The fine tuning argument

[Beth]

Err... is there a reason you did not answer the first question????

Is that probability identical too?

Sorry, I didn't realize you wanted an answer to that one too . It's one out of six.

Beth

 

[Gate2501]

In the beginning, there was nothing. In fact, this beginning is not described by the time vector of the current universe. This beginning is timelessness, a void, with nothing, absolute nada. Then, suddenly, spawned a creation of matter and gas.

For the matter and gas, space and time to unfold, the wave function of quantum mechanics dictates that the universe had to choose the initial conditions from an infinite amount of choices [1]. In effect, the wave function had smeared all the possible universes which could arise in the universe, and fundamentally dictating any of the events which so occured afterwards. This means our very chances of standing here on earth, as thought lit upon a magicians darkened stage, and we ponder mindlessly about the foundations in which we can inexorably observe.

Interestingly, the wave function did not provide a finite amount of solutions from a Copenhagen Point of View. The universe had to choose from an infinite amount of possible universes, so the chances of any universe being observable would actually infer 1 in an infinite amount.

[1] - F. A Wolf. Parallel Universes; The Search for Other Worlds.

Answer the question, yes or no.

Do you believe that it would be possible for us to observe a universe(the one we live in), with fundamental constants that never allowed life to form, barring our own existence.

 

[Singularitarian]

Answer the question, yes or no.

Do you believe that it would be possible for us to observe a universe(the one we live in), with fundamental constants that never allowed life to form, barring our own existence.

No, as that would be an oxymoron... a paradox of sorts.

 

[Beth]

I don't think you read my first explanation, so I am not sure how saying it again would help.

If you say the universe came into being, then this implies, doesn't it, that before the universe began there was no universe?

It implies that this universe didn't exist. Whether any other universes existed then or now is unknown.

So tell me - was there time before time began? If not, then was there a "before" the universe began?

I don't know. I suppose it depends on what else might have been around. I'm sorry I didn't understand your first explanation, but I would appreciate if you could give it another try.

 

[Gate2501]

No, as that would be an oxymoron... a paradox of sorts.

Then you why did you argue with my statement that the probability of us observing a universe which allowed life to exist, given the condition that we do in fact exist, is 1?

I'm confused. You are a confusing fella.

 

[Singularitarian]

Then you why did you argue with my statement that the probability of us observing a universe which allowed life to exist, given the condition that we do in fact exist, is 1?

I'm confused. You are a confusing fella.

Because your ratio is incorrect. Saying 1 alone, is like saying it takes 1 to do anything.

 

[Dancing David]

the probability of an event that has happened is 1.

In the case of the universe, the occurance of the universe is 1, the number of known universes is 1, so we divide the number of existing universes by the number of known universes and we get 1.

 

[Beth]

You're missing my point. The "contradiction" is that on the one hand you are saying "any of these outcomes is possible" and then whatever outcome actually happens you're saying "OMG, it's a miracle! Out of all the possible outcomes, it was this one!!!!"

Either you think they are all possible, or you don't. If they're all possible, why the surprise that one of the many possible outcomes occurred? Where, in other words, is the evidence of "fine tuning"?

I don't know if they are all possible. As near as I can tell, no one does. Apparently, the physicists who create such models know of no reason why they would not all be possible. However, out of all the possible parameter values, only a very few result in universes like ours. The remaining universes are very similar and, if you presume many universes, far more common that universes like ours. That isn't a contradiction, nor am I saying "OMG, it's a miracle!". I'm saying that according to the smartest physicists on the planet, it appears that a universe like ours is very unlikely to have occurred by random chance and therefore, it's reasonable to consider other possibilities.

If the "fine tuning" argument is to mean anything AT ALL, however, it requires that the physical parameters of this universe not be intrinsically necessary. If they are intrinsically necessary then there's no "fine tuning"": there simply is "the way things have to be." So, it's the "fine tuning" argument that requires the assumption that things could just as easily have been otherwise in order for there to be surprise and amazement that they happened to turn out this way.

