Materealism and morality

[JetLeg]

Yes. See Antidepressant^WP.

If it is a scientific discovery that feelings are actually different interactions of various chemicals in the brain -

then you definitely can't define feelings as "different interactions of various chemicals in the brain".



You discover that A is B.

If A were defined as "B", then your discovery would be meaningless.



It shows that you need to give a different definition for feelings from "different interactions of various chemicals in the brain". After you do it, go ahead and claim that science has shown that feelings are "different interactions of various chemicals in the brain"

 

[Taffer]

If it is a scientific discovery that feelings are actually different interactions of various chemicals in the brain -

then you definitely can't define feelings as "different interactions of various chemicals in the brain".



You discover that A is B.

If A were defined as "B", then your discovery would be meaningless.



It shows that you need to give a different definition for feelings from "different interactions of various chemicals in the brain". After you do it, go ahead and claim that science has shown that feelings are "different interactions of various chemicals in the brain"

Or it could be that, after the scientific discovery, it was found that feelings are different interactions of chemicals within the brain.

Y'know, here, in reality.

 

[L The Detective]

"If you choose to be moral only when it suits your purposes, then you are not really being moral."

And then you claim that one should be moral because it benefits you in the long term.

But I don't see much difference between those. If you are moral because it benefits you in the long term, then actually you are moral just because it suits your purposes (long-term, in this case). And then - are you really moral?

For all practical purposes, yes, I believe so. I believe it's actions that matter, not motivations. If a person always behaves morally, even when it is not in his best interests, then that is good enough for me. It doesn't matter to me if he's only doing so because that philosophy is in his overall best interest.

Actually, I'm not sure if there's really a meaningful difference between a person who is only moral because it is in his overall benefit, and a person who is moral simply because it is "programmed" in. There's a technical difference, as you have pointed out. But what's the functional difference? If I were this person's friend, and I had no way to tell whether he was one or the other, what would be the meaningful difference to me, and why?

This is why I referred to this view as "nihilistic" which is a bad choice of a word. I meant to say that saying that morality is a "useful idea" means that if morality is decided upon what is useful to you, it is not really about morality.

Yes, I see your point, now. If we are judging solely by intentions, then you are right. But if we are judging solely by actions, you are wrong. That's the way I see it.

And as far as I can tell, there is no better logical justifications for being moral. There are emotional reasons, (it feels good to be moral) which themselves can also be logical justifications, but again that comes back to being moral for your own sake. And there's moral dogma, which as you point out is simply obedience. Depending on how you look at it, that's also being moral for your own sake.

Can you think of any reason to be moral that, in some way, has nothing to do with self-benefit?

What are your criteria for morality, even if not absolute?

The reason I think that the idea of "objective morality" is such a good one, is because it can explain the attitudes we have in real life. If a person kills another person, then we think that he "really" did something bad. And if he thinks he did something good, we think he is "wrong". This is the language of objective reality. Also, the idea of "objective morality" can explain the fact that we can use reason to advance our moral understanding. How could we use reason if there were no objective moral reality?

Well, I sort of agree with you. I do think there are good reasons for being moral. But like I said, I don't think these reasons are objective truth, because what is true depends on our perspective, and the nature of an idea depends upon the parameters you set.

I can get into that in more detail later, if you like, though at this particular moment I don't have the time, so I need to wrap this post up.

Some philosophy text I have read claims that even if morality is objective, the question still remains what does it consist of -> objective good and bad rules? objective good and bad acts? objective good and bad personal traits? objective good and bad intentions? I think it is a good point.

But I am very far from having built a good philosophic understanding of what morality is.

Well, then you and I are in the same boat! I've given it some thought as well, and what I have told you is basically what I've come up with so far. Looks like we are both still learning.

 

[JetLeg]

Or it could be that, after the scientific discovery, it was found that feelings are different interactions of chemicals within the brain.

Imagine that you are a scientist investigating whether feelings are different interactions of chemicals within the brain.

