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My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

If anyone can even give a coherent description of a nonalgorithm involved in consciousness I would be happy.
*Sigh* Processes involving non-discrete quantities.''

The are not, by definition, algorithms.

It is possible for a non-algorithmic process to implement an algorithm.

If this was not the case then everything would be an algorithm.

As I said before, if that is the case then why not just say so?
 
OK, let's recap.

But is there really nothing at all wrong with the idea that my consciousness is produced by a mechanism, the components of which are all isolated from each other?

No device has sufficient information for even an instant of experience and is absolutely isolated from that information and yet I have a unified experience

Is that a confident yes from everybody still?

There has still been no mechanism suggested as to how evaluating the answers to calculations will result in conscious experience. And this mechanism would have to account for the fact that sums being done in isolation from each other would still provide this unified conscious experience.

And the confusion between a simulation and "equivalence" has not been cleared up.

And the C-T thesis appears to have been misapplied.

And the implied definition of conscious appears to apply even when I am unconscious.

Is waiting to see the results before making up my mind really like believing in magic unicorns?

Robin, I suggest you read this

http://netfuture.org/fdnc/

from the last chapter

For without freedom, there is physical cause and effect, but no understanding and truth. The cause-and-effect mechanism can never recognize and describe its own activity at the very highest level, and then transform itself to an even higher level. But that is exactly what we do when we understand; all understanding is self- understanding and self-transformation, another name for which is freedom.

And in those same cracks of freedom our entire future lies -- the only future possessed of human meaning, the only future free of the machine's increasingly universal determinations, the only future not eternally frozen to the shape of our own past natures.

Cracks cannot exist except as fissures breaking through a resistant material, and in this sense our technological achievements may turn out to have provided the necessary resistance against which we can establish a human future. If, for example, we are now learning to manipulate our own genetic inheritances, this technical ability must lead all but the hopelessly somnolent to a sense of desperation: "What sort of men should we make ourselves?" It is the same question we see reflected back at us from the uncomprehending face of the cleverest robot. There is no technological answer.

How might we find an answer? Only by looking within ourselves. Not at what moves in lockstep with all the external machinery of our lives, but, to begin with, at the silent places. They are like the sanctuary we find ourselves passing through for a few moments upon waking in the morning. Just before we come fully to ourselves -- recollecting who we were, bowing beneath all the necessities of the preceding days -- we may feel ourselves ever so briefly on the threshold of new possibilities, remembering whispered hopes borne upon distant breezes. We know at such moments the freedom -- yes, just the tiniest cracks of freedom, for Ellul was, after all, right -- to awaken a different self. "Must I be fully determined by the crushing burdens of the past? Or is something new being asked of me -- some slight shift in my own stance that, in the end, may transform all the surrounding machinery of my existence, like the stuff of so many dreams?"

Man is he who knows and transforms himself -- and the world -- from within. He is the future speaking.

embrace your freedom and wait patiently for the empirical results;)
 
And yet PixyMisa has agreed that the definition implies we are conscious even when we are unconscious.

So what?

Why don't you start asking about specific behaviors instead of using the word "consciousness." Maybe then things will make more sense for you.
 
Okay fine. What you are suggesting is woo heebie-jeebie goofball.

Ah, I had forgotten how the extent of your mathematical expertise allows you to articulate yourself. Thank you for reminding me.

Can you offer any evidence that we are not currently inhabiting a Las Vegas betting pub on NFL fantasy football draft day?

Well, I am currently in Wisconsin, not Nevada, and Madison, not Las Vegas, and in my house, not a pub. I dunno about the day because I don't follow sports.

I can't. Guess that means we are, huh?

Sheesh.

Based on your method of argument, I suspected you might be in such a state of mind.
 
OK, let's recap.

I said that I would wait until I see a simulation of a behaving human mind before deciding that it was possible and this is apparently equivalent to believing in magic unicorns

Now the idea being put is that:

1. Consciousness is behaviour
2. The mind is an algorithm
3. Therefore the mind can be duplicated on any suitably powerful computer
4. A computer running an equivalent algorithm to our mind would be conscious in exactly the same way that we are conscious.

OK so far?

So I find a suitably powerful computer and run an equivalent algorithm and produce a couple of seconds of conscious like behaviour, call this Run1.

So I am unable to decide that I am not Run1.

We run the same algorithm again with exactly the same starting values, call this Run2. I am unable to decide that I am not Run2.

During Run2 I saved all the steps including operation and before values for any data, register etc, to disk in the same order as they were run.

I run this, and call it Run3

So since Run3 consisted of the the same calculations in the same order as Run2, therefore I am unable to decide that I am not Run3.

OK so far?

So I take all these calculations and distribute them onto a few million portable computing devices with caesium clocks and very long life batteries, ensuring that no consecutive calculation is on any device.

I fire them off into space in various directions until they are located at least a light year from each other and they have no communication with each other.

Based on their clocks they start running the calculations again in the same order, call this Run4

Since precisely the same calculations were made in precisely the same order as Run1, Run2 and Run3 therefore the same result must ensue and I am unable to decide that I am not Run4.

But is there really nothing at all wrong with the idea that my consciousness is produced by a mechanism, the components of which are all isolated from each other?

No device has sufficient information for even an instant of experience and is absolutely isolated from that information and yet I have a unified experience.

You might say that each calculation contains information from previous calculations but if I add 2 + 4 and later add 6 + 8, the fact that 2 was added to four is not included in the answer.

