My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[RandFan]

...What would stop a scientist from determining an exact brain state(s) for a given event?

NOTHING thoretcally would stop a scientist from determining such a state! What you can't won't understand is that determining what the exact brain state is won't put his brain in the same state.

Which is why we would need nanobots or chemicals to go into the brain to replicate the state.

When Joe sees an apple, a super MRI-esque machine maps his brain (and its electro-chemical activity) completelely: Neurons A,B,C are firing, chemicals X,Y,Z are present in amounts E,F,G, etc. Why do you think this is not possible?

It is possible. Now we need to replicate that state in our brain. Knowing the variables doesn't make our brains replicate the variables.

Let's take something simple.

Will the knowledge of the effect of dopamine in the brain alone be sufficient to induce a sense of well being in me? NO. I've got to physically change my brain.

Let me try another sample. Does knowing how to build a bicycle produce a bicycle? No. There is still a physical process that is required. What we call knowledge (AKA learning) is in part a physical process. We must program the brain. Just as knowing how to build a bike doesn't produce a bike then neither does knowing how the brain gets high make the brain high or make the brain experience red by simply knowing the state of the brain when it experiences red. We must physicaly change the state of the brain.

 

[yy2bggggs]

When I say "knowing about", I mean "complete knowledge of".

No you don't. You even use the fact that Mary doesn't have complete knowledge to draw the conclusion.

You don't mean complete knowledge. You just say you mean it.

Why is ["complete"] knowledge of a brain state not sufficient?

Because you're not really talking about complete knowledge.

Mary would have complete knowledge of her own brain state and physical processes associated with seeing red without (A) having any knowledge of ever having seen a red object (through a memory wipe)...

Okay, let's say you do a memory wipe of Mary, but you make a backup. A convenient place to store the backup would be in doppleganger-Mary's head. But doppleganger-Mary was never exposed to red before--she never actually experienced red.

Now let's throw Mary away and change the experiment. Instead of showing Mary red for the first time, we're going to show doppleganger-Mary red for the first time. Doppleganger-Mary has never before seen red, mind you, but she doesn't know that--due to the memory-unwipe, she thinks she has seen it. Now upon seeing red, doppleganger-Mary says, "sure, that's red... I've seen that before".

So doppleganger-Mary already has your "new" knowledge, yet she has never experienced red before. And all we did was a physical mind-unwipe, only using the wrong Mary.

Since all of this uses your thought experiment, and assumes physicalism, it would appear that you have indeed identified a major flaw. But the major flaw isn't with physicalism--it's with the argument.

 

[RandFan]

Indeed, if the computational model is accepted as correct, then there would be the option of producing an exactly equivalent computer program, which would produce exactly the same effects - including all the sensory data, which would be provided from a database instead of the nervous system.

Nonsense. Knowing that increased dopamine can change the state of my brain won't change the state of my brain to make me high. IOW: Knowing a brain state doesn't replicate the brain state.

What you and Malerin are refusing to acknowledge is that humans didn't evolve to learn simply by aquiring ad hoc data. When we learn we change the state of our brain. Learning about read doesn't change the physical structures in our brain that experience red. If we were to use electrodes or if we could use chemicals or nanobots to change our brain based on the knowledge learned then we WOULD have complete knowledge. Not before.

If stepping through the program cannot give access to the subjective experience, what can?

Changing the physical state of the brain can give us this subjective experience. We can do this with some success with electric probes. Blind people can experience color. I've stated this over and over but no one will comment on it.

Again, aquiring data change only part of our brain. We understand but only incompletly. A piano player can study sheet music for eternity but that won't change the structure sufficently for him to play as a virtuoso. The reason is that we didn't evolve to gain complete knowldge through aquiring data via a narrow means such as sight (reading a book) or sound (listening to a lecture) alone.

If nothing can - if indeed, it is impossible to have access to the experience - how can that fit into a scientific model?

Something CAN.

I don't claim (possibly unlike Malerin) that this is a nail in the coffin of materialism. I do insist that it's an unsolved scientific problem.

