My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[AkuManiMani]

Well I don't understand the difficulty you are having understanding this.

You have switches. They are physical. You can instantiate the algorithms of computer science using switches.

So if you want a physical basis for any algorithm, simply

1) Look up the algorithm.
2) Figure out how to do it with switches.
3) There is your physical definition -- a specific example of the more abstract functional definition.

What is the problem?

The big point of confusion here is the difference between functional properties and physical properties. Things like switching capacity are functional properties; Things like electrical capacity are physical properties.

So seems the real debate here is: which side of the functional/physical axis does consciousness fall on?

It seems that posters like westprog and I fall on the physics side, with Pixy et al. leaning more on the functional side.

 

[westprog]

I fail to see why elucidating the rules of the reality we inhabit is any more or less meaningful depending on whether or not we are in a simulation.

Either way, our existence depends on those rules, and learning to predict and in turn control our environment in order to have a better and easier life is dependent upon first learning the rules.

For you to arbitrarily label it "important" only if it is somehow "more real" smacks of the objective morality you keep claiming you don't buy into.

I'm saying precisely the opposite. We shouldn't care whether it's a simulation or not - we should assume that the world runs according to non-arbitrary laws of physics, and we should apply those across the board. It's clear that even if this is a simulation, we should assume physical restrictions.

 

[Robin]

There are no p-zombies under behaviorism, if something acts as though it is conscious, then it is.

Here is the problem.

I am lying on an operating table at 8:30 am with a needle in my arm.

The next thing I know I am awake at 9:30 am so in the intervening time I was unconscious, right? If not then you are using a different meaning to the word that I am.

My brain in the meantime was doing plenty of behaving.

It was also doing plenty of self-referential information processing (who else would the information be about?).

But I was not conscious.

So a definition of consciousness cannot apply to periods when I am not conscious.

 

[rocketdodger]

Well no, everybody agreed that the re-desk check would produce consciousness - I did not see when that got changed.

So what you are saying is that when a particular set of sums are done for the very first time, a real qualitative consciousness like the one you are experiencing right now emerges.

When you do precisely same set of sums again in precisely the same order, nothing happens at all?

Nothing happens at all, but it is the same consciousness. The consciousness is in the abstract information flow that can be isomorphic to a whole slew of physical sequences of computations.

It isn't necessarily the first time the sums are done -- it is simply the first time any physical system isomorphic to the mathematical model comes into being I.E. the first time this pattern is instantiated. Usually that is the first time the sums are done, but that isn't the right way to think about it.

 

[rocketdodger]

But the computationalists are also keeping it vague and slippery.

For example we have "self-referential information processing", but our brains process information about ourselves when we are unconscious.

Your definition also could not distinguish between brain events when we are conscious and brain events when we are unconscious.

So if there is a non-slippery definition of consciousness I would be happy to hear it.

The consensus was that consciousness is self-referential information processing, and that human consciousness is what we experience. Plain old consciousness is a subset of human consciousness, but not the other way around.

So we are not keeping it vague and slippery, we are keeping it limited to what we understand already.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

But the computationalists are also keeping it vague and slippery.

For example we have "self-referential information processing", but our brains process information about ourselves when we are unconscious.

Your definition also could not distinguish between brain events when we are conscious and brain events when we are unconscious.

So if there is a non-slippery definition of consciousness I would be happy to hear it.

I don't think I've given a definition of consciousness. I think some sort of Turing test is the only way to decide, at least until we have some way of connecting one brain to another so the second brain can check to see if the first brain is experiencing phenomenal consciousness like the rest of us.

I think I'd be happy to agree with a definition that didn't involve some magical ingredient that we can't check.

~~ Paul

 

[rocketdodger]

The big point of confusion here is the difference between functional properties and physical properties. Things like switching capacity are functional properties; Things like electrical capacity are physical properties.

So seems the real debate here is: which side of the functional/physical axis does consciousness fall on?

It seems that posters like westprog and I fall on the physics side, with Pixy et al. leaning more on the functional side.

No, electrical capacity is not any more physical than switching.

You just have to think of a physical definition that works -- and I did. The fact that westprog won't have it is irrelevant.

 

[rocketdodger]

I'm saying precisely the opposite. We shouldn't care whether it's a simulation or not - we should assume that the world runs according to non-arbitrary laws of physics, and we should apply those across the board. It's clear that even if this is a simulation, we should assume physical restrictions.

A better idea would be to use approaches that work under either scenario.

You have no way to know even the likelihood of one scenario vs. the other -- so why is it more pragmatic to assume one or the other?

Can you answer that?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Here is the problem.

I am lying on an operating table at 8:30 am with a needle in my arm.

The next thing I know I am awake at 9:30 am so in the intervening time I was unconscious, right? If not then you are using a different meaning to the word that I am.

My brain in the meantime was doing plenty of behaving.

It was also doing plenty of self-referential information processing (who else would the information be about?).

But I was not conscious.

So a definition of consciousness cannot apply to periods when I am not conscious.

