The Hard Problem of Gravity

[AkuManiMani]

I'm not clear how an emergent metasystem can have a subjective perspective. How do you distinguish mind from the contents of mind?

Nick

Its not so much that I'm distinguishing the contents of the mind from the mind; I'm proposing that the experience of mental content, as such, is consciousness. The contents of one's mind are always there even when they are asleep or otherwise unconscious. Once we become conscious again [what ever the specific requisite for that is] we become able to consciously access some of the contents of our mind. Its like when we are asleep, the dimmer switch of consciousness is turned low or all the way down; when its turned back up it illuminates the already existent content and our minds become conscious of them. I'm not sure how much this resembles your personal conception but this appears to be the case to me.

 

[Belz...]

It's almost certain that thermal effects will produce some kind of current through some of the bits and pieces.

Oh, please. Now you're just being contrarian. Saying that a heap of computer components has the same processes as a computer is kinda like saying that pieces of an engine and rubber tires amongst a puddle of gasoline perform the same processes as a car.

 

[Belz...]

But the point of "annoyance" is that it is not, in general terms, a behaviour.

Of course it is! My body is reacting in a certain way to stimuli. That's a behaviour. Annoyance is only a sub-category of behaviour. One that you can, most certainly, observe.

In fact, it's quite possible that someone will use language to state that they are annoyed precisely because their behaviour does not indicate annoyance.

That's because you think that all behaviours are observed. But clearly, it isn't the case. When I'm hungry, it's a behaviour, and certainly if you could plug me into a complex computer you'd know I was hungry, probably before I was even aware of it, just by checking the behaviours of the associated organs and cells.

That's all there is to it. Just because it's immensly complex from your point of view doesn't mean we get to invent fairies to explain it.

I'm not sure what "private behaviour" is supposed to be. It's a term that's been used a lot in this thread, but as far as I can tell it's an oxymoron.

See above.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Essentially, a quale is an elementary subjective response to some informational stimuli. This means that they are always referent to some other object. In order for a conscious entity to be self-aware they must have the ability to self-reference their basic qualitative elements. This means that qualia must be able to act as informational stimuli.

Word salad. WHAT is a quale ? How does it work ? How do you know they exist ?

What exactly are qualia and how exactly do they work? That's just what I wanna know. How do I know they exist? The term 'qualia' is just a label for what I already experience. That they exist is a given; how they exist is not.

Because to be conscious of something one necessarily perceives it as some quality or collection of qualities.

Huh ? Which qualities ? Cold, for instance ? But it's not something the "mind" makes up. It's a direct consequence of the properties of whatever is already cold. I still see no reason to posit the existence of qualia.

You seem to be unable to distinguish the sensation of cold from the actual state of being cold. They most certainly are not the same.

In order to create a sentence or body of sentences in reference to phoneme(s), one necessarily creates a group of phonemes about phoneme(s).

Absolutely not. Phonemes represent nothing. They are arrayed together to form arbitrary meanings but the phonemes themselves have none. So they're not about anything, and assembled phonemes are no longer phonemes.

Words are still composed of phonemes; they do not lose their status of being phonemes when they compose words or propositions. What you are saying is equivalent to claiming that rivers flow downstream but water does not.

I understand that qualia are unnecessary, and that the standard definition is incoherent. Qualia only make sense from a philosophical point of view, but scientifically they are meaningless.

How can a concept make sense from any point of view if it is incoherent? The concept of 'genes' had the same epistemic status until Watson & Crick helped discover the structure of the DNA molecule and crack the genetic code. The fact that a concept or phenomena has not yet been scientifically mapped does not make the concept 'incoherent', it just means that we have no working knowledge of it.

Because the code's already been cracked and we can easily read and reproduce conscious experiences with perfect fidelity. Oh, wait....

Argument from ignorance.

Its not an argument from ignorance, its a statement about our ignorance. We know that conscious experiences occur but do not yet have a sufficient understanding of them to scientifically read or reproduce them.

The sensation of cold is not temperature; it is the mental representation of a stimuli that, in our case, happens to correspond with temperature.

No, it's a behaviour that is a direct consequence of the cold. There is no intermediary step.

That is utter nonsense, and you should know better. A frozen corpse doesn't feel cold it simply is cold. In order for something to experience stimuli as something there must be a quite a number of intermediate steps. If there were no need of those steps then there would be no need for brains or neural processing because objects would just directly experience stimuli w/o.

All observable entities are actions. Just because atoms are just the actions of its components does not make them non-existent as entities. The same is true of mental representations.

Aku. Observable entities are objects that have behaviours. Now, it's possible that elementary particles are, in and of themselves, behaviours but that's besides the point. Things composed of particles are objects, not behaviours. A thought, like "running", is an action and is not composed of anything. Yet it still exists. I think you're trying to describe the composition of a behaviour.

