My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[Dancing David]

The question is are you able to make any of the above statements without thinking?

Gently i ask you, and how would you demonstrate your assumption that you think? How do you show that it is more than an opinion?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Translation: nobody accepts my bluster as truth

This is the exact sort of nonsense I am talking about. I don't "bluster". I make clinical, logical arguments. I have already made such a clinical argument in this thread. I am not merely waving my arms about. There is a very specific conceptual/metaphysical problem which links the two issues being discussed and I have explained precisely what it is.

Translation: the HPC sounds weird, QM sounds weird, anyone who watches Buffy knows that weird things go together.

Another typical load of nonsense. Your "translation" is what is known as a "straw man". You put words into my mouth that I did not utter, then knock them down. Why are you doing this??? Answer: because you do not want to engage with the actual issues, almost certainly for reasons I have already specified.

"the-world-as-we-experience-it and the-world-as-it-is-in-itself" Classic misunderstanding - the QM world is part of the world as it is at a very small scale - a scale we find it hard to visualize. The macrocosmic world that we experience is not made any less real because the world acts counter to our intuition at a small scale.

No, this is not the problem I am talking about. You're right, the sub-molecular world is counter-intuitive and hard to imagine, but this problem runs much deeper than that.

There's two sorts of materialist at this point: those who admit there is a serious problem here and they don't have a clue what the solution is, and those who try to claim there is no serious problem. Which sort are you?

 

[Wudang]

The question is are you able to make any of the above statements without thinking?

Why not? Most of them are reflex action after seeing the same "linguistic games as excuse for real thought" for quite some years.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Um, why should they in the case of consciousness or QM?

I don't understand, i ask sincerely.

The history of what we now call modern science can be traced back to a strategic decision taken by Galileo and certain other trailblazers at the dawn of the scientific revolution. This decision involved ceasing to ask metaphysical/ontological questions and concentrating on the empirical investigation of the material world - the OBSERVABLE material world. Somewhere later in that history, science also became closely associated with a metaphysical claim of external realism, materialism, physicalism or whatever-else you want to call it. For >99% of all scientific issues, this metaphysical claim was of no consequence - it made no difference to the actual practice of science whether you were talking about a directly-observed physical world as accepted by idealists and phenomenalists or the unobservable external material reality of the physicalists. The difference between that >99% and the <1% that includes consciousness and QM is that in these rare cases, the metaphysical assumption matters...BIGTIME. If you try to approach them like normal science, taking no notice of the metaphysical problems raised, then you might as well just give up on being rational.

Bottom line: you can't even ask the difficult questions regarding interpretations of QM and the nature of consciousness without straying outside the model of science established at the start of the scientific revolution by people like Galileo and Newton. Science doesn't do metaphysics and these are metaphysical issues. This is unavoidable. It is not down to lack of technology or the current state of science. It is to do with what it is possible to know and how it is possible to know it, which is the domain of philosophy, not science.

Why consciousness and QM are similarly-problematic scientifically: you cannot observe Schroedinger's cat when it is in the box and you cannot observe the noumenal brain that supposedly "produces" (insert some other nonsense word if you like) consciousness, yet the questions science asks about QM and consciousness conceptually requires that we acknowledge these unobservable entities. Claiming science can answer these questions without refering to metaphysics is to fail to understand what the scientific revolution was all about in the first place and to fail to acknowledge the absolute limitations of empirical science.

 

[!Kaggen]

that might be an assumption, how do you show it in phenomenology?

metaphorically "You can take a horse to water, but you cannot make it drink"

that is already part of science, what are you thinking? I don't understand.

What I was thinking is that it is an unexamined part of science.

 

[!Kaggen]

Well, there may be something you can demonstrate, what benefit is there to phenomenology? It seems to some of us to be dead end, that does not produce an effective/pragmatic model.

Unless you want to include cognitive behaviorism.

I don't believe phenomenology is a model to explain, language/logic has this job, as much as a tool for the individual to sharpen observational skills. I do not want to replace the scientific method with a phenomenological method as much as sharpen the observational ability of the scientist.

