Can theists be rational?

I'm not so sure what you mean by separating the idea of "role" from definition. My point about definition is that if the word is not defined, it's pointless talking about it being rational to believe it exists. We have no idea what it is we're talking about.
It's in the dictionary, by the way, so it's at least defined. I agree to some extent, but I frankly do not believe the term is well defined. However, I also do not believe there are only two possibilities--where a term must either be well defined, or we have no idea what we're talking about. In fact, I think we do have an idea what we're talking about, and all not being well defined does is make it harder to tread.
So, if we use the characteristic of being worshipped (or worthy of being worshipped), the problem is that it would exclude the deist notion of an impersonal God (and a great many others--some Gods are appeased and feared but not actually worshipped--yet that is what those people mean when they use the term "god").
With respect to the impersonal deist god you have a point. With respect to "some gods are appeased and feared but not actually worshipped", you're at the very least breaking from the set of definitions in Merriam-Webster (given MW online, definition 2 calls for gods "requiring worship"). Then again, I don't believe dictionaries were handed down by the gods either, but I think it at least warrants a bit more caution when you depart from them.

But all this does is move to an even more vague role.
So rather than including too many (well it does that too, as Randfan pointed out), it excludes things that people would say should be in the class.
Whoah... slow down a bit. RandFan didn't demonstrate that this definition includes too many. I think I covered this with my previous post.
Now I don't mind excluding some people's notion of God, but it's obvious then that we're not dealing with a single class when we use the word "God" unlike, for example, the word "dog". We could list a series of characteristics that would form a class that could include everything we think is a dog and exclude everything that we think is not a dog.
Actually, dog is a bad example. If you trace evolutionary lines, eventually you'll either get something quite arbitrary, or you're going to run into a fuzzy border. But those things that bark in my neighbor's yard? Definitely dogs.

In fact, I think most things you find are going to either be extremely arbitrary, or have fuzzy borders (and even the extremely arbitrary definitions often have fuzzy borders anyway). I don't think you'll have much luck finding things that are very well defined outside of mathematics and the like. All I can say is that I sincerely apologize on behalf of the universe for it not being easily pegged into Platonic ideals.
Again, I think this definition of God (the list of characteristics) should reflect the characteristics that most people attribute to God. People really profess to believe all that perfect, omniscient, omnipotent, etc. stuff until it comes time to discussing whether God is rationally possible.
Not just then. They also back off when defining God for the purpose of arguments--for example, the Kalam cosmological argument. Furthermore, though they say omniscient, many place restrictions on what God knows in certain contexts (such as results of that free will thingy); though omnipotent, on what God can do (within the context of doctrines like atonement--namely, God can't forgive you unless something bleeds--it's a rule!); etc. I frankly think it's because they have no clue what they're talking about when they define it--not because they back off from the definition, but because the definition in itself is more a doctrine/dogma than an accurate description of what they mean.
Then it becomes the very vague God retreating into the gaps.
But that's not an issue for me, if it is indeed what's going on.

Edit: I guess I must interject another point here. I find the problem with sticking to the omni definition a problem more for the opposition than the theist; the problem isn't really that theism is trying to move to dodge the bullet, the problem is more a desire to shoot only the easy to hit targets and claim victory. The evidence for this is the suggestion that we're supposed to ignore all of the targets that aren't hit, in addition to the fact that the targets not being hit are legitimate targets.

I'm not taking the theist side here--I don't care if all of the targets get hit, quite frankly. I'd just like to see you do the work.
 
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Yeah--I'm not so sure. I think they can always make a more and more vague non-definition of God.

Which is why we need to pin it down before they get away. :)

I'm pretty sure Gould's NOMA separated the magisteria by claiming religion has the realm of values and morals. (I'd quarrel with that!)

I completely disagree with Gould's NOMA.

This is what I still don't get. How? I still don't see how it excludes stuff that is obviously not what they mean when they use the term "God". It would be like defining a "dog" as a "mammal". That's just not sufficient. There are plenty of concepts that could provide an unlawful force--including the Tooth Fairy and (as yy2bggggs astutely pointed out) other supernatural non-god figures like Moses, Satan, archangels, sprites, elves, etc.--not to mention a singularity and other more esoteric physics stuff.

What about "forms the subject of a religion"?

So do Deists actually believe that a singularity is what they're calling God?

I don't think so. It doesn't seem like there would be a lawless or capricious nature to a singularity.

If it were proven for sure to be the cause of the universe, would they still be Deists or would they become atheists?

I suspect they'd find something else to call God.


