Science and free will

[Beth]

I agree. It's ruled out by logic.


So if I load the dice and then throw them, you're willing to say that the results are entirely random?

Actually, yes, I would say it's entirely random. It's just that they have a different distribution of outcomes than normal dice.

No, because that wouldn't be free will.

Obviously, I don't agree with this statement.

So then you have to answer the following question: To the extent that the dice were loaded, what "determined" how the loading was done?~~ Paul

Yes, that is the crucial question.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I agree. It's ruled out by logic.

Yes, this is the problem. If you were claiming it was ruled out by science then I'd be offering a different argument in response. But you're claiming it is ruled out by logic, and from a mainstream philosophical point of view, that is a pretty outlandish claim, because it contradicts both both Kant and Wittgenstein.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Yes, that is the crucial question.

The answer to the question is beyond both science and philosophy. It is pure religion. Discussing the answer would require an in-depth exploration of the finer points of theology, mysticism and the Occult. There is no point in trying to have that discussion here, because there are so few people here who could even agree on a starting point for that discussion. I think Paul wants a philosophical answer. The closest we can get to a philosophical answer comes from people like Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, and I don't think many people here are prepared for a serious discussion of what these two originators of post-modernism had to say about Will.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Actually, yes, I would say it's entirely random. It's just that they have a different distribution of outcomes than normal dice.

Sorry, but this is a stance that completely muddies the waters. If I have rigged the dice, then their outcomes are not purely random. The distribution has been purposefully skewed. The outcomes are stochastic, but no longer uniformly random. And the nonuniformity was caused.

Yes, that is the crucial question.

So we've gotten nowhere. I still want someone to give an explanation of how my dice-rigging free will works.

Yes, this is the problem. If you were claiming it was ruled out by science then I'd be offering a different argument in response. But you're claiming it is ruled out by logic, and from a mainstream philosophical point of view, that is a pretty outlandish claim, because it contradicts both both Kant and Wittgenstein.

Right-o. Could you give me a specific quote from either of those fine gentlemen concerning nondeterminism and how it has room for something that is not random?

The answer to the question is beyond both science and philosophy. It is pure religion. Discussing the answer would require an in-depth exploration of the finer points of theology, mysticism and the Occult. There is no point in trying to have that discussion here, because there are so few people here who could even agree on a starting point for that discussion. I think Paul wants a philosophical answer. The closest we can get to a philosophical answer comes from people like Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, and I don't think many people here are prepared for a serious discussion of what these two originators of post-modernism had to say about Will.

I am, as long as you can summarize what they said.

~~ Paul

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

Quote:
I'm specifically interested in the part where you say that "there are certain things we can't be mistaken about". What are the things we can never be mistaken about and how do you determine this?

If somebody chops your leg off, can you be mistaken about it?

I'm glad you asked because as matter of fact you can!!. There actually happens to be a a series of mental diseases regarding perception of the limbs. One is known as the Phantom Limb in which a patient who lost a limb, can still feel it as if it existed and actually suffers from "real" pain in the non existent limb. The other one is Anosognosia in which a patient with a paralyzed limb is not aware that the limb is paralyzed and if asked if it is working, he/she goes through the delussion that it works and that he/she is moving it. If you ask them to use it, they will of course fail at it, but in their reality, the limb is moving.

If you asked them if their limb is paralyzed they would swear to you that it isn't (Meaning, they would pass a lie detector because to them, this is the truth). They just know it isn't and can't believe you are telling them that it's not there. To them this is a reality as strong and real as the fact that you have your limbs fully functional

There are also patients who have had their limb paralyzed yet when they see someone who has their limb paralyzed, they "know" that it isn't because they lack the ability to recognize this ailment in other people

So answering your question: Yes. You can even be mistaken about that. You can be mistaken about anything (given the proper brain damage) and be sincerely 100% sure that you are right. And that's why you need a Third Person science, without which you would never find out that you are having this perception problem

Put another way: I only have subjective/personal reasons for a positive belief in free will, but I have objective/collectively-justifiable reasons for believing that it is impossible to rule it out a-priori.

Sounds just like the "you can't prove a negative" argument, yet you say "objective" colletively justifiable reasons. May I know what those are?

Yes. If you ignore the "first person approach" then you might just as well be a materialist/determinist.

I'm not ignoring the First Person approach. I'm simply not just relying on it as the main source, given how easy it is for perception to fool the individual

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Sounds just like the "you can't prove a negative" argument, yet you say "objective" colletively justifiable reasons. May I know what those are?

Do you want to have a discussion about Kant?

I'm not ignoring the First Person approach. I'm simply not just relying on it as the main source, given how easy it is for perception to fool the individual

But you are prepared to rely on it as a secondary source?

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

Do you want to have a discussion about Kant?

No

But you are prepared to rely on it as a secondary source?

