Idealists: What does 'physical' mean to you?

[Malerin]

And in that situation, I'd have no problem with their conclusion. However, at some stage in history there were observations which came about which meant that conclusion was no longer adequate.

The thing is, there is no problem speculating 'what if?'. Yet to seriously suggest an alternative, you need an observation which demonstrates a short-fall in the current explanation.

Not really. To achieve agnosticism all I need to show is the evidence we have is consistent with multiple mutually exclusive models of reality. Think of it as playing the role of defense lawyer. I don't have to prove my theory. I just have to show that all your evidence is consistent with mulitiple suspects. If I do that, then agnositicsm is the only defensible position.

That's not the point. It's also consistent with fairies working behind the scenes, with butterfly dreams, computer simulations, and everything being built by tiny invisible elves. It's consistent with an infinite array of possible scenarios.

Right, that's my point. Evidence that is consistent with multiple theories cannot be evidence for any particular theory.

Yet the reason why parsimony is assumed is that deferring only to what is consistent with a theory is virtually useless.

I don't quite understand you. If sense-data isn't evidence for a type of reality (because it is consistent with other types of reality), what else do you have to defer to?

Surely in making other decisions in life you don't give all possibilities that are consistent with an idea equal weighting? Why would you in this case?

I think about whether this is all a projection of mind or not. The apparent orderliness of the universe doesn't mean it's materialistic or atheistic.

This seems like an odd way to form a philosophy, and one I suspect you don't apply to all decisions you make. If you were driving down the road, and the petrol gauge 'appeared' to say 'empty', I'd doubt you'd consider it equally likely that the gauge was broken. Hell, the observation is consistent with 'broken gauge', yet an empty tank is parsimonous, hence you'd pull into a station and fuel up.

That's just an appeal to pragmatism. You can be pragamtical in an idealistic reality, a theistic one, a materialistic one, etc.

Ok, most of the stuff you've said so far has been (more or less) reasonable, even if ultimately it does come down to a conflict with parsimony. It's kept me interested in the hope you'd bring some thoughtful comments to the table (which you have). But this is just plain silly.

What we're discussing here is not a matter of 'simplicity of concept' but of parsimony. Given two possible ideas, the one that uses all of the observations with the fewest assumptions (all else being equal) is to be selected for testing or application. To do the reverse makes no sense.

1. How do you know this rule of parsimony is valid? You can't derive it from logic or math. It's a matter of induction, which is based on empirical evidence. But that empirical evidence is also consistent with other models of reality.
2. How do you "test" for what reality you're in? Even if parsimony is true, it doesn't follow that we should assume reality does not have an illusionary layer to it. Without any evidence to the contrary, we can't know one way or another. Parismony is as valid in a coherent idealistic reality as it is in a materialistic reality.

3. Parismony is a form of Occam's razor (principle of parsimony). So let's look at two competing claims:

A)Lightning is Zeus throwing thunderbolts from the clouds.

B)Lightning is a static discharge of electricity, the causes of which are still being debated (http://www.pbs.org/wnet/savageplanet/03deadlyskies/01lforms/indexmid.html). The eletrical discharge is comprised of electrons, and the reason we see ligthning is because it emits massless particles called photons.

Is (B) really the simpler theory? (A) is cartoonish, but also very simple to understand. Zeus gets mad and throws thunderbolts. That's lightning. On the other hand, parts of (B) are still being debated, and (B) leads to other very esoteric questions about the nature of matter and energy which very few of us even understand (and some of the questions aren't even answered yet). This was my earlier point: that far from being the simpler theory, materialism is so complex, no one fully understands it.

 

[rocketdodger]

I will contribute with the usual "three equivalent properties of 'physical' originally proposed by Robin some years ago" post.

If something is physical (or material) it features these three equivalent properties:

1) It can be mathematically described.

2) It follows the same underlying order as all other physical (material) stuff.

3) It can be scientifically observed.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Do you really think I'm trolling? Come now. Arthwollipot seems to be enjoying all this and he actually understood something I wrote! I think I know why we're not understanding each other. What do you mean by "external"? This claim that you've made:



Is either a trivial point or an epistemic point with an ontological assumption (i.e., reality consists of external things and sense-data is evidence of them). It all hinges of what you think "external" means. So can you tell me how you're using it?

It is a trivial point. An entirely trivial point. Of course it is trivial. I meant it as an utterly trivial example of how you can open your eyes and see people sitting over there drinking their Starbucks and discussing bits of silly philosophy between tokes on a clove cigarette.

How could the statement -- open your eyes and you can see people over there too -- be anything but trivial?

I have already explained more than once what "external" means -- it means I can see someone over there and so can you. It does not mean that person necessarily exists, but that I receive sense impressions of such a person and these same sense impressions help me to negotiate this world that I perceive and avoid the charging tiger, recently escaped from the zoo and angry at clove cigarette smokers, that the first year philosophy student still thinks is a figment of his solipsistic imagination even as he is torn to shreads before my eyes.

