Materealism and morality

[Skeptic Ginger]

There is nothing magic about dualism.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cartesian_dualism

The soul is real, not magical?

Why is it people who make these claims often don't understand what is being asked? I'll try again.

Where does the 'mind' originate if it isn't biology? Where does it exist?

 

[Third Eye Open]

Second, I am interested in your basis of distinguishing people from objects.

Seriously, read some about biology. Our brains are programmed to recognize human faces and human attributes in everything we look at. We can't HELP but recognize a human when we see one.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

This is why I tried to state in the OP explicitly that materialism doesn't give logical foundations for morality. (Just like solipsism/emotivism/relativism, et cetera).

Not that materialists are likely to be less moral - precisely because morality in reality is often not based upon logic.

Whether morality should be based on logic\reason, and to what extent is a fascinating topic. Perhaps for another post.

OK, fair enough.

How about this approach, no branch of philosophy or religion gives logical foundations for morality because morality doesn't depend on logical foundations (any more than language depends on the principles of linguistics or grammar) but rather exists as a mental trait that was a successful adaptation for humans. This explanation of morality is founded in science (which you might consider to be dependent on a materialist approach to the empirical world).

It seems to me that criticizing materialism for not providing logical foundations for morality presupposes that morality has logical foundations (that is, has its foundation on some system of logic leading to moral axioms or propositions).

 

[Miss_Kitt]

Jetleg -- Please define what you mean by "objective". I am used to "objective" meaning independent of the specific observer, as opposed to "subjective" which is something that is dependent on/defined solely by the observer. Thus "tasty" is a subjective definition, since some people like spice, some bland; some like very sweet, some not sweet; etc. By contrast, "conductive" is an objective quality, meaning that electrons move easily thus passing electrical current--this is true whether the observer has any concept of electricity or not, and even when no observer is present. (If lightning hits a tree in the forest, it will be scorched even in the absence of an observer.)

Morality can be objective, but that does not mean it is derived solely by the direct physical properties of the beings involved. Because morality always involves a relationship between two or more beings, it is necessarily defined by the context of interaction.
Your assertion that in order to believe that there is only matter means one is limited to things that are directly defined or described by the movement of atoms is mistaken. Physics may define the electrical impulse, and biology and chemistry the movements of neurons that occur during thought; but the definition of thought necessarily includes the information contained in that neuronal activity.

If we see something electrical occuring in a group of cells, we know some kind of activity is going on in them. If we see electrical impulse moving down a neuron and then releasing neurotransmitters into the next neuron, we know a signal is being sent. But we cannot know the content of that signal unless it somehow interacts with the world external to the neurons. Not until a muscle moves, a hormone level changes, a sound emerges, etc. do we have any indication of the signal's content. This activity is what we can observe and detect the content of; the neuronal activity is not (yet) of determinable content.
(Sidebar: I wonder if we will reach a 'Heisenberg' level with neural activity, where we can measure the movement of a neuronal impulse or its content, but not both?)
Thought can be comprised entirely of actions of material objects and forces, and still have information content. A rainbow, to draw a parallel, is a distribution of scattered light by refraction through water droplets; its content is the color spectrum.

Color is defined ostensibly, that is, ultimately we agree on what we mean by "red" by looking at a lot of red objects and abstracting the concept of "redness" from those concrete examples. The subsequent investigation into what wavelengths of light are perceived by our eyes as Red does not change the fact that the definition of RED is specific to human perception. We identified red first, then learned a way to scientifically describe what physical properties agree with the defined "redness". Color is a property of the physical interaction of the object(s), light, and the reflected (or emitted) light being taken in by a human eye and processed by a human brain. You can't take the human being's perception out of the definition; that is the context in which the concept is meaningful. We cannot, except allegorically, speak of the redness of a mathematical equation.

Similarly, "morality" is defined within a context of a human (or human-like) being interacting with another entity. It is nonsensical to try to define morality solely in terms of the movement of electrons, for the same reason that 3 + 4 = 7 cannot be evaluated for its redness. The context in which the concept is meaningful occurs at a higher level of abstraction. And just as we eventually found a way to use wavelengths of light to explain more precisely what we have agreed is "red", we can try to lay a logical foundation under the observed phenomena we agree is "moral". But morality, thought, and redness exist at a conceptual level above, and in a different context than, the physical properties of the objects that contain or convey them.

I've just condensed about 3 weeks of epistemology lectures into a half a page, I hope you can follow my train of thought. Regards, Miss Kitt

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I agree that you don't need to believe in God or be a logician to be moral.
<snip>
Whether morality should be based on logic\reason, and to what extent is a fascinating topic. Perhaps for another post.

Not to belabor the point, but it seems that your position has shifted around from this:

First, that morality is a useful idea, and that it doesn't need a strict logical foundation. I can't agree, because an unstated premise of my argument was that morality is objective, and not just a useful idea.

 

[Third Eye Open]

Miss kitt,

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I've been making the comparison of morality to language for some time now, and I think it's an apt one.