But it's not really. We can cause a blind person to experience red. We can artificaly induce a sense of well being. Knowledge of dopamine won't make me high. Taking a drug to change the state of my brain WILL.

 

[Dancing David]

I think that is the common sense proof of solidity you are referring to.
Science does not prove things remember.

Ooops, not commons ense again.

The existance of the material world is not a given, we could be brains in vats or butterfly dreams, god thought or dancing energy.

No way to tell, that is why use the term appeance.

 

[westprog]

Nonsense. Knowing that increased dopamine can change the state of my brain won't change the state of my brain to make me high.

The big question is whether a computer program that emulates the state of your mind when it has increased dopamine will have the same subjective experience that you have.

Changing the physical state of the brain can. Physically or chemicaly altering the brain. We can do this with some success with electric probes. Blind people can experience color. I've stated this over and over but no one will comment on it.

We already know that physical events can change the state of the brain. Shining a red light is a physical event.

Something CAN.

But it's not really. We can cause a blind person to experience red.

That's not such a big deal as you seem to think. We can make a sighted person experience red using entirely physical means. We still don't know what it means to experience something.

We can artificaly induce a sense of well being. Knowledge of dopamine won't make me high. Taking a drug to change the state of my brain WILL.

The difficult question is - where does the subjective experience come from?

 

[RandFan]

The big question is whether a computer program that emulates the state of your mind when it has increased dopamine will have the same subjective experience that you have.

Agree though I'm not sure of your point here.

We already know that physical events can change the state of the brain. Shining a red light is a physical event.

So are electrical probes. So are chemicals. So are nano-bots. We could learn using these physical means.

That's not such a big deal as you seem to think. We can make a sighted person experience red using entirely physical means. We still don't know what it means to experience something.

If falsifies the theory advanced by Malerin. Learning via study isn't the same as learning through other physical means (see piano player example). We didn't evolve to learn simply by study or we could be able to change the physical structures of our brain to experience red just by learning all that we could know about it.

Learning is a physical process that changes the physical processes of our brain. Study alone will not replicate every physical state of our brain. Knowing about dopamine will not make me high.

The difficult question is - where does the subjective experience come from?

It's difficult but one thing we know for sure, Malerin's thought experiment is pointless and tells us absolutely nothing. Well, it does illustrate that all knowledge can't be gained just by studying.

 

[Dancing David]

Yes, I think we have covered this now.


How do we compare the results from the introspection of different observers?

The same way we do everything through communication.
Different peopel do report different results from instrospection. But that is abroad etrm we may need to narrow it.

Surely we define the results in terms of the data that we observe in order to communicate them?

yes but it can be very hard to establish metric of the qualitative nature of introspection, such as "It was beautiful."

In which case I don't see a problem here.

The issue is that there is little consistency between the tintrospective reports of different observers. Some patterns are found but it is difficult to form a theory based upon them, that would be the issue.

that and that different events seem to have a wide variety of introspective ersults. Future theories may have the pwoer to resolve them.

I think that behaviorsim already does. But that is an opinion not shared by many.

Confirmation bias is just terminology to describe one of the results of this processes on the way to a definition which we can communicate.

It is a little more specific than that:
It is a statement about tehs elf reinforcing nature of beliefs. If an entity only retains the data that confirms their belief and disregards the data that contradicts thier beleif, then it might be possible that analysis of the data shows there is no corrwelation.

The point of introspection is to realise how we organise and interpret the data and systematize this .

Well, that is one of the things that happens yes.

This is all very well, but it does not tell us anything about the relationship between inner and outer reality.

They are the same, in all cases humans have interior (or self referencing models) of the action of themselves, reality and the role of themselves in that reality. the models are about different ways of organizing human thoughst and the body is the common boundary between them in human thoughts. Now there are forces which interpenetrate the body (like gravity).

But the human brain (whatever that is) set up these models and events that sort of and try to organise the events of perception. However some of them seem to have little ability to predict the behavior of the reality that is not the body.
In that a confabulated memory of a large sum of money in the bank account is going to be invalid to making with drawls from teh bank.