But perhaps it is not doing any information processing that involves distinguishing the self from the external world. Or perhaps it is not doing any information processing that involves focusing on particular ongoing processes. Or perhaps certain areas of the cortex are not active, which means that only "old" brain processes are underway.

Some of the behaviors are silent.

~~ Paul

 

[Robin]

Right. I'm just waiting for some evidence that we need anything nonalgorithmic. It is certainly a possibility.

And I am waiting for some evidence that we need it to be algorithmic, what it would explain.

Is a TM+RNG more powerful than a TM alone? That is an important question.

Why? I thought you had agreed with me that the "more powerful" thing was a red herring.

Sorry, I don't understand what you're saying. What is a "non TM"?

Something which is not an algorithm.

I'm not sure what other people are saying, but I'm not saying the brain is a Turing machine. I'm simply suggesting that it is doing nothing that cannot be simulated on a Turing machine and thus a brain simulator can be built for a conventional computer.

But others are saying more than this - they are saying that there can be a TM that is equivalent to the brain.

I very much doubt that it is using noncomputable values to more than a few decimal places. I also doubt that it is doing parallel processing that cannot be done with multiple computers.

Again, so?

Well sure. It's pretty clear that the brain is not actually a tape and a read/write head.

A turing machine is a mathematical abstract, not a thing with tape and read write head.

Neither is a conventional computer. The question is whether it's Turing machine compatible.

If something is an algorithm then there is a turing machine that is the exact equivalent of that algorithm. That is one concept.

Also you introduce the concept of a simulation. That is different - a simulation does not need to be the equivalent of the thing it is simulating, only to model it's behaviour or some part of it's behaviour.

But these two concepts are being conflated here.

The kind of equivalence stated by the Church-Turing Thesis is different to simulation and the two concepts should not be confused.

 

[Robin]

But perhaps it is not doing any information processing that involves distinguishing the self from the external world.

Do the brain processes do this when we are conscious?

Or perhaps it is not doing any information processing that involves focusing on particular ongoing processes. Or perhaps certain areas of the cortex are not active, which means that only "old" brain processes are underway.

Some of the behaviors are silent.

~~ Paul

So what is the difference between a noisy behaviour and a silent behaviour? And who's listening?

 

[Robin]

Nothing happens at all, but it is the same consciousness. The consciousness is in the abstract information flow that can be isomorphic to a whole slew of physical sequences of computations.

It isn't necessarily the first time the sums are done -- it is simply the first time any physical system isomorphic to the mathematical model comes into being I.E. the first time this pattern is instantiated. Usually that is the first time the sums are done, but that isn't the right way to think about it.

So consciousness is non-temporal?

A computer can produce consciousness with a simulation, but if you run it the second time with precisely the same values it won't create conscious, just relate in some mysterious way back the the consciousness from the first run?

Again - what is the mechanism to produce anything except for numbers?

 

[Robin]

I think I'd be happy to agree with a definition that didn't involve some magical ingredient that we can't check.

~~ Paul

Such as sets of sums producing qualia? Sounds like magic to me!

As I said before, the I evalute the expression 1+1 and get 2 the universe is not listening and does not care or relate it to any ther expression I have evaluated or will evaluate.

Nothing mysterious happens when you run an algorithm. It is just lots sums being done on a series of natural numbers.

So what is the connection being suggested between a lot of sums on natural numbers and this conscious experience I am having? What mechanism is being suggested?

So the position being pushed by PixyMisa, rocketdodger, RandFan etc is pure magic until they can answer that.

And yet they say that either they are right or the universe is illogical.

 

[rocketdodger]

So consciousness is non-temporal?

A computer can produce consciousness with a simulation, but if you run it the second time with precisely the same values it won't create conscious, just relate in some mysterious way back the the consciousness from the first run?

Again - what is the mechanism to produce anything except for numbers?

It doesn't "create" consciousness, that is the consciousness.

If it is the same numbers, then it is the same consciousness.

Just like any copy of an executable is the same program. It isn't the substrate, it is the information.

 

[rocketdodger]

Such as sets of sums producing qualia? Sounds like magic to me!

As I said before, the I evalute the expression 1+1 and get 2 the universe is not listening and does not care or relate it to any ther expression I have evaluated or will evaluate.

Nothing mysterious happens when you run an algorithm. It is just lots sums being done on a series of natural numbers.

So what is the connection being suggested between a lot of sums on natural numbers and this conscious experience I am having? What mechanism is being suggested?

So the position being pushed by PixyMisa, rocketdodger, RandFan etc is pure magic until they can answer that.

And yet they say that either they are right or the universe is illogical.

Wtf?

You are using the results from previous calculations to alter the behavior of the system -- which is you running numbers. If value A is X, then you do M, if A is Y, then you do N, etc.

It isn't just "numbers," it is a series of behaviors.

I honestly do not understand you people that think mathematics somehow exists out in the void, apart from all physical stuff.