I don't think so. It seems to me that it's the multiverse hypothesis that assumes things could just have easily been otherwise and ours is just the one that randomly happened to have those parameters. The fine-tuning argument assumes that they were deliberately set or chosen in order to achieve this sort of universe. It does assume that they could have been chosen differently.

So, ex hypothesi, the fine tuning argument says "our universe turned out in one of many, many, many possible ways." Great; but presumably it had to turn out in some way, right? So why should I be excited about the fact that it is this way.

Because turning out this particular way is very very rare. Generally, things that are rare are interesting and often they are something to get excited about.

Here's what you're not seeing about the 20-dice analogy. Every single possible throw of 20 dice is equally improbable. If I throw 20 dice and get
1,3,6,4,2,6,1,6,5,4,3,2,5,2,3,4,6,1,1,1--that's just as unlikely as 6,6,6, etc.

For that particular sequence, yes. However, if you merely specify five ones, three twos, three threes, three fours, two fives and four sixes rather than the exact sequence, the probability of getting it is much higher than that of getting 20 6's. If you get a result similar to the one you specified, are you going to scratch your head and wonder whether the dice were loaded the way you would if you got 20 sixes in row?

The error that the "fine tuning" people make is that they start from the assumption that there's something particularly "interesting" about an outcome in which we happen to end up evolving and then ask "what are the odds"??? That's like starting from the requirement that the dice come up 20x6. But what reason do we have for thinking there's anything so "interesting" about an outcome in which we end up to ask about that outcome?

The same reason you'd find it interesting if you threw a dice 20 times and they were all sixes versus throwing the sequence you specified above. One is similar to what would be expected, even though unlikely to be exactly predicted. The other is reason to suspect there is something going one with the dice that causes that particular outcome.

Again, if every single possible universe is "wildly improbable," then what makes the one we've got different from any other one? Where's the evidence of "fine tuning."

Apparently, the parameter values that result in a universe like ours are very rare. The vast majority end up quite differently and unable to form any type of structure.

 

[Dancing David]

As to the improbability of life existing, how can you make a statistical argument about what is unknown?

If you vary the cosmological constant by what factor?
If you vary the EM field by what factor?

We can not say what variability there would be in the constants of the universe.

It is factors of hundred, one or fractions of one.

How many states are there between 1.1 and 1.2, if you adjust by .1 then 1, if by .01 then 10, by .001 then a hundred and so on, in an unknown state you CAN NOT give the probability for how 'finely tuned' the constants are becuase you have no idea what they could vary by.

penrose sattes that the possible outcomes og the universe was something like 10^10^123 and then concludes that this means the universe is improbable. And so is a single atom of hydrogen, out of ~10^80 partciles what are the odds of a single atom of hydrogen. If you randomly get one 1/10^80, but if it is already the one you have in a jar, then it is 1/1.

The universe may have had 10^10^123 possible states, but we know nothing about them or what properties they have had, so you can say NOTHING about the probability of life arising in one of them.

 

[Robin]

Sorry, I didn't realize you wanted an answer to that one too . It's one out of six.

Beth

And so you would agree, wouldn't you that 1 in six is not the same as 0.9739?

And yet you ask why stipulating the number of attempts and the number of agents is necessary to the probability argument.

So suppose someone says: "Give me twenty dollars and if I don't roll a six on a die I will give you ten thousand dollars"

So would you take the bet? Suppose some trusted person could act as guarantor?

Would you think it unnecessary for him to stipulate that the six must be off the first roll?

Would you think it unnecessary for him to stipulate that he throw only one die?

Would you think it necessary that he only stipulate one of the above conditions?

Or would you have to ask him to stipulate both in order to get the 1 in 6 odds that you were expecting?

The same principle applies with the cause of the universe - the probability argument will not be valid if the cause has produced countless other universes. And the probability argument will not be valid if the cause is an entity among many like entities all producing universes.

