My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[rocketdodger]

As usual, the point flies way, way over Rocketdodger's head.

This "more powerful" idea is pointless because it simply assumes what it sets out to prove. Obviously if you assume that nothing is going on in the brain except for algorithmic computation, then you can prove that the brain must be a computational device. After that, saying it's equivalent to a Turing machine is trivial.

The reason that it's a pointless argument is that it assumes the very point which is in dispute.

The reason that it's a dubious argument is that it uses the term "powerful" without defining what is meant, and without explaining what the context is. "Oh, but we're talking about computation". No, we're talking about computation and consciousness.

As usual, the point flies way over your head. And why do you refer to everyone in the third person?

I understand exactly what you are saying.

But what you have to realize is that even if you don't mean to (although I think you do), your constant refusal to use the same commonly agreed upon definitions as everyone else comes across as you making incorrect claims and then backtracking when you get called on it.

 

[Dancing David]

IOW, a person who doesn't scream isn't experiencing as much pain as a tape recording of someone hurting themselves.

Um, there are more 'bahaviors' to the experience of pain than screaming? Do you really define the 'behaviors of pain' as just screaming?

Behavior includes all biological functions under behaviorism.

 

[yy2bggggs]

And if we assume that the brain is a machine to transform inputs I to outputs O, then we can reasonably say that it cannot be more powerful than a Turin machine. Which is of course begging the question.

You're missing the program. The machine runs a program that transforms from the set I to the set O. "Program" here is a collapse of concepts--lambda's, recursive functions, or Turing machine equivalents.

An argument should put all such assumptions forward explicitly. Using ambiguity of language to conceal them makes the argument dubious. In this case, the assumption makes the argument not only dubious and shoddy, but circular.

There's nothing ambiguous about these terms. The assumptions are well established. Nobody is hiding these things from you.

You want to argue that the brain is doing more than just transforming inputs into outputs. Fine. Do that. But don't misrepresent what's being done in your counterarguments. This is not a case where people are using terms that are ambiguous.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I don't think that there is anyone here saying that the brain cannot be simulated with a TM. But keep in mind that the operative word here is "simulation". A simulation is just a dynamic representation; in other words, it just the description of a thing and not the thing itself. I think many here are making a serious categorization error.

For instance...

A detailed simulation of photosynthesis gives us a helpful model of the process, but it will not fix carbon or provide chemical energy. A simulation of the solar system would be an invaluable tool for understanding the one we live it, but it will not produce gravitational effects. Like wise, a comprehensive simulation of a brain may give us insights on it's functioning but that does not mean that it will actually produce consciousness.

Each of the simulations in those examples are descriptive analogues of physical processes. But its important to remember that a description of a physical process, no matter how detailed, is NOT a reproduction.

Whilst you see a difference some will point out that you cannot explain the difference and therefore others will deny a difference. Whilst I see all these views as equally wrong and equally right depending on the time line of cognition.

I think that a simulation of the brain is one of those simulations that does produce a functioning brain, for all intents and purposes. Just like the simulation of arithmetic produces the correct answers and the graphical simulation of a book produces readable text. This is an empirical question, of course.

~~ Paul

Computation is an abstract function. It is not medium dependent and can be effectively reproduced in any number of ways. It can be carried out as as a series of static symbols in the form of written text, the sliding of beads on an abacus, or the switching of logic gates. The significant point here is that conscious experience [which is not computation, per se] is not an abstract function but an actual physical process akin to electrical current or combustion.

 

[rocketdodger]

Which is one way of not answering the question.

I must have a look back at all those questions I asked, and see how many times somebody even gave a tentative attempt at answering them, and how often they went to great length and trouble to tell me that the question had been really, really well answered already, and that I was being deliberately disingenuous in pretending that I didn't have a perfectly good answer already.

So let's save time and make up a FAQ for this endlessly repeated thread where the commonly agreed definition of "information processing" can be referenced.

Well, I have given you a very precise physical definition for switching, the basis of all computation and information theory. Do you dispute this discussion with me?

yy2bggggs gave you answers and furthermore asked you to specify how a glass of water is a virtual machine + software -- by any definition. Do you dispute this discussion with yy2bggggs?

drkitten has precisely illustrated the differences between functional and physical definitions and why your demands are nonsense because nobody even cares about physical definitions for 99% of the sciences that we consider very well explained -- explained to the point of being fact, actually. Do you dispute this discussion with drkitten?

So that is at least three individuals that you have run from so far. And by "run" I mean actually ceased a discussion because you just have no responses to the issues brought up.