You are missing/ignoring the point and now playing with semantics

Did you even pay attention to the examples I gave you of mental diseases? I would love to hear your take on that. Would you seriously say that we can rely exclusively on a First Person type of approach when you actually have human beings that are completely unaware that their arm is paralyzed? Or human beings that don't have an awareness of their Left Side of their world. Or human beings who think their mother is an impostor (only when they see them but not when they talk to them on the phone). What's your take on that? For once I'd like to hear your take on actual real examples of real cases rather than abstract philosophical drivel

 

[UndercoverElephant]

No

Then there is no point in continuing the discussion.

 

[paximperium]

Then there is no point in continuing the discussion.

Wow.
Most people when cornered and defeated will admit it. Pathetic.

 

[RandFan]

Free will can't just be something happening in your brain.

Says who?

To clarify: we are talking about libertarian free will here, not compatibilist free will (which is something else entirely). There's a basic problem in your usage of the word "I". You are using "I" to mean "my body". A believer in free will is using "I" to mean "my soul" or "the agent of my free will".

To paraphrase you "Free will can't just be something happening in the 'soul'" (whatever the hell that is)."

(It's sure easy to simply assert something.)

Ahh... the homunculus. Don't understand something? Just insert an undefined and undetectible entity.

First you need to prove that this homunculus exists and then you need to provide a mechanism to explain why the homunculus can have free will while a material brain can't (assuming free will of course).

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Says who?

To paraphrase you "Free will can't just be something heppening in the "soul", whatever the hell that is." It's sure easy to simply assert something.

Ahh... the homunculus. Don't understand something? Just insert an undefined and undetectible entity.

First you need to prove that this homunculus exists and then you need to provide a mechanism to explain why the homunculus can have free will while a material brain can't (assuming free will of course).

Hi Randfan.

I'd appreciate your views on this:

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=144884

Geoff

 

[RandFan]

Hi Randfan.

I'd appreciate your views on this:

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=144884

Geoff

I've responded. Consciousness is a very difficult problem and one that hasn't been solved. That's not to say that experts in the field aren't making significant strides toward understanding consciousness. They likely are.

 

[Beth]

Sorry, but this is a stance that completely muddies the waters. If I have rigged the dice, then their outcomes are not purely random. The distribution has been purposefully skewed. The outcomes are stochastic, but no longer uniformly random. And the nonuniformity was caused.

Yes, the distribution has been purposefully skewed in a non-random manner. The outcomes are still random, only the probabilities of the various outcomes have changed, they are no longer uniform. However, the uniform distribution is not required for randomness. At least, that isn't how I have been interpreting the use of the word in the context of this thread.

At any rate, I'm sorry the waters have been muddied for you. For me, it is why I think that randomness is not a good argument against the concept of free will. If free will can alter the probabilities of the possible outcomes, then randomness could be included in the concept.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Yes, the distribution has been purposefully skewed in a non-random manner. The outcomes are still random, only the probabilities of the various outcomes have changed, they are no longer uniform. However, the uniform distribution is not required for randomness. At least, that isn't how I have been interpreting the use of the word in the context of this thread.

Correct, a stochastic process is not necessarily a uniformly random one. But you're talking about skewing the probabilities on purpose. How is that not deterministic?

At any rate, I'm sorry the waters have been muddied for you. For me, it is why I think that randomness is not a good argument against the concept of free will. If free will can alter the probabilities of the possible outcomes, then randomness could be included in the concept.

No one is arguing that some portion of my decision can't be random. Of course it can. But insofar as some of my decision is not random, and this includes the nonrandom skewing of stochastic variables, that part of the decision is deterministic.

You are trying to convince us that there is a third factor in the decision, in which case it has to be something other than deterministic skewing of random processes. Either that, or I'm mistaken and you are happy with determinstic skewing of random processes, but I do not see how that is of any comfort to the libertarian.

People appear to have in mind the picture of a uncaused agent poking stochastic processes, not unlike the picture of a god poking natural law to direct evolution. Fine. But now it's time to explain how the agent "decides" what sort of poking to do. What sort of skewing to do, that is the question.

~~ Paul

 

[Beth]

Correct, a stochastic process is not necessarily a uniformly random one. But you're talking about skewing the probabilities on purpose. How is that not deterministic?

How is it deterministic? Consider this example. I am overweight. I wish to lose weight to improve my health and looks. I try dieting and fail. I join weight watchers with my sister, who also wishes to lose weight and we both succeed. The decision to lose weight is what I think UE is referring to as 'will'. It is a choice I make. By choosing to join weight watchers, I purposefully alter the probability that I will succeed in losing weight. But it isn't a deterministic alteration. I might or might not succeed with the program nor do I know, in advance, how much of a difference it will make in the probability of my success.

Would you consider that a deterministic process? If so, could you tell me why?

No one is arguing that some portion of my decision can't be random. Of course it can. But insofar as some of my decision is not random, and this includes the nonrandom skewing of stochastic variables, that part of the decision is deterministic.

I don't agree. Why should that aspect be considered deterministic?

You are trying to convince us that there is a third factor in the decision,

Not really. I'm trying to determine if you can convince me that there isn't. I'm not sure that there has to be a third factor. But I'm not convinced there can't be either.

in which case it has to be something other than deterministic skewing of random processes.

Why would it have to be something other than that?

