My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[PixyMisa]

No, not surprised that the experience "seeing red" is real. She already knew that was real from studying the physical process of seeing colors.

Right.

Her surprise would be one of "Wow, I knew people could do this, but I had no idea it was like this".

But this directly contradicts your own premise. She knows everything there is to know about the physical process of colour perception. Therefore she knows what it is like. Therefore there is no surprise.

Perhaps "astonished" or "amazed" would be a better word, but surprise fits- she finds herself experiencing something she knew was possible, but had never experienced before.

Again, this directly contradicts your own premise. She has had this experience before. She hasn't physically seen colour before, but she knows exactly what the resulting mental state will feel like.

How do you think she would react upon being shown a red object for the first time?

She'll say yep, that's red.

 

[PixyMisa]

But she already knew that she had no idea what it was like.

Here is the premiss in question:

6. Mary learns of a new mental state associated with perceving red.​

Which is incorrect since we have established that she already knew of the mental state, she just hadn't experienced it yet.

Premise 6 directly contradicts premise 4. If we accept premise 4, there's no reason to accept premise 6. It's just thrown at us as though it were self-evident or something, when instead it is simply wrong.

 

[Malerin]

But she already knew that she had no idea what it was like.

I think she would know this, but she would only know this if reductionism is false. If mental states = brain states, she would know what seeing red was like from her knowledge of brain states.

Here is the premiss in question:

6. Mary learns of a new mental state associated with perceving red.​

Which is incorrect since we have established that she already knew of the mental state, she just hadn't experienced it yet.

No, it's still correct. People blind from birth know of a mental state called seeing, yes? They know people have this sense, it works through the eyes, and that objects are experienced in a way they can't imagine. So having this knowledge, imagine a blind person has an operation where they see for the first time. Are you saying the blind person who sees for the first time does not discover a new mental state? Of course they do, even though they had an academic knowledge of the mental state "seeing" to begin with.

Mary is in the same boat. All her knowledge of brain states tells her is there exists a mental state called "seeing red". What this mental state actually is, she is as clueless about as the person blind from birth.

The only change I would make to (6) is "discovers" in place of "learns of". If reductionism is true, Mary should not discover any new mental state when she sees red for the first time.

Or it can be done like this. There is "seeing red"1 and "seeing red"2. (1) is the academic knowledge of color perception: brain states, nerves, etc. (2) is the actual experience of seeing red. If reductionism is right, complete knowledge of (1) should lead to complete knowledge of (2). But I think there wil be a gap between (1) and (2), even if Mary knows all there is to know about (1).

Now that I think of it, a reductionist would probably balk at this distinction, but I think it would be a mistake. We already know it is quite possible for a blind person to have extensive knowledge of seeing1. However, this does not get them any closer to knowing what seeing2 is. So I think the distinction is a fair one to make.

BTW do you have any guesses about the reductionism question?

No. I read up on it on Wiki and just learned not all physicalists or materialists are reductionists.

 

[Malerin]

Premise 6 directly contradicts premise 4. If we accept premise 4, there's no reason to accept premise 6. It's just thrown at us as though it were self-evident or something, when instead it is simply wrong.

That's the crux of the issue. It's self-evidently right to me and wrong to you. Probably because I'm not sympathetic to materialism and you are. Maybe that's where your claim of circularity comes in: whether you think Mary experiences anything new will most likely probably depend on your metaphysical views. I don't think this is circular (a person with no metaphysical leanings may be strongly inclined to think Mary experiences something new), but most of the time, it probably just reinforces what a person already thinks.

 

[Malerin]

Right.


But this directly contradicts your own premise. She knows everything there is to know about the physical process of colour perception. Therefore she knows what it is like. Therefore there is no surprise.


Again, this directly contradicts your own premise. She has had this experience before. She hasn't physically seen colour before, but she knows exactly what the resulting mental state will feel like.


She'll say yep, that's red.

OK, take two people, both blind from birth. Bob studies the process of seeing as much as he can. He learns as much as there is currently to know. Jane, on the other hand, cares nothing for science and has almost no clue how the process of seeing works. She basically knows its done with the eyes and takes place in the brain. Then they both have an operation that gives them sight.

If reductionism is true, shouldn't Bob be less amazed than Jane when they see for the first time? It's true he doesn't have anything close to a complete understanding of the physics of seeing and all the brain states involved. However, he knows a lot more about it than Jane. Shouldn't that make him less amazed than Jane? But my intution is that they would both be equally floored expericing sight for the first time.

 

[PixyMisa]

That's the crux of the issue. It's self-evidently right to me and wrong to you.

