My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Do the brain processes do this when we are conscious?

I think so, yes. That is where we get a sense of self.

So what is the difference between a noisy behaviour and a silent behaviour? And who's listening?

Not all behaviors are happening all the time. Isn't that obvious, or does it require explaining? By "silent" I did not mean "not making noise," of course. I meant suppressed or inactive.

~~ Paul

 

[Dancing David]

Do the brain processes do this when we are conscious?

So what is the difference between a noisy behaviour and a silent behaviour? And who's listening?

You may not like the language but that is the way it is used, there are 'public' behaviors and 'private' behaviors. And under radical behaviorsim in fact the 'private' behaviors are just conjectures unless observed some how, which is why I am a methodologist, I believe we can interview people and ask them about some of their private behaviors.

But if we define respiration and the transfusion of oxygen as behaviors, respiration in many cases is a public behavior, then transfusion would be a private behavior in terms of the transfer of oxygen across cell membranes. And it is a private behavior the subject is most likely not aware of. (Unless we/they observe it somehow)

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Such as sets of sums producing qualia? Sounds like magic to me!

At least we can check it in principle.

So what is the connection being suggested between a lot of sums on natural numbers and this conscious experience I am having? What mechanism is being suggested?

It is being suggested that your phenomenal experience is just another mechanistic process that takes place inside your head and produces behaviors such as the feeling of redness.

So the position being pushed by PixyMisa, rocketdodger, RandFan etc is pure magic until they can answer that.

It's not magic, it's just nonintuitive. Magic is when someone suggests something nonmechanistic or supernatural is involved. At least that's my definition of magic.

Indeed it is possible that the brain is not Turing machine compatible. But the argument appears to be that consciousness just can't be TM compatible because it just doesn't seem possible. But does adding an RNG or parallelism or other-nonalgorithmic-thing change the intuition? I don't think so. It's noninuitive unless you simply declare consciousness to be a fundamental existent that behaves the right way, thus finessing the issue.

~~ Paul

 

[PixyMisa]

Such as sets of sums producing qualia? Sounds like magic to me!

That's because qualia are magic. A hidden invocation of magic. That's the entire point of the term - to be able to say, no, your mechanistic explanation cannot account for these magical things. There is no reason to suppose that qualia exist, other than as mechanical processes.

But sets of sums producing information? Well, there's a surprise.

As I said before, the I evalute the expression 1+1 and get 2 the universe is not listening and does not care or relate it to any ther expression I have evaluated or will evaluate.

So? You are listening, I presume. You care, I presume. You can relate it to other expressions, I presume.

That's all that's needed.

Nothing mysterious happens when you run an algorithm. It is just lots sums being done on a series of natural numbers.

Nothing myserious happens in consciousness either.

So what is the connection being suggested between a lot of sums on natural numbers and this conscious experience I am having?

That's what it is. That is all that consciousness is. Why should anything else be required?

What mechanism is being suggested?

Self-referential information processing. I could have sworn I mentioned that at some point.

So the position being pushed by PixyMisa, rocketdodger, RandFan etc is pure magic until they can answer that.

Baloney, Robin, utter baloney.

You are saying that our explanation is mechanical and can't account for qualia and other mysterious things.

We are pointing out that there are no qualia and other mysterious things. And that the processes we are saying happen do, observably, happen, and also do, provably, allow for every real, rather than imagined, aspect of consciousness.

And yet they say that either they are right or the universe is illogical.

Logically inconsistent, yes.

 

[PixyMisa]

To sum up, what we are saying is as follows:

1. Consciousness is produced by the brain. (By observation.)
2. The brain is a physical system. (By observation.)
3. Physical processes are either deterministic or random, or some mix thereof; and either discrete or continuous, or some mix thereof. (By exclusion.)
4. Any deterministic, discrete process can be represented precisely by a Turing machine. (Church-Turing thesis.)
5. Any deterministic, continous process can be approximated by a Turing machine with arbitrary precision. (Calculus, Chuch-Turing thesis.)
6. Any non-deterministic, discrete process can be simulated by a Turing machine with arbitrary accuracy. (Statistics, Chuch-Turing thesis.)
7. Any non-deterministic, continuous process can be approximated by a Turing machine with arbitrary accuracy and precision. (Calculus, Statistics, Chuch-Turing thesis.)