You want to submit a paper to a journal. I am the editor of the journal. I return you the paper, and say "Your claim is that you have discovered that feelings are different interactions of chemicals within the brain. Please define 'feeling' ".



Do you think that you would be justified to say "feelings are different interactions of chemicals within the brain. " ? Of course not.



If we want to debate whether feelings are different interactions of chemicals within the brain, do not define feelings as what you want to prove them to be...

 

[Taffer]

Imagine that you are a scientist investigating whether feelings are different interactions of chemicals within the brain.

You want to submit a paper to a journal. I am the editor of the journal. I return you the paper, and say "Your claim is that you have discovered that feelings are different interactions of chemicals within the brain. Please define 'feeling' ".



Do you think that you would be justified to say "feelings are different interactions of chemicals within the brain. " ? Of course not.



If we want to debate whether feelings are different interactions of chemicals within the brain, do not define feelings as what you want to prove them to be...

You are playing semantics. A feeling is a feedback-loop generated within the brain to modify behaviour. A feeling is not a magical "thing" which is separate from the brain.

 

[JetLeg]

You are playing semantics. A feeling is a feedback-loop generated within the brain to modify behaviour. A feeling is not a magical "thing" which is separate from the brain.

I am not playing semantics. You need to prove that a feeling is a feedback-loop generated within the brain to modify behaviour. I will ask you for evidence. But before citing the evidence, I am asking you for a definition. Please do not define feeling as the very thing you want to prove it to be.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

That's a good point. Not only do I agree with you, in fact I am certain that morality is not *always* more beneficial to you.

However, what I think you are overlooking, is that if you are not *always* moral, then you are not really moral. You have to choose whether you are, in the long term, going to be moral or not. If you choose to be moral only when it suits your purposes, then you are not really being moral.

I think both of you are using a different idea of what "being moral" is than what I am.

I think all adults with normal functioning brains (and even many of those with mental impairments) are "moral"--that is, they have moral capacity and have been able to internalize the moral norms they grew up with.

I think you guys are talking about having different moral values (some of which look amoral from certain view points). To compare to language, individuals might speak German or English or ASL as your first language, but they all have language.

ETA: Someone who is immoral, for example, can only be immoral with a moral capacity. Someone who breaks moral norms of society and attempts to hide it is still acting based on that moral processing that goes on in the mind. (The exception, I think, are those psychopaths and sociopaths that seem to have a cognitive deficit and really don't have that innate capacity for learning to sense right and wrong. I would lump them in the category of people who don't have normally functioning brains.)

As for benefit, I think it's more useful to look at the benefit in terms of how this moral capacity is adaptive. It's pretty clear that having the capacity to discern moral norms in a social setting is advantageous to the individual. (You know how to form alliances, enter into social contracts, expect to be treated the way you treat others, etc.) It's also advantageous to the group even when it might not favor a particular individual.

All of this is a materialist approach to morality. It's exactly the same as a materialist approach to language. (I think a great deal of what Pinker wrote about in The Language Instinct is probably true of morality.)

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I am not playing semantics. You need to prove that a feeling is a feedback-loop generated within the brain to modify behaviour. I will ask you for evidence.

What I mentioned before is pretty strong evidence. You could inject certain hormones into the bloodstream and get instant changes in emotion (as measured by a standard instrument, for example). You could do the same with some other drugs as well.

You can also do an fMRI while inducing emotional changes (perhaps by asking subjects to recount an emotion-laden memory rather than with drugs), and see some strong correlation between activity at certain brain sites with the reporting of the subjective experience of feeling emotion.

That's pretty strong evidence that the subjective experience of an emotion is caused by--or even "is"-- these physiological process. (Much the same way mind is caused by--or even "is"--the physiological processes in the brain.)

 

[JetLeg]

As for benefit, I think it's more useful to look at the benefit in terms of how this moral capacity is adaptive. It's pretty clear that having the capacity to discern moral norms in a social setting is advantageous to the individual. (You know how to form alliances, enter into social contracts, expect to be treated the way you treat others, etc.) It's also advantageous to the group even when it might not favor a particular individual.

