My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[westprog]

I don't understand the question.

If they are different configurations of the brain why should a computer have a problem differentiating between them, just so long as it has a way of examining the brain?

What I'm getting at is whether a computer can have the experience of red in the same way as a human mind.

A human mind can have state S1 - where it knows all about red - and S2, where it experiences red. I think we are agreed that the two states are different.

Consider an "intelligent self-referencing computer program". What is the difference between P1, which knows about red, and P2, which experiences it?

I realise that this is a tangent to the original argument, but I'm not trying to debunk materialism.

 

[Robin]

However, many physicalists claim that mental states are reducible to brain states

This misconception has been bugging me for a while.

When any reductionist, be they Materialist, Positivist, Physicalist or Idealist, says "X is reducible to Y" then X and Y will be statements, propositions, theories or hypotheses.

No reductionist will, to my knowledge, ever say "mental states are reducible to brain states".

They might say " a theory about mental states is reducible to a theory about brain states"

Or " a statement about mental states is reducible to a statement about brain states"

Or "a statement about mental states is reducible to a theory about brain states"

Or even "a statement about brain states is reducible to a statement about mental states"

But never "mental states are reducible to brain states"

 

[Robin]

What I'm getting at is whether a computer can have the experience of red in the same way as a human mind.

A human mind can have state S1 - where it knows all about red - and S2, where it experiences red. I think we are agreed that the two states are different.

Consider an "intelligent self-referencing computer program". What is the difference between P1, which knows about red, and P2, which experiences it?

I realise that this is a tangent to the original argument, but I'm not trying to debunk materialism.

Well a brain is a sort of a computer, in that it is a machine that can do computing.

But I don't personally think that consciousness is a product of function alone.

So I don't think that just any suitably complex, suitably programmed computer can have this subjective conscious experience, or even anything similar.

But it is not an area in which I could claim any certainty or even confidence.

 

[Malerin]

Which?

So to paraphrase the first two your argument using equivalent terminology:

1. Mental states are identical to brain states
2. It is possible to have complete knowledge of brain states without having a complete knowledge of mental states.​

Yes?

No. If brain and mental states are identical, then complete knowledge of one is complete knowledge of the other. Otherwise, they're not identical. If John is genetically identical to Bill, then knowledge of John's DNA is knowledge of Bill's DNA. It would be impossible to have complete knowledge of John's DNA and be missing some knowledge about Bill's DNA.

And again, if we don't expect a photograph of water to be wet, why would we expect an MRI of a brain experiencing the taste of salt to be salty?

In other words, how do you get from 1 to 2?

Good point. Two points of my own:

1. Can you predict you will get a compound with the property of wetness just from knowledge of chemical bonds, electrons, Oxygen, Hydrogen, etc.?

2. "Wet" is a property of water, it's not identical to water, so I don't think this is analagous. The claim isn't that a mental state is a property of a brain state- the claim is that a menal state is identical to a brain state. Is it possible to learn about a brain state without actually having the brain state in your own brain? Sure. In the same way you don't need to spill water on yourself to learn about water.

How much of a particular brain state can you know without experiecing the brain state? You can know exactly which neurons are firing, where they're located, how much of chemicals X,Y,Z are present, electrical activity, etc. The better question is, what won't you be able to learn about a brain state without experiencing it? What bit of information will be forever hidden from you because your own brain state is different from the one you're studying?

 

[westprog]

Well a brain is a sort of a computer, in that it is a machine that can do computing.

But I don't personally think that consciousness is a product of function alone.

So I don't think that just any suitably complex, suitably programmed computer can have this subjective conscious experience, or even anything similar.

But it is not an area in which I could claim any certainty or even confidence.

I can find nothing in the above with which to disagree. I presume that Pixy and Rocketdodger at least won't accept that, but I'll let them speak for themselves.

 

[Malerin]

One other thing: It seems odd for physicalism to state that to have complete knowledge of a brain state, I must have that particular brain state. Nowhere else does this necessary condition arise: to learn about the structure of Joe's arm, say, I don't need to have Joe's arm. Ditto, photosyntheis, whale anatomy, the earth's core. To learn about anything, I don't need to have a specific brain state. But for this one thing, I need to actually alter my brain in order to study it.

