My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[RandFan]

It's impossible now to conceptualize the experiment because we lack the knowledge to do so. That doesn't imply that it will always be impossible. I'm carefully not claiming that it will be always impossible to access consciousness experimentally. I'm just stating that it's impossible now.

I reject that it is "impossible" now. That's an epistemological position you are not reasonably warranted to take.

If you said that to date there is no known experiment and there is no indication that we have the means to do so I could accept that.

IOW: You are not being careful enough.

 

[!Kaggen]

How can we know that the definition of physical state is not dependent on a mental state?
In fact how do we even know that a physical state is not a mental state?

By observation.

Liquid water is, by observation, in a different physical state than ice, which in turn is different than steam. Any five year old knows this.

Why a five year old?
Because they have the mental capacity to tell different physical states?

Since liquid water doesn't have the necessary physical capacity to support information processing, it has no associated mental state.

Ergo, a physical state without an associated mental state.

That is not what the homeopaths think


No seriously, I do not see how you can mentally define something, in this case waters properties and then claim its independence from a mental process.

 

[westprog]

I reject that it is "impossible" now. That's an epistemological position you are not reasonably warranted to take.

If you said that to date there is no known experiment and there is no indication that we have the means to do so I could accept that.

IOW: You are not being careful enough.

I disagree. It is not possible to conceptualise the experiment at present, due to lack of knowledge. Therefore it is impossible.

However, I don't want to go down a blind alley on this. I think it's clear what is meant.

 

[drkitten]

Why a five year old?
Because they have the mental capacity to tell different physical states?

... and because I figured the sophisticated epistemology of a five-year-old might be an achievable goal for you to attain.

After that, we'll discuss what it will take to make you "smarter than a 5th grader."

 

[!Kaggen]

I honestly think that the rational thinkers have given more answers and less jibes than you. I'll concede that I'm subject to confirmation bias but I would hope that you would be as honest to admit you are not free of confirmation bias also.

Of course I am otherwise we would not be having this discussion about consciousness and strong "perfect" AI would be called !Kaggen.

 

[!Kaggen]

Then again rational thinkers might actually have something to contribute to the questions I ask on this educational forum instead of intellectually superior jibes.

such as

And we've provided them. Including actual answers. That you dislike the answers makes them no less of contributions.

It simply means that, once again, you're wrong.

and

... and because I figured the sophisticated epistemology of a five-year-old might be an achievable goal for you to attain.

After that, we'll discuss what it will take to make you "smarter than a 5th grader."

Its a pity Drkitten, because I did think you had some great posts in the origin of mathematics thread, that you insist on the jibes.
Perhaps I'll take DD past advice and stand down so you can punch some air a bit.

 

[RandFan]

Of course I am otherwise we would not be having this discussion about consciousness and strong "perfect" AI would be called !Kaggen.

That is a non-sequitur. It doesn't follow that you could only have this discussion if you were capable of admitting confirmation bias.

It's this kind of rhetorical nonsense that belies your assertion (the basis for this particular point).

 

[drkitten]

Its a pity Drkitten, because I did think you had some great posts in the origin of mathematics thread, that you insist on the jibes.

That's because there's nothing substantive to answer. There's only so many ways you can be told politely that you're wrong.

When you deny that the physical difference between liquid water and ice exists in the absence of a human observer, there's really little left to say. No human has ever observed the surface of Pluto at close range. Are you REALLY claiming that the water or other substance there has no physical properties before we observe them?

 

[RandFan]

I disagree. It is not possible to conceptualise the experiment at present, due to lack of knowledge. Therefore it is impossible.

However, I don't want to go down a blind alley on this. I think it's clear what is meant.

No. I'm sorry. It's not just pedantry. You are declaring something you cannot possibly know. It's an absolute statement. We might have the means to conceptualize it but we just haven't done so. The means to conceptualize evolution as Darwin did existed before he conceptualized it. To have stated before Darwin that it was impossible would be wrong.

I'm sorry but "not possible" is wrong in many ways. Disagree if you want but you are wrong.

 

[!Kaggen]

That's because there's nothing substantive to answer. There's only so many ways you can be told politely that you're wrong.

When you deny that the physical difference between liquid water and ice exists in the absence of a human observer, there's really little left to say. No human has ever observed the surface of Pluto at close range. Are you REALLY claiming that the water or other substance there has no physical properties before we observe them?