Is that a confident yes from everybody still?

There has still been no mechanism suggested as to how evaluating the answers to calculations will result in conscious experience. And this mechanism would have to account for the fact that sums being done in isolation from each other would still provide this unified conscious experience.

And the confusion between a simulation and "equivalence" has not been cleared up.

And the C-T thesis appears to have been misapplied.

And the implied definition of conscious appears to apply even when I am unconscious.

Is waiting to see the results before making up my mind really like believing in magic unicorns?

You still don't get it.

Run1 and Run2 are fine -- the program and the isomorphism are one and the same.

Run3 is where you begin to go astray -- by caching all the intermediate data, and simply playing it, you have moved much of the isomorphism into whatever substrate you used as memory for the intermediate data.

And Run4 is right out -- the isomorphism occurs when you program the devices, not when they run their isolated calculations.

You keep thinking in terms of individual computational operations -- this is wrong. The individual computational operations are merely an implementation of the algorithm, and the algorithm is self-referential.

Which means that if you inject a calculation in the middle of it -- as you do in Run3 and Run4 -- the whole notion of self is destroyed. Or at least it becomes different than in Run1 and Run2.

Do you understand that? There are big differences in the total calculations taking place, and where they are happening, between the last three runs. In run2 they are all happening within the system, not so in Run3 and Run4.
 
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And since the result of any calculation was the case even before the calculation was made then the result of all calculations made by the algorithm would have been the case before the algorithm was even run.

So you don't need the computer, nor even to write the algorithm since it was the result of another algorithm and therefore already the case.

Therefore all logically possible conscious experiences exist eternally!

So you are one of those people that think mathematics exists independently of physical reality?
 
So you are one of those people that think mathematics exists independently of physical reality?
No, why do you ask?

I am one of those people who think that evaluating an arithmetic expression helps you find the answer and nothing else.
 
You still don't get it.
Fair comment, yet I am willing to learn.

Run1 and Run2 are fine -- the program and the isomorphism are one and the same.

Run3 is where you begin to go astray -- by caching all the intermediate data, and simply playing it, you have moved much of the isomorphism into whatever substrate you used as memory for the intermediate data.
But I am not simply playing it, Run3 recalculates - it does every calculation that Run1 and Run2 do and in the same order. The only difference is that it doesn't have to go so far for it's data.

Why should a different data fetch method make any difference?

Also, any loops will be calculated inline, which shouldn't make any difference.

I don't see why Run3 should not be equivalent to Run1 and Run2
 
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You keep thinking in terms of individual computational operations -- this is wrong.
I don't see how that can be wrong. The individual instruction refers to nothing but itself and the value of any data or register it uses.
The individual computational operations are merely an implementation of the algorithm, and the algorithm is self-referential.
But the algorithm only exists as a set of numbers. These numbers are evaluated one by one with reference to nothing but the current instruction and the data,register state when that instruction is run.

I can't see how the algorithm can be self-referential.
 
Can anyone spot the problem with the argument, "it's only numbers"?

Please point me to the physical numbers in my computer Robin.

Thanks.
 
I don't see how that can be wrong. The individual instruction refers to nothing but itself and the value of any data or register it uses.

But the algorithm only exists as a set of numbers. These numbers are evaluated one by one with reference to nothing but the current instruction and the data,register state when that instruction is run.

I can't see how the algorithm can be self-referential.
An algorithm, carried out on any Turing-complete system, can examine and modify its own operation.

You mention instructions and data. But there's no fixed distinction between the two. Instructions are data. And data can be instructions.
 
Huh?

Who is talking about mathematical "representations?"

PixyMisa. He emphatically believes computer simulations are identical to the phenomena they're simulating. A simulation of photosynthesis actually fixes carbon, according to Pixy. A simulation of the solar system produces actual gravitational effects, according to Pixy. He seems to be under the impression that simply calculating aspects of physical phenomenon on a Turing machine is the same as reproducing the phenomenon; i.e. he believes the representation = reproduction.
 
An algorithm, carried out on any Turing-complete system, can examine and modify its own operation.

You mention instructions and data. But there's no fixed distinction between the two. Instructions are data. And data can be instructions.

Since you seem unable to answer my previous questions can you atleast answer this one:

Does hardware simply execute algorithms or are they algorithms themselves?
 
Meaning that its has physical properties [like electricity or H20] and that reproducing it is not simply a matter of abstracting it as a simulation.

Intelligence =/= consciousness. A system can carry out intelligent operation w/o being conscious.

I know that. I was simply stating -- and you seem to have missed that -- that some things that are simulated operate precisely like the real thing. I'm saying that consciousness could be like that.
 
Intelligence =/= consciousness. A system can carry out intelligent operation w/o being conscious.
But it can't carry out conscious operations without being conscious.

It's no more speculative that saying that a computer simulation of photosynthesis is not photosynthesis.
Multiple category errors and a non-sequitur; not bad for such a short sentence.
 
I'd love to know what computer you're using. It sounds very different to any that I've used.

You've never seen intelligence being simulated in computers ? Sometimes it's uncanny. At a certain point, how could you tell if the intelligence is "real" or not ? And if you can't, who are you to say that it isn't ?

Read a book on, say, the Fisher-Spassky matches. Then look at the moves played in the matches.

I'm asking you for a summary by you. What, in your opinion, is so different; and why isn't it simply a matter of degree ?
 

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