My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[RandFan]

I think that is the common sense proof of solidity you are referring to.

No. If you want to call it common sense then that's fine. I thank I understand what you mean.

Science does not prove things remember.

More pedantry. I was speaking in a coloquil sense. Swap demonstrate for "prove".

 

[PixyMisa]

Malerin, I'll go over it for you one more time.

1. If physicalism (materialism, reductionism, whatever) is true, all mental states are reducible to brain states.

Correct.

2. If physicalism is true, complete knowledge of brain states results in complete knowledge of mental states.

Correct.

3. If physicalism is true, then Mary has complete knowledge of the mental states associated with perceiving red when Mary has complete knowledge of the brain states associated with perceiving red.

Correct.

4. Mary has complete knowledge of the brain states associated with perceiving red.

So stipulated.

5. Mary perceives red for the first time.

There is a problem here, but I'll leave it for the moment, because there's a much worse problem in the next step.

6. Mary learns of a new mental state associated with perceving red.

No.

Mary does not learn anything new. She already knows exactly what it is like to perceive red. You said so.

There is an inconsistency here, but it is in the argument itself, not in the position of materialism.

If materialism is true, Mary does not learn anything new about the perception of colour when she leaves the monochomatic room.

It's very very simple, so I'll say it again:

If materialism is true, Mary does already knows exactly what the experience of seeing red is like before she leaves the room.

This is stipulated by the argument. It's a physical process of colour perception. Mary knows everything there is to know about the physical process of colour perception. Therefore she already knows what it is like to see the colour red.

The problem with premise 5 is that in a very important sense, Mary has already perceived red before she physically sees it for the first time. She already has access to the mental state of seeing red for the first time before she physically sees it for the first time.

If you accept the premises that mental states are physical states, and that Mary knows everything there is to know about the physical process of colour perception, then it is an inescable conclusion that Mary already knows what it feels like to see colour. "Feels like" is a mental state, which is a physical state, which it is stipulated that Mary already knows.

If you don't accept those premises (for the sake of argument, at least), then you can't use modus tollens.

And if you don't accept that, then you don't understand the basic laws of logic, and you're wrong by default.

 

[PixyMisa]

Feel free to boast that your logic is consistent.
But it helps naught if your premise is false.

Purely as a hypothetical, that is correct. But how is it relevant?

 

[!Kaggen]

But how is it relevant?

The premise that you can have one without the other.

 

[PixyMisa]

The premise that you can have one without the other.

What premise that you can have one what without the other what?

 

[!Kaggen]

What premise that you can have one what without the other what?

this one

All mental states are physical states, but not all physical states are mental states.

 

[PixyMisa]

this one

All mental states are physical states, but not all physical states are mental states.

Ah, thank you.

Well, that is true. All mental states are physical states. Not all physical states are mental states.

I don't understand. What exactly is your objection?

 

[!Kaggen]

No. If you want to call it common sense then that's fine. I thank I understand what you mean.

More pedantry. I was speaking in a coloquil sense. Swap demonstrate for "prove".

The truth is that I can get a review paper publish by only referring to other papers and this is regarded as definitive science. I need not have any perceptions of what it is I am only reviewing. I only need to understand the deductions, the scientific method and statistics and I can make a logical inference from these premises.
When we read a scientific paper or thesis we also do not understand and/or except/criticize it due to our own perceptions, but because of our abilities described above.
In fact even if for example we do a scientific study of the photosynthetic capacity of tomatoes plant under high atmospheric carbon dioxide levels we do not perceive anything about these things as they are imperceptible, we perceive numbers which a machine tells us about carbon dioxide levels and infer photosynthesis levels through mass gains of the plants. We just need to understand the deductions of how machines that measure carbon dioxide work or how photosynthesis works to make sense of this information. Perceptions are not necessary in order to do science.

If you said a scientist needs perception to move around a lab without bumping into things, I would have no problem with that, but that's never mentioned in a scientific paper

 

[!Kaggen]

Ah, thank you.

Well, that is true. All mental states are physical states. Not all physical states are mental states.

I don't understand. What exactly is your objection?

How can we know that the definition of physical state is not dependent on a mental state?
In fact how do we even know that a physical state is not a mental state?

 

[Belz...]

Not really, because you're confusing modus tollens with circular reasoning. Consider this simple argument:

1. If A then B
2. Not B
:. Not A.

Not circular. Moving right along...

The only problem is this is not the form of your argument.

 

[PixyMisa]

How can we know that the definition of physical state is not dependent on a mental state?

That question makes no sense.

In fact how do we even know that a physical state is not a mental state?

This question also makes no sense, but for a more subtle reason. We should properly be talking about processes, not states.

Now, how do we know that a physical process is not a mental process? That depends on whether and how it represents information. Mental processes are representational. Bricks (a brick is also a process) aren't.

There are penty of interesting boundary cases (is this browser a mental process?) but for the most part, if you can hit someone with it, at least in principle, it's not a mental process.

 

[PixyMisa]

The only problem is this is not the form of your argument.