It contrasted with the statement you made that we have equal evidence for God as we do for people sitting over there. We don't. We have plenty of reliable evidence for people sitting over there. We open our eyes and see them. We do not have reliable evidence for God. The only evidence for God that we have is definitional or personal.

We have an equal lack of absolute evidence for everything ontological -- God, people, whatever. That is an entirely different issue, however, since that state of affairs is no help to anyone. There is essentially no way out of radical doubt (your earlier attempt didn't emerge from that dark cave any more than Descartes' appeal to his ontological proof). So we live our lives by opening our eyes and accepting what we see. Whether or not that has anything to do with ultimate reality, who knows? Or as Dancing David is fond of saying, "Who cares and what difference does it make?"

I am not the one making ontological claims. You are. My stance is that we can't make any such claims. We may begin with assumptions. The assumption I accept is that everything is ultimately one substance. Most philosophical issues disappear with that assumption, but it does have consequences. Increase the number of substances and you multiply the problems.

Now, at this point, you can continue this fruitless line -- which does amount to trolling at this point since I have had to repeat myself five times now while you ask the same questions and I give you the same answers -- or we can move on and you can deal with the other issues at hand. It's your choice.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I will contribute with the usual "three equivalent properties of 'physical' originally proposed by Robin some years ago" post.

If something is physical (or material) it features these three equivalent properties:

1) It can be mathematically described.

2) It follows the same underlying order as all other physical (material) stuff.

3) It can be scientifically observed.

I guess the short answer would be anything that is objectively real and knowable, right?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

1. How do you know this rule of parsimony is valid? You can't derive it from logic or math. It's a matter of induction, which is based on empirical evidence. But that empirical evidence is also consistent with other models of reality.
2. How do you "test" for what reality you're in? Even if parsimony is true, it doesn't follow that we should assume reality does not have an illusionary layer to it. Without any evidence to the contrary, we can't know one way or another. Parismony is as valid in a coherent idealistic reality as it is in a materialistic reality.

3. Parismony is a form of Occam's razor (principle of parsimony). So let's look at two competing claims:

A)Lightning is Zeus throwing thunderbolts from the clouds.

B)Lightning is a static discharge of electricity, the causes of which are still being debated (http://www.pbs.org/wnet/savageplanet/03deadlyskies/01lforms/indexmid.html). The eletrical discharge is comprised of electrons, and the reason we see ligthning is because it emits massless particles called photons.

Is (B) really the simpler theory? (A) is cartoonish, but also very simple to understand. Zeus gets mad and throws thunderbolts. That's lightning. On the other hand, parts of (B) are still being debated, and (B) leads to other very esoteric questions about the nature of matter and energy which very few of us even understand (and some of the questions aren't even answered yet). This was my earlier point: that far from being the simpler theory, materialism is so complex, no one fully understands it.

Yes, B is the simpler theory because it is based on a simpler ontology. If there is a Zeus, then he is a highly complex being that, if we believe the stories, is divine. If he is divine and the world is material, as the stories hold, then we are dealing with dualism. If dualism is the case, then how does the divine interact with the material?

A purely mechanical explanation does not unnecessarily multiply ontological categories or types of substances. Monism is as simple as it gets. That one story is told in fewer words is not an expression of the simplicity of how it all works.

The material explanation for lightening is an explanation. The Zeus explanation ultimate devolves into "it's magic". That is not an explanation; it is a mere description since it does not provide an actual mechanism.

 

[Frozenwolf150]

Not really. To achieve agnosticism all I need to show is the evidence we have is consistent with multiple mutually exclusive models of reality. Think of it as playing the role of defense lawyer. I don't have to prove my theory. I just have to show that all your evidence is consistent with mulitiple suspects. If I do that, then agnositicsm is the only defensible position.

The only problems are that you haven't shown that it's consistent with other models of reality, and you have failed to prove that they're mutually exclusive either. In fact, it's been pointed out to you numerous times that your other models of reality are indistinguishable from the currently accepted theory. Furthermore, the point I have raised, which you continue to ignore, is that regardless of how many alternate models you come up with, the evidence we gather from this reality is most reasonably applied to this reality. It's not a matter of faith to apply observations such as "gravity makes things fall towards a center of mass" to the world we live in, regardless of how many models of reality there are.

The problem with postulating unsubstantiated models of reality is that for every reality you claim is possible, there's an equal and opposite model of reality that cancels it out. You say that God could be the prime thinker, I say we could have imagined God into existence. You say there could be a Matrix world machines have created, I say there could be humans pulling the strings of the machines. That's why possibility is cheap.