I have found many naturalists who, without any formal training and relying on pure observation, have developed insights which have lead to further research using the scientific method in order to create a logical framework for there observations which then allows for effective communication thereof.

I am not fimiliar enough with behaviorism to comment.

 

[!Kaggen]

Gently i ask you, and how would you demonstrate your assumption that you think? How do you show that it is more than an opinion?

"I think" certainly will not stand up to scrutiny by analytical philosophy and could be regarded as a metaphysical proposition resulting from poor syntax.

And this is a good thing because it keeps us interested in analytical work.
However at some stage I believe we need to start putting together that which we have torn asunder. I have not found any other way to do this other than
thinking.

 

[rocketdodger]

I do not see quantum de-coherence spoken of in the thread so i guess it was not mentioned. The problem with Penrose idea is that quantum de-coherence happens at the nanosecond or so level, whereas neuron function are in the millisecond level. So I hardly see how a quantum effect can explain anything at all in the neuron function or even of the emerging behavior called consciousness.

Yep. But that is only half of why he is wrong. Here is a dumbed down version of Penrose's argument:

1) A "perfect" mathematician is always able to generate Godel sentences for any formal system it can use.
2) Computation theory tells us that the halting problem is undecidable for Turing equivalent computation machines.
3) Somehow, being able to generate Godel sentences for every formal system is equivalent to a solution to the halting problem.
4) Therefore a "perfect" mathematician must be somehow beyond Turing equivalent.
5) There are somehow "perfect" mathematicians among the human race.
6) Therefore human consciousness is somehow beyond Turing equivalent.
7) Outside of the effects of QM, computation is limited to Turing equivalence.
8) Therefore human consciousness must somehow be linked to the effects of QM.

Now, you are saying that there is quite a big gap left after step 8), because there is no plausible way any QM effects could impact the behavior of a neuron, never mind somehow affect the behavior of a neural network in any determined way.

That is true.

But note also that every step after 2) is wrong as well -- and even first year philosophy students can see why. This is why nobody takes him seriously in this matter anymore.

 

[rocketdodger]

The "hard problem" of consciousness and the conundrums posed by Schroedinger's cat thought-experiment both end up being curve-balls for materialistic scientists because in both cases, unlike any other areas that we would like mainstream science to tackle, we cannot ignore the conceptual, metaphysical distinction between the-world-as-we-experience-it and the-world-as-it-is-in-itself.

Actually, you can. And actually, people do.

Do you have some kind of a reason for why that "conceptual, metaphysical distinction" is so important and cannot be ignored?

Bottom line: both subjects cause serious problems for naive materialists, and most of the people here are naive materialists who are unwilling to admit there is any reason for them to question their unacknowledged metaphysical commitments. It is a threat to the foundation of a belief system which, in this case, most adherents aren't even willing to admit is a belief system at all, let alone that there might be a serious problem with it.

I fail to see how the default model of the external environment that our neural networks eventually develop is a "belief system."

When you see a ball flying towards your head, you don't just "believe" there is a ball flying towards your yead. The "belief," if there is one, is just icing on the cake. I know this because even people like yourself flinch and duck.

The reason I am unwilling to question this "metaphysical commitment" is that every single other metaphysical commitment hurts quite a bit, and some can even get you killed.

 

[cyborg]

Not this **** again.

Conciousness.

Definition.

Go.

 

[Kevinking]

We think, so we are! This is not a physical concept, so it must be a metaphysical concept. This has to be a starting point in all dialogue about consciousness.
Consciousness seems subjective, while science seems objective. Do you think you can have a scientific experiment to create consciousness?

 

[rocketdodger]

There's two sorts of materialist at this point: those who admit there is a serious problem here and they don't have a clue what the solution is, and those who try to claim there is no serious problem. Which sort are you?

You forgot the third type -- those that know the problem appears hard but understand the solution is trivial and therefore the problem is not hard at all.

And it is funny, but I bet most of the materialists here are the third type. I wonder why you saw fit to not mention them?

 

[rocketdodger]

Interesting responses. I pretty much started this thread to read people's opinion on the matter, before I launch myself into Penrose's book. Now I'm having doubts as to wether or not I should make the investment.

