My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[PixyMisa]

No it doesn't. Premise (4) simply asserts Mary knows everything there is to know physically about color perception.

That's not your only premise, is it?

It does not presume materialism because (4) is also consistent with dualism

Where does dualism come into it?

Premise 6 only has significance if it causes a contradiction. But if you assume materialism, it doesn't cause a contradiction, it contains a contradiction.

Mary knows everything there is to know about the physical aspects of color perception, but her knowledge could still be incomplete because there may be a non-physical aspect to color perception.

Yes, but you have to actually show that. You can't just assert it.

It doesn't assert materialism. It simply asserts complete knowledge of the physical aspect of a phenemenon. That is NOT materialism.

If you don't assert materialism, the argument is not modus tollens.

If you do, it's still not modus tollens, because it's not logically valid.

No.

Sorry, you're just wrong.

No.

Sorry, you're still just wrong.

If the argument is a modus tollens (proof by contradiction) attack on materialism, it must first assert materialism as true. If it doesn't do that, it doesn't mean anything at all.

 

[PixyMisa]

You do realize you're wrong?

Not in this case I'm not.

Um, the same way we quantify levels of happiness, sadness, or pain?

http://www.parrishmed.com/_content/english/patients_visitors/_images/painchart.gif

You're either in pain or you're not, am I right?

That's subjective. It cannot tell you that Bob is more or less amazed than Jane, it can only indicate Bob's amazement relative to other things that he found amazing.

None of which is in any way relevant to any discussion of Mary's room.

I'm sure if I won the lottery I would feel just as amazed as if I were looking for my glasses and found them on top of my head. Yep. No way to quantify amazement

And if you found your glasses on top of Jane's head?

Slow down and think about this stuff a little more.

Good advice. You'd do well to take it.

 

[yy2bggggs]

I know that. That's the problem.

Here. Let U be the universe of things that can happen. Let L(U) be the set of all things that are learned as a result of anything that can happen. Then my analogy is:

L(U-Exp(red)):Exp(red) :: L(U-flight):flight

Yes, flight isn't Exp(flight). But flight is a physical thing, and Exp(flight) is also a physical thing, and all of my terms are parallel. It's not like I'm using L(U-Exp(flight):flight on the right hand side--I don't use Exp(flight) anywhere.

So what exactly is the problem?

 

[PixyMisa]

If you cannot get past the fact that an infant relies exclusively on its senses to sense solidity and negotiate around it without reference to definitions of physical processes then I am wasting my time talking to you.

Since I said nothing of the sort, I don't know why you're talking to me. I would suggest that you read what I wrote before replying, though.

 

[PixyMisa]

good advice

Yes.

Though, in retrospect, inadequate.

Introspection is a provably and profoundly useless way to learn about what is happening in our own minds. Introspection, like our senses, lies to us.

So I'd suggest instead you listen to the MIT Introduction to Psychology lecture series my Jeremy Wolfe.

Twice.

At least.

 

[PixyMisa]

Here. Let U be the universe of things that can happen. Let L(U) be the set of all things that are learned as a result of anything that can happen. Then my analogy is:

L(U-Exp(red)):Exp(red) :: L(U-flight):flight

Yes, flight isn't Exp(flight).

Flight is not something you can learn.

The experience of flight is.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Flight is not something you can learn.

The experience of flight is.

L(flight) doesn't mean you learn flight. It means the set of things you learn as a result of (your) flight.

 

[PixyMisa]

L(flight) doesn't mean you learn flight. It means the set of things you learn as a result of (your) flight.

Yes.

Those things you can also learn without ever flying.

Malerin isn't suggesting that the experience of redness causes red photons to intercept your retina (or at least, I don't think he is). So it's a false analogy.

 

[Robin]

I think she would know this, but she would only know this if reductionism is false.

So now you are back to saying that Mary has no inkling that seeing red would be different from seeing grey.

As I say this is an entirely new spin on the Mary argument.

So Mary would predict that people couldn't tell the difference between a colour and black & white TV set.

How could she be such an expert on colour if she would be unable to frame a simple experiment to test one of her hypotheses?

If mental states = brain states, she would know what seeing red was like from her knowledge of brain states.

What nonsense. Physicalism does not predict that an hypothesis about the perception of red should be red, any more than it predicts that an hypothesis about water should be wet.

No, it's still correct. People blind from birth know of a mental state called seeing, yes? They know people have this sense, it works through the eyes, and that objects are experienced in a way they can't imagine. So having this knowledge, imagine a blind person has an operation where they see for the first time. Are you saying the blind person who sees for the first time does not discover a new mental state? Of course they do, even though they had an academic knowledge of the mental state "seeing" to begin with.

