How do you deal with the 'science is a religion' crap?

[athon]

Even if true, this fact does not negate that the claim is falsifiable and scientific.

How's that? If there are temperatures which we will never be able to reach at which a metal could potentially (or not) melt, how would it be falsified?

Athon

 

[AvalonXQ]

I've studied history for the past 50 years. You want all that in one lump?

No. I want enough evidence to support your claim that, historically speaking, violence that occurred was due to religion and not to culture. Certainly a history book isn't going to persuasively isolate the one value from the other; in fact, I'm not sure how to prove that one and not the other is responsible unless you can somehow produce societies with identical cultures but different religions and show that one was violent while the other wasn't.
But, the point was, you made a claim. I asked for evidence.
"History" is not a good answer.

 

[Tubbythin]

Ah, I see your point. I guess I see more to science than just theories. To say it isn't science if it isn't a theory, again, seems like a useless categorisation. Even if it was an agreed definition, there is no particular point at which a hypothesis magically turns into a theory. It's a gradual slide over time (some ideas progress faster than others).

I wasn't saying if it isn't a theory it isn't science. I was saying if it isn't a theory, its an observation, then it doesn't have to be falsifiable (it doesn't make much sense to say an observation has been falsified anyway).

 

[athon]

I wouldn't say this demonstrates something to be false, rather it just doesn't support its truth. I see a difference between an idea being wrong and there being no reason to think it's right.

Yup. That's my point.

Athon

 

[not daSkeptic]

If there are temperatures which we will never be able to reach at which a metal could potentially (or not) melt, how would it be falsified?

I'm inclined to agree that the statement is not falsifiable, but I think you're focusing too much on practicalities and ignoring the bigger picture. Whether or not we will be able to reach any given temperature is not the point in my opinion. Given sufficient time I see no reason why we could not reach any specific temperature, but that's irrelevant in an infinite universe because there will always be something higher. I do not see the non-falsifiability of the statement to be a result of our abilities, but rather a result of the unbounded nature of the idea itself.

 

[athon]

I'm inclined to agree that the statement is not falsifiable, but I think you're focusing too much on practicalities and ignoring the bigger picture. Whether or not we will be able to reach any given temperature is not the point in my opinion. Given sufficient time I see no reason why we could not reach any specific temperature, but that's irrelevant in an infinite universe because there will always be something higher. I do not see the non-falsifiability of the statement to be a result of our abilities, but rather a result of the unbounded nature of the idea itself.

I think that's a big part of the disagreement here, and it contradicts what I understand of Popper. Even if you take a different view of falsification than he did, I then fail to see what pragmatic good it does. It's on the same level as invisible pink dragons who leave no footprints. In practical terms, is there any real difference between 'invisible' and 'visible, but you'll never be able to see it'?

Athon

 

[Cimerian]

I have often heard this "argument" that science is something that we just chose to believe; and it's just as much of a faith as religion. I'm sure you've heard it too. How do you deal with it? I get so annoyed at that "argument" that I usually get rude and sarcastic. But I wanted to know how I can counter that without being sarcastic. How can I construct a reasoned argument against that? Should I start from how axioms in maths and science are self-evident truths and belief in them is not even remotely close to belief in a religion.

Any help would be greatly appreciated.

Tell them that if they are consistent to theirs religion, they should stop using computers, cars and planes, since they all work based on principles described by science.

If they get sick, from the humblest headache to the most terrible cancer, they should refrain from visit any doctor, taking any pill, since they work based on principles of a 'religion' which is not theirs.

Oh, almost forgot, no TV, no DVD, no radio (electromagnetic waves, an abominable creation of science!), and no cellphones.

These arguments don't work with Amish.

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

No. I want enough evidence to support your claim that, historically speaking, violence that occurred was due to religion and not to culture. Certainly a history book isn't going to persuasively isolate the one value from the other; in fact, I'm not sure how to prove that one and not the other is responsible unless you can somehow produce societies with identical cultures but different religions and show that one was violent while the other wasn't.
But, the point was, you made a claim. I asked for evidence.
"History" is not a good answer.

