My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[!Kaggen]

Not interested in p-zombies for your reasons.

If I had an example from my own experience, I could never make you experience it, so it would be pointless. All I can do is try to point you towards what I mean. Funnily enough, my first proper realisation that I was conscious and what that fully meant was through introspection in a philosophy class when I was about 30!!

So it's like this. I see red. But I am not the redness I see, I am what sees the red. I have organs of perception. But I am not the organs of perception, I am what experiences through the organs of perception. The red has an effect on my organs of perception. But I am not the effect on my organs of perception, I am what experiences the effect on my organs of perception. The effect on my organs of perception produces a quality that is what it is like to experience redness. But I am not what it is like to experience redness, I am what experiences that redness.

Well after I studied the teachings of the buddha I came to a different experience.

There is no 'seer behind the seeing', would be the quote and then the whole teaching of anatta which is a counter to the teachings of the atman. But it has deeper meaning than tahta s well, there is no self there is the body, thoughts feelings, perceptions and habits. But that is all, the illusion of the self is the source of dukka.

This is all very well until you have to explain the memory involved in conscious actions. No "self" = no memory = no conscious actions.

'I' being used here to mean consciousness. This isn't meant to be spiritual, it is an exercise in introspection and observation. Consciousness is the final observer.

Well take away the habits, take away the perceptions, take away the emotions, take away the thoughts, take away the body.

What have you got? That is the doctrine of the empty house.

Yes, useful for passive action. Useless for conscious action were memory is required.

I think you are right that its not possible to have consciousness without perception, even if that perception is restricted to brain generated inputs, thoughts, emotions, feelings. I just don't see how that helps really. Being conscious implies being conscious of something, even if it is only the feeling of existence, which is the lowest level I have ever achieved. Anything else is called falling asleep.

yet i would argue those being conscious of something is being conscious of thoughts, emotions, thoughts, perceptions and the body.

Once again what about conscious action, were memory is required?

 

[Belz...]

It's not a problem for science. It is a problem for people who think that science has no absolute limitations.

That sounds contradictory to me.

 

[westprog]

And quite clearly they are defined in terms of mathematical models.

The models cannot be purely mathematical. They have to refer to physical quantities, and the only way we have access to physical quantities is through perception.

 

[westprog]

Can you explain how this works with something specific? Say, chair?

In particular:

And we have your answers:

• It has to be in terms of something else.
• One of the following:
  1. We define everything in a circle - so that nothing is defined to be anything in particular
  2. We have to have something irreducible that cannot, in principle, be defined.
• Nevertheless, we need to know what it means.
• So we define everything in terms of our perceptions
• Our perceptions are defined by our sensations, which are subjective experiences, which are part of consciousness.
• Sooner or later we have to come to the end of the road.
• Everything cannot be defined.

I want to know what (B2) thing you're referring to in your definition of "chair" that is irreducible--that cannot, in principle, be defined. Furthermore, I'd like to know which percepts in particular are ultimately used to define the chair.

I'm claiming that whatever way we define "chair" - be it in terms of purpose, or shape, or by simply itemising various items - they rest on our perceptions of the chair - or of wood, steel and plastic, or of the act of sitting down.

It might be possible to define a mathematical chair-shape, independent of perception - but that wouldn't be a chair.

 

[Belz...]

Anyone who really "doesn't understand what all the fuss about consciousness is" simply isn't looking hard enough. It's amazing what you can fail to see if you really don't want to see it..

Rhetoric. Argument from personal incredulity.

 

[westprog]

The rate of conduction heat transfer between two plane surfaces is:

Q/t = (kA(T_hot-T_cold))/d

Where Q is heat transferred in time t
k = thermal conductivity of the barrier
A = area
T=temperature
d=thickness of barrier


So the question is, if physical things are defined in terms of perceptions, then which specific perceptions is the rate of conduction heat transfer between two plane surfaces defined in terms of?