8. Therefore the brain can be simulated by a Turing machine.

9. A simulation of a physical system reproduces the behaviours of that system based on the behaviours of its components. (Definition.)
10. Consciousness is a behaviour. (Definition - everything that happens is a behaviour.)

11. Therefore a simulation of a brain produces simulated consciousness.

12. We classify a system as conscious (or not) by its response to perceptions. (Definition.)
13. Perceptions are information, and responses can be represented as information. (Definition.)
14. Information can be passed freely to and from the simulation. (Definition.)

15. Therefore simulated consciousness is real-world consciousness.

Though I'm sure we can tighten that up a bit.

So, guys, exactly what is it you object to? The Church-Turing thesis? Calculus? Statistics? Logic? The observed correlation between brains and minds?

Or do you just not like the conclusion?

 

[AkuManiMani]

I don't think that there is anyone here saying that the brain cannot be simulated with a TM. But keep in mind that the operative word here is "simulation". A simulation is just a dynamic representation; in other words, it just the description of a thing and not the thing itself. I think many here are making a serious categorization error.

Category error. Yes. That would be you.

I'm a Category error, huh? What an interesting thing for a person to be

But seriously, tho. A few pages back I listed some points I would like you to clarify before we continue this discussion in posts 2375 and 2376.

I'm not sure if you missed them or if you're deliberately avoiding them. I hope its the former.

 

[AkuManiMani]

So, guys, exactly what is it you object to? The Church-Turing thesis? Calculus? Statistics? Logic? The observed correlation between brains and minds?

Just your apparent inability to distinguish between a mathematical representation of a thing and the thing itself.

 

[Robin]

It's not a question of who the information is about, Robin. That's not what self-referential information processing means at all. That's the same error AkuManiMani keeps insisting on making.

The point is that the processing of the information examines and alters itself.

But that is precisely what I said.

Yes you were - in the sense that there were self-referential processes going on inside your brain.

If, by your definition, I was conscious after the general anaesthetic took hold and before it wore off, then we are clearly not talking about the same thing.

 

[AkuManiMani]

But that is precisely what I said.

If, by your definition, I was conscious after the general anaesthetic took hold and before it wore off, then we are clearly not talking about the same thing.

Of course, Pixy will just respond that you ARE talking about the same thing but you're just "Wrong".

Oh, well. Whatcha gonna do, right?

 

[Robin]

At least we can check it in principle.

And the comment I made that PixyMisa took such passionate exception to was that I would wait until the results were in before making my mind up.

Something wrong with that?

It is being suggested that your phenomenal experience is just another mechanistic process that takes place inside your head and produces behaviors such as the feeling of redness.

Who said it wasn't? What you are suggesting is that evaluating a lot of sums in a particular order will lead to our conscious experience. But haven't said how.

It's not magic, it's just nonintuitive. Magic is when someone suggests something nonmechanistic or supernatural is involved. At least that's my definition of magic.

So what is the mechanism then? What does it change when I add two numbers together and find the result. Wasn't the result the case before I added them?

Indeed it is possible that the brain is not Turing machine compatible. But the argument appears to be that consciousness just can't be TM compatible because it just doesn't seem possible.

Not at all, you are shifting again.

The argument is that the mind must be an algorithm, that there is no alternative and that anybody who doesn't agree wholeheartedly with every single consequence of that must believe in magic unicorns.

All I am saying is that the Church-Turing Thesis says that if some process P can do a computation on natural numbers then there is a Turing machine that can also do that computation and that the Turing machine is equivalent to the method that P uses to do the calculation.