Having the capacity to discern moral norms is very advatageous. But acting according to them isn't neccessarily.

Your attitude misses the whole point of morality. Can you imagine a possible world in which behaving morally is disadvatagous? (For example, if there is an evil god that punishes moral people). But in such a world it is still 'better' to behave morally, disregarding the consequences.

 

[nescafe]

On abortion -> Even if there is some emotional basis, you have to use science&reason to determine the question.

Science and reason can help clarify what the reasons you should or shound not allow abortion are, but the answer that any given person comes up will be guided by their moral intuition, their emotional response and other nonrational factors, often to the point that it does not matter what scientific or rational evidence you used.

Had not neurobiology discovered that cosnciousness depends heavily on the brain, and discovered the stage at which a fetus developed a neural system, we wouldn't have been able to have a reasonable discussion.

Abortions happened long before we knew anything at all about embryonic development. I doubt that the change in what we know about embryonic development has had much of an impact on people's moral intuitions on the subject.

On the other hand, it is not clear how the brain creates consciousness, and what consciousness really is. Had we known that, we wouldn't have a problem deciding whether abortion is moral.

So knowing that (if it is possible) will have a significant impact on the "you are killing a potential person" vs. "my body is mine to do what I want with it" dynamic that drives the abortion issue? I doubt it.

I am a bit confused with regards to your position, since it seems obvious to me that reason plays the vital part here. Even if both sides use emotion to further their arguments -> it is irrelevant, since the essence of the arguments is not about appeals to emotions, but about what a living being is.

Depending on what one considers a "being" -- eggs and sperm cells are living cells for any reasonable definition of "living", after all. The abortion argument is all about appeals to emotion and unreasoned moral responses (it is wrong because it is WRONG!! and all that).

Even, if your intuitionist meta-ethics would be true, then reason needs to function well, so the intuition would not be clouded by dogma.

You do not have to reason about morals at all in order to have them -- five year olds do not carefully consider their moral stance on anything by adult standards, yet they have recognizable (and even personalized!) moral positions.

 

[JetLeg]

What I mentioned before is pretty strong evidence. You could inject certain hormones into the bloodstream and get instant changes in emotion (as measured by a standard instrument, for example). You could do the same with some other drugs as well.

You can also do an fMRI while inducing emotional changes (perhaps by asking subjects to recount an emotion-laden memory rather than with drugs), and see some strong correlation between activity at certain brain sites with the reporting of the subjective experience of feeling emotion.

That's pretty strong evidence that the subjective experience of an emotion is caused by--or even "is"-- these physiological process. (Much the same way mind is caused by--or even "is"--the physiological processes in the brain.)

Maybe it is true, but it wasn't my point. My point was the sentence you didn't quote - that one cannot define feelings as physical processes if he is going to prove that feelings are physical processes.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Maybe it is true, but it wasn't my point. My point was the sentence you didn't quote - that one cannot define feelings as physical processes if he is going to prove that feelings are physical processes.

I don't follow. It seems to me if you are going to prove that feelings are physical processes, that's exactly how you'd define them.

 

[L The Detective]

I think you guys are talking about having different moral values (some of which look amoral from certain view points). To compare to language, individuals might speak German or English or ASL as your first language, but they all have language.

Yes, I think you're right. Maybe moral values is a better term.

 

[JetLeg]

I don't follow. It seems to me if you are going to prove that feelings are physical processes, that's exactly how you'd define them.

Huh?

If you define that feelings are physical processes, then the statement "feelings are physical processes" is a tautology, and not a scientific question.

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

Sounds to me like someone just doesn't like the idea of feelings having a scientific explanation.

Don't insist with him. It's been clearly explained already. This is just denial.
Let him believe whatever he wants to believe.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Having the capacity to discern moral norms is very advatageous. But acting according to them isn't neccessarily.

It certainly is at the level of a social group. (And you don't have "norms" without a group.)

