The Hard Problem of Gravity

[AkuManiMani]

It is in the DNA molecule, but at a higher level of abstraction than the bases. Looking at the bases you won't see the wood for the trees - it's the genes that explicitly code for morphology - length of limbs, number of digits, etc.

Thats just it. There are no genes that code for limbs, numbers of digits, and things like that. All genes are are templates for amino acid chains -- that's it. They don't give any instructions like how, where, and when the proteins are supposed to be produced or arranged. The genome isn't a blueprint; its a database of parts. Its the living cell that determines how loci will be read, when they will be read, and how their products will be utilized.

I think I mentioned earlier in the thread that I've recently been reading up on a field called biosemiotics. Basic idea is that what separates living systems from inanimate ones is that they are all semiotic -- they are systems of signs, codes, and meanings that direct every level of biological processes. In this scheme, a distinction is drawn between catalyzed chemical reactions and coded chemical reactions.

Before you get too involved in biosemiotics, it might be worth picking up some more basic biology & physiology.

I have. I've done well in bio since high school and I've continued doing quite well in my college level bio. My curiosity doesn't stop there, I'm afraid >_<

All I know is that there must be some unitary process that allows a single microscopic cell to not only function, but unfold into a complex community of cells that considers itself a singular entity.

The genetic code generating a good number of self-organising systems.

The genes are not even what contains the codes for proteins; its the ribosomes which determine which genetic sequences correspond with particular amino acids. Genes do not DO anything -- even their very significance as protein templates is determined by the active processes of living cells. Genes, by themselves, do not generate anything or determine anything.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Thats just it. There are no genes that code for limbs, numbers of digits, and things like that. All genes are are templates for amino acid chains -- that's it. They don't give any instructions like how, where, and when the proteins are supposed to be produced or arranged. The genome isn't a blueprint; its a database of parts. Its the living cell that determines how loci will be read, when they will be read, and how their products will be utilized.



I have. I've done well in bio since high school and I've continued doing quite well in my college level bio. My curiosity doesn't stop there, I'm afraid >_<



The genes are not even what contains the codes for proteins; its the ribosomes which determine which genetic sequences correspond with particular amino acids. Genes do not DO anything -- even their very significance as protein templates is determined by the active processes of living cells. Genes, by themselves, do not generate anything or determine anything.

That's not quite right as stated. The 'reality' lies in some intersection of this conversation.

Genetic material in DNA does not properly code for everything. But it is also not right to say that it doesn't code for everything and that ribosomes do it all. Rather, it is the intersection of DNA coding for protein, assembly of protein and interaction of proteins that the work occurs.

While there is no direct code precisely for limb formation, there are interactions amongst several gene products that determine limb formation. While there is no gene for "this is a pinky", the concentration of sonic hedgehog here rather than there determines pinky side vs thumb side; just as concentration of sonic hedgehog and BMPs determine the patterning of the CNS.

While it isn't correct for people to think one gene -- one particular outcome, it is also no correct to say that genes don't code for this stuff. It's just that the timing and interaction of gene products is very complex.

 

[westprog]

The fact that everything is conscious is not a word game. It's a matter of how the universe works.

Of course, you will reply "that is absurd." Funny how when I use an identical argument you all of a sudden declare it to be incorrect.

I'm delighted you've moved from a position that is internally inconsistent to one which is merely unsupported. It's certainly possible that the universe is full of conscious entities at every level. There's no evidence to show that to be the case, though.

Until you understand what physical process creates consciousness, you are in no position from which to declare anyone else incorrect on the matter.

It is just that simple.

And again a total misunderstanding of how science works. It may seem unfair to you that your beloved theory can be attacked by someone who doesn't have one of his own for you to take apart. However, that's the way it is. If your theory is wrong, or unsupported, or inconsistent, then all a critic is obliged to do is to point out the flaws.

The most obvious flaw in the "information processing" model is in the failure to define "information processing" in any systematic way.

lol.

Again, you ignore everything in the middle. You understand that there are animals halfway between a human and an amoeba, right?

Are they just "half" conscious?

Why is "We don't know" such a hard thing for you to accept?