But how? How do you exclude Satan or Mohammed or the Buddha or Gandalf? What characteristic does God have that these guys don't have? Is it Perfect Compassion? Omniscience? Omnipotence?

God is the subject of a religion. Buddha is also, but (I realize this is debatable) he is not a supernatural agent.

ETA: And I still haven't gotten past the problem with "unlawful"--how can we know something is unlawful when we simply don't know all the laws?

If you recall, I added "considered unlawful". We don't usually usually consider stuff that we don't know unlawful just because we haven't figured it out yet. The actions of gods are unlawful because (in most cases) they are meant to be personal - that somehow things turn out differently for you because you prayed or you tithed or you sinned, than they would have for someone else under the exact same conditions. It's not just a matter of not knowing the laws that constrain the outcomes, it's the active assumption that those constraints (even if known) would occasionally be broken, just for you.

I also like to think of it as a sort of courtroom burden of proof question. I don't have to disprove the existence of God to be an atheist. (I still maintain I have not heard of a proper formal definition of the term God that people actually believe in that I can't show is internally inconsistent or flagrantly inconsistent with the empirical world.)

Exactly my point. This isn't a definition of a "rational god", it's a definition of "god". "God" is flagrantly inconsistent with the empirical world except in a very few cases (e.g. universe creation) in which it is simply not flagrantly inconsistent yet.

Linda
 
I just want to add that some of the classic attributes of gods, such as omniscience or omnipotence are unnecessary for the definition and are insufficient to distinguish gods from other agents anyway.

Linda
 
NOMA appeals to me as diplomatic and an appeal to find consensus to foster communication between theists and atheists.

In the end it's BS though.

Sorry.
 
It's in the dictionary, by the way, so it's at least defined. I agree to some extent, but I frankly do not believe the term is well defined. However, I also do not believe there are only two possibilities--where a term must either be well defined, or we have no idea what we're talking about. In fact, I think we do have an idea what we're talking about, and all not being well defined does is make it harder to tread.
For logic purposes, a definition is a list of characteristics that includes the object in a class but excludes objects that don't belong.

You're exactly right, since this is a deconstructionist approach, most all definitions get a little fuzzy around the edges. I'd be OK with a God definition that's just a little fuzzy around the edges.

The trouble is we go from a personal savior that you can have a relationship with, that you talk to on a daily basis (that can tell you that he wants you to be president), that routinely intervenes in human affairs, that is all the omni-words, that reveals himself through writings, etc., to terms like "first cause".

Sorry, but that's not a definition that's just a little fuzzy around the edges.

Actually, dog is a bad example. If you trace evolutionary lines, eventually you'll either get something quite arbitrary, or you're going to run into a fuzzy border. But those things that bark in my neighbor's yard? Definitely dogs.

I think a lot less fuzzy than you might think. We do draw lines when we make definitions. We might even call non-dog animals dog-like, but we have a definition of dog that is miles better than anything I've seen for God.

I have no problem with arbitrary borders. That's how language works. We decide where to draw the lines by convention. I'm asking, when people use the term God where is that line? I think it jumps around so much that the term is meaningless.

Not just then. They also back off when defining God for the purpose of arguments--for example, the Kalam cosmological argument. Furthermore, though they say omniscient, many place restrictions on what God knows in certain contexts (such as results of that free will thingy), on what God can do (within the context of doctrines like atonement), etc. I frankly think it's because they have no clue what they're talking about when they define it--not because they back off from the definition, but because the definition in itself is more a doctrine/dogma than an accurate description of what they mean.
Yes, I've run into some of that (where omniscient really doesn't mean knowing everything, only knowing what is "possible" to know, and since the future isn't predetermined God doesn't know what humans will do next, even though a great many believers profess loudly that God in fact does know what will happen in the future).

And I don't mind that most believers approach it this way, as long as they recognize that they're talking about something they believe based solely on faith and no reasoning of any kind.

Which leads me back to the question I'm much more interested in-- about a believer shifting back and forth from believing some things based solely on faith and other things based on rational thought.

yy2bggggs, do you have any thoughts on that? (See some of my earlier posts for my completely baffled position.)

When I first saw the thread title, I thought it would be on this point rather than discussing "proofs" of God and definitions of God as usual.
 
I have no problem with arbitrary borders. That's how language works. We decide where to draw the lines by convention.
Agreed. It's up to the speaker to communicate in such a way as to avoid confusion.