You could also say "materialism cannot provide a logical foundation for language" and it would be just as meaningful.

In other words, "materialism" can't generate the rules of grammar, but a scientific/materialist approach can explain the neural structures and functions that result in language and the evolutionary adaptive value of language--just as it can wrt morality.

Does some non-materialist approach ("dualism") do better? I think not.

 

[The_Animus]

I agree with that. But lets start from the premise that all that exists is matter.

If our words are to carry meaning, they should have denotations. All that words can denote in a material world is matter.

How can you define "feelings", "suffering" using only the language of physics?

You can't. And therefore materealism cannot provide a logical basis for morality.

Thank you for better defining those terms
If you intend to start with the premise that all that exists is matter and that such things as feelings and suffering don't apply or can't be defined in physics concepts, then neither can morality. At which point drawing a moral line is impossible as there is no such thing as morality, or at the very least not a physics definable morality.

However the concept that all things are made of matter, or of similar elements does not mean that all things are the same. One piece of matter can have different properties than another piece of matter. Organic matter has different properties than non-organic matter. Some organic matter contains the properties of feeling, suffering, and self-awareness.

 

[L The Detective]

First, that morality is a useful idea, and that it doesn't need a strict logical foundation. I can't agree, because an unstated premise of my argument was that morality is objective, and not just a useful idea. (It seems nihilistic to me to say that it is just a useful idea).

Hmmm... morality is objective? I'm not sure if I agree with that premise. I don't think an abstract idea can be "objectively true," although of course it can be measured with logic. But even if an idea is logically flawless, that doesn't make it objective truth. There's a difference, isn't there?

Why do you see that as nihilistic? What do you think is a better way to measure an idea than it's usefulness?

Second, that it is an abstract idea, and one shouldn't look for physical justifications for it. This is more in line with my thinking.

Yes, I agree.

But this way leads to non-materealism! Since there are abstract ideas, and they shouldn't be justified by physical justifications, doesn't it hint that materealism is false.

I don't understand your reasoning here.

I believe that there are abstract ideas, and they have non-physical justifications. (Feelings are non-physical reasons to treat humans ethically).

Yes... well, feelings and logic are both non-physical justifications.

And third, I am not sure what you mean by saying "arbitrary". Can you give an example?

Well, it basically just means "without purpose."

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I agree with that. But lets start from the premise that all that exists is matter.

If our words are to carry meaning, they should have denotations. All that words can denote in a material world is matter.

That's just not true.

First, it sounds like you're making a typical strawman description of materialism. A materialist doesn't believe in the existence of the supernatural. That's not the same as saying that all that exists is matter. (For one thing there is energy and spacetime.)

There are also hierarchical levels of organization of matter and a series of emergent properties at each one. The mind is certainly not a collection of quarks, for example. Or atoms, or molecules or even brain cells. At each level of organization, all sorts of phenomena emerge. One of them is the function we call "mind".

On to linguistics: words and grammar mean what they do by convention. We can certainly agree to meaning of abstract words, like "beauty" or "truth" in a material world. The levels of organization of the matter of the brain is sufficient to explain how this works.

By the way, your argument seems to be, at an extreme, that even verbs can't exist in a materialist world. That since there is no matter that is called "running" that we can't define "running".

This is an interesting point because I've run into the strawman summary of the materialist approach to "mind" as saying "mind is equal to brain". That's no more true than claiming that a materialist says that "running is equal to legs". Of course we can define "running" (and "beauty" and "truth" and "suffering" and "feeling") in a materialist world. You don't think when those words come up people need to believe in something beyond the material (i.e. the supernatural) in order to understand them?

And therefore materealism cannot provide a logical basis for morality.

I certainly can in the way you're talking now. (Not to say that materialism can generate moral statements, but that it can sufficiently explain where morality comes from.)

 

[JetLeg]

That's just not true.

First, it sounds like you're making a typical strawman description of materialism. A materialist doesn't believe in the existence of the supernatural. That's not the same as saying that all that exists is matter. (For one thing there is energy and spacetime.)

Sorry, a naturalist doesn't believe in the existence of the supernatural.


Doesn't seem that my definition is a strawman according to wiki

Wikipedia :

The philosophy of materialism holds that the only thing that can be truly proven to exist is matter, and is considered a form of physicalism. Fundamentally, all things are composed of material and all phenomena (including consciousness) are the result of material interactions; therefore, matter is the only substance. As a theory, materialism belongs to the class of monist ontology. As such, it is different from ontological theories based on dualism or pluralism. For singular explanations of the phenomenal reality, materialism would be in contrast to idealism.

Will reply later about the rest.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Doesn't seem that my definition is a strawman according to wiki

Trust me, it is. Saying this is the current state of materialism is a straw man just as explaining "evolution" as being the contention that "man came from monkeys".

Materialists do not share a uniform view about the nature of psychological properties, such as the properties of being a belief, being a desire, and being a sensory experience. In particular, they do not all hold that every psychological property is equivalent or identical to a conjunction of physical properties. Only proponents of reductive materialism hold the latter view, and they are a small minority among contemporary materialists.

Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind.

I believe most contemporary materialists are one type or another of functionalists. You are right that materialism and naturalism overlap quite a bit. From the same source as above, "Naturalism is the doctrine that the methods of philosophy are continuous with those of the natural sciences."

 

[JetLeg]

By the way, your argument seems to be, at an extreme, that even verbs can't exist in a materialist world. That since there is no matter that is called "running" that we can't define "running".

This is an interesting point because I've run into the strawman summary of the materialist approach to "mind" as saying "mind is equal to brain". That's no more true than claiming that a materialist says that "running is equal to legs". Of course we can define "running" (and "beauty" and "truth" and "suffering" and "feeling") in a materialist world.

I agree.

In a strictly materialist world, verbs indeed cannot exist. If you admit abstract properties, you admit something that is a property of matter, but isn't matter itself.

Logically speaking, a thing cannot be a property of itself, right? Matter has properties (weight, size, velocity), and since a thing cannot be a property of itself, those properties are cannot be matter.


(I have realized the point above only now. )

So I have to change my position. I used to think of materialism as a worldview that says only matter exists. But according to this interpretation, size, velocity, running cannot exist. Nobody would really hold this view, so it is a ridiculous interpretation.

I thought so because of the common phrase "materialism is the idea that there is only matter". According to this phrase, running indeed doesn't exist, since strictly speaking, running isn't matter. Perhaps it is "something that happens to matter"?

I will try to adress materialism as the view that matter is the only substance. (Indeed, the materialist <-> spiritualist debate is whether there is a immaterial substance. ) Since numbers, and abstract ideas are not "substances", their existence is not negated by this definition of materialism, so it seems.


I understand your position better now, thanks. According to the interpretation of materialism as "only matter exists", feelings can indeed have no meaning. But such interpretation is absurd. Though look, here

http://faithdefenders.com/materialism/

he treats materialism similarily to the way I did.



Still seems to me that emotions are not just "concepts" and not abstract ideas but a different substance.

You don't think when those words come up people need to believe in something beyond the material (i.e. the supernatural) in order to understand them?

Gosh, immaterial doesn't equal supernatural. Zero logical link.

 

[Third Eye Open]

Gosh, immaterial doesn't equal supernatural. Zero logical link.

I guess that depends on your definition of immaterial. I would call thoughts immaterial, but that doesn't mean I don't think that they are caused by matter. If something can be a property of matter or caused by matter and be immaterial, then I agree with you. If not, then yes, immaterial would be the same as supernatural.

 

[JetLeg]

I guess that depends on your definition of immaterial. I would call thoughts immaterial, but that doesn't mean I don't think that they are caused by matter. If something can be a property of matter or caused by matter and be immaterial, then I agree with you. If not, then yes, immaterial would be the same as supernatural.

When you say that thoughts are immaterial, what do you mean?

 

[rocketdodger]

Hi, thanks for taking my argument seriously.

Ok, so you say that it is a continous system. But what does it change according to?

You progress from inanimate to animate in small steps. What are these steps "made of"? Matter? Feelings? Atoms?

Perhaps it is possible of a continous system without threshold values that establishes good criteria. But what is it that changes in continuity for the materealist?

Behavior.

Other humans behave very differently from other rocks.

 

[westprog]

Also, it's spelled "materialism".

I thought this whole thread was about being realistic about your mate.

 

[Third Eye Open]

When you say that thoughts are immaterial, what do you mean?

I mean that they don't physically exist, in the way that a word does not physically exist. Even though you can write a word on a piece of paper it doesn't make sense to say that words are made of ink and paper. You think thoughts with your brain, but it doesn't make sense to say that thoughts are made of brain matter.

But if you take away matter, you can't have any of these things. Words, thoughts, abstract concepts, anything. Everything is connected to matter, because without matter there is nothing. How can anyone disagree with this? Or is the debate about something completely different that I am not getting?

 

[paximperium]

I mean that they don't physically exist, in the way that a word does not physically exist. Even though you can write a word on a piece of paper it doesn't make sense to say that words are made of ink and paper. You think thoughts with your brain, but it doesn't make sense to say that thoughts are made of brain matter.

But if you take away matter, you can't have any of these things. Words, thoughts, abstract concepts, anything. Everything is connected to matter, because without matter there is nothing. How can anyone disagree with this? Or is the debate about something completely different that I am not getting?

Thoughts are an emergent property of brain processes.

 

[Third Eye Open]

Thoughts are an emergent property of brain processes.

Right. But do any of these non-materialists really claim that thoughts or the color red or anything else can exist without matter? If you understand that when we take away all matter in the universe that there is NOTHING, how can you not make the deductive step to saying 'hey, all these things that don't seem to be made of matter must be caused by it, because when we take away matter they go away too!'

This is why I'm wondering if this debate is even about what I think it is about.

Jetleg, are you really saying 'thoughts and emotions can exist without matter.'