Your analogy of the sun is beside the point. If all the currently available evidence pointed towards a sun that was really a glowing chariot wheel, or was a small body that revolves around the earth, or was a giant lump of burning coal, it would be perfectly reasonable to accept the current model. The way people found out more about the sun was through further observations, not by asserting that we can't ever know the truth because the evidence could fit other unfounded explanations.

 

[Malerin]

It is a trivial point. An entirely trivial point. Of course it is trivial. I meant it as an utterly trivial example of how you can open your eyes and see people sitting over there drinking their Starbucks and discussing bits of silly philosophy between tokes on a clove cigarette.

How could the statement -- open your eyes and you can see people over there too -- be anything but trivial?

Because "external" can be defined different ways, as I showed. Only now am I clear what meaning of the word you're using. When you said

Good God, what has gone wrong with you? Sense data is evidence for the existence of external things and people.

it was in the context of a couple of other people arguing that sense-data is evidence that material external (strong sense) things exist. I'm guessing they thought you were agreeing with them.

Even in the trivial sense, though, there are problems with your claim.

It contrasted with the statement you made that we have equal evidence for God as we do for people sitting over there. We don't.

As long as you don't make any claims about the actual existence of real people, this is true (for the moment). Your claim seems to be:

1. Sense data is evidence that there are other people.
2. Sense data is not evidence that other people actually exist, independent of our minds.
3. The evidence for God is not as strong as evidence for other people.

This is a very weak argument though, because you're basically claiming there's no evidence for the real external (in the strong sense) existence of other people and there's no evidence for God.

Here's where I think it falls apart. When you claim that we have more evidence (through sense-data) for the existence of external (weak sense) things, you're assuming that the sense-data is not coming from God in some idealistic way. If it is coming from God, then every piece of sense-data is evidence for God's existence.

So even the trivial claim that we have more evidence (through sense-data) for other things begs the question that the sense-data is not coming from God. But you can't know that, so it fails as even a trivial claim.

There is essentially no way out of radical doubt (your earlier attempt didn't emerge from that dark cave any more than Descartes' appeal to his ontological proof).

It's a work in progress. I still think there's something to the claim "If there are multiple coherent theories, and we know one of the necessary conditions of one of the theories is true, then that theory is more likely to be true."

I am not the one making ontological claims. You are. My stance is that we can't make any such claims.

I've almost entirely been pushing agnosticism. The few times I've admitted to a theistic bias, I've explained that I have no evidence for it.

 

[Malerin]

Furthermore, the point I have raised, which you continue to ignore, is that regardless of how many alternate models you come up with, the evidence we gather from this reality is most reasonably applied to this reality.

I'm ignoring it because this doesn't mean anything. You're basically saying "the evidence from this reality is evidence for this reality". OK.

 

[Frozenwolf150]

I'm ignoring it because this doesn't mean anything. You're basically saying "the evidence from this reality is evidence for this reality". OK.

Keep burning all that straw, because it seems to be the only thing you're good at. I was saying that there's no reason to treat the evidence we have as if it applied to any of your other models of reality. You've repeatedly claimed that evidence, including sense-data, could just as easily support alternate theories of reality. However you haven't offered up any connection whatsoever between said evidence and any given alternate model; all you've said is that because it's possible, we have to give all of your ridiculous assertions about reality an equal share. This is just as disingenuous as creationists claiming that fossil evidence was put there to trick us.

 

[athon]

Right, that's my point. Evidence that is consistent with multiple theories cannot be evidence for any particular theory.

Not at all. This fails to take into account assumptions.

You refer to a court case - imagine two postulated scenarios which both use all of the evidence. One has to introduce some assumptions in order for the evidence to still fit, while the other does not. Otherwise they are perfectly equal, in that all observations are accounted for. In a court, there would be a requirement for the second model to provide additional evidence for those assumptions. This same requirement exists in science.

If this didn't happen, no court would ever convict, science would never progress, and we'd be paralysed for choice. Yes, it is pragmatic, but what is the point of any of this if not for having some use?

I don't quite understand you. If sense-data isn't evidence for a type of reality (because it is consistent with other types of reality), what else do you have to defer to?

I said 'only'. We have to defer to sense data, of course. But we also need to limit the assumptions. Otherwise in every case I require some sort of explanation, I'd be able to concoct the wildest, most complicated stories which (so long as it could account for the observations) would all, according to you, be equally valid.

I think about whether this is all a projection of mind or not. The apparent orderliness of the universe doesn't mean it's materialistic or atheistic.

As others have said again and again, the observations can only be used to form relationships which lead to laws. These laws are what are referred to as 'material'. There is no comment on where these laws are embedded. That is a statement of idealism. Materialism simply says the appear to be independent of our thinking of it. It is parsimonous. Idealism says they are not. That is not parsimonous, as it makes an assumption that contradicts what appears to be the case.