I'm asking, when people use the term God where is that line? I think it jumps around so much that the term is meaningless.
Agreed. I'm fine with the fuzzy idea most of the time. I think it is possible to discuss and debate most of the time with just using the term "god" and assuming we understand each other but I'll concede that it is likely I've been wrong. :)

Which leads me back to the question I'm much more interested in-- about a believer shifting back and forth from believing some things based solely on faith and other things based on rational thought.
I used to hang out at ex-Mormon forums but I can't do that. Too many are theists who are found of their skepticism and critical thinking skills when it comes to Mormonism but still like to believe that Christ walks on water and rose from the dead.
 
Which is why we need to pin it down before they get away. :)
Yeah. I like to whip out my old Baltimore Catechism where is says clearly in black and white what God is!
I completely disagree with Gould's NOMA.
Me too.

But I do think quite a few people (at least the vast majority of Catholics that I know) subscribe to something like it. In matters of medicine, biology, etc., they turn to rationality and science. In matters of the hereafter and the condition of their "souls", they use faith.

What about "forms the subject of a religion"?
My first thought was that there are godless forms of Buddhism. However, I've run into plenty of people who say that because of that, it's not really a religion. (As I see you mention too.)

I guess my only problem is that this also seems to beg the question. If the question is, "Does the thing that forms the subject of your religion exist?" defining that thing for the purposes of answering that question as "that which is the subject of my religion" is circular.

What if the religion is based on nothing? Is it meaningful to say a God that is nothing exists?

If you recall, I added "considered unlawful". We don't usually usually consider stuff that we don't know unlawful just because we haven't figured it out yet. The actions of gods are unlawful because (in most cases) they are meant to be personal - that somehow things turn out differently for you because you prayed or you tithed or you sinned, than they would have for someone else under the exact same conditions. It's not just a matter of not knowing the laws that constrain the outcomes, it's the active assumption that those constraints (even if known) would occasionally be broken, just for you.
Yes, I understand that. I'm asking about "unlawful" as a characteristic to use in deciding whether or not something belongs in the class "God" for purposes of discussing whether God exists.

Since we don't know all the laws, we can't know whether a given phenomenon is unlawful or only seems to be.

Just to avoid talking about magnetism again--and because this is interesting--I'll mention something I just read in Charles Panati's Extraordinary Origins of Everyday Things. In 1603, an Italian cobbler who dabbled in alchemy came across a glow-in-the-dark coating. He of course thought it was a step on the path to discovering the philosopher's stone.

The story goes on to say that the stuff became especially popular in religious trinkets--crucifixes and so on. "The belief developed that prayers recited in the presence of glowing amulets were more readily answered." The artifacts "would only lose their mysterious aura centuries later, when physicists explained how molecules absorb and radiate light through the process of chemoluminescence."

So "makes my crucifix glow" was once a property of God. Now it is not.

How doe we know what other properties to attribute to God if we can't discern what is truly "unlawful".
 
Too many are theists who are found of their skepticism and critical thinking skills when it comes to Mormonism but still like to believe that Christ walks on water and rose from the dead.

And yet, these aren't unstable people, right? I mean they're not just on their way to becoming atheists. (I find that to be a patronizing approach--just as I hate it when theists assume that atheists are all just on a quest for God.)

That's what I don't get. There's a willing acceptance of belief on faith, but yet they have functioning rational filters to keep out a lot of other nonsense.

I suppose I wonder about this because when I was very young, I read voraciously all sorts of silly stuff, and pretty much believed it all. Velikovsky, Fort, reincarnation, age-regression hypnosis, pyramid power, OBE, etc. When I rejected that at about the age 13, I ended up also rejecting the religion I was brought up.

I made a couple of other attempts to get it back, but it never stuck. To me, it's sort of all or nothing when it comes to believing something just because someone (or the Bible or other book) says so.

I'm really curious about the people who are still theists, and fully admit that it's a belief based on faith and not one of these "rational proofs", but are basically as rational as anyone else in most all other matters (including their opinions on other religions and supernatural beliefs).

I have some other ideas about this after a long talk with my girlfriend (who grew up in Soviet-era Bulgaria, and has one heckuva different perspective on religion and God than I do).

She thinks it's a lot about fear of the annihilation of self. I pointed out that these people are capable of rejecting any number of OTHER belief systems that address that fear (either by teaching acceptance or by maintaining the illusion of immortality one way or another).

Aha! But you can't logically believe them all. (See? When I did this, there was no logic or rationality to it. If I wanted to, I could believe all of it--even the contradictory bits.) These are basically sane rational people who don't believe both that you will be reincarnated as a wealthy man after you die AND that you'll live forever in God's presence in heaven after you die and so on.

So it's something about dealing with a really big question, and even though it's an irrational answer, there's enough rationality to know that you can't handle more than one flavor of answer to it.
 