I do not deny or claim anything of the sorts. I only recognize the part played by humans in defining reality. That is, the reality that we can communicate about.

 

[!Kaggen]

Of course I am otherwise we would not be having this discussion about consciousness and strong "perfect" AI would be called !Kaggen.

That is a non-sequitur. It doesn't follow that you could only have this discussion if you were capable of admitting confirmation bias.

It's this kind of rhetorical nonsense that belies your assertion (the basis for this particular point).

I think you misunderstood my post. I was not referring to the the admitting of having CB, but having CB.
But to keep things simple, yes I admit to having CB.

 

[Dancing David]

The fact that you refer to the appearance of things with consistent and predictable behavior as what science deals with and then clarify this with science dealing with perceptions seems contradictory. An appearance refers to a representation of the unrepresented. The physics, chemistry and biology giving us an explanation (representation) of how we sense particles (unrepresented). An abstract idea which cannot be perceived. What we perceive is the represented. It is therefore true that science deals with the appearances and there consistent and predictable behavior, but not true that it relies on perception. That is the domain of common sense.

Please stop with the common sense, this is the JREF

No, an appearnce can also be 'what appears'. It is that which is seen or sensed. It could be a language thing. Appearance is what you sense in one sense of the word as well, and that is the sense I am using.

I think there may be that language barriers. That which is appears, would also mean that which we sense or perceive.

And please do not just say that something is contradictory, ask questions, lay out your arguments, then we can discuss and consensus is very likely.

See you are using assumptions I am not, i did not say anything was represented.

Light appears to bounce off objects and enters our eyes where is interacts with the photosensors, etc... thus what we see is what appears. So i am not sure about your whole represetation/unrepresented thing. Language usage varies.

 

[Malerin]

Very good post. Yes. But whatever brain state exists at the moment mary is exposed to color can be replicated without her seeing it. That's an empirical fact given physicalism. It could be argued that reading books with just text/math/charts, etc., can't put Mary's brain in that state. However, the knowledge of the experience of color doesn't require seeing color. It's possible to stimulate nerves in the blind and sighted so that one can experience color using electrical probes or chemicals.

Mary could know *all there is about color using nanobots to program her brain to know what it's like to experience color without actually experiencing it. It's possible that we could use electrical impusles and/or chemicals in a precise fashion to educate mary about the experience of red.

Right, there's about five ways the materialist could go on this (probbaly more if you get really inventive):

1. Given enough knowledge about brain states, Mary could extrapolate what her own brain state would be when she actually looks at a red thing, study the extrapolated brain state, and then know what the corresponding mental state of seeing red is without ever having seen a red thing.
2. Your example with the nanobots
3. If extrapolation is impossible, then Mary would know what the general experience of seeing red is from studying the brain states of others when they see red. Accordingly, her own specific experience of actually seeing a red object would not produce an "A ha!" moment, but rather just a confirmation that her mental state of the experience of redness gels with what she learned of others' mental states when they experienced redness.
4. Mary could look at a red object, have her memory of looking at the red object erased, and then study her own brain state when she was shown a red object. By studying her own brain state when she saw red, she would know what the mental state of seeing red is, even though she has no memory of what her own mental state actually was. Again, when shown a red object after the memory-wipe, there would be no "A ha!" moment.
5. Mary could make an exact duplicate of herself, show the duplicate a red object, and study the duplicate's brain state to gain knowledge of its mental state of seeing red. Once again, no "A ha!" moment when Mary herself is shown a red object.

I don't agree with any of these (I obviously think the experience of seeing red cannot be deduced from knowing about brain states), but they are ways the materialist can have a color-blind Mary have completele knowledge of the brain state (and mental state, the materialist would say) of seeing red without Mary ever actually having seen a red object.

** And schockingly, I agree with Pixy on something.

 

[Dancing David]

Yes, I think we have covered this now.


How do we compare the results from the introspection of different observers?
Surely we define the results in terms of the data that we observe in order to communicate them?
In which case I don't see a problem here.
Confirmation bias is just terminology to describe one of the results of this processes on the way to a definition which we can communicate.
The point of introspection is to realise how we organise and interpret the data and systematize this .



This is all very well, but it does not tell us anything about the relationship between inner and outer reality. It just assumes that there are two kinds of reality.

Nope that is your inference, not my implication. I see one large set, and subsets with in. They are all one big thingee, I do not see the semantic divide that you insist that i do. The events of perception occur within the larger set.