I heard you. Have fun in the library.

 

[Michael Mozina]

Go on then. How does one falsify "Godidit"?

The same way you expect to falsify "Inflation,DE and exotic matter did it".

Everything that applies to Lambda-CDM theory applies to Lambda-Goddidit theory.

 

[Reality Check]

The same way you expect to falsify "Inflation,DE and exotic matter did it".

Everything that applies to Lambda-CDM theory applies to Lambda-Goddidit theory.

Everything that applies to Lambda-CDM theory applies to Iron Sun-Goddidit theory. See I can replace words with nonsense words also !

But I guess what you mean is that we should ignore the fact that Lambda-CDM theory works (explains what the universe presents to us) because you don't like it.

 

[not daSkeptic]

'visible, but you'll never be able to see it'

I'm having trouble comprehending how this is even logically possible. But perhaps I'm not viewing the problem in the same way you are. Could you provide an example of how this might occur?

 

[ctamblyn]

...(electromagnetic waves, an abominable creation of science!)...

Let there be light! Sorry, couldn't resist.

 

[blobru]

Science does not assume a humane universe; and strives not impose any sort of humane interpretation on it, or expect an humane response from it.

On this point I disagree. I do think that science assumes a humane universe, and imposes a humane interpretation on it -- just in a different way than religion.

By "humane" I mean sympathetic [to human feelings], not human; sorry for the confusion.

Science assumes a universe that is comprehensible, orderly, and consistent. There's no reason a priori that the universe has to be this way. But just as religion is useless if the universe does not respond to human demands, so science is useless if the universe does not conform to human logic. Both institutions make their assumptions out of necessity, but both assumptions are present.

That's a different point than I was making above; however, I agree, more or less. I'd only specify that the scientific assumption (of cosmic order) can be construed as an hypothesis confirmed by scientific progress: i.e., science hypothesizes that if the universe is ordered, it can be described usefully by the languages of order -- logic and math. The basic assumption of science is then verified, 'bootstrapped', by the practice of science, and the uses to which it is put.
The religious assumption (of cosmic sympathy) is based on the authority of paradigmatic individuals. For the religious, confirmation the universe is in fact sympathetic to one's desire for meaning is often existential: the more meaningful life that comes from accepting the religious assumption; whereas the existence of the sympathetic cosmic beings that vouchsafe this meaning is an article of faith, in the religious assumption, extremely difficult to confirm -- short of dying.

phew, that was a tad windy, eh -- blobru eat now.

 

[athon]

I'm having trouble comprehending how this is even logically possible. But perhaps I'm not viewing the problem in the same way you are. Could you provide an example of how this might occur?

What I'm getting at is that I can't see how it is practically useful to state 'it can be falsified, but we can't observe that falsification'. That, to me, seems no different to 'it can't be falsified'. Hence it's as ridiculous as saying 'it's visible, but you can't see it'.

Falsification is a practical way of cutting away theories that are shown to be impossible in the light of an observation, reducing the pool of possible ideas down and therefore increasing the probability that they're useful. I cannot see how falsification can add weight to a theory, therefore, of it can only be theoretically falsified, but not practically. I can understand it would add value later, should that falsification become a practical possibility, but in the meantime it's a useless feature.

Athon

 

[not daSkeptic]

I cannot see how falsification can add weight to a theory, therefore, of it can only be theoretically falsified, but not practically. I can understand it would add value later, should that falsification become a practical possibility, but in the meantime it's a useless feature.

As I understand it, Popper felt that completely non-falsifiable ideas (i.e. those which are not even logically falsifiable let alone practically so) have no potential for any scientific value. On the other hand, ideas that are falsifiable (even if only logically so) do have a potential for scientific value. Thus, while the latter may waste one's time, the former definitely will. It is the difference in potential between ideas that is useful.

The validity of the above would seem to depend entirely upon the first part of the argument, that non-falsifiable ideas have no potential for scientific value. I've always agreed with Popper's opinion, however, I'm willing to explore alternative points of view.

