My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[!Kaggen]

Can you offer any evidence that we are not currently inhabiting a simulation?

If not, then what are the implications of this?

the god theory with god the programmer

 

[Frank Newgent]

Can you offer any evidence that we are not currently inhabiting a simulation regressing a past life?

If not, then what are the implications of this?

Fixed that for you

 

[westprog]

And yet intelligence works in computers, simulated or not, precisely like it does in a human.

I'd love to know what computer you're using. It sounds very different to any that I've used.

 

[westprog]

By all means, westprog, elaborate. In what way is it so different ?

Read a book on, say, the Fisher-Spassky matches. Then look at the moves played in the matches. That's the difference.

 

[westprog]

Physical pathways of information. The neurons communicate with each other.

The calculations I make do not communicate with each other.

I could take all the calculations from the recheck and encode them onto a few million small computing devices ensuring that no device had consecutive instructions and fire them into space in various directions until they were at least a light year from each other and had no path of communication whatsoever.

And so according to the theory a real unified human consiousness would result across many light years with no communication whatsoever between the components creating this consciousness.

It's even better than that. If any combination of particles anywhere in the universe could be interpreted by any single one of an infinite number of possible coding schemes as being a given algorithm, then that will create consciousness absolutely indistinguishable from human consciousness. In fact, "create" isn't even the right word. It will just be consciousness. Rocketdodger has speculated on the pleasant prospect of being granted eternal life on this basis.

If you don't totally accept this, then it means that you believe in magic, since it's the only logical explanation.

 

[westprog]

By the defintion of the behaviors of 'pain'. therefore if you demonstrate that the Thames has the behavioral criteria of pain, then it experiences pain.

Unless we are headed to Franko's 'how do you knwo a rock is not conscious" question.

There are no p-zombies under behaviorism, if something acts as though it is conscious, then it is. Because it is only by denitional usage that terms have meaning in behaviorism, radical behaviorism^WP i can't speak on. I agree with it, but don't really understand it. I thought i did but according to Jeff Corey I am a methodologist as a behaviorist.

IOW, a person who doesn't scream isn't experiencing as much pain as a tape recording of someone hurting themselves.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Aren't all relevant questions ultimately empirical ?

That's why I said "This is an empirical question, of course."

Although it's possible that there may be a logical proof one way or the other.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

This might be true, but I don't think that there's any doubt that some people will insist to their graves that we have produced machine consciousness. No matter how little evidence there is that the machine is having phenomenal experience, they will say that it is. And, yes, they do have a vested interest in making phenomenal experience well defined - even if it means excluding whatever we understand by "experience".

What if the machine is indistinguishable from a human? Is that enough evidence, or would you still say there is something ineffable about phenomenal experience that the machine just isn't experiencing?

The brain needs real quantities in order to work. It's a real object. Whether those quantities equate to the real numbers of mathematical theory is a fairly deep question.

You mean the brain might process information that cannot be modeled mathematically and then simulated to an arbitrary degree of precision?

We don't know that. It depends, of course, what you mean by "power". If you mean "ability to perform calculations on the natural numbers", then yes, it seems unlikely that adding a random element to the machine would make any difference. If it's a matter of how people have experiences, then randomness might well be the element providing that capacity.

But then why wouldn't pseudorandom numbers do the trick? Can you think of a reason why the brain needs true random numbers?

There's nothing in the theory of Turing machines or Turing machines with a random capacity that indicates which of them would be able to produce experience. The word "powerful" is irrelevant in that context.

I have no idea how you're defining experience here, but it sounds magical.

I still don't know what is meant by "processing information". Information is passing through every part of the universe all the time. What does it mean to "process" it?

To manipulate it like a brain or a computer does.

~~ Paul

 

[westprog]

Ah, the westprog admission of incorrectness.

Simple pattern, we see it all the time:

1) It depends on the definition you are using (nevermind that everyone but myself is using the commonly understood definition) and yes, if you use that definition I might be wrong.

2) And anyway, it is irrelevant, because we haven't gathered enough data on the issue.

As usual, the point flies way, way over Rocketdodger's head.