You're completely missing the point. Even the components of atoms are themselves just behaviors, and their components, and so on. There is no such thing as objects outside of process.

And you're acting like a witch doctor making up stuff to maintain your social status.

What social status? I'm probably one of the most irritating member of these forums. If anything, what I say and how I say it is detrimental to my social standing. I make statements w/ hardly a thought or care if they annoy or alienate people. If it was my goal to bolster my social status I could just tow the line and dress up my arguments in terms and concepts that don't trigger your irrational taboo response

Now that we've traded irrelevancies, can we get back to the point ?

But pointing out the irrational basis of your objections is fun

Qualia don't exist. What constitutes perception? Thats what science must establish

Translation:

"I really don't like that word qualia; it makes me wet the bed at night. Can we just call them perceptions?

Now, tell me why your sentence is more realistic than mine.

Because I don't bend over backwards to avoid using taboo words lol

As usual, attempts to delve into my mind are futile. Please refrain from trying to determine what goes on in my mind and adress my points.

Your points don't make any sense. Its just my nature to speculate on things that baffle me

You're right; I AM proposing something a good deal more radical than you're used to. I'm saying that processes and entities are interchangeable concepts.

That actually helps me, not you, because it would mean that, in the end, everything is behaviour and composition is an obsolete concept. That would make qualia superfluous, again.

Erm...How do u figure that? If qualia are no more or less 'behavior' and atoms and you consider 'behavior' as being superfluous then that would make matter superfluous as well

 

[westprog]

I am considering your point, but I disagree with this. (In fact I think it is funny.The question about computing.)

Really, the same levels of current and the same potentials and voltages, really?

No, not the same level of activity. But the same phenomena.

The point I'm making is that it's been asserted that computing is taking place in the computer, but not at all in the pile of components. It's not a matter of degree.

If there is no computing going on in the pile of components, it's necessary to indicate why. What is happening in the working computer that is totally absent from the components? It's really not sufficient to say that there are higher voltages in the working computer.

Other than that yes, a better definition is needed. But all definititions are self referential and circular. Referents are part of language as well.

I don't think all definitions are circular. I think that all definitions end up being in terms of certain things which are not defined, and probably not definable, in much the same way that Euclidean geometry rests on unprovable axioms.

 

[rocketdodger]

The most obvious flaw in the "information processing" model is in the failure to define "information processing" in any systematic way.

Snowflakes.

Why is "We don't know" such a hard thing for you to accept?

You don't know the difference between a snowflake and a drop of liquid water?

Except for the universality of switches. That one seemed to trigger a change of emphasis in a non-linear way.

Is a drop of liquid water crystalline?

Yes, maybe that point you made about crystallisation was so good I'm desperate to avoid confronting it.

Given that you mentioned it here and yet you are still are not responding that is the logical conclusion.

When people mention that I missed a question, I immediately address it.

So lets have it, westprog -- is a drop of liquid water crystalline or not?

Who exactly do you mean when you say "we"?

The vast majority of humans that anthropomorphize, and who understand that snowflakes are different from liquid water.

 

[rocketdodger]

No, not the same level of activity. But the same phenomena.

The point I'm making is that it's been asserted that computing is taking place in the computer, but not at all in the pile of components. It's not a matter of degree.

If there is no computing going on in the pile of components, it's necessary to indicate why. What is happening in the working computer that is totally absent from the components? It's really not sufficient to say that there are higher voltages in the working computer.

So you think liquid water is crystalline, just like a snowflake?

 

[westprog]

Oh, please. Now you're just being contrarian. Saying that a heap of computer components has the same processes as a computer is kinda like saying that pieces of an engine and rubber tires amongst a puddle of gasoline perform the same processes as a car.

There's a difference between "have the same processes" and "performs the same processes". In the case of a car, the difference is that the car moves itself around. That's a physical effect, and it's well defined. What I'm looking for (without any success at all) is an indication of what computation is with the same kind of physical meaning as motion.

 

[westprog]

So you think liquid water is crystalline, just like a snowflake?

Exactly what your point is here I don't know. You seem to think that because a process is going on in A but not B that proves that some different process is going on in C but not D. There's no connection between the two.

 

[rocketdodger]

Oh, please. Now you're just being contrarian. Saying that a heap of computer components has the same processes as a computer is kinda like saying that pieces of an engine and rubber tires amongst a puddle of gasoline perform the same processes as a car.

Belz, you might want to include yourself in this snowflake vs. liquid water thing I got going -- he is backed into a corner and I could use assistance prodding a response from him.

 

[rocketdodger]

Exactly what your point is here I don't know. You seem to think that because a process is going on in A but not B that proves that some different process is going on in C but not D. There's no connection between the two.