How can it be self-evidently right? It directly contradicts your own premise.

Probably because I'm not sympathetic to materialism and you are.

Sympathy doesn't matter. Consistency is what matters. If your premise asserts that materialism is true, you must consistently follow that premise throughout the argument.

Under that initial premise, premise 6 is simply untrue, and the argument fails.

Maybe that's where your claim of circularity comes in: whether you think Mary experiences anything new will most likely probably depend on your metaphysical views.

That's irrelevant. The argument depends on the premise that materialism is true. What your personal beliefs are simply does not matter.

I don't think this is circular (a person with no metaphysical leanings may be strongly inclined to think Mary experiences something new), but most of the time, it probably just reinforces what a person already thinks.

What a person already thinks is irrelevant. The argument asserts that materialism is true. However, it fails to maintain that premise consistently. The argument is therefore not logically valid.

Premise 6 is an unsupported assertion that contradicts the earlier premises. We have no reason to accept it, and we don't. (Actually, there are major problems with premise 5 as well.)

You have two options: Either demonstrate that premise 6 follows from the earlier premises, or accept that the argument is irreparably flawed.

The first is what Jackson intended - he wants to show that there is a contradiction implicit in materialism. He failed, because there is an explicit contradiction in his argument.

That's all that matters. Everything else is irrelevant. Either premise 6 can be shown to follow from the earlier premises, or the argument is worthless.

Arguing that it's "self-evidently right" to you has no value. You have to show that it follows from the premises of the argument.

The problem with that, of course, is that it doesn't follow from the premises of the argument; it flatly contradicts the premises of the argument.

 

[PixyMisa]

OK, take two people, both blind from birth. Bob studies the process of seeing as much as he can. He learns as much as there is currently to know.

You do realise that right here you are making a completely different argument to Mary's Room?

Jane, on the other hand, cares nothing for science and has almost no clue how the process of seeing works. She basically knows its done with the eyes and takes place in the brain. Then they both have an operation that gives them sight.

Okay.

If reductionism is true, shouldn't Bob be less amazed than Jane when they see for the first time?

Who cares? How is reductionism even relevant? How can we quantify levels of amazement?

Jackson's Mary's Room argument has power only because Mary is stipulated to know everything there is to know about the physical process of colour perception. (Which is a physical impossibility, of course.)

If Mary just knew a bunch of stuff about colour perception, the argument would be entirely worthless (which it is, but for a different reason).

It's true he doesn't have anything close to a complete understanding of the physics of seeing and all the brain states involved.

Yes, which makes it irrelevant to the discussion.

However, he knows a lot more about it than Jane. Shouldn't that make him less amazed than Jane?

Who cares?

But my intution is that they would both be equally floored expericing sight for the first time.

Again, who cares? The question is completely disconnected from the Mary's Room argument, and your personal view as to what the answer might be doesn't tell us anything anyway.

 

[!Kaggen]

I presume you mean events outside of introspection?
In which case I have already said then that the only honest option to avoid dualism is to refer to an universal objective consciousness, which includes our own.

What is the difference between a universal objective consciousness and Materialism?

It just sounds like a different label for the same concept.

Universal objective consciousness postulates consciousness as a state of the universe which manifests in degrees and is best defined by human self-consciousness.

Materialism postulates consciousness as a property of matter which will be defined by manipulating matter until it becomes conscious.

 

[PixyMisa]

Universal objective consciousness postulates consciousness as a state of the universe which manifests in degrees and is best defined by human self-consciousness.

What is that supposed to mean?

Materialism postulates consciousness as a property of matter which will be defined by manipulating matter until it becomes conscious.

No it doesn't.

 

[yy2bggggs]

No, that's only part of it. Your analogy doesn't work regardless.

I see where you're coming from, but you've still failed to convince me that this isn't simply a result of you starting from a different place:

Sure. So by knowing everything it is possible to know about flying,

See? You already have Mary₂ "somehow" knowing everything. You're focusing on the complete knowledge and what it entails.

You're basically accepting this as a premise of the argument. I'm not. I'm accepting as the premise that Mary₂ learns everything that it's possible to learn within this universe, without actually seeing red--after all, the argument goes through a lot of trouble to make sure Mary₂ can't learn in a particular fashion, so I'm choosing to honor that as the premise. So whatever Mary₂ knows had to be a specific result of something in the restricted set of transformation₁₂.

Furthermore, the qualifiers are different. In your treatment of principle versus practice, you seem to be arguing that there could possibly be some physicalist universe (possibly ours--doesn't matter) where Mary₂ could obtain this knowledge given the restrictions in transformation₁₂.