 

[PixyMisa]

I don't think that there is anyone here saying that the brain cannot be simulated with a TM. But keep in mind that the operative word here is "simulation". A simulation is just a dynamic representation; in other words, it just the description of a thing and not the thing itself. I think many here are making a serious categorization error.

Category error. Yes. That would be you.

For instance...

A detailed simulation of photosynthesis gives us a helpful model of the process, but it will not fix carbon or provide chemical energy.

Yes it will. In the simulation.

A simulation of the solar system would be an invaluable tool for understanding the one we live it, but it will not produce gravitational effects.

Yes it will. In the simulation.

Like wise, a comprehensive simulation of a brain may give us insights on it's functioning but that does not mean that it will actually produce consciousness.

Yes it will. In the simulation. And since simulated information processing is information processing (Church-Turing thesis), simulated consciousness is consciousness.

Each of the simulations in those examples are descriptive analogues of physical processes. But its important to remember that a description of a physical process, no matter how detailed, is NOT a reproduction.

Sure it is. In the simulation.

And for information processing systems, the substrate is irrelevant. Physical, simulated, any combination thereof; it's all the same.

 

[PixyMisa]

If we are in a non-computational simulation

A what?

then it's unlikely that we can simulate it by computational means.

Non-sequitur.

And if we are in a simulation, then we cannot comment in any way on physical restrictions since we have no idea what the laws of physics are, or even if there are such laws.[/quote]
Of course we can. Of course we do. Of course there are.

The laws of physics are those being simulated.

 

[PixyMisa]

Here is the problem.

I am lying on an operating table at 8:30 am with a needle in my arm.

The next thing I know I am awake at 9:30 am so in the intervening time I was unconscious, right? If not then you are using a different meaning to the word that I am.

My brain in the meantime was doing plenty of behaving.

It was also doing plenty of self-referential information processing (who else would the information be about?).

It's not a question of who the information is about, Robin. That's not what self-referential information processing means at all. That's the same error AkuManiMani keeps insisting on making.

The point is that the processing of the information examines and alters itself.

But I was not conscious.

Yes you were - in the sense that there were self-referential processes going on inside your brain. And you weren't - in the sense that the particular process that makes you you was suppressed. And you also weren't - in the sense that you were asleep.

There are two problems here: First, there is more than one conscious process going on in the brain; it's just that you only have access to one of them because you are that one. (Cf. split-brain patients again.) Second, the term conscious in the English language refers to multiple distinct behaviours, which is why (as I've noted before) psychologists use terms like arousal and attention instead.

So a definition of consciousness cannot apply to periods when I am not conscious.

Of course it can. You can be conscious₁ when you are not conscious₂, because the word has multiple meanings.

You can be aroused (awake, conscious) and not paying attention (unconscious of something).

You can be self-aware (conscious) and fast asleep (unconscious) - for example, lucid dreaming.

And so on. Multiple meanings for one word leads to apparent incongruities, but certainly no contradiction.

 

[Dancing David]

Here is the problem.

I am lying on an operating table at 8:30 am with a needle in my arm.

The next thing I know I am awake at 9:30 am so in the intervening time I was unconscious, right? If not then you are using a different meaning to the word that I am.

My brain in the meantime was doing plenty of behaving.

It was also doing plenty of self-referential information processing (who else would the information be about?).

But I was not conscious.

So a definition of consciousness cannot apply to periods when I am not conscious.

yes and so one of the behaviors that you are using to define consciousness is, awareness and recall of events, ability to respond to requests is another, I believe you misunderstood me, I did not say that all behaviors would meet the defintion of 'consciousness', or if I did I mispoke myself.

I don't recall using self referential information processing at all, do you?

I am saying that if we define certain behaviors as conscious and therefore indicative of consciousness, then there are no p-zombies under behaviorsim.

In that you generate a set of criteria for what you label as 'consciousness', if something meets those criteria then they are 'conscious'. The point of my post is to lampoon and point out the error of the p-zombie. Id there are no behaviors that distinguish a p-zombie from a conscious being, then there is no difference.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

And I am waiting for some evidence that we need it to be algorithmic, what it would explain.

We be the waiting kids.

Why? I thought you had agreed with me that the "more powerful" thing was a red herring.

The required power determines our ability to simulate the brain on a computer. Of course, we could always attach an RNG.

Something which is not an algorithm.

If anyone can even give a coherent description of a nonalgorithm involved in consciousness I would be happy.

But others are saying more than this - they are saying that there can be a TM that is equivalent to the brain.

I think so, too. But it is an empirical question.

If something is an algorithm then there is a turing machine that is the exact equivalent of that algorithm. That is one concept.

Assuming Church-Turing is correct, yes.

Also you introduce the concept of a simulation. That is different - a simulation does not need to be the equivalent of the thing it is simulating, only to model it's behaviour or some part of it's behaviour.

In particular, consciousness.

The kind of equivalence stated by the Church-Turing Thesis is different to simulation and the two concepts should not be confused.

I don't understand. You can't simulate a complete brain on a Turing compatible machine if the brain is not Turing compatible.

~~ Paul