It just assumes that there are two kinds of reality. One personal, one a consistent model. It is in my opinion a form of dualism. This is the problem that arises if we do not recognize the nature of thinking. It is not finished until the subject and object is reconciled as they were before thinking starts.

The issue is the organic nature of the brain and associative learning, as well as social, personal and cultural convention.

I don't see it as a dualism, but then I am not you. I see it as models of communication within the organic brain, some seem to be spurious or invalid to the nature of the world of which they are a part.

Someone on this forum (I cannot remember exactly were) someone mentioned that this is the nature of the human condition, perhaps due to an evolutionary advantage, to think of themselves as a subject.

It is more of a cultural convention, running through the dichotomy of hellenism and going to Zoroaster and beyond. there are net theories as well of organization, and multifacted pluralistc appraoches. Dualism is not inherent, it seems to be social.

Now the belief that the body is an idependant unit in the world is probably a result of not having sensations outside the body.

I tend to agree. I think that it gives us the ability to be free. Whether it is an illusion or not is irrelevant since it is not what we hypothesize of freedom passively that counts, but what we actively do when we reconcile the subject/concept with the object/percept by means of cognition. The thing-in-itself is not given in cognition as such it is what cognition makes of it. Yes this freedom comes with a price. The possibility of error, but that is why we can change our minds
I think it is the fear of error which creates dogma but we need not fear if we learn to trust our thinking, by embracing it wholeheartedly instead of ignoring it as a consequence of matter and therefore expecting to find an explanation of thinking in matter.

I am not afraid, I have already learned that free will may be an illsuion and that i am not a self.
You show me a way outside of matter that is not dualsim and that is great. So far I haven't seen a way to distinguish idealism from materialsim. I can always change my mind.

I do not think it is a necessary axiom. What difference would it make to the scientific method if it weren't?

Then we would not have the symetries of physics and the alpha fine constant would vary.
And the differences if predictable would not matter.

More later.

Why do we have to make assumptions about something that is unknown?
Why does the unknown need properties before it becomes known?
Is it now good enough to get to know something by its properties?
We would only know if something was inconsistent by using the scientific method in the first place.
If you reject the need for the consistency axiom, why does this imply that we would automatically only discover inconsistency?
Why is memory not good enough?
Do you think we might forget what we know about something unless it had some form of axiomatic existence?




How is the pondering going?



Sure, if we need axioms of existence in order to trust our perception then the world will be an appearance. It will be an idol.

 

[RandFan]

Malerin, Westprog,

I would impress on you guys to watch the following video by VS Ramachandran and also to get one or both of his books. The first link is the video.

VS Ramachandran on your mind

Phantoms in the Brain: Probing the Mysteries of the Human Mind

A Brief Tour of Human Consciousness: From Impostor Poodles to Purple Numbers

Ok, here is the point.

Capgras syndrome is a disorder in which a person holds a delusional belief that a friend, spouse, parent or other close family member, has been replaced by an identical-looking impostor. The Capgras delusion is classed as a delusional misidentification syndrome, a class of delusional beliefs that involves the misidentification of people, places or objects. It can occur in acute, transient, or chronic forms.

In this instance a person knows all he needs to know about an individual INCLUDING what the person looks like but he or she cannot identify the person.

Next there is another disorder (I didn't take the time to make out the name). One in which a person with a rare brain injury can recognize the face of his mother but will swear that his real mother is an imposter. Learning (being told that it is his mother) WON'T solve the problem.

If you find out why you will begin to understand why simply learning about the color read through study won't teach you all you can know about the color red (that takes another method of learning and knowing). I assure you that Ramachandran won't find the Mary example at all puzzling or contrary to physical explanations of conciousnesss or experience. On the contrary, he would explain to you that study is an incomplete form of learning.

 

[Malerin]

NOTHING thoretcally would stop a scientist from determining such a state! What you can't won't understand is that determining what the exact brain state is won't put his brain in the same state.

So not only do I have to know what Joe's brain state is to determine what his mental state is, I have to have Joe's brain state? Where did that come from? Why is that necessary? The only way that would be necessary is if the subjective experience that results when Joe has that particular brain state is necessary in order to know Joe's mental state. You're not claiming that, are you?