Westprog, your entire method of argument is to actively avoid making points.

I've noticed that few of the points I've made have actually registered.

Except for the universality of switches. That one seemed to trigger a change of emphasis in a non-linear way.

It is no wonder everyone else has to deduce what you might mean.

For example, you haven't yet addressed my questions about crystallization, now have you? Why is that? Maybe you just didn't see the post ... or maybe you are pretending you didn't see it...

Yes, maybe that point you made about crystallisation was so good I'm desperate to avoid confronting it.

And billions of people could carry on talking to their animals... their plants... their dead relatives... their dolls... their gods...

...their dogs

I guess we must look pretty stupid to you.

Who exactly do you mean when you say "we"?

 

[Dancing David]

I've been giving the issue a lot of thought and been reading up on a lot of materials since we first started discussion this issue a while ago. For the most part, I've been going down the list of candidates in my mind. I don't think I have any definite candidate for 'self' or 'organizing process' but I think I go down the list of candidates I think can be disqualified.

Sounds like you get the idea of the buddha's drift.

Cell walls and membranes must be actively maintained so I think we can rule that out as a primary organizing factor. All of the chemical processes of the body seem to be actively pushed away from thermodynamic equilibrium so it doesn't seem that strait forward chemistry, IAOI, can be invoked as the organizing process.

Ooops, you can't violate the laws of physics, there is still theromdynamic equilibrium, you just have a mechanism for bringing in energy and distributing it. (Digestion, metabolism)

Right now, DNA seems the reigning candidate as the organizing factor in contemporary biology but, after personally giving it some thought, it appears that this one doesn't cut it either. DNA itself doesn't do anything; its just a chemical string that the machinery of the cell selectively reads and translates into amino acid strings. There is nothing in the DNA molecule itself that explicitly codes for, or dictates, morphology. This is even more clear in multicellular organisms where all of the cells contain the same genes yet develop and function in radically different ways.

Yup.

I think I mentioned earlier in the thread that I've recently been reading up on a field called biosemiotics. Basic idea is that what separates living systems from inanimate ones is that they are all semiotic -- they are systems of signs, codes, and meanings that direct every level of biological processes.

I am not sure thata chemical gardient is really a sign or a code.

In this scheme, a distinction is drawn between catalyzed chemical reactions and coded chemical reactions.

Not really, what if catalysis is the basis for the developmental pattern?

I'm not quite certain if the ideas of the biosemiotic discipline will be a sufficient explanation but it seems that if there is to be a more complete understanding of the organizational process of life semiosis may be a crucial part of it.

So it sounds like there is no 'organizing principle' that you could point to as the self?

What is the 'self'? How does it work? Beats me. All I know is that there must be some unitary process that allows a single microscopic cell to not only function, but unfold into a complex community of cells that considers itself a singular entity.

Why the 'single', pluralism rocks.

I got some vague guesses as to what the 'self' might be, but I don't know enough to bring them to ground, atm.

See, the buddha's thought is growing in you. It takes time.

For a long time I used to think that that would be a sufficient explanation. Then I realized that, as of now, what we have is a crude explanation of the mechanisms of stimulus/response but not of the subjective perceptions of stimuli as qualities [what I've been calling 'qualia']

I answered what you asked, you raised another question.

I don't see how anything could occur or operate w/o some reason or understandable mechanism for doing so. Contrary to the impression I might have given some people in this thread, I do not believe in magic

Sure but that does not mean there is a single priciple or mechanism.

 

[Belz...]

They're in a big heap. Of course they're connected. Some are electrically insulated from others, just as in the "working" computer.

No, not "just" as. Seriously, what kind of computing do you think the heap does compared to the functional computer ?

So are the people who think they do have qualia mistaken, or is their experience of the universe different?

First choice. Qualia are logically incoherent, superluous, undefined, physically impossible and scientifically unfalsifiable.

 

[westprog]

Person A: "What is consciousness?"

Person B: "Oh, its just information processing."

Person A: " What does that mean? There has to be more to it than that."

Person B: "Nonsense. We already know what it is."

Person A: "But what about stuff like feelings, colors, and sounds? Shouldn't we be trying to figure out what they are and how they come about?"