Yes, parsimony is an assumption based on induction. I agree. And it is most certainly born of pragmatism (ironically, William of Occham's philosophy was born out of theology...it was later modifications that used it for pragmatic purposes. I'm sure the poor old monk is now turning in his grave. )

That's just an appeal to pragmatism. You can be pragamtical in an idealistic reality, a theistic one, a materialistic one, etc.

Yes it is, and no you can't.

The reason is straight forward - when one relies on using a model for something, parsimony provides the most useful means of selecting one as it will lead to progress where others will not.

Historically, there were two schools of thought on how life transpired. One thought life arose mechanistically, the other from a strange life essence called 'vitalism' (I'm giving the five second version of this story - in reality, it's much more detailed).

Now, both schools used all the observations, but both required some assumptions. Yet out of the two, the mechanistic school believed life could be explained by rules of chemistry and physics, which required only the assumption that they operated in ways yet to be understood. Vitalism believed there was a yet to be discovered force which created life. The assumptions were greater, and there were no observations indicating that a new property of the universe was required.

Vitalism never moved forward, and contributed nothing. The reason being was it was not parsimonous - the assumptions provided no indication of how to interpret new observations. It could not even say anything about this mysterious force (Vitalism was simply a 'god of gaps' argument in disguise).

Idealism is also a god of gaps argument. Yet in this case, there isn't even a gap. It is purely an assumption without a purpose. It's even more useless than vitalism in that respect.

1. How do you know this rule of parsimony is valid? You can't derive it from logic or math. It's a matter of induction, which is based on empirical evidence. But that empirical evidence is also consistent with other models of reality.

It's an induced conclusion. And it has proven useful.

2. How do you "test" for what reality you're in? Even if parsimony is true, it doesn't follow that we should assume reality does not have an illusionary layer to it. Without any evidence to the contrary, we can't know one way or another. Parismony is as valid in a coherent idealistic reality as it is in a materialistic reality.

*sigh* Now this is getting tiring, sorry. We've all pointed out how idealism is not parsimonous. You constantly ignore it.

I can't argue too much if you wish to make a special case for your ontology and choose against parsimony. Go for it. I can't state you're wrong, only that it seems pointless to me. But if it's 'use' is helping you to sleep at night, who am I to argue?

But when you say it is equally parsimonous, when you've been shown where it isn't...you're simply being obtuse. If that's the case, the respect I've had for this discussion has vanished. Which is a shame, as it's otherwise been interesting.

Is (B) really the simpler theory? (A) is cartoonish, but also very simple to understand. Zeus gets mad and throws thunderbolts. That's lightning. On the other hand, parts of (B) are still being debated, and (B) leads to other very esoteric questions about the nature of matter and energy which very few of us even understand (and some of the questions aren't even answered yet). This was my earlier point: that far from being the simpler theory, materialism is so complex, no one fully understands it.

What is it with you ignoring what has been said? Please, by all means disagree if you can show where something is wrong, but ignoring it in order to maintain your argument is dishonest.

Parsimony IS NOT the same as simplicity. Yes, I know some explanations use the term 'simpler explanation', but I hate them. They are wrong.

Parsimony is based on a ratio of observations and assumptions. Assumptions that require more details which cannot be accounted for by observations are to be avoided in favour of assumptions that can be. That is parsimony.

I'll continue when you've demonstrated that you understand that much, as I don't think there's much point if you wish to ignore that difference.

Athon

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Because "external" can be defined different ways, as I showed. Only now am I clear what meaning of the word you're using. When you said it was in the context of a couple of other people arguing that sense-data is evidence that material external (strong sense) things exist. I'm guessing they thought you were agreeing with them.

Even in the trivial sense, though, there are problems with your claim.

I have no idea what others thought, nor do I think it very likely that anyone else read what I wrote. I often don't have time to read everything that people write here, though there are many who I do take the time to read in full.

I'm gald to see that you understand and are being reasonable about it. That's more the Malerin I know and respect.

As long as you don't make any claims about the actual existence of real people, this is true (for the moment). Your claim seems to be:

1. Sense data is evidence that there are other people.
2. Sense data is not evidence that other people actually exist, independent of our minds.
3. The evidence for God is not as strong as evidence for other people.

This is a very weak argument though, because you're basically claiming there's no evidence for the real external (in the strong sense) existence of other people and there's no evidence for God.

OK, but I didn't make a positive argument. I argued negatively against your claim that there is as much evidence for God as there is for the external existence of other people. We don't generally use the word "evidence" to refer to knowledge of true ontology. While it is the case that we are equally in the dark about ultimate reality, it is not the case that we have equal evidence for God and the external reality of other people.

I don't need to repeat the same arguments, but, yes, it is a weak argument. I didn't mean it to be a knock-down argument. It is simply trivially true that we have sense data and that we use sense data that can be corroborated by others and that constitutes the primary way that we use the word "evidence" or "reliable evidence". We simply lack the corroboration from others (except in a mediated way) for the existence of God.

