Piggy
Unlicensed street skeptic
- Joined
- Mar 11, 2006
- Messages
- 15,905
But you are now saying that he could pad the asset list with imaginary value without any cash, buildings, etc. This would indeed be "creating money". It would as far as I am aware be way, way outside the allowed bounds of GAP (generally accepted accounting principles) and thus would not withstand any accountant's audit.
Well, that question comes down to how you "mark" such an asset.
The loan you hold is an asset, just like a bond is -- one day you'll get something from it, unless there's a default. If you don't allow institutions to count loans, even risky loans, as some sort of asset, then their balance sheets become deceptively low.
The question is, how much is it worth?
Your choices are "mark to market" (the value you could get if you had to liquidate right now) and "mark to model" (the value you predict you'll get based on your projections over time).
Enron used mark-to-model to inflate its books. It created high-risk ventures and then predicted outlandish profits from them and treated those profits as if they were assets, thereby hiding their actual (real and current) losses by padding the books with "assets" which were nothing more than figures picked out of the air.
So what we have now is a standard mark-to-market valuation. The banks are protesting this b/c they say it forces them to undervalue their holdings, given that some portion of those holdings certainly do represent higher realized value over time.
But no one wants to re-open the floodgates of mark-to-model.
I would be interested to know how the securitized-against-potential assets were valued. [ETA: I'd guess that the value was marked at the insured amount, which one would assume could be realized in case of default -- but of course the insurance companies did not have the assets to back all of their insured securities if everything went in the tank, which it did.]
Anyway, yes, you have to have some means of allowing a held loan to be counted as an asset.
Once you do that, you necessarily allow banks to generate further loans against that asset base. If you did not, then banks would stop making loans.
So once again, we see that the problem was not in this or that part of the system -- it was in the collective consequences of what the entire system was allowed to do.
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