Person B: "Those are incoherent irrelevancies we already understand."

Person A: "Erm...So what are they?"

Person B: "Information processing."

Person A: "..."

Person A: "What is information processing?"

Person B: " What do you mean? Information processing is processing of information."

Person A: "But when is it taking place, and when is it not taking place? What constitutes processing? What constitutes information?"

Person B: "Are you trying to say that there's no difference between a snowflake and a drop of water? Because that's absurd."

 

[westprog]

No, not "just" as. Seriously, what kind of computing do you think the heap does compared to the functional computer ?

What do you mean by "computing"? If you mean transmitting information into a human consciousness, then none. If you mean transferring information around, then plenty.

I've been waiting for a precise definition of "computing" or "information processing" that applies to the working computer but not to the heap of components for a while now. Surely in such a mature and respected field someone has done the basics?

First choice. Qualia are logically incoherent, superluous, undefined, physically impossible and scientifically unfalsifiable.

The ironic thing is that you probably felt happy typing that. But that's incoherent, physically impossible and scientifically unfalsifiable, so we can just disregard it.

 

[Belz...]

Essentially, a quale is an elementary subjective response to some informational stimuli. This means that they are always referent to some other object. In order for a conscious entity to be self-aware they must have the ability to self-reference their basic qualitative elements. This means that qualia must be able to act as informational stimuli.

Word salad. WHAT is a quale ? How does it work ? How do you know they exist ?

Because to be conscious of something one necessarily perceives it as some quality or collection of qualities.

Huh ? Which qualities ? Cold, for instance ? But it's not something the "mind" makes up. It's a direct consequence of the properties of whatever is already cold. I still see no reason to posit the existence of qualia.

In order to create a sentence or body of sentences in reference to phoneme(s), one necessarily creates a group of phonemes about phoneme(s).

Absolutely not. Phonemes represent nothing. They are arrayed together to form arbitrary meanings but the phonemes themselves have none. So they're not about anything, and assembled phonemes are no longer phonemes.

That's pretty presumptuous considering that you have yet to understand what I'm saying. Just because your understanding of the concept is incoherent does not make the concept incoherent

I understand that qualia are unnecessary, and that the standard definition is incoherent. Qualia only make sense from a philosophical point of view, but scientifically they are meaningless.

Because the code's already been cracked and we can easily read and reproduce conscious experiences with perfect fidelity. Oh, wait....

Argument from ignorance.

The sensation of cold is not temperature; it is the mental representation of a stimuli that, in our case, happens to correspond with temperature.

No, it's a behaviour that is a direct consequence of the cold. There is no intermediary step.

All observable entities are actions. Just because atoms are just the actions of its components does not make them non-existent as entities. The same is true of mental representations.

Aku. Observable entities are objects that have behaviours. Now, it's possible that elementary particles are, in and of themselves, behaviours but that's besides the point. Things composed of particles are objects, not behaviours. A thought, like "running", is an action and is not composed of anything. Yet it still exists. I think you're trying to describe the composition of a behaviour.

Neither am I. You're just reacting like a superstitious peasant to unfamiliar terms and concepts.

And you're acting like a witch doctor making up stuff to maintain your social status.

Now that we've traded irrelevancies, can we get back to the point ?

Qualia are made of our perceptions. What constitutes perception? Thats what science must establish

Qualia don't exist. What constitutes perception? Thats what science must establish

Now, tell me why your sentence is more realistic than mine.

That's because you're being unreasonable and reacting irrationally. I suspect that your chief motivation is to knock the arrogant AMM down a few pegs by proving him wrong. I think you're so blinded by your desire to put a 'woo' in his place that you don't even realize how naive and shallow your level of argumentation is. This frustrates me because I know you're a lot smarter than that.

As usual, attempts to delve into my mind are futile. Please refrain from trying to determine what goes on in my mind and adress my points.

You're right; I AM proposing something a good deal more radical than you're used to. I'm saying that processes and entities are interchangeable concepts.

That actually helps me, not you, because it would mean that, in the end, everything is behaviour and composition is an obsolete concept. That would make qualia superfluous, again.