Do you dispute that there are open issues between yourself and the three individuals mentioned above, and that the ball is in your court regarding those issues? Because I would be more than happy to refresh your memory.

 

[westprog]

Yes.

And what you are categorically failing to grasp is that the existence of such coding schemes implies a mathematical isomorphism between the particles and the behavior we are interested in.

What behaviour? The point about these observations is that the consciousness hypothesis has no behavioural implications whatsoever. Whether or not these random configurations produce consciousness is and will always remain entirely untestable.

Since there is no such "behaviour", we are unlikely to observe any such isomorphism.

Once again, if you understood that everything is physical (a failing I find laughable, given how obsessed with the "physical" you are) then you would see this.

Or grok it even.

 

[rocketdodger]

And if we assume that the brain is a machine to transform inputs I to outputs O, then we can reasonably say that it cannot be more powerful than a Turin machine. Which is of course begging the question. By using the term "powerful" about a human brain, that's already claiming that a human brain is a computational device for converting natural number inputs to outputs, and nothing else.

I would also like to point out that your beloved Roger Penrose tries to show that even though the brain only transforms inputs I to outputs O that it is indeed more powerful than a Turing machine.

Choose your own flavor of wrongness.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Can you offer any evidence that we are not currently inhabiting a simulation?

If not, then what are the implications of this?

Assuming we are living in a simulation, there a some pertinent questions that should be asked:

- What is our world a simulation of?

And..

- Who constructed the simulation, and for what purpose?

Being as how simulations are -designed- constructs, asking whether our "physical" universe is a simulation is essentially the same as asking whether it was created by an extraphysical agency -- i.e. what theists call "God(s)".

Also, even if we accept the proposition that we're inhabiting a simulation, we are still left with the question of what consciousness is, and how the subjects experiencing the simulation are interfacing with it. I think the very question of whether or not we're "inhabiting" a simulation highlights the fact that the nature of consciousness is as much a metaphysical issue as it is physical.

 

[rocketdodger]

What behaviour? The point about these observations is that the consciousness hypothesis has no behavioural implications whatsoever. Whether or not these random configurations produce consciousness is and will always remain entirely untestable.

Since there is no such "behaviour", we are unlikely to observe any such isomorphism.

Wait -- you are saying that there are no unique behaviors exhibited only by conscious entities?

 

[westprog]

Well, I have given you a very precise physical definition for switching, the basis of all computation and information theory. Do you dispute this discussion with me?

yy2bggggs gave you answers and furthermore asked you to specify how a glass of water is a virtual machine + software -- by any definition. Do you dispute this discussion with yy2bggggs?

Yes, that's where I demonstrated the massive holes in the definitions that were given. That's why they aren't given any more. I showed, for example, that switches were so naturally prevalent according to the definition that one could find them almost anywhere, including individual atoms.

drkitten has precisely illustrated the differences between functional and physical definitions and why your demands are nonsense because nobody even cares about physical definitions for 99% of the sciences that we consider very well explained -- explained to the point of being fact, actually. Do you dispute this discussion with drkitten?

Yes. I insisted that any functional definition must still have an underlying physical basis. DrKitten's attempt at a physical definition for computation was better than some, but still hopelessly vague and lacking.

So that is at least three individuals that you have run from so far. And by "run" I mean actually ceased a discussion because you just have no responses to the issues brought up.

Do you dispute that there are open issues between yourself and the three individuals mentioned above, and that the ball is in your court regarding those issues? Because I would be more than happy to refresh your memory.

The fact that the same people keep making the same unjustified assertions doesn't make them correct.

You forgot that Pixy wrote "wrong" after a number of my posts. I didn't rebut that either.

 

[rocketdodger]

Assuming we are living in a simulation, there a some pertinent questions that should be asked:

- What is our world a simulation of?

And..

- Who constructed the simulation, and for what purpose?

Also, whether or not we are inhabiting a simulation, we are still left with the question of what consciousness is, and how the subjects experiencing the simulation are interfacing with it. I think the very question of whether or not we're "inhabiting" a simulation highlights the fact that the nature of consciousness is as much a metaphysical issue as it is physical.

Well, those are good questions, but that isn't what is important in this context.

What is important is whether or not -- if we are in a simulation -- whatever is responsible for our consciousness can be simulated another level down.

Now, I already asked Robin this question -- is there any mathematical reason why not?

I am not aware of one, so I will assume that yes, if we are in a simulation, then we could simulate everything in this simulation within a simulation of our own.

And since we have no way to determine whether or not we are in a simulation... any model should take into account both possibilities.

Guess what -- the computational model does. It works just fine regardless.

Do the others?