But as this is an argument against physicalism, I think it should be treated differently. In claiming that physicalism itself is inconsistent for universes described by the argument, I'm treating the argument as implying that it applies to all possible physicalist universes.

you would have the experience of flying.

Right, but I'm not comparing experiencing red to experiencing flight--I'm comparing experiencing red to actually flying.

Accept different premises and work the other way--assume that Mary₃ really does learn something that Mary₂ never learns. The only difference is that Mary₃ actually experienced red. Now abstract it this way... there is something that can only happen if you experience red.

Now assume that there is something that can only happen if you actually fly--whatever that thing is. Maybe crash-land (doesn't really have to be entailed, just can only happen if). If I were to argue that you could crash-land by learning enough about flying, I would be wrong. I don't know... maybe in a really, really bizarre universe it actually would work this way, but it's by no means a necessary implication of physicalism.

So assume that there's simply a physical universe, and merely things that Mary₂ knows, if she learns everything she can learn in that universe without actually experiencing red. Assume, furthermore, that there is something that can only happen if you experience red--only in that case, this something is knowledge. Then since transformation₁₂ lacked Mary experiencing red, Mary₂ wouldn't have this knowledge, and thus, her knowledge would not be complete.

Now with this in mind, pay careful attention to what Malerin keeps asserting, and (at least if I'm right) you'll see that he is indeed making this very mistake. He's claiming that physicalism must entail that transformation₁₂ gives Mary₂ knowledge that Mary can only get by transformation₂₃, and the reason it must is because, as Malerin keeps emphasizing, tranformation₁₂ has Mary learning everything (<- Malerin will keep emphasizing this word) about (<- I emphasize this one) red, and that must necessarily (per Malerin) lead to the same knowledge that actually seeing red would lead to.

In other words, Malerin is arguing that learning about experiencing red is physically equivalent to experiencing red.

 

[!Kaggen]

I would tend to agree, that is why I ultimately trust my senses. Especially when it comes to solidity although there is no justification to stop at the sense of touch.

Your senses are not reliable. Don't trust them.

Tell that to these guys
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_nI657sEiEc
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QqcYsrOLCws

Like Randfan, I think you are referring to the common sense proof of solidity and construing this as proof of a physical state/process.

Not even remotely. I merely offer it as a rule of thumb.

swap "rule of thumb" for "proof" if that makes you more comfortable. The point is common sense solidity is something sensed and does not need to be defined, whilst a physical process is something that always needs to be defined. That is why an infant without language learns how to negotiate solid objects. Not because of definitions, but because of its functional senses. On the other hand no scientist studies physics like an infant negotiates solid objects. They rely exclusively on definitions of physical processes.

A physical process/state is very much dependent on the mind.

Not at all.

Yes it is.

A rainbow being an obvious example.

Absurd. A rainbow is a straightforward physical phenomenon. Minds are irrelevant.

I suggest you read up on rainbows.

The fact that we can sense a rainbow does not make it a solid thing.

Whoever said that a rainbow was a "solid thing"?

Those that use the "rule of thumb" solidity as synonymous with the definition of a physical state/process.

There is no such thing as an unseen rainbow.

Sorry, but this is just drivel. A rainbow is defined by the physical processes involved, not by whether there is anyone there to see it.

You do realise that you just confirmed that a rainbow (as a physical process) is dependent on the mind. I have yet to see a definition which did not originate in the human mind. However you are wrong that a real rainbow is not dependent on the senses. Otherwise how would you tell the difference between an illusion of a rainbow and a real one? Both rainbows have the same definition, otherwise we would not call it an illusion of a rainbow, but something else altogether. The real rainbow depends on the senses and more specifically consensus.

However we do refer to rainbows in physics and have defined them conceptually.

Yeah, how about that.

Once again since when did a concept originate independently of a mind?

I do not see the difference between a rainbow and a chair in this regards.

Neither do I.

That is good, but for the wrong reasons.

 

[yy2bggggs]

I think she would know this, but she would only know this if reductionism is false. If mental states = brain states, she would know what seeing red was like from her knowledge of brain states.

No. Back up. Physicalism assumes that mental states are brain states, right? So let's run through this.

The mental state--M₁--of knowing what it is like to see red is a brain state--S₁.

The mental state--M₂--of knowing what the brain states are that correlate to a person seeing red is also a brain state--S₂.

But you're saying that the mental state of actually experiencing red--M₁--isn't the same as the mental state of just learning what another brain does when it sees red--M₂.

So if M₁ isn't M₂, and mental states are brain states, then S₁ isn't S₂.