 

[Belz...]

I suspect that your chief motivation is to knock the arrogant AMM down a few pegs by proving him wrong.

I suspect you simply want to prove that your perceptions are not merely illusions.

Let's admit exhibit A:

There must be some kind of physical/metaphysical principle of how and why qualitative experince arises.

 

[Belz...]

"Qualia" is subjective experience. If subjective experience is accepted, then denying qualia is just playing word games.

It's impossible to discuss thoughts, feelings or experiences without implying qualia. That's what qualia are.

So, AGAIN, they are superfluous because we already have words for those behaviours, namely "thought", "feeling" and "experience".

 

[Belz...]

What do you mean by "computing"? If you mean transmitting information into a human consciousness, then none. If you mean transferring information around, then plenty.

I've been waiting for a precise definition of "computing" or "information processing" that applies to the working computer but not to the heap of components for a while now. Surely in such a mature and respected field someone has done the basics?

Westprog, what you are effectively claiming, it seems, is that there is nothing in a working computer that happens that doesn't happen in a heap of unplugged computer components except transmitting information to a human ?

Please say no.

The ironic thing is that you probably felt happy typing that.

Goddamnit. Please stop trying to read other people's minds. It's getting very annoying.

I just wanted to make sure that I listed everything that is wrong with the idea of qualia.

But that's incoherent, physically impossible and scientifically unfalsifiable, so we can just disregard it.

Yes, that's exactly what I was saying. Thanks.

 

[westprog]

Westprog, what you are effectively claiming, it seems, is that there is nothing in a working computer that happens that doesn't happen in a heap of unplugged computer components except transmitting information to a human ?

Please say no.

What I said was that there are no processes going on in the computer that aren't going on in the components. Obviously they aren't the same. No two things are the same. The processes are going on to different degrees in the components lying on the floor.

Goddamnit. Please stop trying to read other people's minds. It's getting very annoying.

And now you "feel annoyed". Well, guess what. That's qualia. And if you think that qualia are not a coherent idea, then you shouldn't be saying that something is annoying. That's just the same thing.

I just wanted to make sure that I listed everything that is wrong with the idea of qualia.



Yes, that's exactly what I was saying. Thanks.

 

[westprog]

So, AGAIN, they are superfluous because we already have words for those behaviours, namely "thought", "feeling" and "experience".

You must find the English language very annoying, with it's superfluity of synonyms. However, qualia includes "thought", "feeling" and "experience" and hence does not have an exact equivalent, and hence is not redundant. Even if it were, what harm? Jargon is a feature of most fields.

 

[Belz...]

What I said was that there are no processes going on in the computer that aren't going on in the components.

I would say that you are wrong. For instance, there is no DC going through the components.

And now you "feel annoyed".

See ? The only reason why you know is because I told you.

Well, guess what. That's qualia.

Claims are not evidence.

And if you think that qualia are not a coherent idea, then you shouldn't be saying that something is annoying. That's just the same thing.

No, it isn't. This guessing at my psyche has caused a behaviour that we label as "annoyance". These "qualia" you speak of are an unnecessary middle step. And you show it by labeling qualia with the same terms we use to label private behaviours.

You must find the English language very annoying, with it's superfluity of synonyms.

The English language doesn't try to describe things scientifically.

However, qualia includes "thought", "feeling" and "experience" and hence does not have an exact equivalent, and hence is not redundant.

So, basically, "qualia", to you and as opposed to what Aku says, is just a synonym for "private behaviour" ? Then why use another term when the other one better describes what we're talking about ?

Even if it were, what harm?

It hints at either dualism or woo-woo.

 

[westprog]

I would say that you are wrong. For instance, there is no DC going through the components.

It's almost certain that thermal effects will produce some kind of current through some of the bits and pieces.

 

[Nick227]

Fine by me.

SHRDLU can tell you exactly how and why it carried out particular actions. If Stanley can't (and as far as I'm aware, it can't) then that's exactly the difference I'm talking about.

So, in the sense of the term "think" used by Hofstadter, you would be happy to state that SHRDLU thinks?

