My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[PixyMisa]

Now I'm confused.

But it's 2AM here; I'll read that over it the morning.

 

[PixyMisa]

Now this is really an interesting statement !Kaggen and at this point I feel like lampooning you by just asking a bunch of questions and dismissing it out of hand.

But I instead will try this.

"Idealism postulates consciousness as a state of the universe which manifests in degrees and is best defined by human self-consciousness. "

and

"Materialism postulates consciousness as a property of patterns of interaction ofmatter which will be defined through observable behaviors and then applied to objects that demonstrate those behaviors."

So what do you think of those changes?

They look good to me, except I don't use the term "self-consciousness" in that way - to me it's just consciousness, and "self-consciousness" is a term for social awkwardness.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Now I'm confused.

But it makes perfect sense in my head! So I'm going to assume I'm not explaining enough, and guess that it's the notation.

L_m(L_o(Exp_o(red))) is what I was abbreviating earlier as learning about red--the subscripts denote two different people: Mary (m) and some other person (o); for example, o would be the duplicate of Mary that Malerin discusses earlier, that he actually allows to see red, and has Mary study.

So this would read (in the context of a necessity argument) that some other person experiences red (Exp_o(red)). As a result of this, that person obtained some knowledge (L_o(Exp_o(red))). And by studying how this knowledge is obtained by this other person, Mary learns a particular set of things--L_m(L_o(Exp_o(red))).

So Malerin is claiming that this set of learned things must include everything that Mary would learn if she herself experienced red. So:
L_m(L_o(Exp_o(red)))=L_m(Exp_m(red))

 

[RandFan]

OK, take two people, both blind from birth. Bob studies the process of seeing as much as he can. He learns as much as there is currently to know. Jane, on the other hand, cares nothing for science and has almost no clue how the process of seeing works. She basically knows its done with the eyes and takes place in the brain. Then they both have an operation that gives them sight.

If reductionism is true, shouldn't Bob be less amazed than Jane when they see for the first time? It's true he doesn't have anything close to a complete understanding of the physics of seeing and all the brain states involved. However, he knows a lot more about it than Jane. Shouldn't that make him less amazed than Jane? But my intution is that they would both be equally floored expericing sight for the first time.

You do realise that right here you are making a completely different argument to Mary's Room?

Perhaps it's just my ego but I thought this was resolved.

There is a fundamental error being made. What learning is, is being taken for granted.

There is a place in the brain that must be active in order to experience color. Learning about color WON'T ACTIVATE that part of the brain. No matter how much you learn about color space, biology, physics, math and all of the information about color you WON'T ACTIVATE that part of the brain so you WON'T know everthing. Knowledge isn't only theory.

How to move your leg requires specific sets of instructions that are stored in a specific part of the brain. Learning all there is to know about moving your leg won't put the necassary sets of instructions in the right place of the brain for the brain to act on it. When someone has been in an accident and they need to relearn to walk they don't read A ****ing book. They take physical therapy because it is the only way to re-program the brain.

End of story.

 

[PixyMisa]

Well, yes. The Mary's Room argument is a boatload of nonsense. My point is that even if you grant the nonsensical premise, it fails anyway because it's also logically invalid.

 

[RandFan]

Well, yes. The Mary's Room argument is a boatload of nonsense. My point is that even if you grant the nonsensical premise, it fails anyway because it's also logically invalid.

Fair point.

Just remember that this is all about me.

 

[Malerin]

So now you are back to saying that Mary has no inkling that seeing red would be different from seeing grey.

As I say this is an entirely new spin on the Mary argument.

I'm already addressed this. Mary is not surprised that color perception is a real phenemenon. She knows that people perceive color the same way a blind person knows other people have this sense called sight. Mary's surprised because even though she has complete knowledge of the physical processes of color perception, she still discovers a new mental state when she sees a red object for the first time. Her knowledge of seeing red mental states was incomplete.

This is where the distinction between color perception¹ and color perception² comes in. Knowledge of brain states gives Mary complete knowledge of color perception¹, but not color perception². That knowledge can only be gotten through conscious experience.

So Mary would predict that people couldn't tell the difference between a colour and black & white TV set.

No, just as a blind person would not predict people can't tell the difference between red and green.

What nonsense. Physicalism does not predict that an hypothesis about the perception of red should be red, any more than it predicts that an hypothesis about water should be wet.

But the claim is not water is reducible to "wet". However, many physicalists claim that mental states are reducible to brain states (and are identical to them). People like Pixy claim that knowledge of brain states is knowledge of mental states. If mental states are identical to brain states, to have knowledge of brain states is to have knowledge of mental states. If Mary knows all the brain states involved in perceiving color then Mary knows all the mental states involved in seeing color.