There are ways to prove God's existence, but they are also trivial and a waste of time.

Here's where I think it falls apart. When you claim that we have more evidence (through sense-data) for the existence of external (weak sense) things, you're assuming that the sense-data is not coming from God in some idealistic way. If it is coming from God, then every piece of sense-data is evidence for God's existence.

So even the trivial claim that we have more evidence (through sense-data) for other things begs the question that the sense-data is not coming from God. But you can't know that, so it fails as even a trivial claim.

No, that has no bearing on the argument. The sense data argument refers to the way that we treat sense data as evidence. It does not concern ultimate reality.

It is certainly possible that every bit of sense data that we experience results from the action of God. But that is beside the point. Let's assume that there are only two possibilities -- God and no God. In one scenario everything that exists is the result of God's action, so all evidence is "from God". In the opposing scenario everything that exists is the result of information banging into itself, so all evidence is from information banging into itself with no God. So, it's a wash, since we can't now which of the two possibilities is "real".

When we speak of evidence as sense data, we speak of evidence as sense data. We can't know what is behind it. God, no God, there is simply no way to reach any final conclusion, so this is not a weak point.

The weak point is that it doesn't tell us anything about ultimate reality. It cannot. We can't start with any ontologic stance because we cannot know what ontologic reality *is*.

All we can do is examine the "rules of the game" and comment on them.

When we engage in metaphysics we leave the realm of what is knowable and enter the realm of assumption.

It's a work in progress. I still think there's something to the claim "If there are multiple coherent theories, and we know one of the necessary conditions of one of the theories is true, then that theory is more likely to be true."

And I obviously disagree. When one of the components for how we can know in the first place is used as a necessary condition, then I don't think we can move forward. As the cogito doesn't prove that "I" exist, but only that "thought exists", I think your formulation proves that thought is necessary for any sort of knowledge; I don't think you can then claim that it is necessarily more likely as the basic ontology.

I've almost entirely been pushing agnosticism. The few times I've admitted to a theistic bias, I've explained that I have no evidence for it.

OK, then, that's fine. I realized several years ago that we can decide on God as the explanation of ultimate reality but can't prove it. Simply stated -- God or no God -- it's a choice. Trying to prove it is a waste of time. I don't particulary think that it matters if the final answer is monism, dualism, pluralism or whatever -- it is still a choice. Or, another way of putting it, it's an approach toward life.

 

[Frozenwolf150]

Not at all. This fails to take into account assumptions.

You refer to a court case - imagine two postulated scenarios which both use all of the evidence. One has to introduce some assumptions in order for the evidence to still fit, while the other does not. Otherwise they are perfectly equal, in that all observations are accounted for. In a court, there would be a requirement for the second model to provide additional evidence for those assumptions. This same requirement exists in science.

If this didn't happen, no court would ever convict, science would never progress, and we'd be paralysed for choice. Yes, it is pragmatic, but what is the point of any of this if not for having some use?

(lots of good stuff snipped)

Yes it is, and no you can't.

The reason is straight forward - when one relies on using a model for something, parsimony provides the most useful means of selecting one as it will lead to progress where others will not.

Historically, there were two schools of thought on how life transpired. One thought life arose mechanistically, the other from a strange life essence called 'vitalism' (I'm giving the five second version of this story - in reality, it's much more detailed).

Now, both schools used all the observations, but both required some assumptions. Yet out of the two, the mechanistic school believed life could be explained by rules of chemistry and physics, which required only the assumption that they operated in ways yet to be understood. Vitalism believed there was a yet to be discovered force which created life. The assumptions were greater, and there were no observations indicating that a new property of the universe was required.

Vitalism never moved forward, and contributed nothing. The reason being was it was not parsimonous - the assumptions provided no indication of how to interpret new observations. It could not even say anything about this mysterious force (Vitalism was simply a 'god of gaps' argument in disguise).

Idealism is also a god of gaps argument. Yet in this case, there isn't even a gap. It is purely an assumption without a purpose. It's even more useless than vitalism in that respect.

Thank you, this is the point I was trying to make better than I could explain it on a moment's notice.

ETA: Actually, I would say that idealism, like creationism, tries to force open gaps that are no longer even there in order to justify itself.

 

[paximperium]

Thanks all for a great discussion. A specific nod to Athon, SilentKnight, Akumanimani and Ichneumonwasp for a very interesting discussion into the topic at hand.

Even Malerin's weaseling is interesting in noting all the different dodges and apologetic he attempts without much success.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Materialism simply says the appear to be independent of our thinking of it. It is parsimonous. Idealism says they are not. That is not parsimonous, as it makes an assumption that contradicts what appears to be the case.

I think there are forms of idealism that are equally parsimonious. It becomes simply a question of whether the fundamental existent is "physical" or "mental." Neutral monism was even invented to reduce the struggle between those two possibilities.