You are contradicting yourself. You start by saying they already knew of this state. Then you say they discover a new state that they already knew about!

No. I read up on it on Wiki and just learned not all physicalists or materialists are reductionists.

And not all reductionists are materialists or physicalists.

Want to have a stab at the metaphysical position held by the philosopher who came up with the concept of reductionism?

 

[Robin]

Universal objective consciousness postulates consciousness as a state of the universe which manifests in degrees and is best defined by human self-consciousness.

Materialism postulates consciousness as a property of matter which will be defined by manipulating matter until it becomes conscious.

Still sounds like label swapping.

There is stuff. In some states this stuff is what we experience as consciousness.

Calling the stuff consciousness is really no different to calling it matter.

What properties does objective consciousness have that differentiates it from matter.

 

[Robin]

No it doesn't. Premise (4) simply asserts Mary knows everything there is to know physically about color perception.

No it doesn't, it says:

Mary has complete knowledge of the brain states associated with perceiving red.​

Now you are saying that a complete knowledge of brain states is everything there is to know physically about colour perception.

Which is to assume that an experience is not physical.

 

[westprog]

No it doesn't, it says:

Mary has complete knowledge of the brain states associated with perceiving red.​

Now you are saying that a complete knowledge of brain states is everything there is to know physically about colour perception.

Which is to assume that an experience is not physical.

So let's review:

There is a "brain state" (assuming for the moment that there are such things as "brain states") associated with knowing that a red light is switched on - call it S1.

There is also a different "brain state" associated with seeing the red light - having the actual "red" experience. Call it S2.

It's fairly clear that S1 and S2 are different. It's also possible to claim that they are materially different. S1 and S2 are physically different configurations of brain tissue.

S1 and S2 will be different even if all possible information about the light is known for S1 - brightness, frequency, location.

So how does a computer program differentiate between S1 and S2?

 

[Belz...]

So not only do I have to know what Joe's brain state is to determine what his mental state is, I have to have Joe's brain state? Where did that come from? Why is that necessary?

I would've thought the multiple examples given would explain that.

 

[Belz...]

If [brain states and mental states] are identical, do you agree we can gain knowledge of Joe's pain brain state without actually making our own brains match Joe's particular brain state (e.g., by running high-tech brain scans while Joe is in pain)?

I think the crux of the problem is your definition of "mental state".

Some of the information for completely understanding an experience of something is to experience that something. Otherwise YOU don't have some of the brain (and therefore, mental) states of the subject being studied, and altough you know HOW the experience works, you don't have the experience per se.

 

[Belz...]

That an understanding of consciousness as a universal objective state is best understood by introspection.

Nothing is best understood by introspection.

 

[Belz...]

What nonsense. Physicalism does not predict that an hypothesis about the perception of red should be red, any more than it predicts that an hypothesis about water should be wet.

Well put.

 

[Dancing David]

[

Why do we have to make assumptions about something that is unknown?

Why are you even talking to me?

Why does the unknown need properties before it becomes known?

Which unknown are you asking about?

Is it now good enough to get to know something by its properties?

Always has been, but we are discussing, or I was the theoretical difference between idealism and materialism.

We would only know if something was inconsistent by using the scientific method in the first place.

You really like that tautology.

One can not know, have experience or create models outside of the events of experience.

I begin to suspect that either you think you are Socrates and I should learn from you, that you are here to play gotcha or that you are not here to discuss. Present your ideas
!Kaggen, then the process is better at communication. Otherwise this will devolve into an endless discussion of digital vs. analog.

I presented you with a rather detailed example of my thinking, and now you have just engaged in these questions.

I am not here to read your mind or guess what you think.

State your ideas.

I loathe the Socratic method, I will learn what you have to say when you say it. If you can't express it then don't pretend that you are Socrates, come out and say it.

If you reject the need for the consistency axiom, why does this imply that we would automatically only discover inconsistency?

Jump to conclusions much? If the scientific method is based upon replication and over repeated trial you get different answers (especially during the exploration phase) then what do you have.

Again, if you have an idea then state it, if you don't have an idea then I would rather not work out your answers for you.

This is the last time I will ask you for examples of what you mean, what do you mean? If you are here to play gotcha, then I won't play.

present your ideas, stop with the endless lack of saying what you mean. If you have ideas kindly present them.

Why is memory not good enough?

I already gave an extensive example, and you give nothing in return. hard to communicate that way, I believe.

So either address the example or give your own. But if I take the time to give you my ideas, reciprocity would be nice. return with your ideas.

I gave two possible examples of why memory is not good enough and now you are back to pretending to be Socrates.