This "more powerful" idea is pointless because it simply assumes what it sets out to prove. Obviously if you assume that nothing is going on in the brain except for algorithmic computation, then you can prove that the brain must be a computational device. After that, saying it's equivalent to a Turing machine is trivial.

The reason that it's a pointless argument is that it assumes the very point which is in dispute.

The reason that it's a dubious argument is that it uses the term "powerful" without defining what is meant, and without explaining what the context is. "Oh, but we're talking about computation". No, we're talking about computation and consciousness.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It's even better than that. If any combination of particles anywhere in the universe could be interpreted by any single one of an infinite number of possible coding schemes as being a given algorithm, then that will create consciousness absolutely indistinguishable from human consciousness. In fact, "create" isn't even the right word. It will just be consciousness. Rocketdodger has speculated on the pleasant prospect of being granted eternal life on this basis.

You need to read Permutation City.

But I'm not sure how the random combination of particles is going to be conscious without a machine to run the algorithm. I suppose if the particles included both the machine and the algorithm, then consciousness would arise. Just like a random pile of objects that happen to make a working clock can tell us the time. Would everyone be hollering that the random-pile clock was just exhibiting the physical correlates of time-telling?


~~ Paul

 

[westprog]

I think it would be helpful for you to define what you mean

Good luck with that. There's a pattern to that one:-

1. blah blah blah x blah blah
2. Could you please define precisely what you mean by X?
3. X is blah blah blah blah
4. But if X is blah blah surely that implies Y and Z?
5. Aha! Westprog thinks Y and Z

As seen with conscious rocks and information-processing disconnected computers. Don't expect the implications of the definitions to be accepted.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The reason that it's a dubious argument is that it uses the term "powerful" without defining what is meant, and without explaining what the context is. "Oh, but we're talking about computation". No, we're talking about computation and consciousness.

Huh? First of all, I think we all mean "more powerful than a Turing machine" when we say "more powerful." Second, we're simply discussing whether we would need more than a Turing machine to simulate the human brain, including consciousness. No one thinks we're talking about whether the brain is actually a Turing machine.

It doesn't appear that a true RNG is required.

There may be some issue with parallel processing.

What else?

~~ Paul

 

[yy2bggggs]

The reason that it's a dubious argument is that it uses the term "powerful" without defining what is meant, and without explaining what the context is.

Analogously, the reason why this rebuttal fails is because it uses the term "dubious" without defining what is meant, and without explaining what the context is.

That you disagree that this addresses consciousness is one thing, but this rebuttal is only flaunting your ignorance. The concept of "powerful" has a technical meaning that is fairly well established. It's part of the language. Learn it.

Here's the idea.

Given two machines A and B, machine A is as powerful as machine B if, for any set of inputs I, outputs O, and program P for B that can transform I to O, there exists a program Q for A that will transform I to O. In this context, we're to consider this mathematically--if P on B takes 10 milliseconds to transform I to O, and Q on A would take 10 times the age of the universe, that counts (this differs from the colloquial sense of "powerful" where my machine is twice as fast as yours, but otherwise equal).

A and B are equally powerful if A is as powerful as B and B is as powerful as A.

A is said to be more powerful than B if A is as powerful as B but B is not as powerful as A.

 

[westprog]

OOoh, look, another common westprog pattern:

1) This has been explained to me by others, but since you might not be aware of that, I will act naive in the hopes that you might fall for my incorrect arguments without noticing how incorrect they are.

Seriously ?

Are you going to continue playing dumb until every last forum member shows why you are wrong?

Off the top of my head, here is a list of individuals who have explicitly shown why your claim is wrong -- to the point of you dropping the issue with them, I might add.

1) Me.
2) yy2bggggs.
3) Belz.
4) Randfan.
5) drkitten.

That is five thus far. Paul soon to be added to the list, I suppose...

Which is one way of not answering the question.

I must have a look back at all those questions I asked, and see how many times somebody even gave a tentative attempt at answering them, and how often they went to great length and trouble to tell me that the question had been really, really well answered already, and that I was being deliberately disingenuous in pretending that I didn't have a perfectly good answer already.