Are you saying that confabulated and delusional memories are real?

One personal, one a consistent model. It is in my opinion a form of dualism.

Sorry the box is the one you put me in. Not the one I constructed. maybe you should examine it as your belief rather than mine.

This is the problem that arises if we do not recognize the nature of thinking.

Not really you are just asserting that.

It is not finished until the subject and object is reconciled as they were before thinking starts.

they were what they are, and do not change as a result of thinking, the thoughts change.

Someone on this forum (I cannot remember exactly were) someone mentioned that this is the nature of the human condition, perhaps due to an evolutionary advantage, to think of themselves as a subject. I tend to agree. I think that it gives us the ability to be free. Whether it is an illusion or not is irrelevant since it is not what we hypothesize of freedom passively that counts, but what we actively do when we reconcile the subject/concept with the object/percept by means of cognition. The thing-in-itself is not given in cognition as such it is what cognition makes of it. Yes this freedom comes with a price. The possibility of error, but that is why we can change our minds
I think it is the fear of error which creates dogma but we need not fear if we learn to trust our thinking, by embracing it wholeheartedly instead of ignoring it as a consequence of matter and therefore expecting to find an explanation of thinking in matter.



I do not think it is a necessary axiom. What difference would it make to the scientific method if it weren't?



Why do we have to make assumptions about something that is unknown?
Why does the unknown need properties before it becomes known?
Is it now good enough to get to know something by its properties?
We would only know if something was inconsistent by using the scientific method in the first place.
If you reject the need for the consistency axiom, why does this imply that we would automatically only discover inconsistency?
Why is memory not good enough?
Do you think we might forget what we know about something unless it had some form of axiomatic existence?




How is the pondering going?



Sure, if we need axioms of existence in order to trust our perception then the world will be an appearance. It will be an idol.

Lots here

response later.

 

[RandFan]

Right, there's about five ways the materialist could go on this (probbaly more if you get really inventive):

1. Given enough knowledge about brain states, Mary could extrapolate what her own brain state would be when she actually looks at a red thing, study the extrapolated brain state, and then know what the corresponding mental state of seeing red is without ever having seen a red thing.

No. Straw man. Knowing about a brain state is not sufficient.

2. Your example with the nanobots

Yes.

3. If extrapolation is impossible, then Mary would know what the general experience of seeing red is from studying the brain states of others when they see red. Accordingly, her own specific experience of actually seeing a red object would not produce an "A ha!" moment, but rather just a confirmation that her mental state of the experience of redness gels with what she learned of others' mental states when they experienced redness.

4. Mary could look at a red object, have her memory of looking at the red object erased, and then study her own brain state when she was shown a red object. By studying her own brain state when she saw red, she would know what the mental state of seeing red is, even though she has no memory of what her own mental state actually was. Again, when shown a red object after the memory-wipe, there would be no "A ha!" moment.

5. Mary could make an exact duplicate of herself, show the duplicate a red object, and study the duplicate's brain state to gain knowledge of its mental state of seeing red. Once again, no "A ha!" moment when Mary herself is shown a red object.

No. Straw men. These would fail for the reason stated. "Study" is not likely to resolve the problems. Knowledge about brain states is not the solution. Mary's brain needs to achieve a specific brain state that can't be gained simply by knowing about brain states.

(I obviously think the experience of seeing red cannot be deduced from knowing about brain states)

This is a straw man. We've told you that "knowing" about brain states is not sufficent.

 

[Malerin]

No. Straw man. Knowing about a brain state is not sufficient.

When I say "knowing about", I mean "complete knowledge of". If, as materialists claim, mental states are reducible to brain states, then complete knowledge of a specific brain state would yield knowledge of the corresponding mental state- nothing new would be learned through subjective experience.

Why is complete knowledge of a brain state not sufficient? What else do you need to know? The layout of optic nerves and rods and cones? I'm assuming that's a given.

In any case (1), (4), and (5) resolve the dilemma. Mary would have complete knowledge of her own brain state and physical processes associated with seeing red without (A) having any knowledge of ever having seen a red object (through a memory wipe)... or (B) ever having seen a red object (viz-a-viz complete knowledge of duplicate Mary's brain state and physical processes assosciated with seeing red or extrapolation of her own brain state based on the studies of others' brain states and physical processes when seeing red).

(3) is the weakest way out, but even in (3), no new mental state is learned. The only knowledge that Mary acquires when she sees a red object for the first time is confirmation that the menal state she previously learned from the brain states' of others matches her own particular mental state.

