My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[westprog]

Wow , so RD's behavior causes you to say bollocks to me, well all I can say is

Double bollocks to you!

There's no point in getting upset every time RD or Pixy accuses you of being dishonest for having the wrong opinions. You'd never get anywhere.

 

[Robin]

I have no idea how you are defining "consciousness" if you think science can investigate it, Robin.

Similarly, I have no idea how you are defining "consciousness" if you think science cannot investigate it, UndercoverElephant.

So since you made the claim first that science could not investigate science then you should go first and define consciousness and give the reasons that science cannot investigate is.

(Don't bother with the old line that you have explained it many times and are tired of explaining it - because really, you never had explained this claim).

Sure, if you're going to claim the word "consciousness" means "self-referential information processing"...

Please deal with what I actually say rather than what you think I am going to say.

Which really makes the rest of your paragraph a complete waste of your time typing it, doesn't it?

Anyone who really "doesn't understand what all the fuss about consciousness is" simply isn't looking hard enough.

And again you are putting in quotes things that I did not say.

Why don't you have a rethink and deal with the stuff I actually did say.

ETA: Having been discussing this subject on this board for nearly a decade now, I can also say that the process of going from "I don't see a problem, honest I don't!" to "err...well actually maybe now I am beginning to see that there is a fundamental problem here" can take several years.

I can remember many of those discussions.

You could never quite understand that people were not saying "there is not a problem".

People were saying "tell us what the problem is"

Apparently you still can't understand that.

People (skeptics, atheists) have to get to the point where either they believe it is "safe" to admit there is a problem, or they have to be committed enough to finding the truth that they pursue it even though it is not "safe" (from the POV of their belief system).

I have been saying that it is safe to admit there is a problem for years. I have been saying it quite a lot to you over the years.

But what you have never been able to understand over all these years is that:

The first step to solving a problem is to define the problem​

Can you, in clear and precise terms, define exactly what this problem is?

 

[Robin]

No, because you could argue, as some philosophers do, that Mary learns nothing new by actually seeing the color red.

Perhaps you could. But I didn't, so why are you bringing it up here?

And if you think Mary does learn something new, it still isn't a circular thought experiment: she learns everything there is to know physically possible about seeing colors, and is still lacking some knowledge by virtue of being color-blind.

What do you mean "everything there is to know physically possible about seeing colour"?

That does not even seem to make grammatic sense.

I don't see any circularity or question begging, and I've never seen the thought experiment objected to on those grounds, either in the Wiki article or here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/

I don't let Wiki or SEP do my thinking for me.

If seeing a colour is information and if consciousness were physical then seeing a colour would be physical information.

So if you say she has all the physical information and has never seen a colour you simply to assume that seeing a colour does not comprise physical information.

So your conclusion is contained in the premiss.

The problem becomes clearer if you try to state the argument rigorously.



(Incidentally, you have been using "Mary in the black and white room" somewhat inconsistently.

You initially referred to it as a "thought experiment" although usually it is presented as an argument. However after I responded to it you drew the usual conclusion from it as though it had been presented as an argument.

Initially you stated that it was a good thought experiment to show whether someone regards consciousness as a hard problem or not. You have still not demonstrated why this should be the case.)

 

[Robin]

Fine.

Now tell me why the fact that we can't get inside a mouse's mind and feel mouselike is a problem for science.

I don't claim that science can ever necessarily solve the problem, but I reject the idea that science should have limits on what it is permitted to investigate.

Your answer does not seem to relate to what I said.

UE is the one that seems to want to impose arbitrary limits on science.

 

[Robin]

Again it is a non-sequitur.

Why does "science can't put us inside a mouse's mind and make us feel mouselike" equate to "science can't investigate consciousness"?
Since I didn't make either of those statements, I feel no need to defend them.

Err... OK.

The remarks were addressed to UndercoverElephant then why are you even commenting????

 

[Robin]

No, it always rests on quantified physical attributes

So physical things are defined in terms of quantified physical attributes?

So what are the physical attributes defined in terms of?

There is no physical equation that doesn't. A physical equation defines the relationship between physical quantities.

The very concept of a physical quantity is defined mathematically.

No physical law could ever possibly be devised in the absence of observation. It's possible to derive one mathematical statement from another, of course, but if it's physics, there is a measurement at the back of it somewhere.

Again, irrelevant - we are talking about how physical things are defined, not where the information comes from.

They are two different things.

 

[Robin]

If you and Robin can come to either a consensus or a disagreement then I'd find it a lot easier.

What a bizarre thing to say.

 

[Robin]

No, it always rests on quantified physical attributes.

In any case you appear to have changed your claim. You said before that physical things were defined in terms of perceptions, now you are saying they are defined in terms of quantified physical attributes.