If all the monism guys got together and really laid out the details of their various metaphysics, they would all be equivalent modulo terminology.

~~ Paul

 

[Frank Newgent]

Imo, solipsism sounds a lot like a form a megalomania. Have there been any serious philosophers who held it as an actual position beyond mere hypothetical debate?

Not always serious

The following is a Preamble to the party platform of the League of Nihilistic Solipsism.


1 - As representatives of the League of Nihilistic Solipsism, "we" hang tough in a world of epistemological failure and cosmic purposelessness; a world in which nihilical solipsists, along with other proto-phenomena and apparent p-zombies, are, every now and again, sovereign over existential horror and emotional anguish, and no one is forced to sacrifice his or her repudiation of all imposed values for the benefit of others' nonlinguistic illusions.

2 - "We" observe that the bodies of other human beings behave as my body does in similar circumstances and, so, infer that the mental life and series of mental events which characteristically accompany my bodily behaviour - today, quite possibly, suicide - are also present in the case of others. It is further observed that the banality inherent in any recognition that such behavior is not necessarily meaningful oft subverts critical tools and seems to make inescapable an environment where pointless ideas can be imposed forcibly with little resistance.

3 - Consequently, "we" defend each person's right to engage in any series of astounding improbabilities most likely destined to fail after a lifetime of meaningless suffering. And although within the world "we" picture one does not absolve his or her self of arbiting ultimate moral responsibility, there may very well be times when wandering the streets wearing a sign "I am not drunk. I am crazy. Give me some goddamn money!" will just have to do. It helps to be good looking and well spoken when alienated by a crippling spiritual emptiness.

4 - In the party platform "we" will set forth our basic principles and enumerate various policy stands derived from those principles. These specific policies are not the goal, however. Decades of scientific inquiry and careful research have ended within a perspective of utter futility for life and universal existence and the unavoidable conclusion that there is no point.

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=662123&postcount=10

 

[Malerin]

Not at all. This fails to take into account assumptions.

You refer to a court case - imagine two postulated scenarios which both use all of the evidence. One has to introduce some assumptions in order for the evidence to still fit, while the other does not. Otherwise they are perfectly equal, in that all observations are accounted for. In a court, there would be a requirement for the second model to provide additional evidence for those assumptions. This same requirement exists in science.

This is just a reiteration of your claim that we should prefer materialism because it is the simpler theory (or more parsimonious one). In court and science, I would agree this is a good tool. In metaphysics? Not so sure. I've already agreed that materialism has this going for it: things seem to exist independent of us in space, but this is also consistent with certain models of theism, dualism, and idealism. In the absence of any evidence about what reality really is, why should we assume things are the way they seem? That seems intellectually lazy because it's been our experience that often times, things aren't what they seem to be. In the absence of any real knowledge about reality, it is just as possible that things aren't the way they seem, that reality has an illusionary aspect to it.

There is also this to be said about materialism: we have no proof that physical matter exists. The information and sense-data we get from the world is equally consistent with non-materialistic models of reality. So why posit a materialistic reality we have no proof for? Idealism, on the other hand, asserts that everything is thought and mind. We do have proof that thought and mind exist (to doubt it is to assert it, in the case of thought. If you doubt you have a mind, I don't know how to repsond). Why not go with the theory of reality we at least have some evidence for?

If this didn't happen, no court would ever convict, science would never progress, and we'd be paralysed for choice. Yes, it is pragmatic, but what is the point of any of this if not for having some use?

It's an epistemic point. If we're agnostic about reality, then that agnosticism will bleed into other areas. I'm not saying we should be radical skeptics, but a blind adherence to materialism is close mindedness.

I said 'only'. We have to defer to sense data, of course. But we also need to limit the assumptions. Otherwise in every case I require some sort of explanation, I'd be able to concoct the wildest, most complicated stories which (so long as it could account for the observations) would all, according to you, be equally valid.

And I would again say materialism is an increidbly complicated story that no one in the world completely understands. Can you imagine how many years it would take just to earn advanced degrees in all the medical fields? And that's just one subset of materialism.

And if we're limiting assumptions, why should we assume that reality is what it appears to be? Why should we assume that the inferences we've made about the existence of physical matter are correct?

Yes it is, and no you can't.

Why can't you be pragmatic in a dualistic reality or idealistic one? If reality is idealistic in the Berkelian sense, there's nothing wrong with claiming God created a coherent world goverened by regular laws. There's no contradiction with behaving pragmatically in a Berkelian idealistic reality. The gas gauge reads empty so I buy gas. The difference is that the things I think are real (gas, gauges, cars) are actually ideas, but my behavior regarding them is still pragmatical.

The reason is straight forward - when one relies on using a model for something, parsimony provides the most useful means of selecting one as it will lead to progress where others will not.