 

[Robin]

No. If brain and mental states are identical, then complete knowledge of one is complete knowledge of the other.

Yes, of course.

But here is the thing.

Identity Materialism says "Brain state X is identical to some mental state Y".

Your definition of "complete knowledge of mental state Y" includes the actual experience. Yes?

But if brain state X is mental state Y then this would entail that "complete knowledge of brain state X" must also include the actual experience.

Otherwise you are using the expression "complete knowledge" inconsistently.

Also, if X is identical to Y, this does not entail that the mathematical isomorphism of X must be identical to Y.

I entails that the mathematical isomorphism of X is identical to the mathematical isomorphism of Y.

 

[Dancing David]

I don't understand. What does it mean to say that consciousness is not dependent on the number of matter?

What does it mean to say that matter is dependent on the number of matter?

What is the "number of matter"?

42

 

[Dancing David]

One other thing: It seems odd for physicalism to state that to have complete knowledge of a brain state, I must have that particular brain state. Nowhere else does this necessary condition arise: to learn about the structure of Joe's arm, say, I don't need to have Joe's arm. Ditto, photosyntheis, whale anatomy, the earth's core. To learn about anything, I don't need to have a specific brain state. But for this one thing, I need to actually alter my brain in order to study it.

Can you throw a ball like babe Ruth, can you have complete knowledge of how babe Ruth threw the ball, same situation you set up a fallacy of construction. I am sure I can come up with hundreds in not thousands of others.

You can insist it is just that one all you want. fallacy of assertion.

 

[Robin]

One other thing: It seems odd for physicalism to state that to have complete knowledge of a brain state, I must have that particular brain state.

It only does this if you define "complete knowledge" as including being in that mental state, as you have.

Nowhere else does this necessary condition arise: to learn about the structure of Joe's arm, say, I don't need to have Joe's arm.

You would if you defined complete knowledge of Joes arm as including having Joe's arm

Ditto, photosyntheis, whale anatomy, the earth's core. To learn about anything, I don't need to have a specific brain state. But for this one thing, I need to actually alter my brain in order to study it.

So here is what you are saying:

I don't have to change my brain state to study a whale

So why should I have to change my brain state to study my brain state?​

Let me stipulate right now that you don't have to change a whale to study your brain state

 

[Dancing David]

My question for supporters of the Mary argument.

If brain states were identical to mental states, would this predict that we ought to be able to experience a mental state without having to be in the corresponding brain state?

Or does it predict the opposite?

I still predict that Mary will not see the color red, she is likely to experience grey at first and it is questionable if she will develop color vision. Since the retinal structure of 'daisy' cross reference in the fovea was never used I am not sure those neurons will ever develop and not atrophy. It is questionable if her brain will even slowly develop the capacity for color vision.

How old is Mary, after twenty five the chances are very low she would develop color vision.

So it demonstrates physicalism (whatever the fred that is) in that Mary not having been exposed to color sensation during development may not ever have color vision.

Now there are deaf people who have had cochlear impants , so maybe that is an area to investigate, but I don't know the levels of deafness that they were born with.

 

[Robin]

42

Did I ever walk into that one.

 

[RandFan]

No. If brain and mental states are identical, then complete knowledge of one is complete knowledge of the other. Otherwise, they're not identical.

An analog copy of an analog video might look the same but it's not identical.

It's not likely that there could be identical brain or mental states.

If John is genetically identical to Bill, then knowledge of John's DNA is knowledge of Bill's DNA. It would be impossible to have complete knowledge of John's DNA and be missing some knowledge about Bill's DNA.

You are making an error. The finger prints of Bill are different than John's because DNA does't produce identical phenotypes. It's unlikely that ever neuron in the brains of both are identical.

2. "Wet" is a property of water, it's not identical to water, so I don't think this is analagous. The claim isn't that a mental state is a property of a brain state- the claim is that a menal state is identical to a brain state.

I seriously doubt we have the capaicty to know this but it really is irrelevant.

Is it possible to learn about a brain state without actually having the brain state in your own brain? Sure. In the same way you don't need to spill water on yourself to learn about water.

{sigh}

It's pointless.

ONE MORE TIME.