 

[westprog]

In any case you appear to have changed your claim. You said before that physical things were defined in terms of perceptions, now you are saying they are defined in terms of quantified physical attributes.

And I quite clearly explained that all quantified physical attributes rest on measurements which we acquire via our perceptions. The universe is as we perceive it. There is no other way we can find out how the universe works. And our perceptions pass into our consciousness.

 

[westprog]

Err... OK.

The remarks were addressed to UndercoverElephant then why are you even commenting????

I don't think I eavesdropped on UE's private email, did I? I assume that anything posted on this forum is open for anyone to comment.

 

[westprog]

Again, irrelevant - we are talking about how physical things are defined, not where the information comes from.

Ultimately, everything in the physical world is defined according to our perceptions. That's if we assume that the physical models bear a relationship to reality. They are capable of standing alone, as purely mathematical models, but that's not physics, or even mathematics - it's fiction.

If physical models relate to the real world, then they rest on perception.

 

[Robin]

I don't think I eavesdropped on UE's private email, did I? I assume that anything posted on this forum is open for anyone to comment.

Here is what you said:

"Since I didn't make either of those statements, I feel no need to defend them"

Nobody suggested that you made the statements.

Nobody asked you to defend them.

So what was the point in telling us that you didn't make certain statements and don't feel a need to defend them?

 

[Robin]

Ultimately, everything in the physical world is defined according to our perceptions.

Perhaps they are defined according to our perception.

But they are defined in terms of mathematical models

That's if we assume that the physical models bear a relationship to reality. They are capable of standing alone, as purely mathematical models, but that's not physics, or even mathematics - it's fiction.

I am not sure what you mean by this.

If physical models relate to the real world, then they rest on perception.

They rest on perceptions.

But they are defined in terms of mathematical models.

 

[Robin]

And I quite clearly explained that all quantified physical attributes rest on measurements which we acquire via our perceptions. The universe is as we perceive it. There is no other way we can find out how the universe works. And our perceptions pass into our consciousness.

Irrelevant as I said.

You originally said that physical things were defined in terms of perceptions.

For pages now you have been defending this by appealing to the separate concepts of how the information was gathered or how the models are tested.

That is not relevant.

Because we are talking about how physical things are defined.

And quite clearly they are defined in terms of mathematical models.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Ultimately, everything in the physical world is defined according to our perceptions. That's if we assume that the physical models bear a relationship to reality.

Can you explain how this works with something specific? Say, chair?

In particular:

Think logically - how do we define something? ...

And we have your answers:

• It has to be in terms of something else.
• One of the following:
  1. We define everything in a circle - so that nothing is defined to be anything in particular
  2. We have to have something irreducible that cannot, in principle, be defined.
• Nevertheless, we need to know what it means.
• So we define everything in terms of our perceptions
• Our perceptions are defined by our sensations, which are subjective experiences, which are part of consciousness.
• Sooner or later we have to come to the end of the road.
• Everything cannot be defined.

I want to know what (B2) thing you're referring to in your definition of "chair" that is irreducible--that cannot, in principle, be defined. Furthermore, I'd like to know which percepts in particular are ultimately used to define the chair.

 

[Robin]

The rate of conduction heat transfer between two plane surfaces is:

Q/t = (kA(T_hot-T_cold))/d

Where Q is heat transferred in time t
k = thermal conductivity of the barrier
A = area
T=temperature
d=thickness of barrier


So the question is, if physical things are defined in terms of perceptions, then which specific perceptions is the rate of conduction heat transfer between two plane surfaces defined in terms of?

 

[Robin]

The "Mary" argument presented on SEP is a prime example of the imprecision with which this argument is stated.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/

For example "facts", "information" and "things" are used interchangeably without even the attempt to define that they mean.

Note the immaterialist explanation given:

One possible explanation is that that there is a realm of subjective, phenomenal qualities associated with color, qualities the intrinsic nature of which Mary comes to discover upon her release, as she herself undergoes the various new color experiences.

So the quale of red is just sitting there in a "realm" waiting for someone to experience it.

I wonder if the unexperienced quale of redness looks red?

They go on to say that this explanation is not available to the physicalist, as though that was a bad thing!

 

[!Kaggen]

I think our discussion is still relevant to at least trying to clarify what this consciousness is that Penrose hopes will be explained by QM.

I am not rejecting neuroscience and the analytical approach as having no role to play. I am questioning the justification in going outside of thinking (subjectivity) to explain thinking. I think the problem with this approach becomes clear when one then asks questions about objective measure and gets told its an emergent property and therefore numbers are irrelevant.
Well then this property needs to explain itself if its components cannot be used to explain it.

I disagree with that, I am not the one who said that you can't define at which level of neurons consciousness occurs. I stated that it is directly dependant upon the number and properties of the neurons, how they intect and the defintion of consciousness.