Your attitude misses the whole point of morality. Can you imagine a possible world in which behaving morally is disadvatagous? (For example, if there is an evil god that punishes moral people). But in such a world it is still 'better' to behave morally, disregarding the consequences.

I think you're missing the whole "point of morality". If we rule out supernatural forces (since there's no evidence they exist), the "point of morality" is strictly a selective advantage. That's why that mental trait was selected for and persists in our genome. (Same as with language.)

Talking about good or bad gods is completely beside the point.

It's "better" to be moral because groups that have these traits survive and reproduce more effectively.

Just like it's "better" to have the capacity for language because that mental capacity was advantageous in surviving and reproducing.

I put "better" in the scare quotes because science really doesn't make value statements (as you pointed out early on). It can explain morality, though. From a scientific, materialist point of view, I doubt very much that there's a selective advantage to making value judgments (moral decisions) about explanations of morality.

Just as there's not much of a selective advantage to being able to understand and explain grammar (as opposed to using it).

Interestingly, here's another overlap of morality and language. Until modern linguistics took over grammar, the study of grammar was considered prescriptive rather than descriptive. It dealt with "ought" rather than "is".

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Don't insist with him. It's been clearly explained already. This is just denial.
Let him believe whatever he wants to believe.

I don't think that's a fair description of Jetleg's attitude (here and on other threads). I think he's been open to new ideas and approaches.

For that matter, reasonable minds can disagree, and I personally have enjoyed this conversation.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Huh?

If you define that feelings are physical processes, then the statement "feelings are physical processes" is a tautology, and not a scientific question.

It's a definition. The proof that feelings are physical process is evidence of that definition. A tautology is only when you offer the definition as if it were an argument.

From my point of view, I don't mind if you distinguish between feelings (the subjective experience) and the physical processes that cause or underly them. That's why I made those grammatically awkward statements like "caused by or even 'is'". It's the same to me as saying that mind is a function or emergent phenomenon of the brain. I'm OK with that.

For the contrary claim, that mind or feelings (the subjective experience) are independent of physical processes, there's a dearth of evidence.

I think about all you've got are things like ghost stories, and NDE/OBE anecdotes. (Both of which can be simulated by drugs nowadays, I believe. I'm pretty sure neuroscience has a pretty good idea of what brain structures are involved in or responsible for the subjective sensation of the location of the "self" with respect to the body.)

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Yes, I think you're right. Maybe moral values is a better term.

It's confusing. The same confusion happens with language and linguistics too.

The distinction between morality (the innate capacity) and morals or moral values (or even moral behavior) is similar to what linguists call langue et parole. Langue is the innate capacity, and parole is more like what is spoken--that is the decisions and behavior that depends on the innate capacity.

Languages (German, French, etc.) similarly correspond to moral codes or norms of society. As with language, some of it is innate ("natural") and some of it is conventional.

The biggest disjunct with my ongoing analogy of morality and language is, I think, that proportionately more of language is conventional and proportionately more of morality is natural. (Before reading Pinker's work, I wouldn't have said that difference was so--and I certainly don't claim to know this difference is so.)

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Back to morality and the selective advantage to the individual. I made a point a while ago that even if you act immorally, it still requires the moral capacity. Let me elaborate.

In chimp groups, there's usually an alpha male who gets first shot at the females in estrus. Studies have shown another reproductive strategy. Males with no hopes of ever being alpha, can sneak off into the bushes with receptive females for extremely fast "quickies". The sneaking depends on some of the mental capacities I'm talking about (awareness of the group norms and the ability to consider what something looks like from the point of view of the "other"--in this case the alpha male).

I'm not suggesting chimps have full-blown morality (or language), but I think they've certainly got proto-language and perhaps proto-morality. I think the difference between what they've got and what humans have is a difference of degree of complexity and not of kind. (In fact, I think most of our cognitive abilities exist as a continuum, and not as some unique endowment from God.)

At any rate, if you lacked the capacity for understanding group norms and for putting yourself in the other's place, you couldn't even act immorally.