Our perception of heat. How do we tell that something is hot? Well, initially we derive the concept from direct perception. Then because we want to measure heat, we derive more sophisticated methods. We measure temperature using thermometers. But that doesn't mean we aren't relying on perception - just that we are trying to find ways to make our perceptions more reliable and predictable.

All the quantities in the above equation are based on measurements, which are based on perceptions. How can we concieve that something like area, or heat exists without first perceiving it?

This is quite different to a mathematical equation such as

y = x + 3;

No physical quantities are involved, and hence it is independent of perception.

 

[Dancing David]

It was not obvious from the start of the numbers discussion

You mean numbers of neurons, I spelled it out?

that this was your stance David, so apologies if I am persistent, but now I am sure.
The question then is what is the common link between introspection, observation and testing?

The lack of ability to show consistent results from introspection across different observers, is the short form. (If introspection is the only method used.)

For example 'confirmation bias', if we only use introspections as the data reference then we can definitely get into all sorts of interesting results through confirmation bias, where the lack of actual data collection from an non-introspective source would lead to beliefs based upon the process of noting only the events that meet our expectations.

You have in the past stated that all experiences are subjective including "objective" ones. Perhaps you could then clarify this with a counter-example?
I am also curious to know how something can be real at one moment and not the next?

well take a delusion, which is in many ways the memory equivalent of an auditory hallucination. It is very real for the person having it IE to them it is reality, it is their experience. therefore from their single perspective of internal experience it is valid.

But if we then look at say the 'historical record' and we find that the event they experience 'I lived at this house and was married to this person in 1990' is not supported by other evidence. We have pictures of their residence from that time, we can talk to people who also claimed to have lived in the house at that time, and their photos suggest that they were in residence, we can interview the person's family and they say that they did not live there, we can interview them and look at the records and no marriage was preformed...etc. there is a converging stream of possible data that points to the individual having a memory event and experience that is not supported by the converging data.
We are then looking at possibilities of what is the explanation:

1. The person has slipped through a hole in alternative universes.
2. The person is the subject of a consistent and overwhelming fraud and conspiracy. (The Truman Show)
3. There is some ambiguity in the data.
4. The person is sane and others are delusional.
5. The person is sane and others are lying. (Perhaps and family feud, murder and cover up, close to #2)
6. That this person is having an experience which for them is very real, but not a valid reflection of the 'collective events we call reality'.

And this is where we would stand, the only course then is to gather further data and then try to decide which explanation is more consistent with the continuing data stream.

Such as, does this person's memory remain fixed over time? is there evidence of fraud and conspiracy, what evidence is there that everyone else is having delusions.

So that is an example of the delusions that would be 'real' for an individual but not valid as a model of reality.

Confabulation of memory after head trauma would be a similar one.

By replacing objectivity with consistency you are only introducing the scientific method as a logical language of communication.

that may be, but consistency is an axiom for the scientific method to work at all. If the behavior of the unknown reality is inconsistent in settings, time and across observers, then it does not work.

However we still need to clarify the meaning of the language for any of it to make sense. Especially when it comes to introspection. So what is meaning other than what our consciousness gives it? In which case if our consciousness has no objectivity then neither does our methods and are we then justified in our beliefs about the abilities of science?

That last one I will have to ponder, and respond carefully.

Introspection is the examination of the contents of 'experience', tentatively I would say that objectivity does not 'exist', it is an appearance of the 'apparent world' , which may we not determine that nature of.

 

[Dancing David]

So now that you have both excluded neurons as a requirement for consciousness, what has neuroscience to do with consciousness again?

If we define the existance of 'consciousness' through the observation of events, thenw e could have neuron based consciousness and consciousness based upon other matrix formation and arrangements or interaction.

Unless you are jusy here to play Gotcha.

 

[Dancing David]

This is all very well until you have to explain the memory involved in conscious actions. No "self" = no memory = no conscious actions.