Nick

 

[Nick227]

On the surface it would seem that what I've been proposing reflects Descartes in some way. Well, I reject dualism [and other pluralisms] mainly because of the interaction problem. Descartes posited that mind and matter were fundamentally different things -- if that were the case then there would be no way for mind to affect body and vis versa. For there to be interaction between entities they must have a common basis. This is why I think that some variant of monism must be the most accurate ontological description of reality.

At the same time, there must be a way for there to be real differences and distinguishability between entities [i.e. functional plurality] otherwise existence would be an undifferentiated continuum and we would not exist to talk about it. Most of the monist ontologies I'm aware of pick some arbitrary category [like mind, matter, 'spirit', etc..] and extend that category to encoumpass all other entities. I think that this is counterproductive since it needlessly blends categories and causes unnecessary ambiguity.

Several months back, when I was expressing my view of metaphysics I was told by a forum member [I've forgotten who] that what I was describing was a kind of neutral monism. I looked into the subject and found that my views are most similar to dialectical monism. When I distinguish between objective/subjective, quanta/qualia, or WaI/WaS I'm not referring to separate 'substances', as Descartes did. What I'm referring to are complementary relations. What I'm thinking of deviates quite a bit from what Descartes ever dreamed of. I'll attempt to elaborate what I've been thinking up below.

In the conception that I'm drawing upon, I don't see 'mind' and 'matter' as being in dialectical relation to one another. It seems to me that the mind is as vertically objective as the atomic matter of the body. Being veridical, in principle, the mind should be objectively observable. In my current formulation [at least the bit I bothered to write in my philosophy term paper >_<] I see the mind as being an emergent 'metasystem', or abstractive layer, of the body. What we call conscious experience is just the 'inside' subjective perspective of a mind [it's WaS correlate]. Even then experience, as such, does not occur unless the mind is in a specific range of states. When in such states, we are able to perceive sensory impressions and mental constructs as being qualities.

I'm not clear how an emergent metasystem can have a subjective perspective. How do you distinguish mind from the contents of mind?

Nick

 

[westprog]

No, it isn't. This guessing at my psyche has caused a behaviour that we label as "annoyance". These "qualia" you speak of are an unnecessary middle step. And you show it by labeling qualia with the same terms we use to label private behaviours.

But the point of "annoyance" is that it is not, in general terms, a behaviour. In fact, it's quite possible that someone will use language to state that they are annoyed precisely because their behaviour does not indicate annoyance. It's also reasonably common for people to claim that they are notannoyed, even when their behaviour indicates that they are. When people are annoyed they don't need to say it if their behaviour demonstrates it.

I'm not sure what "private behaviour" is supposed to be. It's a term that's been used a lot in this thread, but as far as I can tell it's an oxymoron.

 

[Dancing David]

It's almost certain that thermal effects will produce some kind of current through some of the bits and pieces.

I am considering your point, but I disagree with this. (In fact I think it is funny.The question about computing.)

Really, the same levels of current and the same potentials and voltages, really?

Other than that yes, a better defintion is needed. But all defintitions are self referential and circular. Referents are part of language as well.

 

[Dancing David]

But the point of "annoyance" is that it is not, in general terms, a behaviour.

Not in general terms, no.

But under behaviorism as a psychology field. It sure is.

It is the follwoing sets of behaviors (plus many more).
A set of physiological states, sensations and perceptions.
A set of 'emotions' which are part sensation, parta ssociative values and mostly 'cognitive framing'
Can continuie in many directions from there as well.

behaviors in radical behaviorism may also be called events in common language.

In fact, it's quite possible that someone will use language to state that they are annoyed precisely because their behaviour does not indicate annoyance.

Public behaviors do not equal private behaviors.

It's also reasonably common for people to claim that they are notannoyed, even when their behaviour indicates that they are. When people are annoyed they don't need to say it if their behaviour demonstrates it.

Validity of expression and insight are another issue as well.

I'm not sure what "private behaviour" is supposed to be. It's a term that's been used a lot in this thread, but as far as I can tell it's an oxymoron.

Only because you do not agree with it or have not been exposed to it. Mercutio and Jeff Corey have linked to it, i can find the defintions if you want.