Again, an appeal to simplicity based on inferences. I would respond as I have been: why assume reality is materialistic when there's no evidence for matter, and why assume reality doesn't contain an illusionary aspect to it? There's no proof that reality does or doesn't have an illusionary aspect to it, so you're violating your own rule of parsimony by making a baseless assumption (multiplying entities, in other words)

Idealism is also a god of gaps argument. Yet in this case, there isn't even a gap. It is purely an assumption without a purpose. It's even more useless than vitalism in that respect.

Of course there's a gap: Sense data -----> reality. How do we bridge the gap from sense-data to the ultimate nature of reality, to objects in-and-of themselves? There's a huge gap in our fundamental knowledge of reality. Maybe reality is not theistic, but maybe it's not atheistic either. All we have to go on is sense-data, which is consistent with innumerable models of reality.

*sigh* Now this is getting tiring, sorry. We've all pointed out how idealism is not parsimonous. You constantly ignore it.

I don't ignore it. You just don't like my answer. I think materialism also violates parsimony by positing the existence of physical matter that we have no evidence for. And assuming reality is non-illusionary without any evidence to base that assumption on is also fallacious. If you don't find that appealing, should I say you're ignoring me?

I can't argue too much if you wish to make a special case for your ontology and choose against parsimony. Go for it. I can't state you're wrong, only that it seems pointless to me. But if it's 'use' is helping you to sleep at night, who am I to argue?

Just because it seems pointless to you doesn't mean it's not how things are. Materialism seems incredibly pointless to me- we're here for X amount of time until the heat-death of the universe. Whoopee. That doesn't mean reality isn't materialistic.

But when you say it is equally parsimonous, when you've been shown where it isn't...you're simply being obtuse. If that's the case, the respect I've had for this discussion has vanished. Which is a shame, as it's otherwise been interesting.

Sorry to disappoint. I don't agree with your principle that people who don't agree with you are being "obtuse" and disrespectful. I've done my best to present my case. I've heard your arguments and don't find them convincing. That doesn't mean I think you're obtuse or I have less repsect for you- you just don't agree with me.

What is it with you ignoring what has been said? Please, by all means disagree if you can show where something is wrong, but ignoring it in order to maintain your argument is dishonest.

Maybe it would be more helpful if you tell me what do you think I'm ignoring, instead of assuming I'm trying to dodge something. When people argue metaphsyics, so much turns on defintion and nuance that it can appear that someone is ignoring you when they think they've made a valid response. That is what happened with my discussion with Ichenuwasp before I realized everything turned on how "external" was being used in a claim he made.

Parsimony IS NOT the same as simplicity. Yes, I know some explanations use the term 'simpler explanation', but I hate them. They are wrong.

You may hate them, but that's part of the definition:

"Main Entry: law of parsimony
Date: 1837
: occam's razor"

":a scientific and philosophic rule that entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily which is interpreted as requiring that the simplest of competing theories be preferred to the more complex or that explanations of unknown phenomena be sought first in terms of known quantities"

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/law+of+parsimony

Parsimony is based on a ratio of observations and assumptions. Assumptions that require more details which cannot be accounted for by observations are to be avoided in favour of assumptions that can be. That is parsimony.

"Ockham’s razor
philosophy
also spelled Occam’s razor, also called law of economy, or law of parsimony, Main
principle stated by William of Ockham (1285–1347/49), a scholastic, that Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate; “Plurality should not be posited without necessity.” The principle gives precedence to simplicity; of two competing theories, the simplest explanation of an entity is to be preferred. The principle is also expressed “Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.”

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/424706/Ockhams-razor

Webster and Britannica both reference "simplest explanation". You really think they got the definition wrong?

I'll continue when you've demonstrated that you understand that much,

Yes, sire. I humbly beg your forgiveness and will try to understand more in the future.

as I don't think there's much point if you wish to ignore that difference.

Yes, how dare I go by Webster and Britannica. Clearly, Athon is the accpeted standard

 

[Frozenwolf150]

Something just occurred to me.

It really really shouldn't be all that hard to come up with evidence that specifically supports idealism. I'm not talking about the claim that the evidence we have could apply equally to other models of reality; that's not evidence in and of itself, that's special pleading. I'm talking about evidence that actually demonstrates idealism as a plausible model of reality.

Some examples off the top of my head: The first would be a demonstration that the mind can directly affect and alter reality, not just our perception of it, but an actual example of thought changing something in the physical world without any intermediaries. Yes, that could fall under psychic phenomena, but even in that case the burden of evidence still falls on those claiming it to be true. The second would be an answer to the question of interaction, in other words, a proposed mechanism by which a mind, whether ours or God's or whatever, can intervene with or manipulate the world. This is almost the same exact question creationists must answer, yet are incapable of addressing. A third form of evidence could simply be sense-data of another layer of reality, for example, how Neo was shown what the Matrix was instead of just being told.

