Twins and subatomic particles

[Ziggurat]

Would you confabulate more on this, so that i can adjust to this ''self-interpretation'' of free-will?

"Free will" does not have a universally agreed upon meaning. The definitions commonly given are vague, and of little use in the current context. I gave a definition which is precise, and can be used to answer questions in the current context. It is not the only possible definition, and I think everyone understands that. If you want to use a different definition than the one I gave, that will not make any of my conclusions wrong, it will merely mean that those conclusions may not apply under your other definition. But you have not given an alternative definition, so we have no way of evaluating whether or not that's true.

 

[Singularitarian]

"Free will" does not have a universally agreed upon meaning. The definitions commonly given are vague, and of little use in the current context. I gave a definition which is precise, and can be used to answer questions in the current context. It is not the only possible definition, and I think everyone understands that. If you want to use a different definition than the one I gave, that will not make any of my conclusions wrong, it will merely mean that those conclusions may not apply under your other definition. But you have not given an alternative definition, so we have no way of evaluating whether or not that's true.

The alternative solution i would provide would be a contingeant basis on the human perception. I conclude its only logical to assume that the sense of having a free will is essentially subliminal. Because of this painfully-obvious fact, it seems that no theory as yet can assertain whether free-will is completely subliminal, and not dependant on the nature or configuration of the universe (such as a deterministic plan).

Free will so far, can only be applied therefore to a system like ourselves who are incapable of completely reconciling whether our actions are by choice and undetermined factors, or whether one where such a universe can obide by the condition of predeterminism. Interestingly, the Bohmian Interpretation has the wave function defined from the very first instant of the universe. This defined state in the wave function would mean that everything in the universe actually followed a predetermined path through space and time, through instantaneous actions.

If we take the Bohmian Interpretation seriously, then free will would need to remain an illusion - so theoretically, non-predeterminism is not a prerequisite of the actual experience of it.

 

[shuttlt]

I don't see how you can use the term "free will" to refer to quantum fluctuations. Like others have said, this would directly mean that electrons have free will.

Unless Beth is right and free will is something like loading the quantum dice. Although, I still don't see how that could work.

 

[athon]

Unless Beth is right and free will is something like loading the quantum dice. Although, I still don't see how that could work.

I don't either.

In fact, the very notion of randomness, to me, seems to go against free will. The concept of choice seems to insinuate that consciousness can influence events in a particular direction. It would suggest that free will determines the outcome of completely random events, rather than having a random factor playing any role within it itself.

Athon

 

[Beth]

I don't either.

In fact, the very notion of randomness, to me, seems to go against free will. The concept of choice seems to insinuate that consciousness can influence events in a particular direction. It would suggest that free will determines the outcome of completely random events, rather than having a random factor playing any role within it itself.

Athon

Interestingly enough, I don't understand why the notion of randomness goes against free will. Consider this, you respond to this thread. You select this post. There are a variety of ways you could respond. You select one. There is a random component within the selection. There is a genetic/deterministic component to your choices. The exact response is not fixed until you press the submit button. Why does having a random aspect of the choice prevent that response from being the result of your 'free will'?

eta: I guess, for me, the fact that there a random aspect to it is what allows it be 'free will'. If your response is determined, that isn't free will. Since it isn't determined, why doesn't that make it free will?

 

[QED]

eta: I guess, for me, the fact that there a random aspect to it is what allows it be 'free will'. If your response is determined, that isn't free will. Since it isn't determined, why doesn't that make it free will?

You seem to equate "non-deterministic" with "free" and in a way it is free (namely, of determinism), but by doing so aren't you throwing the "will" over board? If you aren't the agent in control of decision making, what does it mean to be your "will" in the first place?

 

[Beth]

You seem to equate "non-deterministic" with "free" and in a way it is free (namely, of determinism), but by doing so aren't you throwing the "will" over board? If you aren't the agent in control of decision making, what does it mean to be your "will" in the first place?

