• Quick note - the problem with Youtube videos not embedding on the forum appears to have been fixed, thanks to ZiprHead. If you do still see problems let me know.

Twins and subatomic particles

Thought experiment....
Imagine we have two twins or clones. They are genetically identical. Both have lived exactly the same lives up to a point A in time. By 'exactly the same' i mean to say that all external stimuli have been equal for both twins. I know this is not really possible but lets imagine that situation.

Then, in point A in time we observe both twins. What do we see?
1) Their reactions and thoughts will be identical.
2) Their reactions and thoughts will diverge.

Is there an inherent random factor that determines our thoughts and actions? Does this uncertainty arise from the statistical nature of behavior of subatomic particles. To put it another way: Is the quantum world responsible for free will?

Please discuss. Tnx.

If you read doctor Wolfs Spirtual Universe, he seems to believe that particle-uncertainty has something to do with consciousness.
 
Let's ignore the free will issue since i wouldn't like to get cought up in philosophical arguments.

But your own OP was a scenario contrived to highlight a question about free will! How can we ignore the free will issue?

My take on it:
Does this uncertainty arise from the statistical nature of behavior of subatomic particles.
Yes.

To put it another way: Is the quantum world responsible for free will?
I don't see how you can use the term "free will" to refer to quantum fluctuations. Like others have said, this would directly mean that electrons have free will.
 
Thought experiment....
Imagine we have two twins or clones. They are genetically identical. Both have lived exactly the same lives up to a point A in time. By 'exactly the same' i mean to say that all external stimuli have been equal for both twins. I know this is not really possible but lets imagine that situation.

Then, in point A in time we observe both twins. What do we see?
1) Their reactions and thoughts will be identical.
2) Their reactions and thoughts will diverge.


By the very nature that they have to occupy physically different space then their perceptions and stimulus will be different from whatever moment we start the 'test' so their stimulus will be different even if it is only slightly.
It cannot logically be the same even if we magic both into existence, fully grown and identical in every conceivable way - from the very first instant they both exist they must diverge as their stimulus must be different. They cannot look out of the same eyes.
 
I think all systems have randomness inherent to them. It's just that we choose to call deterministic those systems that have probabilities greater than, oh say, .99999999999999.
Where does this randomness come from, or are you just observing that everything is to some vanishingly small degree subject to quantum randomness?

Oh, I don't think it works like that. It's more like, I decide to type these words. So I do. But I don't decide to flip each and every bit that needs flipping inside the computer/network system that that decision requires to be implemented.
And yet, what is your decision but the brain equivalent of flipping those bits? What caused the bits to flip? Where is free will?

I am completely and blissfully unaware of the details of that process. I don't need to be aware of the quantum influences of (on?) my nervous system anymore than the computer needs to be aware of the quantum influences on it's network when in order to process my instructions.
Oh, I realize you aren't claiming any of this is under your specific conscious control, but look.... say we are one planck time unit prior to you making a decision. Your brain is in a given state, various inputs are coming in, or in the act of being processed. Is your decision dictated by this previous brain state with a bit of quantum randomness thrown in? You say you have free will, to me that means that somehow the decision you want to make has to be imposed on your brain which means that just the right quantum events in just the right neurons have to go against chance. I don't see how this could work. If you're just saying that there is some random element in your decision, but you have no control of it, then fine, but I don't see how that's free will.

But I don't think the exact words that appear now on your computer screen were deterministically set before I actually thought about what I wanted to say and chose them.
Perhaps there is enough randomness for what you say to be true. It seems to me though that randomness must be to some degree swamped by determinism in the brain, or it would just be random noise.

However, just because I decide to do something doesn't automatically imply that the action will occur. There are other outside events that influence success. In the above example, the power might go out just as I hit the submit button and my words never actually make it to the forum. But the decision itself isn't deterministic as near as I can tell. It's probabilistic. Further, I think the choices we make at any point in time will alter the probability distribution of later choices. That's what I see as free will.
This isn't what I intended to imply.
 
Where does this randomness come from, or are you just observing that everything is to some vanishingly small degree subject to quantum randomness?
The latter.
And yet, what is your decision but the brain equivalent of flipping those bits? What caused the bits to flip? Where is free will?
That is what I consider to be free will. What did you expect it to be if it does not manifest as the brain equivalent of flipping bits.
Oh, I realize you aren't claiming any of this is under your specific conscious control, but look.... say we are one planck time unit prior to you making a decision. Your brain is in a given state, various inputs are coming in, or in the act of being processed. Is your decision dictated by this previous brain state with a bit of quantum randomness thrown in? You say you have free will, to me that means that somehow the decision you want to make has to be imposed on your brain which means that just the right quantum events in just the right neurons have to go against chance. I don't see how this could work. If you're just saying that there is some random element in your decision, but you have no control of it, then fine, but I don't see how that's free will.
I see it as both random (to some extent) and controlled (to some extent).
Perhaps there is enough randomness for what you say to be true. It seems to me though that randomness must be to some degree swamped by determinism in the brain, or it would just be random noise.
What does that mean - determinism in the brain? How is that different from free will? We all develop preferences based both in our genetics and our past. I don't think they are completely deterministic (see above), but that's basically what we are - our genetics and our past experiences. Free will, IMO, is making choices based on those preferences and the options we perceive.
This isn't what I intended to imply.
I'm not sure what you intended to imply then. Perhaps you could elucidate.
 
Last edited:
OK. Take the quantum randomness out of it for a sec, so that we are completely deterministic. Our choices are dictated by our past. We feel like we have free will because our wish to do something arrises out of those past states, but we could never actually have chosen differently.