There is a module in the brain dedicated to learning about things like "wetness". Learning about water won't put the necassary information into that module of the brain.

I DON'T get it. Why is this being argued?

 

[RandFan]

2. It is possible to have complete knowledge of Joe's brain state without experiencing Joe's brain state (e.g., a suped-up MRI machine that maps Joe's brain entirely).

There is a module (area) in the brain that must be activated before a person will experience the color of red. If the area isn't activated THERE IS NO COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE.

Learning about brain states WON'T WORK!

 

[RandFan]

Nowhere else does this necessary condition arise: to learn about the structure of Joe's arm, say, I don't need to have Joe's arm.

Jesus Christ. I must be on ignore.

If you are in an accident and the doctor tells you that you will need to learn to walk again reading a book WON'T HELP!

There is a module in your brain dedicated to muscle movement. This module needs specific instructions for walking. You can't get those instructions into that module by simply reading a book or learing by any process other than physicaly therapy or perhaps electrodes or nanobots.

 

[RandFan]

A human mind can have state S1 - where it knows all about red - and S2, where it experiences red. I think we are agreed that the two states are different.

Not quite.

S1 has incomplete information.
S2 has incomplete information.

S1 + S2 = knows all about red.

 

[Robin]

I still predict that Mary will not see the color red, she is likely to experience grey at first and it is questionable if she will develop color vision.

But that would also entail that she could not achieve that particular brain state, wouldn't it?

 

[PixyMisa]

One other thing: It seems odd for physicalism to state that to have complete knowledge of a brain state, I must have that particular brain state. Nowhere else does this necessary condition arise: to learn about the structure of Joe's arm, say, I don't need to have Joe's arm. Ditto, photosyntheis, whale anatomy, the earth's core. To learn about anything, I don't need to have a specific brain state. But for this one thing, I need to actually alter my brain in order to study it.

Where exactly are you storing that complete knowledge, Malerin? Oh yes, in your brain. And if you store a brain state in your brain, what happens?

(And the idea of storing brain states in your brain is why Mary's Room is physically impossible.)

 

[PixyMisa]

I think so. Here's a quick argument.

1. Mental states are identical to brain states.
2. It is possible to have complete knowledge of Joe's brain state without experiencing Joe's brain state (e.g., a suped-up MRI machine that maps Joe's brain entirely).
3. If it is possible to have complete knowledge of Joe's brain state without experiencing Joe's brain state, and mental states are identical to brain states, it is possible to have complete knowledge of Joe's mental state without experiencing Joe's brain state.

No, wrong. This is why all your arguments are completly irrelevant to Jackson's.

You don't have complete knowledge of Joe's brain state just because you've run him through a super-MRI. You actually have to memorise and understand every part of the results. (Which is impossible.) Then not only to you have complete knowledge, you also have the experience Joe was having when his brain was scanned.

Well, sort of. In fact, brain states are largely irrelevant too. Experiences are processes, not states. So you need to keep scanning Joe with your super MRI (physically impossible) while he undergoes a given experience, and then memorise and analyse and understand all this data (physically impossible - you can't fit that much data into your brain). Then you will be one with Joe.

Even if brain and mental states aren't identical, reductionism seems to make the following claim.

1. If X is reducible to Y, X can be understood viz-a-viz Y.

Example: a watch can reduced to its component parts and understood by study of those component parts. Is there any physical thing which can be reduced to component parts, but can't be understood when those component parts are examined?

Yeah, watches.

You have to know how the parts are organised. You can't deduce that from the parts alone for any moderately complex system.

If mental states are reducible to brain states, then it seems we should be able to understand mental states through study of brain states, just as we learn about a watch by studying its component pieces.

Yes, and indeed we are doing that.

But complete knowlege, of the sort that you and Frank Jackson speak, is a physical impossiblity for one human vis-a-vis another human.

 

[Robin]

3. If physicalism is true, then Mary has complete knowledge of the mental states associated with perceiving red when Mary has complete knowledge of the brain states associated with perceiving red.​

And let me reinforce it by pointing out the above premiss. The first "complete knowledge of" must mean exactly the same as the second "complete knowledge of".

If the first includes actually being in that state, then so must the second.