Yup, that is it.

Consisciousness and conscious choice may be an illusion, it is not a comfortable position for me, but it is a distinct possibility.

But if we can fit 'consciousness' into one of the five heaps as either body, thoughts, feelings, perceptions and habits. Then that is where it would reside.

Yes, useful for passive action. Useless for conscious action were memory is required.

Only if you assume consciousness is required and not a side product.

Again not a comfortable idea.

Once again what about conscious action, were memory is required?

Is this more a question of where 'memory' falls into the five heaps?

It would be a habit and cross all the heaps as well, body(interaction of neurons and sensation), and the involvement of the other four.

It is not an exact thing but a way of saying 'Where does the self reside?"

 

[Robin]

Our perception of heat. How do we tell that something is hot? Well, initially we derive the concept from direct perception.

So the specific perception in this case is the sensation of heat via our nerve endings, right?

But it would be absurd to say that Q was defined in terms of the direct sensation of heat.

Then because we want to measure heat, we derive more sophisticated methods. We measure temperature using thermometers.

So the specific perception becomes the perception of mercury in a glass tube, or the perception of a needle on a gauge, or the perception of digits on an LCD readout, or the perception of numbers spoken by a synthesised voice, or the perception of numbers on a computer screen or the perception of a line on a graph or... well the list is very long.

In cases of automated systems there may be no human perception of heat at all.

But that doesn't mean we aren't relying on perception - just that we are trying to find ways to make our perceptions more reliable and predictable.

But your claim was not that we rely on perceptions, it was that physical things are defined in terms of perceptions

And yet we find it would have to be defined in terms of an arbitrarily large set of perceptions.

But the only thing that remains constant is the mathematical model itself.

So as I said - perceptions are used to gather the data and to test the model.

But physical things are defined in terms of mathematical models.

 

[Robin]

And what is the point about the mouse thing?

We can't know what it is like to be a mouse, or whether there is a "what it is like to be a mouse".

So what?

So there's the problem.

If you don't care what it feels like to be a mouse, or a Chinese dentist, or Bill Gates, then you won't be interested. I presume that you don't read fiction, for example.

So the problem of not being able to get into a mouse's mind and feel mouselike is that it would be an interesting thing to do if we could?

Sort of like the problem of not having a TARDIS?

 

[PixyMisa]

Rhetoric. Argument from personal incredulity.

More like the argument from personal credulity, I'd say.

 

[yy2bggggs]

I'm claiming that whatever way we define "chair" - be it in terms of purpose, or shape, or by simply itemising various items - they rest on our perceptions of the chair - or of wood, steel and plastic, or of the act of sitting down.

And I'm asking how that works, and note that you haven't given me an answer. And no, you're claiming that if I think about this "logically", then I'm forced into B1, or B2.

Both of us are expert chair-identifiers. It's possible, though, that I happened to pick the one example that's excruciatingly difficult to work with. That's fine. Try any other common object if this is the case, but I want a specific B2.

It might be possible to define a mathematical chair-shape, independent of perception - but that wouldn't be a chair.

You're mistaking me for Robin. Furthermore, you're stressing something completely different than what you claimed was logically implied in the listing A-G.

ETA: I posit that this exercise, given your view of how definitions work, should be unduly difficult for you--way more difficult than actually identifying said items. I'm trying to emphasize that this is indeed the case and suggest that the problem is that something is wrong with your description of what goes on when we define things.

 

[westprog]

So the specific perception in this case is the sensation of heat via our nerve endings, right?

But it would be absurd to say that Q was defined in terms of the direct sensation of heat.

So the specific perception becomes the perception of mercury in a glass tube, or the perception of a needle on a gauge, or the perception of digits on an LCD readout, or the perception of numbers spoken by a synthesised voice, or the perception of numbers on a computer screen or the perception of a line on a graph or... well the list is very long.

In cases of automated systems there may be no human perception of heat at all.