 

[Tubbythin]

The same way you expect to falsify "Inflation,DE and exotic matter did it".

Everything that applies to Lambda-CDM theory applies to Lambda-Goddidit theory.

So you're not discussing religion at all. You're changing the name of a theory and pretending because you've changed the name that changes the theory from science to religion. My God Michael how old are you? I think I must have been must have understood that changing the name of something doesn't change what it is when I was four years old. Pathetic doesn't even begin to describe the "argument" you're making.

 

[athon]

As I understand it, Popper felt that completely non-falsifiable ideas (i.e. those which are not even logically falsifiable let alone practically so) have no potential for any scientific value.

Most definitely in his early days, but I get the feeling in some of the articles he wrote later in life showed he was softening in this view a touch.

On the other hand, ideas that are falsifiable (even if only logically so) do have a potential for scientific value.

I'd really need to see some evidence of this view. As I outlined earlier, Popper seemed (at least in my interpretation) to be quite clear on it being empirical and testable. Not 'in theory', or 'perhaps one day in the future', but actually an observation we could have in practical reality.

Thus, while the latter may waste one's time, the former definitely will. It is the difference in potential between ideas that is useful.

I still don't see how this difference is practically useful. Even if it is potentially useful one day in the future, that just means it's an idea that is left to one side for now. Falsified theories are the same - falsification means putting an idea aside until you one day have reason to look at it again (i.e., if new evidence comes to light showing how the falsifying observation might actually not be so exclusive).

The validity of the above would seem to depend entirely upon the first part of the argument, that non-falsifiable ideas have no potential for scientific value. I've always agreed with Popper's opinion, however, I'm willing to explore alternative points of view.

When I first studied HPS many moons ago, I was a huge Popperian. Read what I could of his stuff and would defend falsification to the hilt. As I started to read other stuff - from Kuhn to Lakatos to Feyerabend to Sokal - I started to waver a little. The sticking point for me has been that there is a difference between how people feel science should work, and how it actually does.

Falsification is a nice idea, but people in reality move from one theory to another for different reasons. Falsification is only one influence, and even then, only when it is practically applied to produce a mutually exclusive observation.

Athon

 

[Ivor the Engineer]

With an infinite number of alternate hypotheses possible, does rejecting the null hypothesis at the (arbitrary selected) X% level make any one of the alternate hypotheses more likely than before the experiment was conducted?

It seems to me that most if not all of science is conducted with the a priori belief that some hypotheses are (much) less likely to be true than others.

I.e. Experiments give you P(E|H), but we use our a priori beliefs (faith?) to obtain P(H|E).

 

[athon]

With an infinite number of alternate hypotheses possible, does rejecting the null hypothesis at the (arbitrary selected) X% level make any one of the alternate hypotheses more likely than before the experiment was conducted?

It would if there really were an infinite number of hypotheses that were all equally probable. There isn't, however. There is simply a spectrum of ideas where some are more likely than others. Falsification plays the numbers game - while there may technically be an infinite number of hypotheses, there is a finite class of probable explanations limited by what we observe.

It seems to me that most if not all of science is conducted with the a priori belief that some hypotheses are (much) less likely to be true than others.

I wouldn't call it an a priori belief as much as an economical assumption that has continued to work well. Parsimony might be an assumption, but why complicate a theory with assumptions if there are no observations to prompt us to?

Athon

 

[skeptsci]

On this point I disagree. I do think that science assumes a humane universe, and imposes a humane interpretation on it -- just in a different way than religion. Science assumes a universe that is comprehensible, orderly, and consistent. There's no reason a priori that the universe has to be this way. But just as religion is useless if the universe does not respond to human demands, so science is useless if the universe does not conform to human logic. Both institutions make their assumptions out of necessity, but both assumptions are present.

Yes I agree with you Avalon, and I want to give another example in which science might disturbingly look like religion. The materialistic point of view is widely accepted by scientists from all realms of science. But can it be proven? No! Scientists simply believe in it. Troubling a bit – don't you think?