhaps incompletely) as particles/waves. By formal semantic, empirical, and philosophically sound reasoning "to be/is" is always subsumed by "depends on" or "has the properties of" but not vice versa. If light is a particle/wave I can say that light has the properties of a wave and particle. But I can't say that light is a particle/wave because it has the properties of particles/waves until I can prove that particles and waves are sufficient and necessary to explain EVERYTHING WE CAN OBSERVE ABOUT LIGHT. As much as your house of cards depends on it, you still can't separate the the operational definition/explanation from the observable in science!! Otherwise not only do you not have science but you don't even have the materialism all your assumptions are based on.