 

[yy2bggggs]

Yes, that's where I demonstrated the massive holes in the definitions that were given. That's why they aren't given any more. I showed, for example, that switches were so naturally prevalent according to the definition that one could find them almost anywhere, including individual atoms.

What do switches have to do with how I defined software in the other thread?

Sure, the subject was going on around the time I brought it up. That's the only dependent relationship I can think of.

 

[westprog]

Wait -- you are saying that there are no unique behaviors exhibited only by conscious entities?

I am not aware of any well-defined behaviour that applies solely to conscious beings apart from the assertion of consciousness.

 

[AkuManiMani]

And in any system, it's necessary to know what is the essential component and what is peripheral. One can observe some aspect of behaviour and implement it, and not realise that some vital element is missing.

Thus the numerous wing-flapping attempts at flight. It's also noteworthy that for the people wedding to the flapping model, the failure of their attempts just indicated the need to flap harder.

Just last night while hanging out with friends, one of them brought up the story of the "Cargo cult". When the islanders found that their construction projects failed to get the cargo bearing planes to return, they simply decided to construct even BIGGER runways, and even BIGGER palm tree planes with moving propeller parts! *_*

 

[westprog]

Well, those are good questions, but that isn't what is important in this context.

What is important is whether or not -- if we are in a simulation -- whatever is responsible for our consciousness can be simulated another level down.

Now, I already asked Robin this question -- is there any mathematical reason why not?

I am not aware of one, so I will assume that yes, if we are in a simulation, then we could simulate everything in this simulation within a simulation of our own.

And since we have no way to determine whether or not we are in a simulation... any model should take into account both possibilities.

Guess what -- the computational model does. It works just fine regardless.

Do the others?

I suppose that "simulation" in context means "computational simulation". In which case you can nest computations as much as you like. Which is again begging the question.

If we are in a non-computational simulation then it's unlikely that we can simulate it by computational means.

And if we are in a simulation, then we cannot comment in any way on physical restrictions since we have no idea what the laws of physics are, or even if there are such laws.

 

[rocketdodger]

Yes, that's where I demonstrated the massive holes in the definitions that were given. That's why they aren't given any more. I showed, for example, that switches were so naturally prevalent according to the definition that one could find them almost anywhere, including individual atoms.

Yep. And? Computation occurs when a bunch of switches behave in a certain way.

What is wrong with that definition?

And you didn't address that software + virtual machine in water question .. still ...

Yes. I insisted that any functional definition must still have an underlying physical basis. DrKitten's attempt at a physical definition for computation was better than some, but still hopelessly vague and lacking.

... which completely skirts the issue.

The issue, as you might recall, is that 99% of the sciences don't consider the expression of a "physical basis" when judging whether something is understood or not -- so why do you insist upon the expression of one when judging whether computation is understood or not?

 

[westprog]

Just last night while hanging out with friends, one of them brought up the story of the "Cargo cult". When the islanders found that their construction projects failed to get the cargo bearing planes to return, they simply decided to construct even BIGGER runways, and palm tree planes with moving propeller parts! *_*

Can you prove that the big runway theory is wrong? Do you think that cargo just arrives by magic?

 

[rocketdodger]

I am not aware of any well-defined behaviour that applies solely to conscious beings apart from the assertion of consciousness.

Lol -- so you don't consider any other creatures conscious?

 

[westprog]

Yep. And? Computation occurs when a bunch of switches behave in a certain way.

What is wrong with that definition?

No, that's a brilliant definition.

Crime is when people behave in a certain way.

Sex is when people behave in a certain way, but differently to crime except when it isn't.

Mathematics is when numbers behave in a certain way.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Where on earth do you get that? We have two hypothetical devices, both equally feasible. One is a Turing machine, one is a Turing machine plus RNG. You have decided that the first is sufficient to produce consciousness. On what basis have you decided any such thing? Rocketdodger might grok it from the behaviour of Grand Theft Auto, but I think something more definitive is required for a conclusive theory.

It appears that a TM+RNG is no more powerful than a TM alone (see my various links above). Even if it were, does the brain require true random numbers, or would pseudorandoms suffice? From this it appears that we don't need a true RNG to simulate the brain.

It's unlikely that a lot of sand would fuse into a digital watch, but I'm sure that all over the world, there are objects casting shadows on stones at exactly 11:43:03. I don't consider that they qualify as clocks until someone starts using them as clocks.

And so a conscious cluster of particles wouldn't qualify as conscious until ... ? Surely you're not going to say "until someone starts communicating with it." That would imply that the true test of consciousness is ... interaction!

~~ Paul