It still might be worth it -- you might be able to learn alot from his errors, because I hear he does cover a ton of subject matter in that book.

But if you haven't read GEB I recommend that instead, since it is essentially the same subject matter, only correct.

 

[rocketdodger]

We think, so we are! This is not a physical concept, so it must be a metaphysical concept.

Why is it not a physical concept?

 

[JihadJane]

How Ant Colonies Get Things Done

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R07_JFfnFnY

 

[epeos76]

Here is a link to a paper analyzing the misuse of Godel in Penrose's argument that is so clearly written it almost succeeded in creating the illusion that I understood it.

 

[rocketdodger]

Here is a link to a paper analyzing the misuse of Godel in Penrose's argument that is so clearly written it almost succeeded in creating the illusion that I understood it.

Good find! Thanks for the link, it is always nice to see a fresh proof of the invalidity of Lucas + Penrose.

Each new refuation has a different view of the relevant topics -- you could almost educate yourself in this stuff by only reading refutations of Lucas + Penrose.

 

[Dancing David]

metaphorically "You can take a horse to water, but you cannot make it drink"

Um, so you can't answer the question?
Okay.

What I was thinking is that it is an unexamined part of science.

Then demonstrate how it influences science, you can ask any question you want, that is a given.

Some things are replicable, so what are they?

(And yes the questions you ask do determine the answers you find. So what question would you ask)

ETA: A metaphor does nothing to explain your phenomenology of metaphor, it does not demonstrate your basic premise, you state you think, but how can you know that you think?

The subjective phenomenology runs into the exact same issue as the objective stance.

 

[Robin]

The history of what we now call modern science can be traced back to a strategic decision taken by Galileo and certain other trailblazers at the dawn of the scientific revolution. This decision involved ceasing to ask metaphysical/ontological questions and concentrating on the empirical investigation of the material world - the OBSERVABLE material world.

Really? Have you ever heard of Robert Grosseteste? Roger Bacon? Both a good 300 years before Galileo.

Somewhere later in that history, science also became closely associated with a metaphysical claim of external realism, materialism, physicalism or whatever-else you want to call it.

Well no, in fact the truth is quite the opposite.

When Neurath coined the term "Physicalism" he explicitly divorced it from any claims about external realism, he made it a purely linguistic philosophy. Whenever someone in the Vienna Circle would say something with even the hint of of an assumption of an external reality he would roar "Metaphysics!"

Mach said that science would be the same even if the world was a dream, just so long as it was a consistent dream. Einstein said that to call something "real" was as meaningful as calling it "cock-a-doodle-do", Bohr was closely associated with Neurath, Hawking has said that it is meaningless to ask if a scientific hypothesis describes reality, only whether it matches the observations, Schrodinger was an Idealist, Schlick said that any statement about the existence of an external reality was meaningless.

So where is this alleged association between science and the metaphysical claim of an external reality?

Well a couple of celebrity writers have recently made this association, but that has nothing to do with the underlying philosophy of science.

So you are perpetuating a myth here.

For >99% of all scientific issues, this metaphysical claim was of no consequence - it made no difference to the actual practice of science whether you were talking about a directly-observed physical world as accepted by idealists and phenomenalists or the unobservable external material reality of the physicalists. The difference between that >99% and the <1% that includes consciousness and QM is that in these rare cases, the metaphysical assumption matters...BIGTIME.

And as I have pointed your claim that science has this assumption is in itself an assumption.

If you try to approach them like normal science, taking no notice of the metaphysical problems raised, then you might as well just give up on being rational.

You appear to be saying that science should avoid one metaphysical assumption and make another metaphysical assumption.

What precisely is the metaphysical problem raised by interpretations of QM and the nature of consciousness?

 

[Dancing David]

We think, so we are! This is not a physical concept, so it must be a metaphysical concept. This has to be a starting point in all dialogue about consciousness.
Consciousness seems subjective, while science seems objective. Do you think you can have a scientific experiment to create consciousness?

Psst, that is really off topic, we can discuss objectivism, but it is off topic. (The phenomenology/ontology of consciousness is going to be observable either way.)

How can you demonstrate that consciousness is not an observable phenomena?