I don't get what you don't get about that.

 

[rocketdodger]

As to the improbability of life existing, how can you make a statistical argument about what is unknown?

If you vary the cosmological constant by what factor?
If you vary the EM field by what factor?

We can not say what variability there would be in the constants of the universe.

It is factors of hundred, one or fractions of one.

How many states are there between 1.1 and 1.2, if you adjust by .1 then 1, if by .01 then 10, by .001 then a hundred and so on, in an unknown state you CAN NOT give the probability for how 'finely tuned' the constants are becuase you have no idea what they could vary by.

penrose sattes that the possible outcomes og the universe was something like 10^10^123 and then concludes that this means the universe is improbable. And so is a single atom of hydrogen, out of ~10^80 partciles what are the odds of a single atom of hydrogen. If you randomly get one 1/10^80, but if it is already the one you have in a jar, then it is 1/1.

The universe may have had 10^10^123 possible states, but we know nothing about them or what properties they have had, so you can say NOTHING about the probability of life arising in one of them.

Exactly.

And frankly, I am sick and tired of the dishonesty that propagates this misinformation. When people like you and I try to get an answer on this from FT proponents, it never happens. Ever.

What I have seen in the past is people come in and ask other questions and individuals like Malerin are able to avoid answering because they pretend to get "sidetracked" with other posts.

How about we draw a line in the sand, on this thread, and refuse to move forward until this point is addressed?

 

[Robin]

It implies that this universe didn't exist. Whether any other universes existed then or now is unknown.

But you are quite confident, are you, that there was time before time began?

I don't know. I suppose it depends on what else might have been around. I'm sorry I didn't understand your first explanation, but I would appreciate if you could give it another try.

Again, I am not quite sure what it is that you didn't understand.

Was there time before time began?

 

[rocketdodger]

I don't get what you don't get about that.

She is an FT proponent with a vested psychological interest in proving the existence of God (to herself) by any means possible.

I don't get what you don't get about that. ;p

 

[Singularitarian]

the probability of an event that has happened is 1.

In the case of the universe, the occurance of the universe is 1, the number of known universes is 1, so we divide the number of existing universes by the number of known universes and we get 1.

In the case of the universe, and the wave function which governed the initial beginning, the probability is 1 in an infinity.

This is a big difference in understanding, than merely saying the probability is 1.

 

[Singularitarian]

As to the improbability of life existing, how can you make a statistical argument about what is unknown?

If you vary the cosmological constant by what factor?
If you vary the EM field by what factor?

We can not say what variability there would be in the constants of the universe.

It is factors of hundred, one or fractions of one.

How many states are there between 1.1 and 1.2, if you adjust by .1 then 1, if by .01 then 10, by .001 then a hundred and so on, in an unknown state you CAN NOT give the probability for how 'finely tuned' the constants are becuase you have no idea what they could vary by.

penrose sattes that the possible outcomes og the universe was something like 10^10^123 and then concludes that this means the universe is improbable. And so is a single atom of hydrogen, out of ~10^80 partciles what are the odds of a single atom of hydrogen. If you randomly get one 1/10^80, but if it is already the one you have in a jar, then it is 1/1.

The universe may have had 10^10^123 possible states, but we know nothing about them or what properties they have had, so you can say NOTHING about the probability of life arising in one of them.

David, you over-estimate these calculations. For instance, there is something ''like'' 10^80 particles in this universe. The conditions and boundaries we are allowed to work with comes from the experimental soil of physics and measurement. The statistics of life are obviously not accurate, but if the standard model is correct, we are sure we cannot be far off.

 

[rocketdodger]

we are sure we cannot be far off.

Then why are you so far off?

 

[arthwollipot]

According to Frank J Tipler, the ultimate goal of the Anthropic arguement is to proove the strong arguement.

I consider Tipler to be a nutcase.

I'm just sayin'.