*sigh*... again... a pathetic attempt at avoiding having to answer a very simple question.

Is a drop of liquid water crystalline? Yes or No?

 

[westprog]

Snowflakes.

That's your definition of information processing? Well, it's a start, I suppose.

Now, if you wanted to make a real go of it, you'd cobble together something referring to entropy and combine that with information to produce some kind of theory.

But just saying that there's organisation in a snowflake that isn't present in a drop of water doesn't get us very far. It certainly doesn't produce a theory.

 

[Belz...]

What exactly are qualia and how exactly do they work? That's just what I wanna know. How do I know they exist? The term 'qualia' is just a label for what I already experience. That they exist is a given; how they exist is not.

That they exist is not such a given considering that the people studying behaviour and the human nervous system don't seem to be using the term at all.

You seem to be unable to distinguish the sensation of cold from the actual state of being cold. They most certainly are not the same.

How would you know ?

Words are still composed of phonemes; they do not lose their status of being phonemes when they compose words or propositions. What you are saying is equivalent to claiming that rivers flow downstream but water does not.

Wow. That has nothing to do with it. You said that you can have qualia about qualia and you're using text as a metaphor. But clearly, you can't have phonemes about phonemes so the metaphor doesn't really work, at any level.

How can a concept make sense from any point of view if it is incoherent?

Because philosophy often doesn't care.

The concept of 'genes' had the same epistemic status until Watson & Crick helped discover the structure of the DNA molecule and crack the genetic code. The fact that a concept or phenomena has not yet been scientifically mapped does not make the concept 'incoherent', it just means that we have no working knowledge of it.

Nice try. Indeed, that it isn't understood doesn't mean it's incoherent. That's not why I'm calling qualia incoherent, though.

That is utter nonsense, and you should know better. A frozen corpse doesn't feel cold it simply is cold. In order for something to experience stimuli as something there must be a quite a number of intermediate steps. If there were no need of those steps then there would be no need for brains or neural processing because objects would just directly experience stimuli w/o.

The only intermediate step is that it has to strike a nerve, so to speak, in order for "you" to detect the coldness.

You're completely missing the point. Even the components of atoms are themselves just behaviors, and their components, and so on. There is no such thing as objects outside of process.

Considering what I just said, I find it odd that you answer this, so I'm just going to say it again.

Aku. Observable entities are objects that have behaviours. Now, it's possible that elementary particles are, in and of themselves, behaviours but that's besides the point. Things composed of particles are objects, not behaviours. A thought, like "running", is an action and is not composed of anything. Yet it still exists. I think you're trying to describe the composition of a behaviour.

What social status?

Talk about missing the point.

But pointing out the irrational basis of your objections is fun

Irrational ? NO ONE HERE is able to define qualia in a way that could make them falsifiable or observable even in principle, and I'M the one who's irrational ?

Translation:

"I really don't like that word qualia; it makes me wet the bed at night. Can we just call them perceptions?

Childish.

Because I don't bend over backwards to avoid using taboo words lol

Oh, like "soul" ? Why don't we use that, instead ?

Erm...How do u figure that? If qualia are no more or less 'behavior' and atoms and you consider 'behavior' as being superfluous then that would make matter superfluous as well

Gosh, you're really having problems with this. If everything is behaviour, then it's useless to ever talk about composition. And if not, then qualia wouldn't be basic unless we're talking about new physical laws, and so far you haven't demonstrated that this is necessary.

 

[Belz...]

There's a difference between "have the same processes" and "performs the same processes".

Then I'm done talking to you. When you're that deep into semantics, it's clear that you're way beyond the ability to be convinced by actual arguments.

 

[rocketdodger]

There's a difference between "have the same processes" and "performs the same processes". In the case of a car, the difference is that the car moves itself around. That's a physical effect, and it's well defined. What I'm looking for (without any success at all) is an indication of what computation is with the same kind of physical meaning as motion.

You are correct, except for the fact that every molecule of the parts of a car are also in constant motion ... so , yeah, a pile of car parts "moves itself around" just like the car does.

Sort of like you are claiming a hard drive has electrical current flowing through it.

Can't you see -- given the fact that you don't even recognize your own arguments, as demonstrated above -- that you have literally no idea what you are talking about?

 

[Nick227]

Its not so much that I'm distinguishing the contents of the mind from the mind; I'm proposing that the experience of mental content, as such, is consciousness.

Are you saying then that something experiences consciousness? Something outside of consciousness? Is this not dualism?

Nick

 

[westprog]

Then I'm done talking to you. When you're that deep into semantics, it's clear that you're way beyond the ability to be convinced by actual arguments.

It's not a matter of semantics. It's that you are unable to define in any precise way what you mean by information processing. Rocketdodger had a go. He said "snowflake". One might find that inadequate, but at least he's having a go.