In reality a tiny amount of randomness is added to this model so that over time thiings become unpredictable. I don't see though how there is any more free will.
 
OK. Take the quantum randomness out of it for a sec, so that we are completely deterministic. Our choices are dictated by our past. We feel like we have free will because our wish to do something arrises out of those past states, but we could never actually have chosen differently.

In reality a tiny amount of randomness is added to this model so that over time thiings become unpredictable. I don't see though how there is any more free will.

I guess I don't know what you mean by free will then.
 
Our choices are dictated by our past. We feel like we have free will because our wish to do something arrises out of those past states, but we could never actually have chosen differently.

In reality a tiny amount of randomness is added to this model so that over time thiings become unpredictable. I don't see though how there is any more free will.

Under the definition of free will I gave earlier, a tiny amount of randomness makes all the difference in the world. You can't answer the question of what difference it will make unless you have a definition. As I said before, I'm not actually satisfied with the definition I gave, but it looks to me like the only precise definition that's been given so far in this thread.
 
If a system can respond to its environment non-deterministically, it has free will.
...

I think your definition of free will is good. Why are you not satisfied with it?

Under the definition of free will I gave earlier, a tiny amount of randomness makes all the difference in the world. You can't answer the question of what difference it will make unless you have a definition. As I said before, I'm not actually satisfied with the definition I gave, but it looks to me like the only precise definition that's been given so far in this thread.

And this is the point of the twins mental experiment. If two twins are exactly the same down to wave-functions and live in parallel but equivalent realities up to a point in time and then their action or thoughts suddenly diverge - then that is what i would call free will. It is just an example of your definition.

So, I'd like to know why you think it's inadequate?

ps. tnx everybody for informative and to the point posts
 
I would think that Ziggurat does not think that definition is adequate, because as he said earlier, by that definition we would have to say that an electron has free will.
 
I would think that Ziggurat does not think that definition is adequate, because as he said earlier, by that definition we would have to say that an electron has free will.


He actually assumes too much. He say's, and i qoute:

''If a system can respond to its environment non-deterministically, it has free will.''

This is actually a relative view. Free-will can easily arise out of the undetermined from our mortal minds, whilst the universe independantly can retain predeterminism.
 
I would think that Ziggurat does not think that definition is adequate, because as he said earlier, by that definition we would have to say that an electron has free will.

So be it then. Or we could put a restriction on the definition and say that it applies only to sentient beings.
 
I think your definition of free will is good. Why are you not satisfied with it?

Because I don't like the consequences of it. In particular, it feels wrong to assign the same amount of free will to a mindless object as I assign to myself. I recognize that my dissatisfaction has little bearing on the utility of that definition, nor is there any guarantee that a consistent and useful definition exists which will satisfy me. Reality itself is under no obligation to cater to my whims, though I resent it daily for not doing so. But nonetheless, my dissatisfaction with the definition exists. It would be easier if it weren't a useful definition, because then I could discard it completely and feel good about doing so.

So, I'd like to know why you think it's inadequate?

It's not inadequate, it's unsatisfactory. The former implies some objective criteria by which it fails (for example, inconsistency or ambiguity), but it is only subjective criteria on which I can find fault.
 
I can see how "responding non-deterministically" gets you some kind of "freedom"--I don't see how it gets you any kind of "will."

An electron can act "nondeterministically"--how is that related to the "will" of the electron?

Similarly, even if the human brain is subject to certain kinds of quantum indeterminacy, what does that have to do with "willing"? Are we suggesting that there is some kind of superposition of possible states and then the mind "selects" which will prevail? But what is the "selection" process? How did it break free of either determinacy or quantum flux?

This seems to lead to infinite regression.
 
Last edited:
I can see how "responding non-deterministically" gets you some kind of "freedom"--I don't see how it gets you any kind of "will."

An electron can act "nondeterministically"--how is that related to the "will" of the electron?

Similarly, even if the human brain is subject to certain kinds of quantum indeterminacy, what does that have to do with "willing"? Are we suggesting that there is some kind of superposition of possible states and then the mind "selects" which will prevail? But why is the "selection" process? How did it break free of either determinacy or quantum flux?

This seems to lead to infinite regression.

Come now, if there is anything deterministic in the universe, it would imply that will itself is deterministic. It would radically mean that we have no information relevent to understand such a situation.
 
Come now, if there is anything deterministic in the universe, it would imply that will itself is deterministic. It would radically mean that we have no information relevent to understand such a situation.

I expect you mistyped this, because it doesn't seem to make sense as it is.

"If there is anything deterministic in the Universe, it would imply that will itself is deterministic": no, it wouldn't. The existence of Wooden things in the universe doesn't imply that the will is made of wood.

"It would radically mean..."--I don't know what "It" refers to here.
 
I expect you mistyped this, because it doesn't seem to make sense as it is.

"If there is anything deterministic in the Universe, it would imply that will itself is deterministic": no, it wouldn't. The existence of Wooden things in the universe doesn't imply that the will is made of wood.

"It would radically mean..."--I don't know what "It" refers to here.

No, is it intended to mean that free will itself does not indicate a non-deterministic world. Ziggurat should know that.
 
No, is it intended to mean that free will itself does not indicate a non-deterministic world. Ziggurat should know that.

Depends on how you define free will. I have given a definition. It is not the only possible definition. But under that definition, well, you're obviously wrong.
 
Depends on how you define free will. I have given a definition. It is not the only possible definition. But under that definition, well, you're obviously wrong.

Would you confabulate more on this, so that i can adjust to this ''self-interpretation'' of free-will?
 

Back
Top Bottom