 

[Beth]

And so you would agree, wouldn't you that 1 in six is not the same as 0.9739 wouldn't you?

Yes

And yet you ask why stipulating the number of attempts and the number of agents is necessary to the probability argument.

No. That I understand. I was asking why you wanted to the know the probability of getting at least one 6 out of twenty throws of the same dice or one throw of twenty dice. Those are the same.

So suppose someone says: "Give me twenty dollars and if I don't roll a six on a die I will give you ten thousand dollars"

So would you take the bet? Suppose some trusted person could act as guarantor?

Depends. I'm generally not much of a gambler, but if the details of the bet are specified and the odds were in my favor, I might. On the other hand, the only person likely to offer me a bet like that is someone who is probably trying to cheat me out of my money, so I might pass even so.

Would you think it unnecessary for him to stipulate that the six must be off the first roll?

I'd be willing to let him have two or three throws at those odds.

Would you think it unnecessary for him to stipulate that he throw only one die?

That would be my expectation. If he wanted more, yes, I would want to know how many and how many throws he wanted to take.

Would you think it necessary that he only stipulate one of the above conditions?

It would be necessary if he wanted something other than one throw with one die, as that would the expectation from your phrasing above.

Or would you have to ask him to stipulate both in order to get the 1 in 6 odds that you were expecting?

I'd want to examine the die too.

The same principle applies with the cause of the universe - the probability argument will not be valid if the cause has produced countless other universes. And the probability argument will not be valid if the cause is an entity among many like entities all producing universes.

I agree. We can only talk about the probabilities in regard to our various models of the universe and the what the possible parameters are for those. The physicists build models trying to use as few rules and set as few parameters as possible. We can examine the models they have and determine what percentage of universes produced by such models are like ours. The answer is almost none. They only get universes like ours when they fine-tune many different parameters.

I don't get what you don't get about that.

I get all that fine. What I don't understand is what you mean by "contingent" in your OP. What does your definition of contingent have to do with the probabilities you're talking about here?

 

[Singularitarian]

I consider Tipler to be a nutcase.

I'm just sayin'.

What about John Barrow then? He co-authored the theory in the Anthropic Principle?

 

[Yoink]

I don't know if they are all possible. As near as I can tell, no one does. Apparently, the physicists who create such models know of no reason why they would not all be possible. However, out of all the possible parameter values, only a very few result in universes like ours. The remaining universes are very similar and, if you presume many universes, far more common that universes like ours. That isn't a contradiction, nor am I saying "OMG, it's a miracle!". I'm saying that according to the smartest physicists on the planet, it appears that a universe like ours is very unlikely to have occurred by random chance and therefore, it's reasonable to consider other possibilities.

You're getting confused--perhaps because you're engaging with multiple interlocuters. The question of whether or not it is true that the universe "could have been otherwise" is not the point. The point is for the "fine tuning" argument to mean anything at all, it must be assumed to be possible. If the universe could not have been otherwise, then it wasn't "fine tuned."

Nor is the bald statement that "a universe like ours is unlikely to have occurred by random chance" acceptable in the context of this discussion. It is, after all, the very thing that is under discussion.

I don't think so. It seems to me that it's the multiverse hypothesis that assumes things could just have easily been otherwise and ours is just the one that randomly happened to have those parameters. The fine-tuning argument assumes that they were deliberately set or chosen in order to achieve this sort of universe. It does assume that they could have been chosen differently.

Exactly; if they could have been chosen differently, then they could have just as easily been otherwise. If they could not have been otherwise then there was no "choice" involved and therefore no "fine tuning." This is not a complicated or difficult point.

Because turning out this particular way is very very rare. Generally, things that are rare are interesting and often they are something to get excited about.

But, again, ex hypothesi turning out any way is "very very very rare." Why am I more struck by the "fine tuning" of this way than I should be by the "fine tuning" of a universe in which, say, gravity was twice as strong, or 3.4 times as strong, or 1.987 times as strong? "Gosh, of all the infinite setting it could have had, it got that one!"