If mental states = brain states, which is the materialist claim, then knowledge of a brain state = knowledge of a mental state. If I know Joe's brain state, then I know his mental state, regardless of what my own brain state is. The materialist has to claim this, otherwise the principle of reductionism contained in materialism is violated. It would be very strange if you're arguing that knowledge of Joe's mental state can only occur if you are Joe. That's what Westprog and I have been saying!

What you're trying to do is bring in subjective experience by asserting that knowledge of mental states can occur only if a person is experiencing the corresponding brain state. I don't think many materialists want to claim this, for obvious reasons.

 

[Robin]

Sure, if you follow a dogma everything tends to either fit or not.

Evasion noted.

If you can't answer the question just say so.

If you only have dimwitted insults to offer, don't post.

 

[RandFan]

So not only do I have to know what Joe's brain state is to determine what his mental state is, I have to have Joe's brain state?

YES! Well, at least you need to replicate a similar brain state.

Where did that come from?

Research, inference. (see Ramachandran)

Why is that necessary?

Because that is the basis for our experience.

The only way that would be necessary is if the subjective experience that results when Joe has that particular brain state is necessary in order to know Joe's mental state. You're not claiming that, are you?

I"m saying that it is necassary for your brain to be in a similar state. This could be done by nanobots, electrodes or possibly chemicals.

If mental states = brain states, which is the materialist claim, then knowledge of a brain state = knowledge of a mental state. If I know Joe's brain state, then I know his mental state, regardless of what my own brain state is.

{sigh} Knowing the brain state doesn't replicate the brain state.

I'll reference the piano player again. Knowing the sheet music won't make the pianist a virtuoso.

The materialist has to claim this, otherwise the principle of reductionism contained in materialism is violated.

No. False. Straw man. Untrue.

It would be very strange if you're arguing that knowledge of Joe's mental state can only occur if you are Joe.

I'M NOT ARGUING THAT!

• I'm arguing that your brain needs to be in a similar state.
• I'm arguing that knowing his brain state won't replicate the state in your brain.
• I'm arguing that if we know what Joe's brain state is then we can replicate the state using nanobots (adhering to reductionism).

What you're trying to do is bring in subjective experience by asserting that knowledge of mental states can occur only if a person is experiencing the corresponding brain state.

YES! Thank you. Or at least a similar corresponding brain state the result of programing the brain using chemicals, electrodes or nanobots.

I don't think many materialists want to claim this, for obvious reasons.

Nonsense. Of course they want to argue this.

• Find out what the physical brain state is (reduction).
• Replicate the state physically (using nanobots, electrodes or chemicals).
• Gain the experience artificially.

 

[Robin]

What do you mean "everything there is to know physically possible about seeing colour"?

That does not even seem to make grammatic sense. You're asking me to explain what I mean? I should think it's obvious

Not obvious to me.

I am asking you to at least rephrase it with correct grammar.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Then what is?

There is no single material that is necessary, just as there is no single material that is necessary for building a house, yet material is necessary.

But again, you knew that, so I think you're just trying to play some sort of rhetorical trap. Maybe if you just stated your point rather than playing these silly games we could actually have a discussion.

 

[Robin]

It is information that came about through a physical process, but it is not "physical information".

That is your assumption.

If it were, then Mary would be able to learn of it by studying the physical process of seeing.

You mean as opposed to the non-physical process of experiencing?

Subjective experience as a necessary condition for any information violates the reductionism contained in physicalism/materialism.

If you think so then you probably don't understand Physicalism or Materialism or reductionism.

 

[RandFan]

Let me make this real simple.

This:

stimulates an area of the brain that this (assuming none of the text is in color) NEVER will.

If you want to learn all there is to know about what

is then you will need to somehow, someway, stimulate that part of the brain. Learning by gathering data WON'T work.

What will? Electrodes, chemicals (possibly), nanobots (theoretically).

 

[yy2bggggs]

So not only do I have to know what Joe's brain state is to determine what his mental state is, I have to have Joe's brain state?