If you don't want to discuss things, fine.

Do you think we might forget what we know about something unless it had some form of axiomatic existence?

I have no idea what you are saying here, why don't you elucidate your own comments? try explaining your own thoughts and ideas. I told you where I was thinking.

So if you have a delusion that there is a meal in the pantry and there is not?
If you have the confabulated memory of money in a sock and it is not?

I begin to wonder what is your purpose here?
I am not learning about your ideas, which is why I am here.

Why are you here?

How is the pondering going?

truth be told !Kaggen, I consider you posts, I give you answers and explanations and all I get is endless rounds of questions and no real explanations of your thoughts.

Start discussing things and I might tell you what I ponder about your statement.

But if you just go off on asking questions gain, I might just keep it to myself.

Sure, if we need axioms of existence in order to trust our perception then the world will be an appearance. It will be an idol.

I think you are playing gotcha, rather than a well thought out explanation of what you want , or mean to say I get a dismissive one line post. Great, thanks for your time and effort


Talk about snide comments. Hmmmm?

I can tell if you are agreeing with me or not, it is likely a language barrier but I can not tell anymore !Kaggen, you are not stating things clearly. So I do not know where you are coming from.

I stated

"Introspection is the examination of the contents of 'experience', tentatively I would say that objectivity does not 'exist', it is an appearance of the 'apparent world' , and which may we not determine that nature of. "

then you state:

"Sure, if we need axioms of existence in order to trust our perception then the world will be an appearance. It will be an idol."

Which seems to me to be dismissive, I am saying what I think introspection might be defined as, and you seem to be dismissing it.

Just snide to me, perhaps not your intent.

But I do not see you as stating your response clearly and in a rather cryptic persona language of your own.

You did not elaborate on this "axioms of existence" which you just threw in earlier in the thread, so I have no idea what you are trying to say, then you seem to just dismiss what I say and use the pejorative "idol".

So I am flummoxed.

If you have something to say then say it, if you are here to play gotcha then fine, that is up to you.

But I am not going to engage in discussion with your because it seems very one sided. Ask one question at a time at least and let the discussion go from there. Unless you want to discuss analog vs. digital.

try exchanging ideas back.

You may be really bored and unable to sound these things out where ever you are. I appreciate that. But I stated what I stated, I can give you plenty of examples of why it might not be a good reason to trust perceptions, but I grow frustrated with trying to discuss with you.

 

[Dancing David]

Universal objective consciousness postulates consciousness as a state of the universe which manifests in degrees and is best defined by human self-consciousness.

Materialism postulates consciousness as a property of matter which will be defined by manipulating matter until it becomes conscious.

Now this is really an interesting statement !Kaggen and at this point I feel like lampooning you by just asking a bunch of questions and dismissing it out of hand.

But I instead will try this.

"Idealism postulates consciousness as a state of the universe which manifests in degrees and is best defined by human self-consciousness. "

and

"Materialism postulates consciousness as a property of patterns of interaction ofmatter which will be defined through observable behaviors and then applied to objects that demonstrate those behaviors."

So what do you think of those changes?

 

[Dancing David]

Still sounds like label swapping.

There is stuff. In some states this stuff is what we experience as consciousness.

Calling the stuff consciousness is really no different to calling it matter.

What properties does objective consciousness have that differentiates it from matter.

Ah the memories!

many posters have thrown their hands up, shouted epithets and stormed off at these questions.

I hope !Kaggen does not.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Yes.

Those things you can also learn without ever flying.

Right. x->L(x) (x causes L(x)), and y->L, and it's possible that x and y can be different, yet L(x)=L; or, it's possible that L(x) occurs without x, because y->L(x) and y isn't x.

But that doesn't mean it's necessary that for every x, there exists a y that is different than x such that L(x)=L. Furthermore, Malerin is assuming that this is in fact not true for some particular case.

So under those conditions, if Malerin wants to argue that his special knowledge L(x) can only result from x, which is indeed what he wants to argue, and that L(x) is necessarily there, which is indeed what is he trying to claim, then he had better be including the fact that x occurred. Which he's not doing.

Malerin isn't suggesting that the experience of redness causes red photons to intercept your retina (or at least, I don't think he is).

Sure, but, so? I'm not even remotely focusing on requiring that Exp(red) entails red, nor that Exp(flight) entails flight.

What Malerin is suggesting is that this is an identity under physicalism:
L_m(L_o(Exp_o(red)))=L_m(Exp_m(red))

So he had better be arguing that L_m(L_o(Exp_o(red))) means that Exp_m(red). Or to map to the flight analogy, L_m(L_o(flight_o)) means that flight_m.