Religious beliefs such as the afterlife or direct revelation are not evidence but appeals to magic. Challenging or finding a minute flaw in the established theory is not evidence for the contrary either. That's no different from how creationists claim that the gaps in evolutionary theory are evidence for intelligent design. In keeping with the analogy, even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that evolution is 100% false, so what? Creationism has still got nothing of its own to stand on.

This does not count as evidence:

Malerin: How are you materialists!
All your evidence are belong to us!
You are on the way to revelation!

JREF: What you say?

Malerin: You have no proof of physical matter, make your time!
Ha ha ha ha!

Idealism, on the other hand, asserts that everything is thought and mind. We do have proof that thought and mind exist (to doubt it is to assert it, in the case of thought. If you doubt you have a mind, I don't know how to repsond). Why not go with the theory of reality we at least have some evidence for?

No it's not, you're confusing begging the question for a tautology. You're assuming that thoughts got there in and of themselves and exist acausally, which is no different from how creationists assume in the kalam and telological arguments that God existed uncaused. However it's not so much a question of whether thoughts and mind exist as a question of their specific nature. In the meantime, there is plenty of evidence that the chemical and bioelectrical processes of the brain are the cause of thought. I gave you numerous examples of how physical causes can affect the mind, destroy certainty of thought, and alter one's personality and sense of self, and you handwaved it with special pleading.

By your logic, the fact that the programs on my computer are necessary to respond to the programs on your computer is proof that the programs are responsible for the existence of the computer itself.

 

[athon]

I've only got a few minutes before I have to head out, so I'll hold off on responding to the rest of your post until later, Malerin. Then again, I think we might have come to the end of the discussion - if you still think parsimony equals simplicity, I think we've come to a halt.

I do want to quickly respond to your dictionary definitions, however. Yes, those definitions themselves are too simplistic. Sorry to break it to you, but dictionaries have their limitations. I'd rather go with my understanding of science history and philosophy, where entire chapters have been written on parsimony, than a couple of sentences in a dictionary.

Let's look at your Zeus explanation of lightning. It's certainly simpler, as you simply say some individual is responsible for the lightshow we get in a storm. We then have the static electricity model, where charges are separated within a cloud by the movement of water molecules. Far more complicated than 'a big man does it', but follows parsimony far better, as there are fewer assumptions and they account for more observations related to the phenomenon. In this situation, parsimony has nothing to do with simplicity.

So, yes, the dictionaries are incorrect. Not the first time I've disagreed with a dictionary definition, and won't be the last. Dictionaries aren't the comprehensive authorities we'd like them to be, in spite of being useful.

In the very least for the purposes of my point, understand that in my experience (and I've done quite a bit of study in science history and philosophy) parsimony involves comparing related observations with an evaluation of the nature of assumptions required. If this explanation is more complicated than something like 'god did it', so be it. It's still following parsimony.

Athon

 

[Nick227]

Some examples off the top of my head: The first would be a demonstration that the mind can directly affect and alter reality, not just our perception of it, but an actual example of thought changing something in the physical world without any intermediaries.

Thoughts are creating this discussion. So I'd say that thinking is demonstrably affecting reality here. Thinking creates the sense of there being a self that is having the thoughts but this self is immaterial. One might say that thinking emerges from a neural substrate and so has a material source, but without a mental sense of self being generated by the thoughts there would be no motivation to act upon them imo.

Yes, that could fall under psychic phenomena, but even in that case the burden of evidence still falls on those claiming it to be true. The second would be an answer to the question of interaction, in other words, a proposed mechanism by which a mind, whether ours or God's or whatever, can intervene with or manipulate the world.

There is no compulsion to act upon all thinking. It seems to me only those thoughts which appear to be the most "my thoughts," those which most create a sense of self, get acted upon. Thus it's reasonable to surmise that there must be a process which is developing thinking into acting upon thought. I've heard this process referred to as "identification."

This is almost the same exact question creationists must answer, yet are incapable of addressing. A third form of evidence could simply be sense-data of another layer of reality, for example, how Neo was shown what the Matrix was instead of just being told.

I don't quite understand this bit.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

I have already explained more than once what "external" means -- it means I can see someone over there and so can you. It does not mean that person necessarily exists, but that I receive sense impressions of such a person and these same sense impressions help me to negotiate this world that I perceive and avoid the charging tiger, recently escaped from the zoo and angry at clove cigarette smokers, that the first year philosophy student still thinks is a figment of his solipsistic imagination even as he is torn to shreads before my eyes.

Materialists and skeptics often ime make these kinds of points but I find them of limited philosophical or scientific value. Natural selection means that a coalition of processes that has formed into an organism over billenia is inherently driven to resist death. This makes no meaningful statement that I can see about the nature of reality.

That sensory phenomenology appears to be "outside" and thoughts and feelings "inside" could well be another function of natural selection. It does not necessarily mean anything in particular.

Nick