So not only do I have to know what Joe's brain state is to determine what his mental state is, I have to have Joe's experience?

 

[Robin]

It'll help to think of it in terms of a formal argument:


1. If physicalism (materialism, reductionism, whatever) is true, all mental states are reducible to brain states.
2. If physicalism is true, complete knowledge of brain states results in complete knowledge of mental states.
3. If physicalism is true, then Mary has complete knowledge of the mental states associated with perceiving red when Mary has complete knowledge of the brain states associated with perceiving red.
4. Mary has complete knowledge of the brain states associated with perceiving red.
5. Mary perceives red for the first time.
6. Mary learns of a new mental state associated with perceving red.
7. Complete knowledge of the brain states associated with perceving red did not result in complete knowledge of the mental states associated with perceving red.
8. Physicalism is false.

Putting in line numbers does not make it a formal argument.

You ought to be able to substitute everything that is not a logical connector, punctuation or quanitifier with a variable associated with a definition.

You can't do that with this argument as far as I have tried, you end up with an argument that does not follow.(edit I have to retract this since I have produced a valid formalisation below).

Also, there is line 6 which does not seem true - "Mary learns of a new mental state associated with perceving red"

Are we to suppose that Mary comes out of the b&w room and exclaims "Wow, seeing red is different to seeing grey - I wasn't expecting that!"?

Mary already knew of the mental state, she had just never experienced it.

 

[Robin]

1. If [physicalism (A)] [is true], [all mental states are reducible to brain states(B)].
2. [If physicalism(A)] [is true], [complete knowledge of brain states(C)] [results in] [complete knowledge of mental states(D)].
3. [If physicalism is true(A)], [then] [Mary has complete knowledge of the mental states associated with perceiving red(E)] [when] [Mary has complete knowledge of the brain states associated with perceiving red(F)].
4. [Mary has complete knowledge of the brain states associated with perceiving red(F)].
5. [Mary perceives red for the first time(G)].
6. [Mary learns of a new mental state associated with perceving red(~E)].
7. [Complete knowledge of the brain states associated with perceving red(F)] [did not result in] [complete knowledge of the mental states associated with perceving red.(E)]
8. [Physicalism(A)] [is false].

1. A->B
2. B->(C->D)
3. (C->D)->(F->E)
4. F
5. G
6. ~E
7. ~ (F->E)
8. ~A

So this appears to be how your formalisation pans out to me, would you agree, Malerin?

 

[Malerin]

YES! Well, at least you need to replicate a similar brain state.

Research, inference. (see Ramachandran)

Because that is the basis for our experience.

I"m saying that it is necassary for your brain to be in a similar state. This could be done by nanobots, electrodes or possibly chemicals.

{sigh} Knowing the brain state doesn't replicate the brain state.

I'll reference the piano player again. Knowing the sheet music won't make the pianist a virtuoso.

No. False. Straw man. Untrue.

I'M NOT ARGUING THAT!

• I'm arguing that your brain needs to be in a similar state.
• I'm arguing that knowing his brain state won't replicate the state in your brain.
• I'm arguing that if we know what Joe's brain state is then we can replicate the state using nanobots (adhering to reductionism).

YES! Thank you. Or at least a similar corresponding brain state the result of programing the brain using chemicals, electrodes or nanobots.


Nonsense. Of course they want to argue this.

• Find out what the physical brain state is (reduction).
• Replicate the state physically (using nanobots, electrodes or chemicals).
• Gain the experience artificially.

Hmm, have to think about this.

 

[Malerin]

YES! Well, at least you need to replicate a similar brain state.

Do you believe mental states are identical to brain states? For example, would the mental state of Joe being in pain be identical to some physical brain state of Joe's?

If not, then in what way is the mental state of pain different than the correpsonding brain state?

If they are identical, do you agree we can gain knowledge of Joe's pain brain state without actually making our own brains match Joe's particular brain state (e.g., by running high-tech brain scans while Joe is in pain)? If we can gain knowledge of brain states without actually experiecing the brain state in question, and mental states are identical to brain states, then we can gain knowledge of mental states without experiencing the brain state in question.