 

[RandFan]

When I say "knowing about", I mean "complete knowledge of".

Then please understand something. Materialists don't claim that study can give us complete knowledge.

If, as materialists claim, mental states are reducible to brain states, then complete knowledge of a specific brain state would yield knowledge of the corresponding mental state- nothing new would be learned through subjective experience.

Study can't give us complete knowledge. That's the part that you just can't understand. Materialists don't predict that study alone could ever give us complete knowledge.

Why is complete knowledge of a brain state not sufficient?

Complete knowledge is enough. We can't get it through study alone though. We didn't evolve to gain complete knowledge through study alone.

What else do you need to know?

You would need your brain to be in a given state that it can't be in through study alone.

The layout of optic nerves and rods and cones? I'm assuming that's a given.

The brain doesn't learn by study alone and there is no reason to think that it could. We didn't evolve to learn by study alone.

Here let me give you another example. A piano player must practice to get proficient because knowing which keys to press isn't sufficient knowledge.

In any case (1), (4), and (5) resolve the dilemma.

No. They can't. They are straw men because we can't gain complete knowledge via study alone.

Mary would have complete knowledge of her own brain state and physical processes associated with seeing red...

It's not possible for the same reason a piano player can't be proficient just by knowing the keys to depress. The brain needs more than knowledge gained through study.

(A) having any knowledge of ever having seen a red object (through a memory wipe)... or (B) ever having seen a red object (viz-a-viz complete knowledge of duplicate Mary's brain state and physical processes associated with seeing red or extrapolation of her own brain state based on the studies of others' brain states and physical processes when seeing red).

Won't work. What you call knowledge is not complete. For the same reason that the piano player looking at sheet music doesn't have complete knowledge. For the same reason that the piano player doesn't have complete knowledge after playing a song over and over for a day. Each time he plays it he gets more and more proficient because his brain learns what playing proficiently is through a feedback loop. Each time the music is played the physical structure of the brain is chagned a little bit. No amount of study will change the structure of the brain without physically moving his fingers.

Now, we could theoreticaly use nano-bots to change the structure of the brain so he could have complete knowledge without practicice. But no amount of "study" (assuming that we aren't calling practice study) would ever give him that knowledge.

(3) is the weakest way out, but even in (3), no new mental state is learned. The only knowledge that Mary acquires when she sees a red object for the first time is confirmation that the mental state she previously learned from the brain states' of others matches her own particular mental state.

No. Because we can't get complete knowledge via study. It's not possible. Just like the piano player our learning requires more knowledge than mere study can give us.

 

[Belz...]

When I say "knowing about", I mean "complete knowledge of". If, as materialists claim, mental states are reducible to brain states, then complete knowledge of a specific brain state would yield knowledge of the corresponding mental state- nothing new would be learned through subjective experience.

That makes no sense whatsoever to me. Perhaps you can clarify further ?

 

[Malerin]

Then please understand something. Materialists don't claim that study can give us complete knowledge.

Study can't give us complete knowledge. That's the part that you just can't understand. Materialists don't predict that study alone could ever give us complete knowledge.

Well, you don't. I think this claim is very odd for a materialist to make. Given the right technology, what would stop a scientist from determining an exact brain state(s) for a given event? When Joe sees an apple, a super MRI-esque machine maps his brain (and its electro-chemical activity) completelely: Neurons A,B,C are firing, chemicals X,Y,Z are present in amounts E,F,G, etc. Why do you think this is not possible?

 

[westprog]

Well, you don't. I think this claim is very odd for a materialist to make. Given the right technology, what would stop a scientist from determining an exact brain state(s) for a given event? When Joe sees an apple, a super MRI-esque machine maps his brain (and its electro-chemical activity) completelely: Neurons A,B,C are firing, chemicals X,Y,Z are present in amounts E,F,G, etc. Why do you think this is not possible?

Indeed, if the computational model is accepted as correct, then there would be the option of producing an exactly equivalent computer program, which would produce exactly the same effects - including all the sensory data, which would be provided from a database instead of the nervous system.

If stepping through the program cannot give access to the subjective experience, what can? If nothing can - if indeed, it is impossible to have access to the experience - how can that fit into a scientific model?

I don't claim (possibly unlike Malerin) that this is a nail in the coffin of materialism. I do insist that it's an unsolved scientific problem.