My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[Robin]

Robin,

I'm not going to respond to the majority of your post about Neurath and the Vienna Circle because most people who will read this won't be able to understand the context of the discussion.

If you expected people to understand your original claim about the association between science and metaphysical assumptions, why do you think those same people would fail to understand the counter claim that scientists have for well over a century, carefully examined these assumptions and largely disavowed them?

The same one that was raised by Kant. What is the relationship between the the world as it appears to us and the world as it is in itself, how can we know the answer to this question and what does it have to do with things like time and causality?

OK, so that's more than one problem, but it's all interlinked.

Kant did not raise that problem, he said that "the world as it is in itself" could only be meaningful in the negative sense as something that was unknowable.

Kant only raised the concept of the noumenon in order to all but dismiss it and Mach got rid of it altogether. It is an irrelevant meaningless concept.

Time and causality simple (metaphysically speaking) - we have mathematical models and we check them against observations. No need for the "thing in itself" whatever that means.

 

[Robin]

I know that the claim that consciousness is a product is itself incompatible with materialistic monism. It becomes dualistic epiphenomenalism.

Now your new claim is

X produces Y implies that X is a different substance from Y​

Nonsense.

[edit] and your secondary assumption is that consciousness is a substance at all[/edit]

I don't know what "observably complex process of consciousness" means. I know what complex neural activity is. I know how complex my own consciousness experiences are. But I don't know what your phrase means.

I don't get what you don't get.

You say your consciousness experiences are complex but you don't think your consciousness is complex.

What is the distinction you are making between your consciousness experiences and your consciousness?

Is there some consciousness you have that is not experience and is not complex? Tell me about it.

It is the bridge between naive materialism and post-modernism. It's how you get from John Locke to Friederich Nietzsche and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Locke was neither naive nor a materialist but maybe you weren't suggesting that. I don't know why you would even want to get to Nietzsche and the ability to get to post-modernism is hardly a recommendation.

But your claim seems to be that the thing metaphysics can do that science can't is to get from one philosopher to another.

I think science can operate quite effectively without having to do that.

 

[fuelair]

I think

Therefore you is!!!

 

[soylent]

Why is it not a physical concept?

It's not a physical concept because it is so much more useful to define it as a metaphysical property. That way you can continually claim that materialism is bankrupt because it can't even in principle explain conciousness; who cares whether consciousness as so defined even exists?

 

[Robin]

I know that the claim that consciousness is a product is itself incompatible with materialistic monism. It becomes dualistic epiphenomenalism.

Now your new claim is

X produces Y implies that X is a different substance from Y​

Nonsense.

[edit] and your secondary assumption is that consciousness is a substance at all[/edit]

Oh and I just noticed your third assumption that:

X produces Y imples that Y can have no effect on X​

 

[Robin]

It's not a physical concept because it is so much more useful to define it as a metaphysical property. That way you can continually claim that materialism is bankrupt because it can't even in principle explain conciousness; who cares whether consciousness as so defined even exists?

Or that there is not any metaphysical position that is capable of explaining consciousness.

 

[!Kaggen]

Um, so you can't answer the question?
Okay.


Then demonstrate how it influences science, you can ask any question you want, that is a given.

Some things are replicable, so what are they?

(And yes the questions you ask do determine the answers you find. So what question would you ask)

ETA: A metaphor does nothing to explain your phenomenology of metaphor, it does not demonstrate your basic premise, you state you think, but how can you know that you think?

The subjective phenomenology runs into the exact same issue as the objective stance.

We "understand" a work of art not because we know the mind of the artist, but because we know our own.

You think, therefore consciousness creates itself.

Hmmm...

Perhaps you should be a little more explicit about this step.

Think defined as "to have a conscious mind".
Conscious defined as "aware of ones thoughts"

Asking me, how do you know "you think" is not equivalent to me asking myself how do I know "I think".
In the first instance you are addressing an object not of your creation in the 2nd I am addressing an object I created. This is the unique quality of thinking. It is self-referential. In order to answer the first question I refer to the 2nd and I am stuck, as I cannot transcend my own thinking in order to observe it as an independent object not of my creation. All I can say about it is, I think I think. We can transfer thinking to the brain/matter/atoms and then claim the "I" is an illusion which prevents us from studying thinking as an independent objective entity and this may prove useful in conceptualization, but it is not justified as it still assumes thinking and only transfers thinking elsewhere. We might then be further inclined to deny thinking as well, which is also unjustified as we would use thinking to do this.

 

[!Kaggen]

But if time is only an illusion then process would be an illusion and the word "thinking" implies process - so we cannot have any more metaphysical confidence in the concept of "thinking" than we can in any other.

So we quickly find that everything is torn asunder again.

Maybe we should just cheerfully admit that we may never have any perfect knowledge.

Yes, except that is it justified to use thinking to deny thinking.

 

[cyborg]

Who are you asking?

Anyone who would care to give a definition of consciousness that could facilitate a productive conversation rather than "my favourite semantics".

 

[!Kaggen]

Anyone who would care to give a definition of consciousness that could facilitate a productive conversation rather than "my favourite semantics".

Well before we can define something which stands up to the rigors of logic we need to experience it or alternatively not it.
I suggest starting here

 

[!Kaggen]

Now the issue is that phenomenology is not sufficient in and of itself, but it is also subject to the scientific method. All things are.

here is the intro to cognitive behavior therapy, a good place to start on cognitive behaviorism. You will note it combines an objective phenomenology.