You have to show that M₁ isn't M₂--i.e., there is a distinction--for some scenario where the corresponding S₁ is S₂--i.e., there is no brain state distinction. You can't get this from an a priori argument using the physicalist assumption, because if M_i--a mental state--is a brain state too, then M_i!=M_j necessarily means that S_i!=S_j.

After all, under physicalism, mental states are brain states.

 

[!Kaggen]

Universal objective consciousness postulates consciousness as a state of the universe which manifests in degrees and is best defined by human self-consciousness.

What is that supposed to mean?

That an understanding of consciousness as a universal objective state is best understood by introspection.

Materialism postulates consciousness as a property of matter which will be defined by manipulating matter until it becomes conscious.

No it doesn't.

So your self-referential information processing definition of consciousness is not the aim of AI then. In other words the manipulation of matter until it has self-referential information processing.

 

[PixyMisa]

Tell that to these guys
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_nI657sEiEc
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QqcYsrOLCws

Try not to use up all those non-sequiturs at once! There a scarce commodity, you know.

...

Oh, wait. No they're not. Never mind then.

swap "rule of thumb" for "proof" if that makes you more comfortable.

The two are not equivalent.

The point is common sense solidity is something sensed and does not need to be defined

No, it's a physical process.

whilst a physical process is something that always needs to be defined.

Therefore it needs to be defined.

That is why an infant without language learns how to negotiate solid objects.

Not reliably, no, because our senses are not reliable.

Not because of definitions, but because of its functional senses.

Yes. So?

On the other hand no scientist studies physics like an infant negotiates solid objects. They rely exclusively on definitions of physical processes.

No.

Yes it is.

Not at all.

I suggest you read up on rainbows.

I have. A rainbow is a straightforward physical phenomenon. Minds are irrelevant.

Those that use the "rule of thumb" solidity as synonymous with the definition of a physical state/process.

And who is that?

You do realise that you just confirmed that a rainbow (as a physical process) is dependent on the mind.

Absurd. A rainbow is a straightforward physical phenomenon. Minds are irrelevant.

I have yet to see a definition which did not originate in the human mind.

Yes. Of course. So what?

However you are wrong that a real rainbow is not dependent on the senses.

Senses? Or minds? The perceived position of a rainbow depends on the position of the perceiver, but mind remains irrelevant.

Otherwise how would you tell the difference between an illusion of a rainbow and a real one?

Rainbows are illusions.

Both rainbows have the same definition, otherwise we would not call it an illusion of a rainbow, but something else altogether.

What are the properties of this illusionary illusion you keep talking about?

The real rainbow depends on the senses and more specifically consensus.

The real rainbow? You mean, the illusionary one, not the illusionarily illusionary one?

It's not meaningful to say that it depends on the senses. Your perception of the rainbow depends on your senses.

In any case, this is again a different argument. A camera, an old-fashioned film camera, can detect a rainbow perfectly well. Minds are irrelevant.

Once again since when did a concept originate independently of a mind?

Who cares? Rainbows exist with respect to a light source, a source of refraction, and a light detector. Minds are irrelevant. Concepts are irrelevant.

That is good, but for the wrong reasons.

Yes, but your reasons are the wrong ones.

 

[PixyMisa]

That an understanding of consciousness as a universal objective state is best understood by introspection.

What does "consciousness as a universal objective state" mean then?

So your self-referential information processing definition of consciousness is not the aim of AI then.

Well, since we achieved that in about, oh, 1950, no.

In other words the manipulation of matter until it has self-referential information processing.

Which is not what you said. What you said was that materialism defines consciousness circularly. This is clearly untrue.

 

[PixyMisa]

I see where you're coming from, but you've still failed to convince me that this isn't simply a result of you starting from a different place:

See? You already have Mary₂ "somehow" knowing everything. You're focusing on the complete knowledge and what it entails.

Right.

You're basically accepting this as a premise of the argument. I'm not. I'm accepting as the premise that Mary₂ learns everything that it's possible to learn within this universe, without actually seeing red--after all, the argument goes through a lot of trouble to make sure Mary₂ can't learn in a particular fashion, so I'm choosing to honor that as the premise. So whatever Mary₂ knows had to be a specific result of something in the restricted set of transformation₁₂.

Okay. We can safely say that for any self-consistent, finite material universe containing Mary, it is impossible for Mary to know "everything there is to know about the physical process of colour perception".

I don't know for sure if we can establish that for an infinite universe, but it seems plausible at least.

So we are left with the situation that any material universe containing a Mary who possesses the stipulated body of knowledge is not consistent.

The argument fails again in this case, because since we already know that such a universe is not consistent, we can't disprove its existence by demonstrating that it contains... inconsistencies.