For that particular sequence, yes. However, if you merely specify five ones, three twos, three threes, three fours, two fives and four sixes rather than the exact sequence, the probability of getting it is much higher than that of getting 20 6's. If you get a result similar to the one you specified, are you going to scratch your head and wonder whether the dice were loaded the way you would if you got 20 sixes in row?

But now you're cheating (and revealing the cheat in your initial position). You are starting from the assumption that there's something particularly wonderful about a universe that ends up with us in it (your "all 6's" one). But, again, every single possible result of a cast of 20 dice is equally 'improbable.' That's simply a fact.

What gives you the right to say "every single die showing 6" is inherently a more interesting result than die one showing 1, die two showing 4, die three showing 2 etc. etc. etc.? The answer--translated into universes--is that you're saying that any universe with us in it is special and needs a special explanation, but any of the myriad possible alternative universes that don't have us in them aren't interesting. So you're sweeping all the universes in which we can't live under the same pile as the 1,4,3,5... die cast and the 5,4,3,1... die cast because you don't happen to find an interesting difference between those two varieties of "non ordered results." But that just proves that you're begging the question. Just like the person who finds the lottery winner and asks "what made you so special," you've defined "universe that produced us" as the lottery winner and you're asking that universe "what makes you so special"?

The same reason you'd find it interesting if you threw a dice 20 times and they were all sixes versus throwing the sequence you specified above. One is similar to what would be expected, even though unlikely to be exactly predicted. The other is reason to suspect there is something going one with the dice that causes that particular outcome.

ETA: This REALLY shows your anthropic bias. Why is 1,4,5,2,6...any more "what would be expected" than 6,6,6,6,6,....? That's the classic lottery-ticket blunder: the idea that the sequence 1,2,3,4,5,6 is less likely to turn up than something that looks more "random" because most lottery results "look random." Surely you understand why that's an error, don't you? The universe we can't live in with parameter x=1 is exactly as improbable or probable as the universe we can't live in with parameter x=1.1 and exactly as improbable or probable as the universe we can live in which happens to have parameter x=1.2. If that's not the case, then our parameters aren't arbitrary and there's not "fine tuning" argument to be made. /ETA

Apparently, the parameter values that result in a universe like ours are very rare. The vast majority end up quite differently and unable to form any type of structure.

And, again, so? If the universe had turned out not to be able to maintain any type of structure and with its parameters set at x=1,y=2,z=3...., that's no more and no less improbable (ex hypothesi) than a universe unable to maintain any type of structure with its parameters set at x=1.1, y=2.2, z=3.3 etc. That's no more or no less improbable than a universe with it's parameters set at x=1.3, y=2.3, z=3.3 etc. etc.

The fact that we wouldn't be there to ask "what makes this universe so special" does nothing at all to alter the odds or to make it more less "miraculous."

Either the creation of the universe was arbitrary or it wasn't. If it wasn't arbitrary then there's no room for a "fine tuning" argument. If it was arbitrary, then the only person who would be able to make the "fine tuning" argument would be someone who spoke to the "tuner" before the creation of the universe. If you spoke to the "tuner" and the tuner said "you know what, I'm gonna make a universe, but I'm leave it entirely up to chance what the parameters are. But you know what, I'd really, really like a universe that ends up evolving human beings!" then you'd have a really good argument for saying "oh, come on now--you're telling me that quite by chance this was the result?" Just as, if you see someone roll 20 dice and they say "I'm really hoping for 20 sixes" just before they roll them, you can be pretty sure that either the dice are crooked or they have telekinetic powers if they then roll 20 sixes.

But this way round what you're doing is the equivalent of data mining a string of random numbers looking for the longest ordered string you can find and then saying "wow, that can't have been by accident! Consider the odds against it!" You found a universe that happened to have it's dice rolled in a certain way and then asked "what were the odds against that particular roll." Probability doesn't work that way.