I suppose I wonder about this because when I was very young, I read voraciously all sorts of silly stuff, and pretty much believed it all. Velikovsky, Fort, reincarnation, age-regression hypnosis, pyramid power, OBE, etc. When I rejected that at about the age 13, I ended up also rejecting the religion I was brought up.

I made a couple of other attempts to get it back, but it never stuck. To me, it's sort of all or nothing when it comes to believing something just because someone (or the Bible or other book) says so.

I'm really curious about the people who are still theists, and fully admit that it's a belief based on faith and not one of these "rational proofs", but are basically as rational as anyone else in most all other matters (including their opinions on other religions and supernatural beliefs).

I have some other ideas about this after a long talk with my girlfriend (who grew up in Soviet-era Bulgaria, and has one heckuva different perspective on religion and God than I do).

She thinks it's a lot about fear of the annihilation of self. I pointed out that these people are capable of rejecting any number of OTHER belief systems that address that fear (either by teaching acceptance or by maintaining the illusion of immortality one way or another).

I think I can somewhat shine some light here on why the shut out evidence, along with what a posted earlier; After being a "believer" (not repented, going to church, etc) and then also being a Christian (repented, baptised, church, etc)... I can also say that your faith very much becomes your life, and it's not just fear of leaping over to atheism or any other religion and the possibility of "death" because of that (and lets not forget if you have that fear to the extent that you won't even consider an alternative, then your life is completely ruled by that fear - but also that you have to have a big amount of realisation about your own faith in order to LOSE that fear) but it's also the fact that to quite an extent you become involved in the church, in the church and Christian community, a lot of that... you won't have anymore, you can hope that the people themselves won't reject you as a friend, but you can't be quite sure. Especially if they slip away because you don't have that social time anymore.
That socialising is also very important. I remember reading an article on it (excuse lack of link, but it won't yet let me post any links), whilst I was a Christian and doing a fair amount of thinking, a lot of it does ring true in terms of liking being part of a community.
 
Premise 1 says that the probability of God existing is 1 in a million.

That is the same as saying there exists one God for every 1 million possible universes. It assumes that God exists.

Correct, that is the same as saying there exists one God for every 1 million possible universes.

But not every possible universe actually exists. If you wanted to assume that every possible universe actually exists, then you'd have to rephrase the conclusion from "the existence of God is probable" to "the existence of God in our universe is probable."

The original argument posted by cj does not assume that every possible universe actually exists. That is something that you added. Without changing the conclusion to match the additional assumption, I agree that your straw man argument contains circular logic.

-Bri
 
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Correct, that is the same as saying there exists one God for every 1 million possible universes.

So the conclusion is right there in the premise. If this is not the conclusion, then it is not an argument for the existence of God.

I said this early on too. If he's not using probabilities as actual probabilities (which he is, because he's doing math with them), then he's saying "if God is not very likely, then God is very likely" or "if God is likely, then God is likely".

I made this last point earlier too. 1 in 1 million is not a "low" probability if you can multiply it by a very large number.* In fact, it still assumes a probability for the existence of something and then concludes a probability for the existence of that thing. It is still circular.

A bit of a tangent dealing with whether 1 in 1 million is "low": In the SETI thread, I'm saying the same thing. Given the size of the universe and number of stars and galaxies, what does it mean to say that intelligent life is "rare" or "commonplace"? It's a relative term--relative to the numbers you will multiply other numbers by in something like Drake's equation. If intelligence evolved on 1 in a million stars, that works out to thousands in our galaxy and millions across the universe.

Are you familiar with the Ontological "proof" for the existence of God? Also called, St. Anselm's proof.

My rendition of the argument (I prefer the term "perfect" to the awkward "that than which nothing else can be greater" or other things like that):

God is defined as an all-perfect being.

A being that exists is more perfect than one that doesn't exist.

Therefore God exists.

(Just to clarify: a God that doesn't exist isn't perfect, and therefore isn't what we mean when we say God.)

It's the same problem. It makes existence a predicate (or what I would say part of the definition) of God, then "proves" that God exists.

Again, you're basically saying "assume God exists" and then concluding "God exists". It's couched in language that obfuscates this fact, but most people read "proofs" like this and know instantly that something fishy is going on.
 
Actually I think I have spotted why it's not circular. The first premise is not a premise - it's a postulate.

A premise is part of an argument like this, to use a deductive example

1. Sound moves through matter by wave action
2. There is no matter in a true vacuum
_______________________________________________________
therefore 3. Sound does not travel through a vacuum.