In the case of automated systems, if there is no perception of heat, then heat cannot be measured, and cannot be part of the equation.

There is no difference between an automated system that records the heat in Sydney and displays it via XML on a webpage. We still have to read it. Until we read it, we don't perceive it.

But your claim was not that we rely on perceptions, it was that physical things are defined in terms of perceptions

And yet we find it would have to be defined in terms of an arbitrarily large set of perceptions.

But the only thing that remains constant is the mathematical model itself.

So as I said - perceptions are used to gather the data and to test the model.

But physical things are defined in terms of mathematical models.

 

[westprog]

And I'm asking how that works, and note that you haven't given me an answer. And no, you're claiming that if I think about this "logically", then I'm forced into B1, or B2.

Both of us are expert chair-identifiers. It's possible, though, that I happened to pick the one example that's excruciatingly difficult to work with. That's fine. Try any other common object if this is the case, but I want a specific B2.

I don't see quite how providing one definition of a chair will help - I'm claiming that all definitions of chairs - that is, physical chairs that exist in the real world - rest ultimately on terms that are defined by perception. And perception is mediated by consciousness.

I don't see how you can define something that exists in the real world except either by other objects in the real world, or by our perceptions of those objects. And it is only by the perception of the things that make up the real world that we discover their qualities.

We can define a chair by it's shape, it's ability to support weight, the materials from which it is formed - but all of these are things which we have discovered in our consciousness via perception.

And we do not have a definition for what it feels like to perceive a chair, or weight, or wood.

You're mistaking me for Robin. Furthermore, you're stressing something completely different than what you claimed was logically implied in the listing A-G.

ETA: I posit that this exercise, given your view of how definitions work, should be unduly difficult for you--way more difficult than actually identifying said items. I'm trying to emphasize that this is indeed the case and suggest that the problem is that something is wrong with your description of what goes on when we define things.

The question is - are definitions circular - and hence ultimately meaningless - or do they refer to something which cannot be in principle defined? Do you accept that it must be one or the other?

 

[westprog]

So the problem of not being able to get into a mouse's mind and feel mouselike is that it would be an interesting thing to do if we could?

Sort of like the problem of not having a TARDIS?

Or like wondering whether there is water on the moon, or what the molecular structure of DNA might be.

 

[yy2bggggs]

I don't see quite how providing one definition of a chair will help - I'm claiming that all definitions of chairs - that is, physical chairs that exist in the real world - rest ultimately on terms that are defined by perception. And perception is mediated by consciousness.

I don't think you get what problem I'm identifying.

Here's a chair (tap tap). It's a real-world object. I perceive it.

It's reducible. See that? That's a chair leg. See that? It's a back.

B2 goes out the window.

ETA:

This real chair, that I perceive, isn't defined in terms of anything irreducible. It's also not defined in terms of what I perceive. How do I know? This object I've never seen before in my life. Obviously it's a chair.

The role of perception here is a means, not an end.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

So now that you have both excluded neurons as a requirement for consciousness, what has neuroscience to do with consciousness again?

In humans and in all other animals we know of, neurons are a requirement for consciousness.

My analogy to bricks and the emergent properties of a house is still valid. Your question about how many neurons it takes for consciousness is just as silly as asking how many bricks before your get shelter from weather or a place to secure your possessions.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Or like wondering whether there is water on the moon, or what the molecular structure of DNA might be.

But since you can't turn yourself into a single DNA molecule, does that mean you can't learn about the molecular structure of DNA? (Makes as much sense as saying our inability to share the subjective experience of another person or mouse or whatever is a barrier to learning how that process works.)

 

[RandFan]

So now that you have both excluded neurons as a requirement for consciousness, what has neuroscience to do with consciousness again?

Straw man. I no more exclude neurons as a requirement for consciousness as I do atoms for airplane wings or bricks for homes.

I've told you over and over that we can't determine the exact number and it's a silly and absurd question.