Either that, or I'm mistaken and you are happy with determinstic skewing of random processes, but I do not see how that is of any comfort to the libertarian.

I'm not a libertarian, although I do have some sympathies with their positions. I'm basically agnostic.

People appear to have in mind the picture of a uncaused agent poking stochastic processes, not unlike the picture of a god poking natural law to direct evolution. Fine. But now it's time to explain how the agent "decides" what sort of poking to do. What sort of skewing to do, that is the question.

~~ Paul

Yes, that is indeed a very interesting question. I think we do it to ourselves. How we are able to accomplish that is a mystery to me.

 

[RandFan]

How is it deterministic? Consider this example. I am overweight. I wish to lose weight to improve my health and looks. I try dieting and fail. I join weight watchers with my sister, who also wishes to lose weight and we both succeed. The decision to lose weight is what I think UE is referring to as 'will'. It is a choice I make. By choosing to join weight watchers, I purposefully alter the probability that I will succeed in losing weight. But it isn't a deterministic alteration. I might or might not succeed with the program nor do I know, in advance, how much of a difference it will make in the probability of my success.

Would you consider that a deterministic process? If so, could you tell me why?

That's a good question and one I've been mulling over. I'm also overweight.

According to Sapolsky, some folks with OCD spend upwards of 6 hours a day washing their hands. Isn't the answer simply to stop it?

 

[yy2bggggs]

How is it deterministic? Consider this example. I am overweight. I wish to lose weight to improve my health and looks. I try dieting and fail.

This being a complex act, either you didn't try hard enough, or it was not your fault that you didn't lose weight. Other than that, I see cause of facts, prior causes, and effects. What thing that is will among these listed entities is non-deterministic?

I join weight watchers with my sister, who also wishes to lose weight and we both succeed.

I see another proximate cause, and another effect.

The decision to lose weight is what I think UE is referring to as 'will'. It is a choice I

...proximate cause...

make

...effect.

By choosing to join weight watchers, I purposefully alter the probability that I will succeed in losing weight.

Correct.

But it isn't a deterministic alteration.

But you don't say that the first time, when you failed, you chose to fail, unless you can connect the failure to something within your control. What you chose to do was to lose weight. That you failed reflects a lack of power, not the thing being willed.

Compare this to the response I gave you a few posts above.

Would you consider that a deterministic process? If so, could you tell me why?

The thing that is determined is precisely the thing you are able to control--i.e., what you will. The things you cannot control--the specific outcomes you did not intend--are not the things that you will to do. You even said so in your example--you chose to diet, but the result was that you failed.

(As a side note... I've misplaced 80 pounds of myself somewhere over the past year... I love your example).

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

How is it deterministic? Consider this example. I am overweight. I wish to lose weight to improve my health and looks. I try dieting and fail. I join weight watchers with my sister, who also wishes to lose weight and we both succeed. The decision to lose weight is what I think UE is referring to as 'will'. It is a choice I make. By choosing to join weight watchers, I purposefully alter the probability that I will succeed in losing weight. But it isn't a deterministic alteration. I might or might not succeed with the program nor do I know, in advance, how much of a difference it will make in the probability of my success.

Would you consider that a deterministic process? If so, could you tell me why?

It is the decision to join weight watchers and skew the probability that is relevant here. The outcome is another issue entirely. So we're back to whether you think the decision is determinstic or free.

I don't agree. Why should that aspect be considered deterministic?

Beth, we're going around in circles. It is deterministic because it is not random, and those are the only two choices. You still haven't described your third "technique" of making decisions.

Not really. I'm trying to determine if you can convince me that there isn't. I'm not sure that there has to be a third factor. But I'm not convinced there can't be either.

If there isn't a third factor, then the decision was entire deterministic and/or random. There is no libertarian free will there.

Why would it have to be something other than that?

Because "deterministic skewing of random processes" is not what libertarian free willies have in mind.

Yes, that is indeed a very interesting question. I think we do it to ourselves. How we are able to accomplish that is a mystery to me.

So now we agree that the source of libertarian free will is a complete mystery. The only difference between us is that I don't think there can logically be such a source.

~~ Paul

 

[RandFan]

What you chose to do was to lose weight. That you failed reflects a lack of power, not the thing being willed.

Good post.

I accept this "lack of power" what Nietzsche termed, I think, as "will to power" but in the end what does it mean? I ask that because often the idea is one of defect of character and/or... one could have the will to power but sloth or other negative character attributes were the cause for failure. Isn't "lack of power" simply a post hoc assessment offering little if any insight other than the person didn't do what he or she wanted to do?

If a river flowing downstream is unable to breach a given obstacle what does it tell us about the river other than the pressure necessary to breach the obstacle was above the threshold of the river?

 

[yy2bggggs]

Isn't "lack of power" simply a post hoc assessment offering little if any insight other than the person didn't do what he or she wanted to do?

I don't think so... I believe it's a perfectly apt description of the case, and I don't think "didn't do what he or she wanted to" describes it very well.

In a failure of character scenario, it's not so much a failure of a goal that is the problem per se--it's the success of conflicting goals.