 

[AkuManiMani]

That they exist is not such a given considering that the people studying behaviour and the human nervous system don't seem to be using the term at all.

So what if they aren't using the term? Its just a label for a class of phenomena. Just because some don't choose to use the term doesn't mean that the process it refers to isn't real.

You seem to be unable to distinguish the sensation of cold from the actual state of being cold. They most certainly are not the same.

How would you know ?

Because its possible not to feel temperature.

Words are still composed of phonemes; they do not lose their status of being phonemes when they compose words or propositions. What you are saying is equivalent to claiming that rivers flow downstream but water does not.

Wow. That has nothing to do with it. You said that you can have qualia about qualia and you're using text as a metaphor. But clearly, you can't have phonemes about phonemes so the metaphor doesn't really work, at any level.

By merely talking about phonemes you're creating phonemes in reference to phonemes. You've hit a dead end on this one, try another route.

How can a concept make sense from any point of view if it is incoherent?

Because philosophy often doesn't care.

I wasn't aware that philosophy was a person.

The concept of 'genes' had the same epistemic status until Watson & Crick helped discover the structure of the DNA molecule and crack the genetic code. The fact that a concept or phenomena has not yet been scientifically mapped does not make the concept 'incoherent', it just means that we have no working knowledge of it.

Nice try. Indeed, that it isn't understood doesn't mean it's incoherent. That's not why I'm calling qualia incoherent, though.

You're simply quibbling over the term. You can't prove the the concept is 'incoherent' because the term is in reference to a class of vertical phenomena.

That is utter nonsense, and you should know better. A frozen corpse doesn't feel cold it simply is cold. In order for something to experience stimuli as something there must be a quite a number of intermediate steps. If there were no need of those steps then there would be no need for brains or neural processing because objects would just directly experience stimuli w/o.

The only intermediate step is that it has to strike a nerve, so to speak, in order for "you" to detect the coldness.

You claimed that there are no intermediate steps and equated the temperature as being identical to the sensation of it being cold. However you want to phrase it, the statement was dead wrong.

You're completely missing the point. Even the components of atoms are themselves just behaviors, and their components, and so on. There is no such thing as objects outside of process.

Considering what I just said, I find it odd that you answer this, so I'm just going to say it again.

Aku. Observable entities are objects that have behaviours. Now, it's possible that elementary particles are, in and of themselves, behaviours but that's besides the point. Things composed of particles are objects, not behaviours. A thought, like "running", is an action and is not composed of anything. Yet it still exists. I think you're trying to describe the composition of a behaviour.


[...]

Gosh, you're really having problems with this. If everything is behaviour, then it's useless to ever talk about composition. And if not, then qualia wouldn't be basic unless we're talking about new physical laws, and so far you haven't demonstrated that this is necessary.

*facepalm*

I thought you would be able to intuitively pick up on the concept but it seems I'm going to have to break it down to you piecemeal. All entities are processes and their objecthood is a measure of the degree of their overall habituation. An entity's particular pattern(s) of habituation determine its properties as an object. It is pattern of habituation thru time/space that allows entities to be distinguished from the background of their surroundings and labeled, as such. Process and object are fundamentally equivalent.

This is all just a fancy metaphysical way of restating the equivalence of matter and energy. Energy is change [or potential change] and objects are habituated patterns of energy. Matter is just a class of objects composed of atoms. Thoughts and ideas are another class of objects which just happen to not be composed of atoms.

But pointing out the irrational basis of your objections is fun

Irrational ? NO ONE HERE is able to define qualia in a way that could make them falsifiable or observable even in principle, and I'M the one who's irrational ?

'Qualia' is just a label -- a term -- for the sense datum that make up our conscious observations. Pray tell, how do you falsify observation? The fact is, you're going thru the ridiculous effort to falsify the concept on the grounds that it cannot be observed when the concept is in reference TO observation. You're just mindlessly attacking on the basis of fluff [in this case, a choice of labels] and confusing it with a dispute of substance. Get off it, Belz, this is becoming embarrassing. -_-

Translation:

"I really don't like that word qualia; it makes me wet the bed at night. Can we just call them perceptions?"

Childish.

Maybe, but its still true

Because I don't bend over backwards to avoid using taboo words lol

Oh, like "soul" ? Why don't we use that, instead ?

Because that isn't the concept being discussed, obviously

 

[AkuManiMani]

Are you saying then that something experiences consciousness? Something outside of consciousness? Is this not dualism?

Nick

I'm saying that conscious experience is a state function of the mind.

 

[Nick227]

I'm saying that conscious experience is a state function of the mind.

I think where I'm getting caught up is over the word "experience." Do you mean that there is something that is experiencing? I mean at a level below that of the whole organism.

Nick