You are contradicting yourself. You start by saying they already knew of this state. Then you say they discover a new state that they already knew about!

There are distinctions involved with knowledge, how could there not be? We talk all the time about how much we know of something. I know math, but I learn new math all the time. There is nothing contradictory there. Mary knows that seeing red exists as a real phenemenon, but she doesn't have complete knowledge of red perception until she sees a red object.

And not all reductionists are materialists or physicalists.

Can you name any contemporary reductionists who are not materialists or physicalists?

Want to have a stab at the metaphysical position held by the philosopher who came up with the concept of reductionism?

Democritus was a materialist.

 

[!Kaggen]

If you cannot get past the fact that an infant relies exclusively on its senses to sense solidity and negotiate around it without reference to definitions of physical processes then I am wasting my time talking to you.

Since I said nothing of the sort, I don't know why you're talking to me. I would suggest that you read what I wrote before replying, though.

Either that is what you said

That is why an infant without language learns how to negotiate solid objects.

Not reliably, no, because our senses are not reliable.

or you could have misunderstood what I said so I corrected a possible error in grammer

If you cannot get past the fact that an infant relies exclusively on its senses to sense solidity and to negotiate around it without reference to definitions of physical processes, then I am wasting my time talking to you.

 

[!Kaggen]

So I'd suggest instead you listen to the MIT Introduction to Psychology lecture series my Jeremy Wolfe.

I'll look it up.

 

[!Kaggen]

Still sounds like label swapping.

There is stuff. In some states this stuff is what we experience as consciousness.

Calling the stuff consciousness is really no different to calling it matter.

What properties does objective consciousness have that differentiates it from matter.

You have not been following the thread then?
Apparently consciousness is not dependent on the number of matter. Whilst matter certainly is.

 

[RandFan]

Apparently consciousness is not dependent of the number of matter.

Why do you think that is apparent?

 

[yy2bggggs]

Keep in mind that given physicalism, mental states are brain states, and brain states are mental states.

So, assuming physicalism:

Mary's surprised because even though she has complete knowledge of the physical processes of color perception, she still discovers a new mental state when she sees a red object for the first time.

Or...

Mary's surprised because even though she has complete knowledge of the physical processes of color perception, she still discovers a new mental state brain state when she sees a red object for the first time.​

Does this make sense to you?

Mary knows that seeing red exists as a real phenemenon, but she doesn't have complete knowledge of red perception until she sees a red object.

Her knowledge of seeing red mental states was incomplete.

Her knowledge of seeing red mental states brain states was incomplete.​

So Mary has never had the opportunity to witness her brain being in this brain state. She only witnessed her brain being affected by some other brain being in the brain state.

This is where the distinction between color perception¹ and color perception² comes in. Knowledge of brain states gives Mary complete knowledge of color perception¹, but not color perception². That knowledge can only be gotten through conscious experience.

Confused... color perception₁ is something akin to duplicate Mary experiencing red. If color perception₂ can only be gotten through conscious experience, so can color perception₁. But Mary isn't the one that is having that experience. Duplicate Mary is the one that has this experience.

So why should you expect Mary to have this knowledge? Because you simply said she should have it? You must demonstrate that Mary's study of duplicate Mary would actually lead to that knowledge.

But under your own rules, Mary cannot have this knowledge, since she doesn't experience red. So we shouldn't expect her to get it by studying duplicate Mary, because studying duplicate Mary experiencing red isn't experiencing red.

 

[!Kaggen]

I begin to wonder what is your purpose here?

Why are you here?

You may be really bored and unable to sound these things out where ever you are. I appreciate that.

but I grow frustrated with trying to discuss with you.

I appreciate your patience.
I joined this forum to learn as this is an educational forum.
Apart from learning facts from others I also hope to learn how to communicate my ideas in philosophy and yes there are no people in my immediate surroundings with any interest in the subject.
Obviously from your points below I need more practice.
I have no illusions to the fact that my philosophical discourse is not very good as it is not what I have been trained in.
Ask me about soil science or sustainable agriculture and I can communicate on these subjects better than most.

State your ideas.

I am not here to read your mind or guess what you think.

what do you mean?

come out and say it.

Again, if you have an idea then state it

present your ideas

If you have ideas kindly present them.

return with your ideas.

why don't you elucidate your own comments?

try explaining your own thoughts and ideas.

