If I stimulate a part of your brain that makes you feel like you're eating a carrot when there is no carrot, then yes, it means that the carrot isn't real.
Come on, you're missing the point - on purpose? What if there is no way to
know if there is or isn't a carrot, as is the case with the reality/validity of perceptions in a mystical state?
Sure, you can just assume that there is no 'carrot,' but that kind of begs the question doesn't it? Even if Persinger could induce mystical states with magnetic fields, it hardly proves or even indicates that mystical perceptions are all illusionary - any more than stimulating a brain into perceiving a carrot means that carrots do not exist.
As I said earlier - you cannot simply presuppose that the dataset (in this case, all unexplained or inexplicable coincidences) is random data - because that is precisely the question we are trying to examine - can they be meaningful? Don't mistake axioms in your philosophical framework for arguments - just because you do not or can not question them does not mean they are objectively 'givens.'
Actually, it does, although Persinger's explanation of exactly what is happening seems to be wanting, somewhat. And whether the induced experiences are "mystical" or not is a matter of individual interpretation.
Disagree, although it's not really relevant that I can see anyway. In all three links you provided, the headset made people feel weird, at best - and none of them reported a "mystical experience" - which IS a term with a meaning. It doesn't just mean any altered state of consciousness.
Again, please see the Johns Hopkins studies I linked to for examples of actual mystical experiences which have been induced, if that is what you seek. These links may also be helpful to your understanding:
http://www.srds.co.uk/begin/mystical.htm
http://www.themystica.com/mystica/articles/m/mystical_experiences.html
And since I can link to it now - here is a non-reductionist rationalist's answer to the question, 'can an atheist have a mystical experience?':
http://www.srds.co.uk/begin/papers/robinson-mystic.pdf
You realize that it is possible to be a physical materialist without being a reductionist?
Yes, but what I'm dealing with here is clearly a pack of rabid reductionists.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductionism#In_science
Exactly. My "mystical experience," if you will, came prior to the snakes. It was the feeling of the "rightness of the world," brought on by the chemical in my bloodstream influencing my interaction with the environment. It was that feeling which gave significance to the snakes, both imaginary and real, later encountered.
Perhaps, but you lacked the same kind of connection between the state of mind that you experienced* and the snakes - and there was really no connection between the hallucinated snakes and the car snakes - other than that both were snakes. You merely hallucinated snakes while feeling good and tripping, then, much later had an unrelated experience involving snakes.
*(it sounds to me more like you just felt really good, but given your apparent inability to understand the definition of a 'mystical experience' I am going to leave that alone for now)
Your original statements were:
You had, in fact, a number of experiences upon which you collectively imposed a pattern. You have chosen to interpret your 'discovery' of that pattern as "a mystical experience".
And I pointed out that the subsequent synchronicity, while related to the mystical experience, was in no way part of the mystical experience itself. Hopefully you grasp this now.
My mystical experience profoundly shook up the way I viewed reality. The primary lesson I took away from it was "intuition is a useful tool - pay attention to it."
I babbled about this happily to my GF in the car while still tripping, and tried to make decisions in the aftermath based upon it. I did not make this up - my GF witnessed me doing this, talking about this, and, eventually, fretting about this - as I got further away from the experience and my old fundamentalist 'rationalism' came seeping back and made me think I'd been a magical-thinking fool to even consider intuition potentially valid.
Note that there was no initial connection between the mystical experience and a teapot, which you clearly failed to understand when you wrote:
a not uncommon effect of certain hallucinogenic drugs is the apparent perception of certain correlations/underlying meanings in experiences encountered while under the influence ... such experiences can be very memorable and even influential on subsequent behavior ... such memories can easily be triggered by subsequent encounters with components of the original experience (in your case, a teapot; in mine, snakes) ... in the event such a recall is triggered there can be a strong tendency to correlate the current trigger with the previous event ...
This belief in intuition was the explicit and direct result of the mystical experience, and it was the explicit and direct reason that I bought the first teapot a week later (not because I was "triggered" by a teapot from the trip.)
I bought it
because of the seemingly-unrelated conceptual content / reality model that I'd experienced and believed in while in the mystical state.
But there was nothing about that particular object that tied it to the mystical experience, the trip, or the idea of intuition I'd found so compelling during the trip - other than that for some reason, I was powerfully, intuitively drawn to it.
I chose it - out of a sprawling thrift store packed full of random objects - for no reason other than an irrational intuition I could not shake, coupled with a fading mystical mindset that had told me that intuition was a legitimate guide to navigating reality.