Indeed. Mary's Room actually goes like this:

1. If A then B.
2. A.
3. Not B.
:. Frank Jackson screwed up.

 

[PixyMisa]

By the way, Frank Jackson and David Chalmers both work at the Australian National University. Where's Alexander Bunyip when you need him?

 

[!Kaggen]

How can we know that the definition of physical state is not dependent on a mental state?

That question makes no sense.

I would tend to agree, that is why I ultimately trust my senses. Especially when it comes to solidity although there is no justification to stop at the sense of touch.

In fact how do we even know that a physical state is not a mental state?

This question also makes no sense, but for a more subtle reason. We should properly be talking about processes, not states.

Now, how do we know that a physical process is not a mental process? That depends on whether and how it represents information. Mental processes are representational. Bricks (a brick is also a process) aren't.

There are penty of interesting boundary cases (is this browser a mental process?) but for the most part, if you can hit someone with it, at least in principle, it's not a mental process.

Like Randfan, I think you are referring to the common sense proof of solidity and construing this as proof of a physical state/process.
A physical process/state is very much dependent on the mind.
A rainbow being an obvious example.
The fact that we can sense a rainbow does not make it a solid thing.
There is no such thing as an unseen rainbow.
Otherwise I would have found that pot of gold
However we do refer to rainbows in physics and have defined them conceptually.
I do not see the difference between a rainbow and a chair in this regards.

 

[drkitten]

How can we know that the definition of physical state is not dependent on a mental state?
In fact how do we even know that a physical state is not a mental state?

By observation.

Liquid water is, by observation, in a different physical state than ice, which in turn is different than steam. Any five year old knows this.

Since liquid water doesn't have the necessary physical capacity to support information processing, it has no associated mental state.

Ergo, a physical state without an associated mental state.

 

[westprog]

So when you say "problem" do you just mean it in the sense that everything that science studies is a problem?

We can't study the molecular structure of DNA by getting out the magnifying glass, so we find other ways.

We can't study the consciousness of a mouse by getting inside a mouse's mind and feeling mouselike, so we find other ways.

Which is why I specifically said "What it feels like to be a mouse". Or bat, or Italian pilot. If the term "consciousness" is just used to mop up various issues relating to brain function, then "what it feels like to be..." remains unanswered.

The question "what is the molecular structure of DNA" has an answer. The question "what does it feel like to be a mouse" does not, at present. Malerin thinks that the inability to answer the question presents a problem for materialism. I don't think it's necessarily an insurmountable problem, but it has not been solved so far - even in principle.

 

[westprog]

So a machine cannot measure heat unless it displays the result of the measurement where a human can read it?

Or are you including a mechanical heat sensor in the definition of "perception"?

You seem to be missing something in that sentence.

Quite.

So if there is a thermostat that controls the temperature of a machine buried deep underground or out in space, and the thermostat does not produce any human readable output, are you saying that the thermostat would fail to work?

I'm saying that if the device does not eventually communicate in some way with a conscious mind, then how can a measurement be said to take place?

If the criterion for measurement is to simply be effected by some physical event, then everything is performing measurements all the time, and it becomes meaningless.

 

[drkitten]

I'm saying that if the device does not eventually communicate in some way with a conscious mind, then how can a measurement be said to take place?

By simply saying so -- and observing that that particular statement matches the world, while its converse does not.

If the criterion for measurement is to simply be effected by some physical event, then everything is performing measurements all the time, and it becomes meaningless.

Not really. A better criterion for measurement is that it categorizes things according to a physical property.

A few examples of a way a device can "measure" without the device communicating with a conscious mind : consider a sifter, which sorts objects by size. We can easily imagine a robotic set up -- most mines have these -- which "sift" the rocks into into big rocks and small rocks and package them separately for reprocessing and/or sale. The eventual consumer wants to buy "sand" and and he never even sees the "rocks" that were pulled out of it by the sifting machinery. How is the sifter "communicating" with a conscious mind?

Similarly, a thermostat controls the temperature in a greenhouse; I know it's working because the plants have not yet died (as they would have if the thermostat failed). In theory, with a suitably automated system, I don't need to check my plants more often than once a month. Again, this is an extremely odd definition of "communication"; if you mean that things "communicate" simply because they have a causal effect that a human may or may not eventually notice,.... well, you're doing the equivalent watering down of "communication" that you accused others of doing with "measurement." Do dinosaurs "communicate" the size of their femurs to paleontologists? Or do they just die and the scientists find their bones in the rock?

 

[westprog]

You seem to be missing something in that sentence.

I think what I intended to write was that perception of external reality is always indirect, whether it's via various complex mechanical means, or by reflected photons off a surface.

 

[Dancing David]

I think that is the purpose of common sense. Science has another purpose altogether and that is to make our thoughts/hypothesis predictable and repeatable. All this talk of materialism in science is really a meaningless explanation for the common sense concept solidity. Common sense has nothing to say about un-felt solidity let alone an unseen rainbow or chair for that matter. Honest scientists acknowledge that physics confirms common sense. Followers of scientism on the other hand are stuck in idolatry.

Commopn sense is neither, common sense leads to racism, bigotry and prejudice, unfair and unethical support for biased social structures.

Common sense says that torture extracts the truth, etc...

Common sense is not sense, it is confirmation bias.