That is not what is happening here - it's not a deductibe proof; - it's using Bayes Theorem, so it's an algorithm, not a deduction. Bayes theorem is used to calculate a posterior probability, given one known variable in this case. The other numbers are as noted completely arbitrary and subjective. Bayesian probability is not a frequency form of probability - in fact which form it uses is disputed, but it is NOT frequency probability. (see earlier linked article for explanation of frequency probability.)

Now let's look at my initial post again --

Here's a rational argument for God, drawen from the Cosmological Fine Tuning discussion. Using cosmologist Paul Davies' numbers for the likelihood of the universe having arisen by chance Forster & Marston (1989) set out the Bayesian analysis as follows -

Let us assume the existence of a deity is one in a million.
Let us assume the chance of that deity creating the universe as is is also one in a million.

OK, so
1.Prior probability: Pr [God exists]: = 0.000001
Prior probability: Pr [No God]: = 0.999999

2.Prob [universe inhabitable if God exists] = 0.000001
Prob [universe inhabitable if no designer] = 0.00 (one billion, billion, billion zeros) 1]

THEN: Prob [God exists given that Universe is inhabitable]

Prob [universe is inhabitable if God exists] x Prob [God exists]
= -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
{ Prob [universe is inhabitable if God exists] x Prob [God exists] }
{+ Prob [universe is inhabitable if no God exists] x Prob [No God] }

0.000001 x 0.000001
= -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
{ 0.000001 x 0.000001 }
{ + (0.999999) x (0.00 (one billion, billion, billion zeros) 1) }

this gives us a figure so close to 100% as to seem to establish beyond doubt the reality of God (but see below!)

Now we can clearly change our initial numbers for a deity, or use another cosmologists calculations (they are all similarly huge though), but this in a nutshell is the problem. I have pointed out all kinds of answers which do not require God can be produced, from multiple universe, to constraints, etc, etc The Skeptic article I often link is excellent
http://www.skeptic.com/the_magazine/...c13-2_Kuhn.pdf

and I'm not saying this proves anything at all -- it merely demonstrates why there is a problem, and why invoking design for the universe is not actually at all irrational. If one has a vast multiverse of universes he problem is greatly reduced but we can't show it is so yet.

Secondly, note postulate 1 is not "There is a God". Postulate 1 is there is
1.Prior probability: Pr [God exists]: = 0.000001
Prior probability: Pr [No God]: = 0.999999
In other words it is "there is a very small chance God exists - here postulated as one in a million. There is a 999,999 to 1 chance there is no God. So you can't argue the initial premise is God exists. Nope it's assigning a subjective, arbitrary number to this possibility. Now garbage in garbage out applies - if you think the chance of a deity existing is more like

1.Prior probability: Pr [God exists]: = 0
Prior probability: Pr [No God]: = 1

Then the equation, even modified by the supposed improbability of Cosmological Fine Tuning, is 0%.

So really all this argument shows is how improbable the numbers for CFT are -- and that if you slot in even a many million to one God, then if you regard CFT as potential evidence for a designer it becomes far more likely.

Replace God with "aliens who built our universe" and it works exactly the same. It's not a proof of God - it's a rational exploration of the numbers -- and as such can be employed as a rational argument for a designer God (or aliens) - but never a proof...

Hope that clarifies. Note the numbers used are Paul Davies pre-1989 figuures - I'll have a look at Rees and Davies more recent numbers, and see how it works, but not much difference I think...

cj x
 
Bri: ...there exists one God for every 1 million possible universes.
So the conclusion is right there in the premise. If this is not the conclusion, then it is not an argument for the existence of God.
Is there one square circle for every 1 million possible universes? There might be 1 million possible universes but is there even a possibility of god?
 
Actually I think I have spotted why it's not circular. The first premise is not a premise - it's a postulate.
The fatal flaw, IMHO, is to assume that god is a possibility. Infinite monkey theorem won't make the impossible possible. Infinite dead monkeys will never type anything.
 
Nope, this is not a frequency probability, so there will not be one God for every million universes.


Try the existence of life on mars as one million to one.

A subjective probability means "this is my opinion of the odds"
A frequency probability means "when we explore 1000 different Mars one of them has life on it."
A logical probability is a calculation based upon external evidence for the probability - and whether a Bayesian theorem is a logical (objective) or subjective probability varies on how much evidence supports the postulates I think,m though philosophers of science are as far as i can make out divided.

There are several other theories of how probability works - have a look at the previous article i linked on them... I'm too tired and no mathematician. :) FLS might be able to explain them all?

cj x
 
Well just answer the question. I'm only interested in probability and the fatal flaw of thinking that at some point the impossible becomes possible.

Is a square circle possible in any universe?
 

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