Thanks for the link

Another example of the use of phenomenology in science is cognitive archaelogy as used by Prof. Lewis-Williams archaelogy described in his books The Mind in the Cave: Consciousness and the Origins of Art and Inside the Neolithic Mind: Consciousness, Cosmos and the Realm of the Gods

 

[Aepervius]

Philo...what ?

But note also that every step after 2) is wrong as well -- and even first year philosophy students can see why. This is why nobody takes him seriously in this matter anymore.

I got a 2 out of 20 in first year of philo (extremly poor note), did not take a second year. I continued off to QM. So you can udnerstand that I only commented on the argument I could understand .

 

[!Kaggen]

Now the issue is that phenomenology is not sufficient in and of itself, but it is also subject to the scientific method. All things are.

Yes I agree and would not say otherwise. For me the main purpose of the scientific method is to develop a language through which consistent and repeatable information can be shared. However we cannot avoid being ourselves and this implies self-examination if we are to understand ourselves, especially something such as consciousness. For this task I believe phenomenology is indispensable.

Perhaps a better way of understanding consciousness is indirectly by examining its effects on the objective world around us.

Have humans interacted with the world differently through history? I believe there is plenty of evidence to suggest so.

Does this imply we had a different awareness of ourselves in relationship to the world through history? I believe there is evidence to support this.

Is there reason to believe that currently humans from different backgrounds and upbringings interact with the world differently and therefore have different types/degrees of self-awareness? I believe there is evidence to support this.

Then perhaps consciousness cannot be defined as an atomic fact available for logical scrutiny and it is rather a complex term encompassing many types of self-awareness through time and space. The best we can do is find correlations between consciousness and its effects on the objective world.

 

[PixyMisa]

Anyone who would care to give a definition of consciousness that could facilitate a productive conversation rather than "my favourite semantics".

Self-referential information processing.

 

[quixotecoyote]

Self-referential information processing.

I seem to have heard that somewhere before...

And I remember what that thread was like.

 

[Robin]

Yes, except that is it justified to use thinking to deny thinking.

That is merely an assumption of your conclusion to say that I am using thinking to deny thinking.

If there is no such thing as process or change I am not thinking at all and neither are you.

 

[Robin]

Think defined as "to have a conscious mind".
Conscious defined as "aware of ones thoughts"

Circular - if I substitute like terms you have defined conscious as aware of one's having a conscious mind and you have defined think as to have an awareness of one's thoughts

Asking me, how do you know "you think" is not equivalent to me asking myself how do I know "I think".
In the first instance you are addressing an object not of your creation in the 2nd I am addressing an object I created. This is the unique quality of thinking. It is self-referential. In order to answer the first question I refer to the 2nd and I am stuck, as I cannot transcend my own thinking in order to observe it as an independent object not of my creation. All I can say about it is, I think I think. We can transfer thinking to the brain/matter/atoms and then claim the "I" is an illusion which prevents us from studying thinking as an independent objective entity and this may prove useful in conceptualization, but it is not justified as it still assumes thinking and only transfers thinking elsewhere. We might then be further inclined to deny thinking as well, which is also unjustified as we would use thinking to do this.

Again - circular. In any case I don't deny thinking - I just cannot prove the concept.

So "thinking" is no better a metaphysical starting point than "matter".

 

[!Kaggen]

That is merely an assumption of your conclusion to say that I am using thinking to deny thinking.

If there is no such thing as process or change I am not thinking at all and neither are you.

And how would we decide whether there is process or change other than employing thinking?

Circular - if I substitute like terms you have defined conscious as aware of one's having a conscious mind and you have defined think as to have an awareness of one's thoughts

Again - circular. In any case I don't deny thinking - I just cannot prove the concept.

Exactly, this is the unavoidable nature of thinking. It is self referential because I create it myself.

So "thinking" is no better a metaphysical starting point than "matter".

Except it would be nonsensical to claim to create matter but not thoughts. However both depend on thinking before we can have knowledge of either. "Thinking" is not a metaphysical proposition as metaphysics pre-supposes thinking.

 

[Robin]

And how would we decide whether there is process or change other than employing thinking?

If there is no process and no change then we neither decide nor think - so the question is redundant.

Exactly, this is the unavoidable nature of thinking. It is self referential because I create it myself.

This has precisely nothing to do with what I said. Providing a circular definition of "think" and "conscious" does not prove that consciousness creates itself.

It only proves your definition is meaningless. If someone provided a circular definition of "matter" would that prove that matter creates itself?

But if you create thinking please feel free to go ahead and explain how you create it.

Except it would be nonsensical to claim to create matter but not thoughts.

Nobody has claimed this and so the point is meaningless

However both depend on thinking before we can have knowledge of either.

Just so long as there is such a thing as thinking.

"Thinking" is not a metaphysical proposition as metaphysics pre-supposes thinking.

So what? Did I suggest that thinking was a metaphysical proposition?

I can't even prove there is such a thing as thinking and neither, apparently, can you.

 

[Dancing David]

Thanks for the link

Another example of the use of phenomenology in science is cognitive archaelogy as used by Prof. Lewis-Williams archaelogy described in his books The Mind in the Cave: Consciousness and the Origins of Art and Inside the Neolithic Mind: Consciousness, Cosmos and the Realm of the Gods

Sorry that looks wildly speculative to me, I will take the time to read through it, but it goes against my childhood training at the feet of my father. (A famous mezo american archaeologist.) Structural analysis of living culture is very difficult to do, economic and game theory provides some metrics for theory, but speculation about un-measurable metrics is fraught with danger.

For example the common Victorian assertions about egyptian culture, which is not montheistic.

More later.