Or we can point out that in any self-consistent material universe containing Mary, Mary cannot have the stipulated knowledge. The argument fails again.

Furthermore, the qualifiers are different. In your treatment of principle versus practice, you seem to be arguing that there could possibly be some physicalist universe (possibly ours--doesn't matter) where Mary₂ could obtain this knowledge given the restrictions in transformation₁₂.

Well, I granted that premise without going into it in depth. As I said, it's physically impossible for any finite universe if Mary is contained within that universe. The knowledge granted Mary could not possibly be encoded in that universe.

But as this is an argument against physicalism, I think it should be treated differently. In claiming that physicalism itself is inconsistent for universes described by the argument, I'm treating the argument as implying that it applies to all possible physicalist universes.

Okay, yes.

Right, but I'm not comparing experiencing red to experiencing flight--I'm comparing experiencing red to actually flying.

I know that. That's the problem.

You can experience red without seeing red.
You can experience flying without flying.

You're comparing the wrong things.

Accept different premises and work the other way--assume that Mary₃ really does learn something that Mary₂ never learns.

Right. In which case either the premises are false or the universe is inconsistent.

The only difference is that Mary₃ actually experienced red. Now abstract it this way... there is something that can only happen if you experience red.

In which case Mary's universe is not material (or not consistent).

Now assume that there is something that can only happen if you actually fly--whatever that thing is. Maybe crash-land (doesn't really have to be entailed, just can only happen if).

Sure.

If I were to argue that you could crash-land by learning enough about flying, I would be wrong. I don't know... maybe in a really, really bizarre universe it actually would work this way, but it's by no means a necessary implication of physicalism.

Yes.

So assume that there's simply a physical universe, and merely things that Mary₂ knows, if she learns everything she can learn in that universe without actually experiencing red. Assume, furthermore, that there is something that can only happen if you experience red--only in that case, this something is knowledge. Then since transformation₁₂ lacked Mary experiencing red, Mary₂ wouldn't have this knowledge, and thus, her knowledge would not be complete.

Right, so the premise is false.

Now with this in mind, pay careful attention to what Malerin keeps asserting, and (at least if I'm right) you'll see that he is indeed making this very mistake. He's claiming that physicalism must entail that transformation₁₂ gives Mary₂ knowledge that Mary can only get by transformation₂₃, and the reason it must is because, as Malerin keeps emphasizing, tranformation₁₂ has Mary learning everything (<- Malerin will keep emphasizing this word) about (<- I emphasize this one) red, and that must necessarily (per Malerin) lead to the same knowledge that actually seeing red would lead to.

Yes.

In other words, Malerin is arguing that learning about red is physically equivalent to experiencing red.

Yes.

But if it were possible - which it isn't, as the premise is stated - it would be.

That's what makes it different to your flight analogy. Premise 4 might actually be a physical possibility if it were stated more carefully. (Though the argument would still fail at premises 5 and 6.) Your alternative isn't possible at all.

 

[Malerin]

How can it be self-evidently right? It directly contradicts your own premise.

No it doesn't. Premise (4) simply asserts Mary knows everything there is to know physically about color perception. It does not presume materialism because (4) is also consistent with dualism: Mary knows everything there is to know about the physical aspects of color perception, but her knowledge could still be incomplete because there may be a non-physical aspect to color perception.

Sympathy doesn't matter. Consistency is what matters. If your premise asserts that materialism is true, you must consistently follow that premise throughout the argument.

It doesn't assert materialism. It simply asserts complete knowledge of the physical aspect of a phenemenon. That is NOT materialism.

That's irrelevant. The argument depends on the premise that materialism is true. What your personal beliefs are simply does not matter.

No.

What a person already thinks is irrelevant. The argument asserts that materialism is true.

No.

 

[Malerin]

You do realise that right here you are making a completely different argument to Mary's Room?

You do realize you're wrong?

Who cares? How is reductionism even relevant? How can we quantify levels of amazement?

Um, the same way we quantify levels of happiness, sadness, or pain?

You're either in pain or you're not, am I right?

I'm sure if I won the lottery I would feel just as amazed as if I were looking for my glasses and found them on top of my head. Yep. No way to quantify amazement

Slow down and think about this stuff a little more.

 

[!Kaggen]

That is why an infant without language learns how to negotiate solid objects.

Not reliably, no, because our senses are not reliable.

If you cannot get past the fact that an infant relies exclusively on its senses to sense solidity and negotiate around it without reference to definitions of physical processes then I am wasting my time talking to you.

 

[!Kaggen]

Slow down and think about this stuff a little more.

good advice