So let's save time and make up a FAQ for this endlessly repeated thread where the commonly agreed definition of "information processing" can be referenced.

 

[westprog]

Can you offer any evidence that we are not currently inhabiting a simulation?

If not, then what are the implications of this?

If we are inhabiting a simulation, then none of the observations of the nature of the brain, the laws of physics or the operation of computers means a jot. All we have is human consciousness and Turing machines, with nothing whatsoever to connect them together.

 

[westprog]

Analogously, the reason why this rebuttal fails is because it uses the term "dubious" without defining what is meant, and without explaining what the context is.

That you disagree that this addresses consciousness is one thing, but this rebuttal is only flaunting your ignorance. The concept of "powerful" has a technical meaning that is fairly well established. It's part of the language. Learn it.

Here's the idea.

Given two machines A and B, machine A is as powerful as machine B if, for any set of inputs I, outputs O, and program P for B that can transform I to O, there exists a program Q for A that will transform I to O. In this context, we're to consider this mathematically--if P on B takes 10 milliseconds to transform I to O, and Q on A would take 10 times the age of the universe, that counts (this differs from the colloquial sense of "powerful" where my machine is twice as fast as yours, but otherwise equal).

A and B are equally powerful if A is as powerful as B and B is as powerful as A.

A is said to be more powerful than B if A is as powerful as B but B is not as powerful as A.

And if we assume that the brain is a machine to transform inputs I to outputs O, then we can reasonably say that it cannot be more powerful than a Turin machine. Which is of course begging the question. By using the term "powerful" about a human brain, that's already claiming that a human brain is a computational device for converting natural number inputs to outputs, and nothing else.

An argument should put all such assumptions forward explicitly. Using ambiguity of language to conceal them makes the argument dubious. In this case, the assumption makes the argument not only dubious and shoddy, but circular.

 

[rocketdodger]

Fixed that for you

Do you actually have a coherent argument to make?

You keep chaning my words to something you think illustrates whatever point you are trying to make, but ... nobody gets what you are trying to say.

Perhaps trying to express the idea in your own words would help?

 

[westprog]

Huh? First of all, I think we all mean "more powerful than a Turing machine" when we say "more powerful." Second, we're simply discussing whether we would need more than a Turing machine to simulate the human brain, including consciousness. No one thinks we're talking about whether the brain is actually a Turing machine.

It doesn't appear that a true RNG is required.

Where on earth do you get that? We have two hypothetical devices, both equally feasible. One is a Turing machine, one is a Turing machine plus RNG. You have decided that the first is sufficient to produce consciousness. On what basis have you decided any such thing? Rocketdodger might grok it from the behaviour of Grand Theft Auto, but I think something more definitive is required for a conclusive theory.

 

[rocketdodger]

It's even better than that. If any combination of particles anywhere in the universe could be interpreted by any single one of an infinite number of possible coding schemes as being a given algorithm, then that will create consciousness absolutely indistinguishable from human consciousness. In fact, "create" isn't even the right word. It will just be consciousness. Rocketdodger has speculated on the pleasant prospect of being granted eternal life on this basis.

Yes.

And what you are categorically failing to grasp is that the existence of such coding schemes implies a mathematical isomorphism between the particles and the behavior we are interested in.

Once again, if you understood that everything is physical (a failing I find laughable, given how obsessed with the "physical" you are) then you would see this.

 

[westprog]

You need to read Permutation City.

Oh, I'm well up on Permutation City. If you liked that, I suggest some Ken MacLeod or Charles Stross.

But I'm not sure how the random combination of particles is going to be conscious without a machine to run the algorithm. I suppose if the particles included both the machine and the algorithm, then consciousness would arise. Just like a random pile of objects that happen to make a working clock can tell us the time. Would everyone be hollering that the random-pile clock was just exhibiting the physical correlates of time-telling?


~~ Paul

It's unlikely that a lot of sand would fuse into a digital watch, but I'm sure that all over the world, there are objects casting shadows on stones at exactly 11:43:03. I don't consider that they qualify as clocks until someone starts using them as clocks.