So I followed intuition, and bought the thing, confused about why I was doing so.
A week later, I found the identical teapot buried under my house, after having lived above it, unknowing, for eight years.
If you cannot understand why this is both different from your snake hallucination and more meaningful to me than merely having found two of the same teapot, there is really nothing I can do for you.
If the patterns we impose do not reflect actual relationships, then they will have no predictive value, and that too, can be tested.
We are not all-knowing, and therefore not all actual patterns can be predictive for us. This is a great example of why I call you a reductionist - you rule out as meaningless any pattern that's not simple enough to be completely understood, as measured by its predictive utility.
You axiomatically rule out patterns we can perceive, but not fully enough to understand or predict. Rule out patterns that we cannot even begin to perceive, yet exist and effect our lives ... and no, I am not saying that any all perceivable patterns are meaningful - just that you cannot assume that they are not, any more that you can assume they are.
If scientists and thinkers from the distant past thought like you, civilization would have never progressed, because any pattern that could not be explained by the knowledge of that time would have been dismissed out of hand.
Sometimes, randomness looks like pattern. And sometimes, patterns appear random.
We should agree on that, I think - but you also believe that you have rational, objective grounds for dismissing the possibility of my teapots (or any other reported synchronicity) being meaningful, rather than random.
I am trying to help you see that the basis for your conclusion is not actual reasoning - merely that your framework
presupposes that any and all such inexplicable patterns are random, the connections that form them, illusionary.
Not at all. As noted, whether or not a particular pattern is meaningful is testable.
Perhaps, but only if you employ reductionism in order to keep your worldview and filters manageable in the face of a world far more complex than your worldview allows for ...
What does this information allow you to predict?
Unless someone predicts and repeats the effect it's like blazing away at the side of a barn ...
we would say it's a significant or meaningful correlation (in which case, you could predict that reaction and get it to happen repeatedly under similar conditions).
We impose patterns on the world because if a pattern is really there, then it has predictive value
Either you can observe it and formulate a law for it or you can't.
And repeat it at will, and see it repeated by other investigators.
Holy Billiard-Ball-Believers Batman!
Guys, not all actual, causal patterns are cyclical or simple, and many manifest in unique ways. As a result, many meaningful, real, connected events or patterns cannot be used for making predictions.
It is
ridiculously reductionist to reject as random and meaningless all patterns which are not simple enough for you to test, repeat, and use to make accurate predictions.
See the outputs of consciousness for an example. Or social groups. Or any complex system at all whatsoever. Or stochastic processes. Or chaotic systems.
The fact that we cannot predict how a mind or a society will unfold in a given circumstance in no way discredits the possibility that there are actually causal connections involved in such a process, or that there are reasons that things happened as they did.
In the same way, the fact that we cannot predict anything based on an acceptance that a synchronicity is meaningful (not random) does not mean that synchronicity does not exist as an actual phenomenon.
I do not think I know how the teapots happened. I do not expect to be able to make predictions regarding future events. I do not conclude that teapots are more likely to attract people who have been to California and dropped acid.
I simply do not have faith in the belief that it was a meaningless pattern, imagined in randomly-connected events.
Science moves forward gradually and systematically; even it's "revolutions" are long and drawn out.
Scientific revolutions happen. I don't care how fast or slow you say they move. Even if you just call it "growth" or "change" instead of a 'paradign change,', it in no way changes the fact that today's fringe data has a habit of becoming foundational to tomorrow's hot new theory on the block. Not all fringe data leads to new accepted theories - but most new accepted theories grow from fringe data, not adequately explained by currently accepted patterns within the paradigm.
It is not 'pardigmatic entrenchment' to ask "so, what is the inherent meaning in the pattern you claim to have discovered?"
Regardless, it IS paradigmatic entrenchment to respond to whatever answer is given to that question with "because I do not believe such patterns can be meaningful, any meaning you find in it is irrational and false."
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Aaaanyways ... we seem to be doomed to go around in circles at this point, unfortunately, repeating the same things in slightly different words.
I'm not about to return to what I see as fundamentalist reductionist materialism, and you guys aren't going to revise your entire paradigms to accommodate someone else's account of a strange coincidence wrapped up in what you see as irrational magical thinking.
Perhaps we should just agree to disagree ...
Unless perhaps you're now willing to concede that Teapots
can Happen meaningfully, and not just randomly, illusionarily?