It does not imply that a Turing machine is necessarily equivalent to P itself.

A category error as everybody is so suddenly fond of saying.

But does adding an RNG or parallelism or other-nonalgorithmic-thing change the intuition? I don't think so. It's noninuitive unless you simply declare consciousness to be a fundamental existent that behaves the right way, thus finessing the issue.

Well it is certainly non-intuitive that this unified conscious experience could be the result of millions of devices completely isolated from each other doing sums.

Now I might say, OK, if there were some coherent argument as to why that should be the case.

But no-one has made one yet

1. You have misapplied the C-T thesis as I pointed out above.
2. You have confused a simulation with an equivalent algorithm
3. You have suggested no mechanism as to why evaluating a lot of sums should lead to this should lead to the conscious experience I have.

 

[Robin]

Of course, Pixy will just respond that you ARE talking about the same thing but you're just "Wrong".

Oh, well. Whatcha gonna do, right?

We will just have to agree that the computer would be conscious in the same we that we are conscious when we are unconscious.

That fixes it.

 

[Robin]

8. Therefore the brain can be simulated by a Turing machine.

A simulation is different to an equivalent algorithm. Not the same thing.

Fail

Though I'm sure we can tighten that up a bit.

For sure.

So, guys, exactly what is it you object to? The Church-Turing thesis?

Nope

Calculus? Statistics? Logic?

Nope

The observed correlation between brains and minds?

Nope, since that would accord more with our thesis than with yours.

You are saying that the mind is something quite independent of the brain. So how exactly does that correlation help you?

So it would be more relevant to ask if you object to the observed correlation between brains and mnds. So what is your objection to that?

Or do you just not like the conclusion?

Nope.

Just think that the various versions of the C-T thesis say what my old maths lecturers say they did and not what you and drkitten say they mean, especially when you get so mixed up over the the question of whether everything is an algorithm (have you sorted that one out yet?).

And that a simulation of a process is different to an equivalent algorithm.

And that you have suggested no mechanism whereby working out the answer to a lot of sums might lead to this qualitative experience that I have.

And that your definition of consciousness is clearly trivial - especially when it applies to times when I am not conscious.

 

[Robin]

Not all behaviors are happening all the time. Isn't that obvious, or does it require explaining?

I don't think you should get snippy when I don't understand your metaphors.

By "silent" I did not mean "not making noise," of course. I meant suppressed or inactive.

OK, so there are brain processes that are inactive when we are unconscious and active when we are conscious.

What is it in particular about them that leads to conscious experience when they are active?

 

[Robin]

The consensus was that consciousness is self-referential information processing, and that human consciousness is what we experience. Plain old consciousness is a subset of human consciousness, but not the other way around.

So we are not keeping it vague and slippery, we are keeping it limited to what we understand already.

And yet PixyMisa has agreed that the definition implies we are conscious even when we are unconscious.

 

[Robin]

It's even better than that. If any combination of particles anywhere in the universe could be interpreted by any single one of an infinite number of possible coding schemes as being a given algorithm, then that will create consciousness absolutely indistinguishable from human consciousness. In fact, "create" isn't even the right word. It will just be consciousness. Rocketdodger has speculated on the pleasant prospect of being granted eternal life on this basis.

And since the result of any calculation was the case even before the calculation was made then the result of all calculations made by the algorithm would have been the case before the algorithm was even run.

So you don't need the computer, nor even to write the algorithm since it was the result of another algorithm and therefore already the case.

Therefore all logically possible conscious experiences exist eternally!

If you don't totally accept this, then it means that you believe in magic, since it's the only logical explanation.

Ah yes, all I said was that I would wait for the results of the simulation before deciding what the results would be.

And that is the same as believing in magic unicorns

 

[Robin]

Well, those are good questions, but that isn't what is important in this context.

What is important is whether or not -- if we are in a simulation -- whatever is responsible for our consciousness can be simulated another level down.