So i am not sure why you are saying that. I am not RandFan, again. I would not chose any arbitraty number of neurons to say 'this is consciousness' it is a dependant property upon the defintions as well.

What are you trying to say?

I believe that it takes both methods, the methods of introspection as well as observation and testing.

It was not obvious from the start of the numbers discussion that this was your stance David, so apologies if I am persistent, but now I am sure.
The question then is what is the common link between introspection, observation and testing?

The honest approach perhaps is to reject any notion of a subjective consciousness/thinking and embrace a universal objective consciousness/thinking.

I don't follow that at all, i have not rejected the subjective value of anything, so i don't understand. In fact the alleged subjective/objective divide I find to be un-needed. Perceptions are always real to the person having them, the ability of those percpetions to align with reality and its behavior are another issue.

The methods of 'the objective model' are manipulated through the subjective events of individuals.

the two are part and parcel, inextricable.

You have in the past stated that all experiences are subjective including "objective" ones. Perhaps you could then clarify this with a counter-example?
I am also curious to know how something can be real at one moment and not the next?

This is the honest intuition I believe is behind Penrose's argument, but I don't think he is being honest by further projecting our consciousness experiences as derived from the world of atomic particles, because this world happens to be "different". This is the underlying dualism in Penrose which is what I suggested earlier in this thread.

To maintain honesty and avoid dualism one would also have to accept that our consciousness/thinking has some objectivity and is not something different but equivalent to what we can observe. The thing-in-itself is not a thing after all.

Perhaps the phenomenologists were onto something

Sorry, you will have to lay it out in little steps for me, I don't agree with two of the premises. Subjective events are all we can observe, it is the consistency of them between observers and aceoss settings of observation that is the basis of the scientific method.

So i am really confused here.

By replacing objectivity with consistency you are only introducing the scientific method as a logical language of communication. However we still need to clarify the meaning of the language for any of it to make sense. Especially when it comes to introspection. So what is meaning other than what our consciousness gives it? In which case if our consciousness has no objectivity then neither does our methods and are we then justified in our beliefs about the abilities of science?

 

[!Kaggen]

Have you tried the more zen-like meditations where essentially you blank your mind and don't follow the thoughts that flow across it? I found that experiencing that my thoughts came from "outside" the thing that I think of as me quite profound.
So I have experienced "me" as an abstract layer floating above the parts of me that do the thinking and deciding.

Ah ha...DD take note... "thinking" without thoughts

 

[!Kaggen]

!Kaggen is advancing a straw man argument. It is also a very silly and absurd question. neuroscientific models of consciousness don't hold that there is any such absolute threshold. It's not predicted by theory. To posit such a theory has no explanatory power. Consciousness is a gradient. Minimum consciousness between individuals could vary by millions of neurons depending on how they are wired together. Dinosaurs had more neurons than humans. They did not have cognitive equivalency.

Your question is akin to asking how many atoms are necessary for lift in an airplane wing. THERE IS NO EXACT NUMBER! There is NO basis to suppose that there could be or would be such a number. If there was such a number there is no reason to believe that we would know or could ascertain such a number at this time. If we could answer the question it would not tell us anything substantive about consciousness. The fact that we are unable to know an exact number doesn't reveal to us anything about consciousness.

• It's silly.
• It's absurd.
• It's nonsensical.
• It's not part of any neuroscientific model of consciousness.
• It's wrong.

The question cannot elucidate or advance the discussion. It can't serve any purpose aside from some perceived rhetorical belief. So, why do you keep asking such a demonstrably silly and stupid question?

Yep, and he (or she) should know better.

It's just like asking how many bricks before you get the emergent properties of a house (like shelter from the weather, or a secure place to keep your possessions when you're not there to watch them).

The analogy is good because, depending on the organization different numbers of bricks (which are necessary components but not sufficient) will give you those properties, AND you can get those properties without bricks at all!

Sadly I've explained it over and over.

EXACTLY!
And the surface area of a wing is also good because minimal requirements change based on the capacity to be lifted and the composition and design of the wing and the various conditions of a dynamic system.

Further, let's suppose that two wings are built by the exact same manufacturer for the exact same model of airplane. Does physics predict that both planes will have the exact same number of atoms? No. The exact same number of molecules? No. The exact same number of ounces? No.

There is a degree of percision that we cannot measure for dynamic systems. See Chaos Theory. If we could add and subract atoms from a wing we would not be able to predict the exact number of atoms needed for lift. IOW: We would expect and we would get inconsistent answers from such an experiment. This would include any sufficently small units I.E. molecules. It should also be noted that we could not build a test facility percise enough to mesure such effects with any such percision.

BTW: For better understanding of my point see error bars and standard deviation.

So now that you have both excluded neurons as a requirement for consciousness, what has neuroscience to do with consciousness again?