No, I don't think so. You make choices. That there is a random aspect to those choices doesn't take 'will' away IMO. You and I can make conscious unpredictable choices about our future actions. How is that not 'free will'?

ETA: I guess that for me, the key is making conscious decisions. Of course, consciousness is even harder to define than free will, so it doesn't really resolve the issue.

 

[Yoink]

No, I don't think so. You make choices. That there is a random aspect to those choices doesn't take 'will' away IMO. You and I can make conscious unpredictable choices about our future actions. How is that not 'free will'?

ETA: I guess that for me, the key is making conscious decisions. Of course, consciousness is even harder to define than free will, so it doesn't really resolve the issue.

The word you are looking for is "arbitrary" not "random." If our decisions are "random" then they are not "chosen."

But it's hard to see what quantum indeterminacy could have to do with a power of arbitrary decision.

 

[Molinaro]

The alternative solution i would provide would be a contingeant basis on the human perception.

Is there a typo or 2 in the bolded part you want to fix? Otherwise, I can't get any meaning out of those words in that order.

I conclude its only logical to assume that the sense of having a free will is essentially subliminal.

I conclude that it is highly illogical to say that people don't notice the sense of having free will. Why would it be talked about so much if people didn't notice it or think they had it?

Because of this painfully-obvious fact, it seems that no theory as yet can assertain whether free-will is completely subliminal, and not dependant on the nature or configuration of the universe (such as a deterministic plan).

Why can't something subliminal, which free will is most certainly not, be deterministic? Either that or you are using some personal definition of the word subliminal.

Free will so far, can only be applied therefore to a system like ourselves who are incapable of completely reconciling whether our actions are by choice and undetermined factors, or whether one where such a universe can obide by the condition of predeterminism.

Your bolded alternative after the word or, does not seem to be an or, with respect to what came before. You begin by stating what free will can be applied to, namely us. You then say 'or', but what comes next does not look like something to which free will can apply. So why or?

Interestingly, the Bohmian Interpretation has the wave function defined from the very first instant of the universe This defined state in the wave function would mean that everything in the universe actually followed a predetermined path through space and time, through instantaneous actions.

Meaning there is no free will? But why take the Bohmian view when it's a hidden variable theory, all of which are contradicted by Bell's Theorem?

If we take the Bohmian Interpretation seriously, then free will would need to remain an illusion - so theoretically, non-predeterminism is not a prerequisite of the actual experience of it.

That conclusion is only correct, if the assumption, that the Bohmian view is correct holds. What reason is there to think that's the case?

 

[Singularitarian]

Is there a typo or 2 in the bolded part you want to fix? Otherwise, I can't get any meaning out of those words in that order.



I conclude that it is highly illogical to say that people don't notice the sense of having free will. Why would it be talked about so much if people didn't notice it or think they had it? (1)



Why can't something subliminal, which free will is most certainly not, be deterministic? Either that or you are using some personal definition of the word subliminal. (2)



Your bolded alternative after the word or, does not seem to be an or, with respect to what came before. You begin by stating what free will can be applied to, namely us. You then say 'or', but what comes next does not look like something to which free will can apply. So why or? (3)



Meaning there is no free will? But why take the Bohmian view when it's a hidden variable theory, all of which are contradicted by Bell's Theorem? (4)




That conclusion is only correct, if the assumption, that the Bohmian view is correct holds. What reason is there to think that's the case? (5)

(1) - Not the definition i was shooting for. By subiminal, i mean the experience we have of free-will is purely the product of the mind.

(2) - In this case, i can agree have used it in a different context.

(3) - Simple. Free-will, or the experience of it does not necesserily imply a non-deterministic universe. I would like evidence to show why it should.

(4) - The Bohmian interpretation is not obsolete.

(5) - How about that its a theory? It's not osbolete, and it still holds as a possible mathematical description of the universe at large, that's why.