Now, I already asked Robin this question -- is there any mathematical reason why not?

And I think I have already replied that there is no reason, mathematical or otherwise, to think it can. It is a conjecture, that is all.

 

[Robin]

OK, let's recap.

I said that I would wait until I see a simulation of a behaving human mind before deciding that it was possible and this is apparently equivalent to believing in magic unicorns

Now the idea being put is that:

1. Consciousness is behaviour
2. The mind is an algorithm
3. Therefore the mind can be duplicated on any suitably powerful computer
4. A computer running an equivalent algorithm to our mind would be conscious in exactly the same way that we are conscious.

OK so far?

So I find a suitably powerful computer and run an equivalent algorithm and produce a couple of seconds of conscious like behaviour, call this Run1.

So I am unable to decide that I am not Run1.

We run the same algorithm again with exactly the same starting values, call this Run2. I am unable to decide that I am not Run2.

During Run2 I saved all the steps including operation and before values for any data, register etc, to disk in the same order as they were run.

I run this, and call it Run3

So since Run3 consisted of the the same calculations in the same order as Run2, therefore I am unable to decide that I am not Run3.

OK so far?

So I take all these calculations and distribute them onto a few million portable computing devices with caesium clocks and very long life batteries, ensuring that no consecutive calculation is on any device.

I fire them off into space in various directions until they are located at least a light year from each other and they have no communication with each other.

Based on their clocks they start running the calculations again in the same order, call this Run4

Since precisely the same calculations were made in precisely the same order as Run1, Run2 and Run3 therefore the same result must ensue and I am unable to decide that I am not Run4.

But is there really nothing at all wrong with the idea that my consciousness is produced by a mechanism, the components of which are all isolated from each other?

No device has sufficient information for even an instant of experience and is absolutely isolated from that information and yet I have a unified experience.

You might say that each calculation contains information from previous calculations but if I add 2 + 4 and later add 6 + 8, the fact that 2 was added to four is not included in the answer.

Is that a confident yes from everybody still?

There has still been no mechanism suggested as to how evaluating the answers to calculations will result in conscious experience. And this mechanism would have to account for the fact that sums being done in isolation from each other would still provide this unified conscious experience.

And the confusion between a simulation and "equivalence" has not been cleared up.

And the C-T thesis appears to have been misapplied.

And the implied definition of conscious appears to apply even when I am unconscious.

Is waiting to see the results before making up my mind really like believing in magic unicorns?

 

[Robin]

Self-referential information processing. I could have sworn I mentioned that at some point.

Oh, now that is the mechanism as well as the definition? No I don't think you mentioned that this is supposed to be the mechanism too. How exactly is it the mechanism?

It is as meaningless as a mechanism as it was as a definition.

Baloney, Robin, utter baloney.

You are saying that our explanation is mechanical and can't account for qualia and other mysterious things.

On the contrary PixyMisa I have said again and again that you have not suggested a mechanism.

Suggest a mechanism and then you can call your "explanation" mechanical - until then ... nope.

It is neither an explanation nor mechanical, what does it explain? Nothing that I have heard

How does evaluating the answers to a bunch of sums result in this conscious experience I have?

 

[Robin]

Logically inconsistent, yes.

And this from someone who says we are conscious when we are unconscious and that when X simulates Y then X is equivalent to Y and from people who say that everything is an algorithm, or maybe everything is not an algorithm.

There is nothing logically inconsistent about suggesting that the mind is not an algorithm.

There is no coherent argument that it is an algorithm.

It might be. It might not be.

 

[Frank Newgent]

Perhaps trying to express the idea in your own words would help?

Okay fine. What you are suggesting is woo heebie-jeebie goofball.

Can you offer any evidence that we are not currently inhabiting a simulation?

Can you offer any evidence that we are not currently inhabiting a Las Vegas betting pub on NFL fantasy football draft day?

I can't. Guess that means we are, huh?

Sheesh.