That's enough to take you off the hostile list (see below though).
Is it compelling evidence? Should I go back and see if you've made the same mistake?
You're not teasing me are you? Absolutely!
I'll help.
I'm not hostile at all, but feel free to treat me that way if you like. I'm starting to get used to it by now.
Bah, I meant more in terms of the mock legalese for hostile witness
WP (browse for the rules of engagement if you're curious).
Evidence in its broadest sense includes everything that is used to determine or demonstrate the truth of an assertion.
Alright. So what sort of things count as this kind of evidence? That's what I've been talking about (believe it or not) all this time.
Compelling evidence would be "strong" evidence, or evidence that clearly points to the truth of an assertion.
...not so interesting.
Uncompelling evidence would be "weak" evidence, or evidence that does not clearly point to the truth of an assertion.
...not so interesting.
Alright, but I'll use your notion of compelling evidence. Let's compare two scenarios. You don't seem to be compelled by single pieces of evidence... that's fine. That's a different issue about what compels you--and is not what I'm discussing.
But, suppose you have
two pieces of evidence. You already contended that this was mildly, somewhat, compelling. Let's just call that "minimally compelling".
So, I'll introduce these two scenarios.
Now, however, we'll speak of them hypothetically... in both scenarios, there are exactly two pieces of evidence that the sun will rise tomorrow, and you're to consider them to the exclusion of other evidence. Do you find both of these scenarios "minimally compelling"?
Scenario A
Evidence is:
- The sun rose yesterday.
- The sun rose today.
Scenario B
Evidence is:
- The sun rose yesterday.
- I flipped a coin, deciding that if it landed on heads, the sun will rise tomorrow; otherwise, it wouldn't. It landed on heads.
I propose that there is a salient difference between Scenario A, and Scenario B. Both of them have that the sun rose yesterday as evidence (slapped in there just to make them "minimally compelling", since I apparently can't have a discussion about evidence in the singular). But Scenario A, I could find minimally compelling.
Scenario B, on the other hand... well.... it's kind of missing something.
Don't you think?
And I'll have you note--in both cases, we have the "same" amount of evidence. In both scenarios, the pieces of supporting evidence are independent from each other--so we have exactly two pieces of evidence. And in both cases, we need to make a metaphysical assumption. Somehow, though, the metaphysical assumption doesn't bother me a whole lot in Scenario A.
But that coin flip...
that doesn't sound like it should even count.
- We have compelling evidence that the sun will rise tomorrow.
- There is no compelling evidence that there is intelligent life elsewhere.
- There is evidence that the probability of there being intelligent life elsewhere is near 0
Right. Now keep in mind that I'm
not talking about "compelling evidence", but rather, some other difference; but this other difference is so fundamentally related to "sound judgment" that I think it has some significant bearing to this thread.
Now, look at the
other two scenarios in terms of
this difference. In the Drake scenario, we're extrapolating from a single data point. In the Cosmological Fine Tuning argument for God, we're extrapolating from a single data point.
But...
...well... as I said
here:
Uhm... extra terrestrial intelligence is an extrapolation from a single data point, but it is a data point. You don't need to speculate that something entirely different from your experience occurs--only that something happened again, that you know happened once (not any particular thing, but something happened once).
Terrestrial intelligence counts.