I am not learning about your ideas, which is why I am here.

no real explanations of your thoughts.

Start discussing things

try exchanging ideas back.

My language skills as you have pointed out below also do not come naturally.
Perhaps this why I am inclined not to have an oratory approach, but a questioning one as I find it easier for others to sound out my inner thoughts than I am able to sound them myself.
This definitely does not always work and leads to frustration on both sides.
Honestly I find expression in movement, art and music more than I do in language, but my mind works more like a scientist.

I think there may be that language barriers.

Language usage varies.

If you can't express it then don't pretend that you are Socrates, come out and say it.

!Kaggen, you are not stating things clearly

But I do not see you as stating your response clearly and in a rather cryptic persona language of your own.

I will attempt to respond to the parts of your post related to our discussion after more thought on your ideas and my presentation.

 

[Belz...]

People like Pixy claim that knowledge of brain states is knowledge of mental states.

But not experience of mental states, which, I suppose, is also knowledge, right ?

 

[Robin]

You have not been following the thread then?
Apparently consciousness is not dependent on the number of matter. Whilst matter certainly is.

I don't understand. What does it mean to say that consciousness is not dependent on the number of matter?

What does it mean to say that matter is dependent on the number of matter?

What is the "number of matter"?

 

[Robin]

So let's review:

There is a "brain state" (assuming for the moment that there are such things as "brain states") associated with knowing that a red light is switched on - call it S1.

There is also a different "brain state" associated with seeing the red light - having the actual "red" experience. Call it S2.

It's fairly clear that S1 and S2 are different. It's also possible to claim that they are materially different. S1 and S2 are physically different configurations of brain tissue.

S1 and S2 will be different even if all possible information about the light is known for S1 - brightness, frequency, location.

So how does a computer program differentiate between S1 and S2?

I don't understand the question.

If they are different configurations of the brain why should a computer have a problem differentiating between them, just so long as it has a way of examining the brain?

 

[Robin]

My question for supporters of the Mary argument.

If brain states were identical to mental states, would this predict that we ought to be able to experience a mental state without having to be in the corresponding brain state?

Or does it predict the opposite?

 

[Malerin]

My question for supporters of the Mary argument.

If brain states were identical to mental states, would this predict that we ought to be able to experience a mental state without having to be in the corresponding brain state?

Or does it predict the opposite?

I think so. Here's a quick argument.

1. Mental states are identical to brain states.
2. It is possible to have complete knowledge of Joe's brain state without experiencing Joe's brain state (e.g., a suped-up MRI machine that maps Joe's brain entirely).
3. If it is possible to have complete knowledge of Joe's brain state without experiencing Joe's brain state, and mental states are identical to brain states, it is possible to have complete knowledge of Joe's mental state without experiencing Joe's brain state.

Even if brain and mental states aren't identical, reductionism seems to make the following claim.

1. If X is reducible to Y, X can be understood viz-a-viz Y.

Example: a watch can reduced to its component parts and understood by study of those component parts. Is there any physical thing which can be reduced to component parts, but can't be understood when those component parts are examined?

If mental states are reducible to brain states, then it seems we should be able to understand mental states through study of brain states, just as we learn about a watch by studying its component pieces.

But suppose I reduce a watch to its atomic parts. If I give those parts to someone else, they won't have a clue what it is. Also, it would be possible to make other things from the component atoms of the watch. If you can make a watch or a fountain pen from the atoms of the watch, how's the person to know what the pieces add up to? Or would complete knowledge of the atomic parts of a watch lead to knowledge of the watch and everything else that could be made from those atoms? I don't know if (1) works or not.

 

[Robin]

My question for supporters of the Mary argument.

If brain states were identical to mental states, would this predict that we ought to be able to experience a mental state without having to be in the corresponding brain state?

Or does it predict the opposite?

I think so.

Which?

Here's a quick argument.

1. Mental states are identical to brain states.
2. It is possible to have complete knowledge of Joe's brain state without experiencing Joe's brain state (e.g., a suped-up MRI machine that maps Joe's brain entirely).

So to paraphrase the first two your argument using equivalent terminology:

1. Mental states are identical to brain states
2. It is possible to have complete knowledge of brain states without having a complete knowledge of mental states.​

Yes?

And again, if we don't expect a photograph of water to be wet, why would we expect an MRI of a brain experiencing the taste of salt to be salty?

In other words, how do you get from 1 to 2?

 

[Robin]

Let me give an even quicker argument

If brain state X is identical to mental state Y then this unambiguously predicts that we cannot experience Y without first being in brain state X.